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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Nixon Doctrine and the Monetary Crisis

PRESIDENT Nixon's reputation for surprises, gained in the revelation of his new China policy, was enhanced by his latest economic initiatives. The "politics of change" in both cases were sudden and broad in scope. The consequences may profoundly alter the international relationships of the United States.

On August 15, Nixon ordered a ninety-day freeze on wages and prices in the United States. He also announced plans to cut taxes and stimulate the economy, while reducing federal employment and foreign aid. Most important of all, he imposed a 10 per cent surcharge on all dutiable imports not subject to quotas and notified the International Monetary Fund that the United States would no longer conduct international transactions in gold.

These steps officially concluded the Administration's original economic "game plan," which had failed to check inflation or reduce unemployment. The Federal Reserve Board's relaxation of monetary policy many months earlier had in fact removed the main instrument of that "game plan."

Because of the size of the U.S. economy and the complications of the international monetary system, the new policy also threatened to end the Bretton Woods System which had regulated international monetary affairs since the end of World War II. In this system, all the subscribing states could move toward freer trade under fixed currency parities, that is, fixed in relationship to gold. Since the gold hoard was insufficient for the volume of international business, reserve currencies convertible to gold represented the necessary liquidity. The U.S. dollar, currency of the strongest economy with only a small percentage of imports, was the obvious choice. The old reserve currency, British sterling, was retained in the sterling bloc of countries which treated the pound—convertible to dollars—as liquidity. (Similarly, the much smaller franc bloc treated the franc as a reserve.) The currencies depending on this system, including those in reserve, were permitted to fluctuate a percentage point up or down on the exchange markets. If a greater fluctuation occurred it required a re-evaluation or devaluation of established par values in order to realign the country's economy with others in the system.

For twenty-five years the Bretton Woods arrangements worked extremely well. The gigantic trade expansion and enormous economic improvements of Western Europe, Japan and other countries were facilitated by the liquidity and fixed parities of the exchanges. But the whole monetary apparatus relied on the strength of the reserve cur-

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rencies: their convertibility directly or indirectly into gold. And the gold hoard of the United States rose or fell according to confidence in the dollar held by foreign official agencies.

The pound was the first reserve currency to fall. Despite all efforts, including the last-minute infusion of international loans during the 1960's, the British economy was not competitive enough to sustain a reserve role for the pound. Devalued in 1949, the pound succumbed again in 1967. With Britain's entry into the Common Market the pound's reserve role is at an end.

The dollar took longer to undermine. Notwithstanding the sums expended by the United States on foreign aid and military bases, it was apparently not until the early 1960's that the situation became serious. American investment overseas, low interest rates in an expansionary U.S. economy, and government restrictions on use of national currencies created the "Eurodollar" phenomenon: U.S. dollars held by foreign commercial banks as claims. The consequence of the inflationary 1960's—especially after the Viet Nam escalation—was a vast flooding of European money markets by American dollars, far exceeding the Treasury's gold hoard. In addition, the dollar was disadvantaged by America's rising wages, slowing productivity, and inability to compete in mass markets abroad and even at home: e.g., in steel, automobiles, textiles. While the United States reduced its tariffs on some of these and other products, other countries—notably Japan—maintained restrictions in their markets long after they were necessary.

The Nixon Administration's first cure for this problem was to retain the overseas investment restrictions of its predecessor while hoping to arrest inflation through monetary restraint, i.e., high interest rates. Despite the advantages enjoyed by foreign competition, there was considerable international sentiment for restoring balance in the U.S. economy. In Europe especially, the use of monetary policies to restrain domestic economies was subjected to inflationary pressures from Eurodollars. General de Gaulle's government chose to interpret the entire Bretton Woods arrangement as an "Anglo-Saxon" advantage, and labored to undermine the system, but the doctrine of regarding exchange rates as national symbols redounded badly for the French. After the 1968 student riots and general strike, the French gold reserve was dissipated in sustaining the franc. It became de Gaulle's last act to "defend" the franc in relation to the mark, whose value was pushed upward by the powerful German economy. President Pompidou had the melancholy task of devaluation, taken widely to symbolize the emergence of West Germany as the premier economic power on the Continent.

Nixon's policy had solved neither inflation nor foreign exchange problems. In the face of rising unemployment and stagnating production, the U.S. Federal Reserve eased money in an attempt to restore growth. Meanwhile, West Germany was attempting to restrict its own inflation by tight

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monetary policy. This combination was aggravated further by the worst U.S. balance of payments deficits in history.

On May 3, 1971, West Germany's five leading economics institutes argued for "floating" the mark before inflation wrecked the German economy. On May 4, an unparalleled speculation swept the European exchanges. The West German *Bundesbank* reportedly purchased $1 billion in a single day to sustain the dollar's fixed parity. On May 5, the central banks of West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland halted trading in dollars. After emergency meetings of the European Economic Community (one lasting for twenty hours), the mark was floated.

The crisis came at a bad moment for the EEC. In February, it had agreed upon eventual economic and monetary union and a common currency. The first move was to narrow the differences in currencies. Floating the mark made this impossible. Thus, the West Germans who argued so strenuously against the French that European unity must include common fiscal policies and supranational government had to argue for unilateral fiscal policy only ninety days later. The EEC farm policy, heart of the Common Market, was based on complicated cross payments designed to make France the main agricultural supplier while protecting the position of inefficient German farmers. These payments had been calculated by currencies fixed to the dollar, most of which were now "afloat." The patchwork necessary to restore the calculation occasioned a lengthy and acerbic battle between France and West Germany. In the midst of these troubles, on May 13, the EEC completed its negotiations with the United Kingdom and on May 21 British entry into the Common Market was assured by the successful Heath-Pompidou meeting.

Throughout the crisis, the United States professed calm. Vice President Agnew called the crisis "transitory," but warned that the U.S. economic position depended upon "fair" treatment by foreign trading partners: "To be blunt," said Agnew, "we are not, in my judgment, being treated fairly." The ire of American officials seemed to be directed especially at the Japanese, who were balking at the voluntary restriction of textile exports to the United States. Tokyo's response to the European "float" was to insist on a fixed yen, and vast sums of dollars began accumulating in Japan's reserves. Reacting to this speculation and the worst quarterly deficit figures ever recorded for the U.S. balance of payments, announced in mid-May, Secretary of the Treasury Connally blamed the episode on "interest rates. . . . I regret the impression that the dollar has been weakened. I don't believe it has been."

It became evident shortly thereafter that the United States would not—or could not—regard the problem as a passing one. On May 25, the U.S. Treasury announced that its gold supply had declined from $11.9 billion to $10.9 billion in the past year. At the Eighteenth International Banking Conference

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in Munich (May 23-28) there were calls for U.S. devaluation. Wilhelm Hankl, assistant secretary for monetary and credit policy in the West German Ministry of Economics and Finance, proposed that the monetary system be reformed, because domestic problems made it impossible for the United States to continue as central banker for the world. He argued for floating all the EEC currencies as a first step to European monetary unity or replacing the dollar with a reserve based on special drawing rights, a pool to be run by the International Monetary Fund.

This suggestion was resisted by the United States as Dr. Paul McCracken, then Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, expressed support for the Bretton Woods System. Addressing the Bankers Conference on May 28, Secretary Connally amplified Vice President Agnew's remarks: The United States would not devalue but Europe and Japan must "open" their markets to U.S. competition. Meanwhile the Japanese suffered a tremendous influx of dollars as they struggled to maintain the fixed value of the yen.

In July the EEC ministers could not agree on what to do. The French and Germans took opposite positions, the Germans arguing that a floating mark was necessary to their economy, the French insisting upon fixed parity. The Bank for International Settlements, an organization of European central bankers, blamed the crisis on the U.S. balance of payments. The U.S.-Japanese talks were stalled. Both charges and proposals for reform were advanced in bewildering numbers.

In effect Nixon's announcement of August 15 posed two choices for Western Europe and Japan: they could either let their currencies be revalued relative to the dollar or accumulate nonconvertible dollars at an unknown rate. The first meant domestic political risks and economic contraction; the second meant domestic inflation. In addition, the 10 per cent surcharge loomed as a lever to pry open foreign markets to U.S. products by threatening to close off the U.S. market to foreign products. Galvanized into consultation by this challenge, on September 13 the EEC managed to present a common proposal; a mixture of revaluation in Europe, devaluation of the dollar, less gold and more special drawing rights, a gradual end of reserve currencies, restoration of fixed parities but with greater fluctuations permitted, and revocation of the 10 per cent surcharge.

Under the pressure of this announcement and incredibly swollen dollar reserves, the Japanese found themselves in the least tenable position of all, and the yen had to be floated. But the prickly issue of trade restrictions—and the 10 per cent surcharge—remained. One further screw, however, had been turned. In the face of a U.S. deadline, Japan agreed to restrict textile exports to the United States "voluntarily"; the United States thereupon removed its 10 per cent surcharge on all textile imports.

On October 15, after Nixon's Phase Two program for stabilizing the American economy had been

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initiated, Connally thought the deadlock over the new monetary system could be tolerated for some time. He decried the political problems of settlement, with specific reference to the EEC's inability to get together. He broadened the U.S. demand for reduction of trade barriers to include reduction of U.S. "burden sharing," specifically defense. He thought the Germans had a case to be exempted from the surcharge because they had floated the mark.

What were the economic and political consequences of this new policy and the entire monetary crisis? Everyone agreed that the EEC and Japan would suffer greatly if the surcharge were retained; they would lose some of their markets, and the strains within the EEC would be exacerbated. In Europe, the economic question had political overtones. Within the EEC the French, hostile to Bretton Woods fixed parities, sought to maintain an undervalued franc to gain economic advantage at the expense of the Germans. The West Germans wanted flotation for their own economic benefit. Paris and Bonn could not be unaffected by Connally's "defense sharing" remark either, viewed in connection with the Mansfield Resolution to reduce U.S. troops in Europe and the theme of an *Ostpolitik* developed from strength. More importantly, the entire prospect of European unity, with Britain included, had run afoul of the transatlantic economic and monetary pattern which characterizes the Western alliance.

The Japanese economy, third largest in the world and dependent on world trade, stood to take the worst impact of the surcharge, any revaluation of the yen or devaluation of the dollar. The government of Premier Sato, apostle of the U.S.-Japan alliance, had suffered two catastrophes in six months: the reversed China policy (including the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN) and the monetary crisis (including the "voluntary" restriction of textiles).

At a meeting in Washington on December 18, the Group of Ten announced an agreement in which the United States would devalue the dollar by 8.57 per cent and remove the 10 per cent surcharge in exchange for the revaluation of the currencies of certain other countries. This agreement is to be followed by trade negotiations.

It has thus become evident that the United States' chief political allies are also its chief economic competitors. As the United States is no longer able to compete with all unless the dollar is properly valued, or to be the central banker for all on generous terms, so it is no longer able—or willing—to protect all by providing the central war deterrent largely at its own expense. The Nixon Doctrine's implications have come to roost more forcibly and more suddenly in the economic sphere than any other. In the monetary crisis the allies of the United States, though unsuspecting, were well prepared with reserves and, with remedies both numerous and ready at hand, too much is at stake for "retaliation" to become the theme of the hour. But in defense matters the allies

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are ill-prepared. The remedies are few and all painful. Moreover, the attitude of a major factor in the efficacy of the Nixon Doctrine for defense—the Soviet Union—is far from clear. Implementation of the military companion to international monetary reform will have to be much less sudden and much more cooperative if the security provided by the Western alliance is to be preserved.

The Berlin Accord and European Security

FOR more than a quarter of a century Berlin has been the source and the salient of the great-power confrontation in Europe. The strength of determination of the Western powers to defend their position in the divided city has been matched by failure of the Soviet Union to consolidate its empire in Eastern Europe; as a result, Moscow has viewed this Western outpost as a continuing threat to Soviet security interests between the Elbe and the Bug. In turn, Soviet efforts to erode the Western position have merely reinforced Western apprehension about all Soviet diplomatic moves in Central Europe. Berlin has remained the testing center for rival wills and fortitude and for indications of East-West détente.

The construction of the Berlin Wall ten years ago to stem the exodus of more than three million refugees from East Germany to the West was hailed at the time as an admission of failure by the communists. Yet it served also to symbolize the permanence of the partition of Germany and of Europe. The wall has been effective: while a record number of 4,000 East Germans fled on a single day (August 13, 1961), 6,000 have been captured and imprisoned and at least sixty-five have been killed attempting to escape since 1962. The total refugee flow has been cut to a trickle.

In the past two years, under the Brandt Government, the Federal Republic has sought ways to break down the barriers of the wall and the division of Germany. Although Bonn failed in its *Deutschlandpolitik* to establish a productive dialogue with the East German regime, the Four Powers were meanwhile engaged in negotiating a Berlin settlement. After seventeen months of talks, the Four signed on September 3, 1971 the first accord among the occupying authorities governing the status of the former German capital. The treaty is a milestone in modern European history, supplementing the wartime documents whose authority had been seriously weakened by the West German treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union. For the first time the interests and political relations of the Four Powers and the two German governments with respect to Berlin were defined and codified, in an effort to enhance the prospects for security and stability to an extent unknown in Central Europe for more than a generation.

When the Four Power talks began in March 1970, Moscow insisted that their scope should be confined to discussion of the status of West Berlin. The three Western

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Allies refused to restrict the talks to the discussion of their sectors and demanded that the question of access rights should constitute the principal agenda item. From the Soviet viewpoint, the key issue was the establishment of a Soviet presence in the form of a consulate in West Berlin, for this was seen as a means of restricting the Four Power status of "Greater Berlin" to the three Western sectors. The United States regarded the viability of West Berlin, its political and legal ties with the Federal Republic and its subordination on sovereignty matters to Allied authority, as the central problem. It took nearly a year to open formal negotiations on a comprehensive accord.

At that juncture, both sides had agreed that West Berlin was not directly governed by the Federal Republic. They could not reach agreement on responsibility for the access routes or about the extent of Allied authority over Greater Berlin and all Germany. They were deadlocked about whether West Berlin was situated on or within East German territory and about which authority should represent West Berlin abroad. But they had concluded that some form of accord could be mutually beneficial.

On February 5, 1971 the Allies tabled a draft treaty dealing with the practical aspects of a settlement, and on March 26 the Soviet Union responded with a counterproposal. The Allies agreed to reduce the political presence of the Federal Republic in West Berlin by permitting political meetings but banning acts symbolic of sovereignty in the city. The Soviets demanded a prohibition of all official activities that signified an extension of Bonn's competence in West Berlin. The Allies reiterated that West Berlin was not a Federal *Land* and was not governed by Bonn but insisted that its inhabitants should be represented abroad by the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union replied that Bonn could only provide consular representation in Eastern Europe for West Berliners, as it already does in the West, and that they must travel with West Berlin ID cards rather than West German passports. The Allies proposed that travel to East Berlin and East Germany by West Berliners should be permitted on the same basis as for West Germans who travel in East Berlin without difficulty. The Soviets countered that travel improvements should be the subject of inter-German negotiations. On the important issue of access rights, the Soviet Union merely informed the Allies, who insisted upon acceptance of Four Power responsibility, that East Germany was prepared to negotiate with the Federal Republic on "transit" traffic. Thus, by the spring of 1971 the two sides were still far apart on both the fundamental issues involved and the pragmatic application of a proposed settlement.

Moscow then introduced a separate element: the establishment of Soviet representation, in the form of a Consulate General, in West Berlin. It pointed out that Japan, India, Iran and other governments had Consulates General there and that it was entitled to at least the

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same degree of representation; this would merely extend the functions performed by its Intourist and TASS offices already situated in West Berlin.

Initially, Britain, France and the United States, as well as the Federal Republic, were strongly opposed to this suggestion, fearing that it would be difficult to contain consular functions to those defined in the 1963 Vienna Consular Convention. It also appeared anomalous to them that the Soviet Union should be represented with a Consulate General in addition to an Embassy in Berlin, since the city was and remains under *Four Power* control. The upgrading of the political status of the Soviet mission could impair Three Power authority in the Western sectors and might contribute to their conversion into a "special political entity." The United States in particular was opposed because a reciprocal Soviet concession of the same scale seemed improbable. Washington could not demand a consulate in East Berlin without having to negotiate with the East German government.

Altogether, the demand for permanent representation indicated that the Soviet Union sought to strengthen its position in Berlin, from which it could pursue several possible courses: (1) maintain amicable coexistence with the Allies and mutual respect with Bonn, but with sufficient leverage to block West German options regarded as detrimental to Soviet interests, (2) challenge or restrict Western rights and status in West Berlin, or (3) establish a new special presence independent of the Allies, permitting the minimization of Four Power authority without impeding Moscow's own separate channel of influence.

With Soviet representation and influence in West Berlin now the central issue, progress on other matters depended on a solution of this question. Accordingly, Bonn reversed its position and Egon Bahr, Minister of All-German Affairs, visited Washington in April to convince U.S. officials of the soundness of the new rationale. Bahr argued that the establishment of a Consulate General under Four Power agreement would (1) underline that the Soviet Union has no inherent rights in West Berlin but remains a foreign power; (2) increase Allied insurance against Soviet action to restrict the Western presence, and yet tend to minimize Western claims to East Berlin—rights that have largely ceased to exist but that have served as a constant irritant in the past; (3) increase Moscow's stake in assured access; and (4) actually reduce Soviet freedom of maneuver by diminishing the possibility of triggering crises. Yet he explicitly linked the representation issue with a favorable settlement of other matters, particularly West German-West Berlin ties.

In a *Bundestag* debate on the issue, the government refused to elaborate on this position, but Chancellor Brandt stated at a July 23 press conference, "Everything argues in favor of the Four Powers being able to agree on a satisfactory Berlin settlement in autumn." The opposition party also failed to for-

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mulate a definitive position, only linking representation with "appropriate conditions," namely, Soviet acceptance of the political ties between Bonn and West Berlin.

In view of the firm Western posture, Moscow then sought to secure the right of representation by agreeing to co-responsibility for access rights and a wide range of political ties between the Western entities. On this note of accommodation the final phase of the negotiations began on August 10, with the expert committee meeting daily and the ambassadors convening two and three times a week. Gromyko arrived secretly in East Berlin to direct the Soviet representatives.

The Four Power Treaty represents important concessions on both sides. To circumvent the deadlock on jurisdiction over East and West Berlin, the Preamble confines the treaty's provisions to the "relevant area," implying only West Berlin without explicitly negating claims in the Eastern half. The first part of the treaty prescribes a uniform code of behavior. It commits all Four Powers to "strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area," and cites United Nations Charter provisions as the germane proscription against the use or threat of force. Part I also commits the Four Powers to mutual respect for their individual and joint rights and responsibilities and precludes unilateral abrogation of any portion thereof.

On the key access issue, Part II fixes Soviet acceptance of co-responsibility. The Soviet Union "declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the [GDR] of civilian persons and goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and the [FRG] will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment." This Soviet commitment effectively negates the 1955 exchange of notes with the German Democratic Republic in which Moscow unilaterally extended sovereignty to East Berlin over the access routes. East German rights in the matter are clearly defined in Annex I and are to be the subject of coordination with the Federal Republic in a mutually acceptable agreement on traffic management.

In Paragraph B of Part II, the Western Allies declare that the ties between Bonn and West Berlin will be maintained and developed, "taking into account that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it." Annex II defines the level of the Federal political presence permitted in West Berlin, including existing agencies and departments but precluding "constitutional or official acts."

Paragraph C commits the Soviet Union to improve communications for West Berliners to East Berlin beyond mere emergencies. Normal tourist privileges are to be afforded comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas. Annex III prescribes to the two Germanys the extent of these provisions. Paragraph D authorizes

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permanent consular representation for the Soviet Union in West Berlin with the establishment of a Consulate General in the Soviet property on Lietzenburgerstrasse.

The separate notes and statements attached to the treaty further eliminate discrimination against West Berliners by assuring them consular protection in Eastern Europe and the right to participate in all recreational and entertainment activities conducted in Eastern Europe. They are also allowed to travel with a West German passport marked with a stamp indicating that it was issued under authority of the Western commandants. On the other hand, Soviet consular and other persons are permitted to take up permanent residence in West Berlin, increasing Soviet stakes in local stability. When the technical aspects of these and lesser provisions are negotiated by the two Germanys, a final enabling act will be signed by the Four Powers, establishing the first general sanction for the normalization of life in West Berlin.

While both sides made significant concessions in arriving at a settlement, the primary loser was East Germany. Its traditional claim that West Berlin existed on its territory was not upheld. Its insistence on the right to regulate transit traffic as a manifestation of its sovereignty was nullified. Confirmation of the manifold ties between Bonn and West Berlin voided its charges that West Berlin was an independent entity. Four Power authorization of normal customs procedures for West Berliners eliminated this discriminatory practice of the East German government. Furthermore, the treaty did not confirm the constitutional linkage between East Berlin and East Germany, a long-standing East German demand. Instead, existing Four Power responsibilities and privileges were affirmed, such as the joint administration of Spandau prison, continued operation of the joint air safety center, the presence of the Soviet guards at the Soviet War Memorial—all located in West Berlin—and the right of uniformed Allied soldiers to enter East Berlin without submitting to inspection and of Allied civilian officials to enter East Berlin without customs checks.

In compensation, Bonn has agreed to drop its resistance to East Germany's application for membership in international organizations such as the United Nations, and has accepted East German membership in the proposed conference on European security. Compared with the collapse of the main tenets of East Berlin's traditional *Westpolitik,* these are minor concessions that seemed already to have been granted in principle. The agreement would probably have met more opposition from Ulbricht, a factor that may have contributed to his retirement in May as leader of the East German Communist Party.

Yet the Soviet Union secured important gains. The treaties West Germany signed with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, which meet major East European demands for security and Soviet interests in regional stability, now will probably be ratified by the *Bundestag* early in 1972.

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Their ratification will grant the Soviet Union greater confidence in the durability of its strategic frontier along the Elbe than any other event since the end of World War II. Furthermore, Bonn's pledge that, following an agreement on Berlin, it would participate in a conference on European security or a similar forum for the reduction of military forces will undoubtedly speed progress toward this important Soviet objective.

Moscow's subordination of East German national interests to the rights of the Four Powers is viewed by many West Germans as a demonstration of its anxiety about challenges in other quarters and, more important, its determination to assume a leading role in European political affairs. While the Soviets appeared to have made concessions at the bargaining table, they gained a new opportunity for the extension of their influence in Europe.

The provisions of the treaty will contribute to the normalization of life in West Berlin and to prospects for greater economic growth in the isolated city. But the Soviet benefit from this normalization process may be greater than anticipated in the West. The presence of the Soviet Union in West Berlin, under conditions of relaxed tensions, will increase its access to the Western technology it craves. Likewise, the new Soviet position may give Moscow some leverage in the development of the Common Market. (It is worth noting that in July the European Court ruled that West Berlin was an integral part of the Federal Republic and that all EEC regulations pertained to the divided city.) Certainly Moscow will seek to utilize the Berlin accord in its continuing effort to gain international acceptance of the territorial status quo in Europe.

Since the signing of the accord, the Soviet Union has suggested that ratification by the Federal Republic of the August 1970 treaty between Bonn and Moscow must precede final acceptance of the agreement on Berlin. Previously, the Soviets had denied any linkage between the two, while the Federal Republic's position all along has been that ratification of the 1970 treaty depended on the conclusion of a Berlin agreement. The latest ploy represents an effort by Moscow to gain maximum advantage from the Brandt Government, the success of whose foreign policy depends greatly on the *Ostpolitik*.

China and the United Nations: Implications for U.S. Policy

IN the aftermath of the United Nations vote on the China question on October 26, it appears that the era of U.S. predominance in the international organization has ended. If the UN can now be said to reflect more accurately the distribution of world power, it has not necessarily become a more effective instrument in the achievement of goals set forth in its Charter. Peking will become a major force as spokesman for the Third World and will mesh its efforts in the public forum with an increasingly activist global diplomacy. Moreover, the vote on China revealed U.S. diplomacy in considerable disarray: ten of our European

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allies voted against the U.S. position on UN membership for the Republic of China on Taiwan. One of the most costly aspects of the U.S. failure may be the impact of the UN vote on Japanese politics. The Sato Government faces considerable opposition in Japan for having given its reluctant support to the United States even though Washington initiated the Peking diplomacy without advance consultation with Tokyo.

The United Nations, launched during the period of great optimism about prospects for peace that followed World War II, has never measured up to early American expectations and in recent years has lost much of the limited effectiveness it once had to influence the behavior of nations. In particular, American foreign policymakers have found it less and less of an asset. When condemning communist aggression in Korea or separating Arab and Israeli forces, the UN was viewed as a valuable adjunct to U.S. policy. During the 1960's, however, the verdict turned decidedly contrary. There have been many liabilities: the unpopular Congo intervention which created an as yet unresolved financial crisis over the allocation of peacekeeping costs to member states; the at best vaguely hostile attitude to the United States and its presence in Southeast Asia; and the precipitous withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from Egypt on the eve of the Six-Day War in June 1967.

Contributing to the UN's decline is the increasingly unwieldly General Assembly. The admission of mini-states, and the nature of many of its decisions since these new voices have been added, have reduced the Assembly's credibility in the United States and abroad. The stature of the UN has not been enhanced by its repeated condemnation of Israel in marked contrast to its treatment of the Arab states, or by its resolutions on the internal relations of white African states but not the practices of communist governments. The United States has endured its reverses with what grace it could muster in the face of a rising tide of polemics—climaxed by the ill-concealed animosity shown toward it after the decisive vote to expel the Taiwan government. As a result, Washington has displayed studied indifference toward UN diplomacy, and public and Congressional pressures for a reduction of U.S. financial support for the UN have grown.

For the United Nations, Peking's presence will not be an unmixed blessing. Certain peripheral points of controversy, such as membership in the specialized agencies and transfer of positions held by the Taiwan government in the UN headquarters staff, will undoubtedly be resolved in Peking's favor. Moreover, the Security Council, operating with a "Big Five" for the first time in two decades, is likely to become a more active, if not necessarily a more constructive, force in international politics. The carefully contrived Middle East Resolution of 1967 and subsequent negotiations, for instance, are now subject to the influence of Chinese policy, which has opposed efforts at peaceful settlement and sup-

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ported the Palestinian guerrilla movement.

Peking is also likely to have a considerable voice in the selection of a new Secretary-General—a decision heretofore made primarily by the United States and the Soviet Union. Other informal working agreements, including the geographic distribution of Security Council members, may draw Peking's challenge. In these, as in many other prospective issues, the Chinese will urge an end to "domination" by the superpowers and will seek a role as spokesman for the grievances of Third World nations.

Sino-Soviet rivalries for leadership of Third World revolutionary movements and inheritance of the Marxist-Leninist mantle may thus be extended to the United Nations —an organization uniquely suited for fractious disputation. The Soviet Union, which has dominated this arena, now has a new competitor that possesses the advantage of being non-white. Although the radicalization of the United Nations is not inevitable, there are surely more than a few among the ninety-three nations that voted for Peking's admission which will be receptive to its blandishments. The Chinese representative's initial address to the General Assembly on November 15 set the tone by calling for an end to superpower control and singling out the United States for particular condemnation.

Yet, buttressed as it may be psychologically by admission to the UN, Peking is no nearer to physical control of Taiwan than before the vote. Taiwanese military forces are capable of repulsing any threat short of a nuclear attack from mainland China. The republic on Taiwan has prospered over the last decade. Its annual GNP growth rate during that period was slightly under 10 per cent. The $300 average per capita income far exceeds that of the People's Republic of China. The key to this prosperity lies in foreign investment and trade; with 30 per cent of its GNP in exports, Taiwan has passed into the category of nations heavily dependent on exports for their livelihood. Although Peking is now taking a hard line on firms trading with the island, mainland China has maintained economic relations with countries such as Great Britain and Canada, which also trade with Taiwan. The Nationalist government, benefiting from more than $550 million in foreign investment since 1952, has built a sophisticated and diversified economy that includes electronics, chemicals and pharmaceutical industries now capable of sustained growth. To provide a further anchor against economic adversity, it has accumulated a foreign exchange balance of $800 million in recent years.

In its international political relationships, Taiwan will find itself increasingly isolated. Diplomatic relations will be maintained with those governments according recognition, while certain governments turning to Peking will attempt to devise a *modus vivendi* permitting some form of contact with Taipei. Some may adopt the procedure followed by Great Britain, which maintains a consulate on Taiwan

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accredited to the provincial government. Countries such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Spain will in all likelihood continue to deny diplomatic recognition to Peking, but the majority of the other nations will seek to develop closer ties with mainland China.

For Taiwan, an application for separate United Nations membership is improbable, not only because President Chiang Kai-shek has adamantly rejected such a course, but also because Peking now holds a Security Council veto over the admission of new members. The vote to admit Peking was more than a technical readjustment of credentials determining "who won the civil war"; in reality it meant the denial of representation for Taiwan.

For the United States, attempting to keep a foot in each camp is an inherently precarious position. President Nixon was applauded for moving to bring Peking into the international arena, but we have not yet clarified our long-term posture on Taiwan and our China relations have reached a new level of intricacy. It is inconceivable that Peking was not informed of U.S. strategy in the United Nations during Kissinger's visits. Whether or not any approval was given or requested is a matter of supposition. Undoubtedly the Peking government had its own contingency plans for UN developments and it is interesting that these did not include condemnation of the United States during the course of the debate. Peking's goals remain those of 1949—the removal of the U.S. military presence from Taiwan and the ultimate political integration of the island with the mainland. If Chinese leaders thought the outcome of the visit by President Nixon would be inimical to those goals, the meetings would probably not be held.

The options available to the United States on the Taiwan issue are limited. Over the next several years, we can continue to withdraw our military presence in and around the island and abrogate the defense treaty in fact or in spirit. We could seek a bilateral "no first use" of nuclear weapons agreement with Peking which would lessen the possibilities of nuclear blackmail against Taiwan. But so long as we regard the preservation of a noncommunist government on Taiwan to be of value to U.S. foreign policy, we must reaffirm the 1954 defense treaty and maintain the Seventh Fleet in the area. Withdrawal of either of these indications of U.S. support would leave Taiwan isolated, psychologically vulnerable and resentful of our seeming indifference to the fate of the island's fifteen million inhabitants. It might lead the Taipei government to seek other alignments, either with Japan or the Soviet Union. Because of its geographic position, Taiwan is potentially important to Moscow, especially if the Sino-Soviet conflict deepens. For Tokyo, it is not only a trading partner but it lies athwart the sea lanes to southern Asia, where Japan has major markets. The realignment of Taiwan in either direction would be detrimental to U.S. efforts, under the Nixon Doctrine, to create stabilized

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political relationships in Asia. In the development of such relationships the role of the United Nations, given a coalition of Third World states led by China, will be even more uncertain than in the past.

Soviet Naval Power and Its Uses

IN recent years the growth of Soviet naval power has been symbolic of the expansion of Soviet political influence in regions of the world from which Russian power historically was excluded. Although its purpose remains a matter of disagreement among Western political and military analysts, there is no doubt that, in the words of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, "by any standards the Soviet Navy now represents the super navy of a superpower."

The growth of Soviet naval power in the 1950's and 1960's followed a long period in which the navy's missions were confined largely to coastal defense and protection of the seaward flanks of the army. Under Stalin's Five-Year Plans leading up to the Second World War, the Soviet Union constructed more than 500 naval ships. Nevertheless the fleet was primarily composed of submarines and coastal craft designed to defend Soviet territory. An ambitious shipbuilding program at the end of the war continued to emphasize combined operations and the defense of the USSR with the aid of shore-based air cover.

Under Khrushchev the mission of the navy was expanded to stress destruction of NATO navies at the beginning of a future war, interdiction of shipping in the Atlantic, strategic deterrence, and strategic defense against nuclear attack from NATO aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines. The decision to return to the high seas promoted an inevitable and protracted debate about preferred weapons systems: strategic submarines (SSB), surface combatant ships or aircraft carriers. Should the Soviet Union, it was asked, follow the historic notion of attempting to match gun for gun and ship for ship and thereby construct the same number of carriers and heavy cruisers as the West? Or should innovations be sought that would minimize the size, number and cost of individual units? Moscow decided against both guns and tactical aircraft in favor of a novel gamble on surface-launched long-range missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. By the early 1960's, the main threat perceived by the Soviets centered on the Polaris submarine and long-range aircraft carriers that could launch attacks from beyond Soviet home waters, forcing the USSR to extend outward its strategic maritime frontiers.

Since Khrushchev's ouster, the ongoing buildup in naval strength and its more extensive deployment in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and Indian Ocean suggests that the Brezhnev leadership added still another, basically political mission: to show the flag and, perhaps, discourage American naval intervention in future crises around the world. As a result, a new quasi-offensive role has been joined to

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the navy's traditionally defensive missions. These changing circumstances may account for the growing tendency in the West to categorize Soviet naval developments according to two conflicting schools of thought, one stressing defensive aspects, the other offensive. The first school adopts the theater-tactical level of analysis, warning of Western weaknesses in the face of possible Soviet actions and emphasizing the most dangerous rather than the most likely course of events. The second school takes the politico-strategic approach, recognizing the buildup as an attempt by Moscow to counter the threat posed by the West's continuing maritime superiority; in this framework, it highlights Soviet rather than Western weaknesses as it seeks to analyze the aims of Soviet naval policy.

In almost all respects Soviet naval strength is impressive. Operating over 2,000 ships, most of them built within the last twenty years, the admiralty commands a fleet second only to that of the United States in total tonnage. The navy's contribution to the strategic offensive forces is 440 submarine-launched ballistic missiles carried by 61 submarines (30 of them nuclear-powered). This force will continue to grow, according to Secretary of Defense Laird, who disclosed in an October press conference that the USSR is expected to match U.S. Polaris strength by deploying over 40 nuclear submarines by 1973. An additional 60 submarines can fire two to four cruise missiles with a range of 300 miles. The doubling of the size of their submarine shipyard at Severodvinsk on the White Sea — the world's largest submarine yard — confirms the view that the Soviets intend to outstrip the United States in ballistic submarines. In an unusual disclosure, TASS reported in October that large-scale expansion of the city's housing facilities was underway, suggesting new economic activity in the area. The Soviets' reluctance to reach an agreement at SALT limiting future missile submarine construction may provide another indication of their plans to gain the same numerical superiority in sea-based strategic weapons as they have won in land-based ICBM's.

For its other missions the Soviet navy commands over 200 large fighting ships including two helicopter carriers, the *Leningrad* and *Moskva,* which have seen regular duty in the Mediterranean. Designed chiefly for anti-submarine warfare, the carriers are no match for U.S. attack carriers, but they could also be used for amphibious operations involving the navy's 15,000 marines, or naval infantry.

The greatest challenge from the surface fleet to Western naval superiority is probably posed by 11 cruisers and 40 destroyers armed with surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and surface-to-surface cruise missiles designed to sink enemy ships. Whether these missile ships can nullify the advantages enjoyed by a fleet with aircraft carriers remains a necessarily unanswered question.

The Soviet surface fleet also disposes 11 gun cruisers, some of which are being converted to missile armaments, 63 conventional de-

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stroyers, and 140 *Osa* and *Komar*-class patrol boats carrying ship-to-ship missiles. Several hundred minesweepers, coastal patrol boats, landing ships and escorts supplement these forces.

The greatest weakness of the navy is its lack of carriers for fixed-wing aircraft. The fleet relies instead on shore-based aircraft, which are limited in range and mobility. Approximately 500 bombers are based in northwestern Russia and along the Black Sea coast. But without the flexible air power afforded by carriers, the Soviet navy is at a distinct disadvantage against the American fleet. Its mission, therefore, is less likely to be "command of the seas" than harassment of Western sea lanes and political intervention in areas not adjacent to the USSR.

The new uses to which the expanding power may be put are, above all, political. The Mediterranean squadron, sometimes numbering as many as 60 ships, serves to counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet merely by its presence. Any prospective American action in the Middle East on the model of the 1958 intervention in Lebanon will be attended by greater risks because of the Soviet squadron, and the existence of the risk itself may limit U.S. freedom of action in the area. The presence of Soviet ships in Egyptian and Syrian ports has also served to deter Israeli air raids against those targets, although Israeli air superiority has deterred the Soviet squadron from assisting Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal.

Of equally vital interest is the role the Soviet Mediterranean squadron could play in case of an East-West crisis in Europe. By threatening to turn NATO's southern flank, the Soviet Union would be in a position to extract political concessions short of outright war. This threat would be magnified if Arab airfields were put at Moscow's disposal, permitting Soviet aircraft to provide reliable air cover to the fleet. Even now, medium-range aircraft with UAR markings, flying from Egyptian airfields, are able to supply some air cover.

Because of such considerations, it is in the West's interests to secure the reduction of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. One possible means to this end would be a negotiated solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In his report to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March 1971, Brezhnev alluded to the possibility of force reductions in the Mediterranean predicated on a peace settlement. But even in the event the pro-Soviet Arab states were weaned away from their dependence on Moscow, reduction of Soviet naval forces would depend on Soviet willingness to forgo surveillance of the Sixth Fleet and a "presence" in a sea vital to Europe.

In the Indian Ocean, too, the Soviet flag is being shown with greater frequency. Eighteen ships took part in exercises there marking the Lenin Centennial in April 1970. If and when the Suez Canal is reopened, facilitating passage to the Indian Ocean, Soviet naval activity in that area will in all likelihood be stepped up. Already Mos-

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cow has a port agreement with Mauritius, naval rights at Visakhapatnam on India's east coast, and permission to make naval repairs at Singapore. It has aided Yemen to upgrade the port facilities at Hodeida and has intervened to support revolutionary activities in the unstable sheikhdoms of the region. Its political influence in the Persian Gulf and beyond can be expected to grow as the Soviet military presence becomes more visible and more powerful. Countries that rely on Indian Ocean shipping—particularly Japan and Western Europe, for oil—will find themselves increasingly dependent on Soviet good will for uninterrupted supply of necessary raw materials.

The Caribbean is another sea that Soviet forces have entered in greater strength in recent months. The establishment of important naval facilities in Cienfuegos and the occasional presence of a nuclear submarine, submarine tender, and barge used for storing radioactive wastes has caused official concern in Washington. It may be that the Soviets are taking the first, hesitant steps toward achieving the Caribbean strategic deterrent denied them in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis nine years ago. In the future a full Soviet naval squadron may ply Caribbean waters as one now does the Mediterranean. In that eventuality the United States would find its political position throughout Latin America seriously undermined. The local naval superiority it enjoyed in 1962 might well be sufficiently compromised to prevent decisive action in a future crisis.

Moreover, in a prolonged military conflict on the European continent, the Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleet would play a key role in interdicting NATO's vital Atlantic sea lanes. To keep these open, the Western alliance must maintain an escort force capable of dealing with the more than 200 Soviet attack submarines available for the Atlantic.

Thus, although the USSR's strategic deterrent mission may be considered defensive, its wartime mission has now been augmented by offensive capabilities reminiscent of the German navy's during the First and Second World Wars. (In both instances, the mere presence of German light battleship task forces in friendly ports succeeded in tying the vastly superior British Home Fleet to the North and Norwegian Seas, so that it could not be used for the essential task of protecting North Atlantic and Mediterranean sea lanes.) The Soviet offensive threat is designed to force the Western navies to commit resources to the protection of vital sea lanes and thereby reduce the overall potential challenge to the homeland. For this, the Soviets need not seek a numerical parity with the West. Possession of reliable weapons, survivable warships and maritime proficiency will create sufficient military parity to meet their requirements. For example, in light of the possible downgrading of the Icelandic air defenses and the growing Soviet challenge in the North Atlantic, Western attack carriers may be increasingly assigned to area defense and escort duties despite their incompatibility for such missions.

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In a relatively short time the Soviet navy has expanded from a limited defensive force to a credible offensive force. It is no longer the passive arm of the ground forces. As Admiral S. M. Lobov, Commander of the Northern Fleet, has said, "The Soviet Navy, together with the Strategic Rocket Forces and Long Range Aviation, forms the nuclear rocket shield of our Russia and all Socialist systems." The advantage for the Soviets in achieving a flexible mix between offensive and defensive naval capabilities is that in the future the West will be forced to commit far more of its offensive resources for protection of vital maritime objectives than the USSR will have to expend to threaten them.

Soviet Political Influence in the Middle East

RECENT events in the Middle East demonstrate the difficulties encountered by a great power in exercising control over a smaller state. After four years of laborious preparation and the creation of virtually total Egyptian military dependency, the extent of Soviet influence over the United Arab Republic and the so-called radical Arab states has been called into question. Moscow was apparently unable to prevent the deployment of two Soviet-equipped Syrian tank brigades in Jordan in September 1970 or to avert Syrian attacks in the same area nearly one year later. During the 1970 Jordanian skyjacking crisis, the Soviet government could not prudently counter the U.S.-announced intention to intervene if necessary. The climactic struggle between King Hussein and the Palestinian guerrillas was another battle seemingly beyond Moscow's influence. The attempted coups in Egypt and the Sudan caught Moscow by surprise and damaged Soviet interests.

The most serious situation is in Cairo. Although there seems to have been no connection between the Soviet Union and the unsuccessful Sabry conspiracy, President Sadat could not fail to note the collaboration between local communists and Soviet technicians in the Sudan.

Moscow's alarm over Sadat's purge of the "left" in Egypt was reflected perhaps in the treaty binding the UAR and the Soviet Union to fifteen years of "friendship." But the treaty proved more notable for its omissions. It did not provide for mutual defense; it did not prescribe automatically binding commitments; and the self-denying clauses limited Soviet responsibilities primarily to rectification of the results of aggression, conditions that would be negated by an eventual settlement of the canal crisis. If the pact was intended to signify the unity of Soviet and Egyptian activity in the Middle East, events in the Sudan shortly after the treaty was signed provided dramatic refutation of such unity.

The Communist Party of Sudan actively participated in three successful coup attempts. The Soviet government had advised the local party to adopt a policy of assimilation as had its Egyptian and Algerian counterparts, but the advice was firmly rejected by party leader Abdhal-Khalig Mahjub. In the

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wake of the May 31, 1969 coup by a junta of army officers, the communists were offered participation in a coalition government. The proposal split the party. The Secretary General argued against participation on the classical grounds that the junta was only a transitional regime to be followed by a genuine popular uprising; meanwhile, identification with the Numerei Government would contaminate the party's image, and an immediate takeover bid would be premature. A large minority of the party argued in favor of participation on an individual basis in the hope that Marxist influence would "reform the negative elements of the junta's policies." As a result, the slim Mahjub majority followed the standard Leninist evaluation, and the minority remained loyal to Moscow and accepted assimilation and participation in the regime.

When Numerei visited Moscow in November 1970, he complained about continuing communist attempts to subvert his regime. The Soviets restated their preference for assimilation between the Marxists and Numerei's planned single ruling party and communicated this desire to the local Communist Party. They also reinforced it by agreeing to provide massive military and economic aid to the Numerei Government designed mainly to insure public order, but at the cost of one-half of Sudan's annual yield of 1.2 million bales of high-quality cotton. By the summer of 1971, the USSR had re-equipped the Sudanese armed forces and provided advisers at all echelons down to brigade level. But beyond admonitions to the local party leaders and massive aid to the junta government, Moscow could not act decisively to influence either faction as the situation deteriorated. When the local communists refused to join a united national front party, leading party figures were exiled or imprisoned and three pro-communist cabinet members were dismissed.

The dispute between the junta and the communists came to a head over the proposed Arab federation of the UAR, Syria, Libya and the Sudan. Originally the officers had been strong advocates of the federation scheme, but in April Numerei was forced to inform the other participants that he could not endorse it at that time because of severe communist opposition. His hesitation was reinforced by Libyan Premier Mumar Kaddafi's insistence that it was impossible to federate with any state where the communists were acceptable as ruling partners. After visiting Moscow in April, Numerei decided to stabilize his domestic position before advancing the federation proposal. In a major policy statement on May 25, 1971, he condemned the "deviate progressive forces"; his speech was followed by the arrest of seventy leading orthodox communists and the dissolution of trade unions and political societies that had been dominated by this faction. At the same time, Numerei established the only legal national political organization, the Arab Socialist Union, modeled after the UAR party.

The orthodox communists responded to this setback by attempt-

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ing a coup in July. But after four days under house arrest, Numerei was rescued by his supporters in a successful countercoup. This countercoup was made possible by the Libyan seizure of Numerei's would-be successors on their way back from London and the return of the Sudanese Suez brigade to Khartoum, flown by Egyptian aircraft. Even more sensational was the subsequent revelation that President Sadat had been asked to support Numerei's captors by the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, a request Sadat rejected in both word and deed. In the aftermath of Numerei's restoration, the Sudanese government has conducted what TASS called a "hysterical bloodbath and anti-Communist campaign." The vituperation in the Soviet news media directed against Sudanese policies finally led Khartoum to recall its ambassadors to Moscow and Sofia.

These events produced the most serious crisis in Soviet-Arab relations in years. As the situation worsened, Moscow felt compelled to interrupt the customary holiday period and convene a summit meeting on August 3 of Warsaw Pact leaders, minus Rumania's Ceausescu. The assembled bloc leaders apparently decided not to punish the Sudan by breaking diplomatic relations or suspending economic aid. (Pact nations had underwritten an 8 per cent increase in Sudan's gross national product during the 1970-1974 planning period and were heavily committed to providing the necessary capital goods and infrastructure.) Numerei, like Sadat, was to be given a free hand in dealing with his domestic opponents despite repeated public protests against the persecution of communists, and no further action was to be taken against the federation—now made possible by the Sudan's cleansing of communist influence.

So, once again Moscow has revealed confusion in dealing with radical Arab movements and may have realized the limits of its influence among Arab leaders. Clearly massive military and economic aid has assured neither political control for Soviet interests nor elimination of the Arabs' suspicions regarding Soviet participation in their domestic affairs. Once again the Soviet government has preferred to protect Russian national interests rather than honor its international communist commitments. The abandonment of ideological allegiances may be a serious handicap as China re-enters the region, but the real problem lies in the uncertainty surrounding Moscow's stand in the Middle East: Is it able to speak for the Arabs and control them, or can it merely supply them with arms, exercising an erratic and largely inflammatory intervention? The latest Soviet offer of military assistance to the UAR, interrupting strenuous efforts by the United States to produce an interim settlement, raises another question regarding Moscow's position: Does its unwillingness to cooperate with Washington reflect not only the divergence of U.S. and Soviet goals in the Middle East, but also the inability of the Soviet Union to control its Arab client states?

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THE PRESIDENT'S RIGHT TO GO ABROAD*

by Elmer Plischke

THE practice of chiefs of state and heads of government to venture abroad to visit and confer with one another is by no means novel. In earlier centuries they met to air grievances, strengthen positions, resolve conflicts, cement alliances, promote parallel national and mutual international objectives, or join their sovereign families in wedlock. Prior to the era of classical diplomacy the conference or consultation abroad at the highest level seems to have been the normal procedure for conducting much of the major business of reigning monarchs, princes and leaders of the church. Although eventually professionalized diplomatic methods came to be employed in the affairs of state, at times government leaders reverted to face-to-face discussion and negotiation, as at the Congress of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century, the Congress of Vienna early in the nineteenth century, the Berlin Congress of 1878 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Since the end of World War I, summit visits and meetings have become common practice.[1]

Early American tradition established that the President of the United States should not leave American continental jurisdiction during his incumbency.[2] Theodore Roosevelt was the first to break with precedent by visiting Panama in November 1906, in order to hasten the completion of the canal; he not only inspected

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[1]During the period between World Wars I and II leaders of the principal European powers met frequently to consult with one another, usually on a bilateral basis. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, managing much of the diplomacy of Central Europe at the time, engaged in more than thirty summit gatherings with various European leaders.

Through 1969, the Presidents of the United States personally attended some 110 international meetings and conferences (all but six since President Franklin D. Roosevelt), of which more than half were held abroad. For analysis of Presidential participation in summit meetings, see Elmer Plischke, "International Conferencing and the Summit: Macro-Analysis of Presidential Participation," ORBIS, Fall 1970, pp. 673-713.

[2]President Washington is reputed even to have avoided going into Rhode Island while on a coaching trip to New England, because at the time Rhode Island, not having ratified the United States Constitution, was considered to be foreign territory to the new Union. When, shortly afterward, Rhode Island accepted the Constitution, Washington made a special trip to the new constituent state. See *Congressional Record,* Volume 57, Part 1 (65th Congress, 3rd Session), 1918, p. 27.

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the progress of construction but spent a few hours delivering an address in the city of Panama. William Howard Taft, as President-elect, also visited Panama early in 1909, and later the same year, as President, he introduced the diplomatic practice of meeting with the Mexican President when he joined Porfirio Diaz at Ciudad Juárez. The Mexican and U.S. Presidents exchanged visits across the Mexican border while participating in ceremonies opening the International Bridge spanning the Rio Grande, and such border meetings have since become commonplace.[3]

Woodrow Wilson was the first President to be formally received in official visits to foreign countries, to approve legislative enactments while abroad, and to negotiate personally at an international conference. Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover went abroad as Presidents-elect, Harding traveling to Panama late in 1920 on an informal visit, and Hoover introducing the "sub-summit" good will tour by visiting ten Latin American countries late in 1928. On his return from Alaska in July 1923, President Harding also passed through Vancouver where he delivered an address. This was the first Presidential visit to Canada in what later became traditional practice. Calvin Coolidge was welcomed by Havana in 1928 when he went there to open the Sixth International Conference of American States.

Nevertheless, it was not until the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt that ventures abroad became a fairly general Presidential activity. He attended a series of well-known bilateral and multilateral wartime conferences with Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin. Harry S. Truman continued the practice at Potsdam and also was the first President to be received abroad in a formal state visit (Mexico City, 1947). Dwight D. Eisenhower introduced the wide-ranging Presidential good will tour and was first to meet with Soviet leaders in a great-power East-West summit conclave,

[3]President William McKinley, it is reported, met in the spring of 1901 with the Mexican President at El Paso, Texas, near the boundary, but to comport with what he regarded as tradition he did not even go to the halfway line or set foot on the international bridge. Ten years previously Benjamin Harrison had ventured as far as the middle line of the bridge. However, Chester A. Arthur in 1883 is supposed unwittingly to have violated the American tradition on a fishing excursion in the Thousand Islands by drifting across the St. Lawrence River into Canadian jurisdiction. Grover Cleveland is commonly believed to have left U.S. territorial jurisdiction for a short time when he sailed past Cape Hatteras outside the three-mile limit, which technically put him on the high seas. Nevertheless, Theodore Roosevelt was the first to deliberately enter foreign land to perform an official act. When Taft also visited the Canal Zone (under U.S. jurisdiction) in 1910, he deliberately sailed outside continental American territory. For facts, see statement of Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman in *ibid.*, pp. 26-27. It is interesting to note that Sherman did not refer to Roosevelt in his recital; this would have contradicted the point he was making in support of an American tradition against the President's going abroad.

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and Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the globe-girdling summit flight. Altogether, since Theodore Roosevelt — but not including Richard M. Nixon — the President of the United States has gone abroad on public affairs approximately sixty times, Franklin Roosevelt doing so on thirteen occasions, Eisenhower on sixteen.[4]

In short, summit visits and meetings abroad have become a regular feature of contemporary diplomacy, and the President's high degree of participation has been taken for granted since 1934. Not many years ago, however, Presidential involvement abroad was subjected to serious restraints and critical inquiry, evoking Congressional challenge, judicial explication, and serious examination of a number of important juridico-political issues.

The Constitution clearly vests plenary executive authority in the President, and specifies that in the event of his "inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office" they "shall devolve on the Vice President."[5] Basically, "inability" to fulfill the Presidential function may result from either illness or unavailability.[6] Because the functions of the American chief of state and head of government are enjoined in a single office, a special problem arises in the U.S. governmental system when the President absents himself from the forum of governance. When he is away from the national capital, and certainly when he goes abroad, special arrangements need to be made to ensure his ability to continue the exercise of his executive authority.

Stipulations of the Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly prohibit the President from leaving the national capital or the country, but they do presume the unbroken continuance of executive responsibility. Whereas the President may be "as mobile as a jet aircraft," cautions Dean Rusk, "it is not clear that the Presidency is equally so."[7] So far as journeying abroad is concerned, the central constitutional question is whether the *President* (as the incumbent), by virtue of his physical location at a given moment, is unable to "discharge" the "powers and duties" of the *Presidency* (the office). The four principal variants of the

[4]The statistics are as follows: T. Roosevelt, 1; Taft, 1; Wilson, 1; Harding, 1; Coolidge, 1; Hoover, 0; F. D. Roosevelt, 13; Truman, 4; Eisenhower, 16; Kennedy, 8; Johnson, 11, for a total of 57.

[5]The Constitution stipulates: "In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President. . . ." Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 5.

[6]Inability due to illness — or disability — is not central to this discussion. However, see footnote 52 below.

[7]Dean Rusk, Elihu Root Lectures at the Council on Foreign Relations, in "The President," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1960, p. 362.

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issue of physical location embrace the President who is absent from the capital but remains within the continental United States; the President who leaves the continental domain but remains in noncontiguous U.S. territory; the President who departs U.S. territory but does not enter foreign jurisdiction, as when he is aboard an American ship or aircraft (or spacecraft); and the President who enters foreign jurisdiction. Any one of these circumstances could technically raise the question of the President's ability to properly fulfill his duties.

Analysis of the development of Presidential rights and practices related to the President going abroad involves three major aspects: his right to be absent from the seat of government, his right to journey beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, and his right to delay the fulfillment of his constitutionally-fixed responsibility to approve legislation while abroad. The first of these issues came to a head in the Grant Administration, the second was raised at the time President Wilson decided to participate personally in the World War I peace negotiations, and the third, involving Presidential action during the Eisenhower Administration, was considered and clarified by judicial proceeding.

The President's Right to be Absent from the Seat of Government

The principal challenge to the propriety of Presidential absence from the seat of the government was raised by the House of Representatives at the time of the Grant Administration. Apparently politically motivated and considering the institution of impeachment proceedings against Ulysses S. Grant, the House passed a resolution on April 3, 1876 requesting him to inform it as to whether "any executive offices, acts, or duties" had been performed by him "at a distance from the seat of Government established by law," and whether this was "not incompatible with the public interest."

On May 4 the President responded that he was not constitutionally required to furnish such information to the Congress, that he did not find in the Constitution authority of the House to compel the President to render an account of his discharge of "purely executive . . . duties, either as to when, where, or how performed," and that in any case the subject of the inquiry "does not necessarily belong to the province of legislation." On the specific question under consideration, the President said that while he was in the habit of absenting himself at times from the

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seat of government, "as were all of my predecessors," he nevertheless "continued to discharge all of the executive offices, acts, and duties which were required of me as the President of the United States."

Furthermore, he contended that no enactment of Congress "can limit, suspend, or confine" this practice of Presidents; he was unaware of any legislative stipulation which presumed to restrict the exercise of Presidential functions. "Were there such acts," he added, "I should nevertheless recognize the superior authority of the Constitution and should exercise the powers required thereby of the President." Concluding, he stated that no question had ever been raised as to the validity of Presidential absence from the capital, "or as to the right and propriety of the Executive to exercise the powers of his office *in any part of the United States.*"[8]

Grant thus responded to many aspects of the issue at hand, rejecting the Congressional implication that the President must perform all executive functions at the seat of government and, consequently, that he must remain there. He declared, to the contrary, that the President may perform executive acts anywhere in the United States – which would normally be interpreted either as within contiguous continental territory or as anywhere subject to U.S. jurisdiction but outside foreign territory.

To support his statement to the House, Grant appended a detailed memorandum listing the extensive performance of various official acts away from the capital by earlier Presidents – from Washington to James Buchanan. These included signing and promulgating executive proclamations, conferring with members of the Administration, communicating with them, and, in the field of foreign relations, signing diplomatic communications and issuing such diplomatic credentials as letters of credence, exequaturs, full powers and commissions, as well as formally receiving foreign emissaries.[9] Of relevance to later discussion, however, President Grant did not report instances of executive action taken on Congressional enactments.

[8] *Congressional Record,* Volume 4, Part 3 (44th Congress, 1st Session), 1876, pp. 2999-3000; emphasis added. For the text of the House resolution, see *ibid.,* p. 2158.

[9] As early as March 30, 1791, President Washington issued a proclamation, datelined Georgetown (as Grant noted, "a place remote from Philadelphia, which then was the seat of government"), respecting delimitation of the boundary of the permanent seat of government. This action was taken in implementation of the Act of 1790 creating the permanent national capital.

It is amusing to note that Washington also planned to receive the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary at Mount Vernon, away from the national capital, but the ceremony was inadvertently forestalled because the Spanish envoy had failed to bring his appointment credentials.

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Technically, one of the principal issues here involved is the stipulation of the Act of 1790 establishing "the seat of the government" which specifies, among other things, that following the move of the government from Philadelphia to its permanent seat in the District of Columbia prior to the first Monday of December 1800, "all offices attached to the said seat of government shall accordingly be removed thereto by their respective holders, and shall, after the said day, cease to be exercised elsewhere."[10] A strict interpretation would be that the President and all other officers of the government could perform the functions of their offices only at the seat of government. Patently this was not an enforceable — or intended — interpretation. Another more reasonable explication is that the Act intended that there be a national capital or seat of government, that the three branches of the new national government be located at one place, and, conversely, that none of these branches have a permanent, principal location elsewhere.[11]

An additional aspect of importance, however, is whether it would be reasonable to interpret the law of 1790 as meaning that the President could not be absent from the national capital for extended periods of time, or for a substantial amount of time. President Grant's response to the House of Representatives recited *de facto* practice. For example, Thomas Jefferson, President from 1801 to 1809, actually was absent from the seat of government 796 days, or for more than one-fourth of his incumbency, evidencing that the precedent for extended Presidential absence had been set at the very outset of the application of the law.[12]

[10]"An Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the United States," July 16, 1790, in *U.S. Statutes at Large,* Volume 1 (1st Congress, 2nd Session), Chapter 28, p. 130. Also see *ibid.,* Volume 61 (July 30, 1947), p. 643, which defines the District of Columbia as the seat of government, and *U.S. Code* (1964), Title 4, Chapter 3.

The enactment of 1790 was in implementation of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 17, referring to "the seat of the government." Apparently this matter was not much debated at the Constitutional Convention and provoked no discussion of the consequence of establishing the seat of government in relation to the functions of the President. See David Hunter Miller, "Some Legal Aspects of the Visit of President Wilson to Paris," *Harvard Law Review,* November 1922, pp. 57-58.

[11]In addition, it has been assumed that the President shall reside at the seat of government, and that normally he will perform his functions there. Generally this is the case, but Miller questions whether "the establishment of the seat of government at Washington" and the location of the "official residence there of the President in any way limits his discretion as to the place where his functions as executive are to be performed." (Miller, *op. cit.,* p. 60.) Such auxiliary "White Houses" as Mount Vernon, Oyster Bay, Hyde Park, Gettysburg, Hyannis Port, the L. B. J. Ranch and San Clemente have now become familiar and accepted.

[12]Grant's memorandum also records that Washington was away from the seat of

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Grant concluded that neither President Washington nor any of his successors "entertained the idea that their executive offices could be performed only at the seat of government," and that "no question has ever been raised as to the validity of these acts."[13] On the basis of his exposition, the practice if not the legality of the President, at his discretion, performing official executive acts away from the national capital was entirely proper, and this position was later substantiated by both practice and analysis.

The President's Right to Journey Outside the United States

Grant's legal disquisition does not resolve the fourth aspect of the problem of physical location — the President's departure from United States territory and entrance into foreign jurisdiction. In his memorandum of 1876, however, he introduced the issue by asserting that the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, might be required to exercise his powers "possibly even without the limits of the United States," and if he chose to do so he could scarcely be challenged seriously.[14]

The President's constitutional authority in this respect undoubtedly empowers him to be present with, and theoretically even to take personal command of, U.S. forces wherever they are located. George Washington assumed active command of the militia of four states at the time of the Pennsylvania insurrection in 1794, and Abraham Lincoln stated that, as Commander-in-Chief in time of war, "I suppose I have a right to take any measures which may best subdue the enemy."[15] Moreover, as Commander-in-Chief, several Presidents have personally visited U.S. troops in the field in the midst of warfare. Lincoln paid a visit to the Army of the Potomac toward the end of the Civil War, Franklin Roosevelt conferred with General Eisenhower at Casablanca in 1943, Truman met with General Douglas MacArthur at Wake Island during the

government at least 181 days, John Adams 385 days in four years, James Madison 637 days in eight years, James Monroe 708 days in eight years (not counting the year 1824 and two months of 1825 for which no data were found), John Quincy Adams 222 days in four years, and Andrew Jackson 502 days in eight years. Later Presidents on whom he reported were absent less. See *Congressional Record*, Volume 4, Part 3, *op. cit.*, p. 3000.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 2999. On the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief, also see Clarence A. Berdahl, *War Powers of the Executive in the United States* (Urbana: University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 1921); Ernest R. May, editor, *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander-in-Chief* (New York: G. Braziller, 1960); Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1948), Chapter VI; Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68.

[15] See Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

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Korean War, and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon visited American troops in Viet Nam.

In his presentation to the House, President Grant added that the civil powers of the Chief Executive "are no more limited or capable of limitation as to the place where they shall be exercised" than are his powers as Commander-in-Chief.[16] There is sufficient logic to this proposition so that when Theodore Roosevelt upset precedent by going to Panama in 1906 his bold act was not seriously questioned or formally challenged on legal grounds, though it was criticized by some of his political opponents. Taft's Panamanian venture was similar to that of Roosevelt: both traveled on an American public vessel and they were outside national jurisdiction for only a few hours. Moreover, when Taft visited Mexico he merely stepped across the border to dine with the Latin American President in Juárez. Some years later he was moved to write: "Nobody was heard to say that in any of these visits we had disabled ourselves from performing our constitutional and statutory functions."[17]

Yet when Wilson, in his annual message to Congress of 1918, announced that he was going to the Paris Peace Conference, his statement evoked a storm of criticism. His trip to Europe would be quite unlike those of his predecessors. It meant that the President would leave the Western Hemisphere, would go well beyond the direct physical protection of the United States, would be away for an extended period of time, and would be busily engaged in high-level diplomatic discussions and personal negotiation at the conference table.

Josephus Daniels comments in his biography of the President: "So fierce was the criticism that an outsider would have supposed that Wilson was breaking all the Ten Commandments at once."[18] The challenge, brought largely for partisan reasons or at best because there were serious doubts about the political sagacity of the President acting as his own negotiator abroad, nevertheless was couched in legal terms. Republican leaders headed the attack. Theodore Roosevelt took exception to Wilson's foreign venture even though, had he been President at the time, he probably would have relished it himself. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was up in arms. They joined forces in issuing a statement of conditions under

[16] *Congressional Record,* Volume 4, Part 3, *op. cit.,* p. 2999.
[17] William Howard Taft, *Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), p. 51.
[18] *Life of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924* (Will H. Johnson, 1924), p. 225.

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which their party would act in the circumstances; it was more concerned, however, with the substance of U.S. foreign policy to be pursued at the conference than with the constitutionality of the President's decision.

On the other hand, a former Attorney General, writing in the *New York Times* under the designation "An Eminent Jurist," argued that the President may not legally absent himself from the seat of government for an indefinite period when Congress is in session, because Congress must be able to present him personally with legislative proposals when it enacts them. Thus, the tests of the necessity of the President's presence are whether the making of law will proceed as well when the Chief Executive is absent as when he is immediately available, and whether public opinion can be brought to bear on the President if he is not at the seat of government. Straining logic, he concluded that Wilson would cease to be President the very moment he left U.S. territorial waters, and that the Vice President could then legally assume the duties of the office.[19]

While it may appear strange with hindsight, formal action actually was launched against the President in the Congress. On December 3, 1918, the day before the President sailed for Paris, Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman, one of Wilson's severest critics, introduced a concurrent resolution designed to declare the office of President vacant. The resolution's preamble again raised the issue of restricting the executive function to the national capital. Sherman branded Wilson's trip as a violation of the Act of 1790 establishing the seat of government in the District of Columbia — which, he argued, is "the place where legislative and executive powers and duties shall and must be exercised."[20] He also alleged that it is unconstitutional for the President to exercise his powers outside the territory of this country and within the domain of another government.[21] His resolution, succinct and purposeful, specified:

[19]"President Wilson's Projected Trip to Europe Argued Before the Supreme Court of Public Opinion," *New York Times*, November 26, 1918.

[20]Sherman argued that the exercise of federal powers and duties had been "uniformly administered at the seat of government for 118 years. No President has ever undertaken to exercise or administer his great civil functions elsewhere. Federal sovereignty resides at the Capital. It can not be transferred to any other point . . . except by act of Congress. . . . It is a palpable violation of the act of 1790 . . . to attempt to exercise the constitutional sovereign powers of the President within the domain of another Government. . . ." He concluded his presentation by saying: "No imperious necessity justifies the pernicious mischief likely to result." *Congressional Record*, Volume 57, Part 1, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[21]Sherman read into the record an extensive legal opinion of Hannis Taylor,

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That the departure by the President and his absence from the territory of the United States and from the seat of government . . . be, and the same are hereby declared, to constitute an inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office of President of the United States, and is hereby declared to constitute a vacancy in such office of President, and that the powers and duties thereof shall immediately upon such departure and absence by the President . . . devolve upon and be exercised by the Vice President of the United States . . . until a President shall be duly elected . . . .

The vacating of the Presidency by Wilson would thus be made complete and irrevocable, and all official acts of the Vice President while serving in this capacity would be valid "and shall be received and accepted as the act of the President of the United States.

Several points of interest are raised by the presentation of this resolution.[22] It is noteworthy that Senator Sherman introduced his proposal as a concurrent resolution — not a joint resolution. While the political reason for this is manifest, the legal effect is that, if passed by both houses, it would have constituted a Congressional statement of policy rather than binding law. The President would have had no opportunity to approve or reject it, and juridical effectiveness would have been legally and politically contestable. Had the Vice President taken the oath as President under it, a cataclysmic government crisis may well have ensued.[23] Second, the Senator argued that the lack of an express prohibition by the Constitution on Presidential travel abroad does not negate such implied prohibition, but this is scarcely tenable in view of

whom he described as a well-known authority on constitutional law. It regarded the performance of such executive acts as submitting a nomination to the Senate from abroad as being legally invalid. The opinion concluded: "Therefore if the President . . . persists in his purpose at this critical moment to abdicate his office by absenting himself from the seat of government for an indefinite sojourn in foreign lands, while the Congress of which he is an integral part is in session, the fact that he has thus unlawfully put upon himself an 'inability to discharge the powers and duties' of his office will be too plain for controversy." *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[22]In the preamble Sherman stressed that Congress had convened the first Monday of December 1918 (prior to the President's departure) and would continue during the President's absence, and he would be required to perform such executive action regarding legislation as providing Congress with information, recommending legislation for consideration, and approving or rejecting Congressional enactments. As it turned out, the President's involvement in the Paris Conference lasted approximately seven months and his protracted absence was a serious matter, but because this duration could not have been foreseen, it was not stressed in the argumentation. The matter of executive approval and disapproval of legislation is examined more fully later. For the text of the resolution and Senator Sherman's rationalization of his purposes, see *ibid.*, pp. 23 (resolution) and 24-31 (debate).

[23]In support of his contention, Senator Sherman cited an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision respecting the Oklahoma Constitution — allegedly containing a provision similar to that of the United States Constitution. The Oklahoma court declared that the governor of the state could not exercise his function outside its territory "without forfeiting his office . . . but his powers as governor become dor-

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the President's treaty-making authority and his role as Commander-in-Chief. Third, regarding Presidential functioning abroad, he declared: "The civil powers of the President have no extraterritorial validity. They confer no authority . . . outside the area in which the law is operative. The status of civil sovereignty is attached to the territory, the people, and the institutions over which it wields its powers." Were this accepted as a valid theory of governance of all countries, or simply of democracies, none of their Chief Executives could exercise civil powers abroad. Finally, he contended that his ultimate purpose in supplementing the Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 was to provide a "statutory definition" of Presidential "inability" and avoid an executive "interregnum."

Simultaneously, Congressman William A. Rodenberg introduced a companion resolution into the House of Representatives, not proclaiming the office of the Presidency vacant as did the Senate resolution, but declaring the absence of the President from the United States to constitute an inability to discharge his duties and making it mandatory for the Vice President to exercise the responsibilities of the President until the latter returned.[24] Although Vice President Thomas R. Marshall was pressured to assume the Presidency while Wilson was abroad, he declined to do so. When he officiated at a meeting of the Cabinet shortly after the President set sail for Europe, for example, he made it abundantly clear that he was merely acting unofficially and informally.[25]

One of Wilson's principal defenses was delivered by former President Taft. He wrote at some length in the *Washington Post* on December 5, and his remarks were inserted in the

mant the very moment he crosses the State line and they revive again as soon as he returns and is within the borders of the State." (*Oklahoma Criminal Reports*, Volume 10, pp. 399-400.) The situations are not parallel, however. Entirely aside from the relevance of external and internal functions, Sherman's resolution — unlike that of the House of Representatives, referred to later — did not recognize the temporary inability of the President to perform his duties while abroad, but rather regarded the going abroad itself as permanently vacating the Presidency.

[24]House Joint Resolution 353, *Congressional Record*, Volume 57, Part 1, *op. cit.*, p. 19. It is significant to note that this was a joint resolution.

[25]At the outset of the meeting the Vice President informed the Cabinet: "In assuming the chair and presiding over what is known as a meeting of the Cabinet, I deem it proper to make a brief statement so that my conduct may not be misunderstood or misinterpreted. I am here and am acting in obedience to a request preferred by the President upon the eve of his departure. . . . But I am here informally. I am not undertaking to exercise any official duty or function. I shall preside in an unofficial and informal way over your meetings out of deference to your desires and those of the President." *The Sun*, December 10, 1918, quoted in Corwin, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

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Congressional Record the same day.[26] He acknowledged what he regarded as important advantages to be derived from Presidential participation in the peace conference, and argued that the President can, in fact, "by cable perform all his executive duties from Paris."[27] On the issue of legality he concluded: "There is no constitutional inhibition, express or implied, to prevent the President's going abroad to discharge a function clearly given him by the Constitution. That instrument says that he shall make treaties. . . . It is a curious error to assume that the President himself may not attend a conference to which he can send a delegate."[28] On the matter of the President's authority to perform his duties within a foreign jurisdiction, Taft wrote: "It therefore comes down to the question whether the President may not in person perform a duty imposed upon him by law when it is to be performed out of the country. There is certainly no express restriction of this sort in the Constitution, and it is difficult to see why it should be implied."[29]

The Sherman and Rodenberg resolutions died in legislative committee, the President went to Europe and spent months in negotiation, and the attack against him switched from the constitutionality of his action to the substance of his policy and the results of his negotiations at Paris. Nevertheless Taft, some years later, with the benefit of his own experience as law professor,

[26]For text, see Volume 57, Part 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

[27]This, of course, is not accurate with respect to all Presidential action on legislation, which must be physically handled by the President under certain circumstances, as noted below.

[28]Taft thereby produced one of the most trenchant legal arguments in support of the President's right to go abroad in deliberate pursuance of his constitutional authority and responsibility. The right to "make treaties," as the Constitution puts it, clearly implies the right to do so abroad, for otherwise this constitutional right either must be exercised by the President solely within the United States (even leaving aside the additional restriction delimiting executive duty strictly to the seat of government), or by his agents. While the latter is normal practice, it appears indefensible to contend that the Constitution was intended so to restrict the function of the President.

As early as 1816 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee acknowledged: "The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. . . ." (*Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations,* Volume 8, Senate Document 231 [56th Congress, 2nd Session], 1901, p. 24.) Presumably the "how" implies personal Presidential negotiation abroad. On this matter also see Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-66.

[29]Distinguishing the political and legal aspects of the issue, Taft concluded: "If the fact or the manner of the President's going [abroad to negotiate] is a mistake, and if it is unpopular with the American people, that may be made a legitimate ground for criticism in a political campaign." In other words, the President's right to go is incontestable; his political judgment in doing so is another matter.

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Chief Executive, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the opportunity he had had to reflect on the matter, reiterated his earlier judgment by disavowing any illegality in Wilson's venture abroad. He asserted that there is no question of constitutional or statutory prohibition respecting such a trip, and so far as fulfilling Presidential responsibility is concerned, the Chief Executive can carry out his functions wherever the temporary White House may be.[30] The general legal issue of constitutional permissibility — or implied prohibition — was settled, and it has not subsequently been raised.[31]

In analyzing this episode in some detail, and the legal argumentation it evoked, David Hunter Miller, former Special Assistant in the Department of State and Legal Adviser to the American Mission at the Paris Peace Conference, concluded:

> Thus it appears that the functions of the President under the Constitution require the exercise of executive discretion; that the executive powers may be and have always been deemed to be exercisable away from the seat of government, and that their exercise is not inconsistent with the absence of the President in a foreign jurisdiction; that the functions of the President as the organ of intercourse with other nations generally and

[30]Taft, *Our Chief Magistrate . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

[31]By way of comparing the practice of the United States and most other countries, it should be noted that two-thirds of the Latin American constitutions impose limitations on executive freedom of action in the matter of departing the national domain. Such restrictions are posed in various forms. In several countries the constitution specifies that the President shall not leave the national territory without the consent of the national legislature or one of its chambers (e.g., Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru), and some also prohibit him from leaving the country without such consent for one year after completing his tenure (Colombia and Ecuador). Somewhat more lenient, some specify that the President may not leave the country for more than a fixed number of days without legislative consent (in the Dominican Republic this is 30 days, in Uruguay seven days). The Panamanian Constitution puts it another way, prohibiting the President from leaving while he is performing his duties as Chief Executive, and the constitutions of Argentina and Costa Rica simply provide arrangements for the temporary exercise of executive authority by the Vice President during Presidential absences.

Perhaps in part evidencing the existence of such restrictions, Latin American Presidents, according to a Department of State list, came to the United States on only some 30 visits between 1945 and 1969, whereas in ten additional cases such visits were made by Presidents-elect (prior to inauguration, which left them free of constitutional restrictions). Similar visits by the officials-designate of other countries are most extraordinary (only two in a quarter-century).

Furthermore, Latin American legislative approval of executive foreign trips cannot be taken for granted. On January 17, 1967, a Chilean Senate majority of right- and left-wing extremists, by a vote of 23 to 15, decided to forbid President Eduardo Frei Montalva from undertaking a scheduled summit visit to the United States. The matter was taken up by the lower chamber, in which the President had majority support, but the legislative hurdles were such that they could not be surmounted in time for the journey to Washington planned for January 31 and the visit was not made. See *Washington Post*, January 18 and 19, 1967.

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particularly in the negotiation of executive agreements and of treaties, are not subject to Congressional control or limitation, and are exercisable by him either personally or, at his discretion, by such agents as he may select; that his functions as Commander-in-Chief not only permit, but may indeed require, his absence from the seat of government and, in his discretion, his presence with the forces of the United States whether taking personal command of them or not, and whether those forces are within or without the United States; and that his functions in connection with legislation, whether deemed to be executive or legislative, may well be performed away from the seat of government where Congress sits.[32]

The President's Right to Take or Delay Action on Legislation while Abroad

A third major aspect of the question of the President's right to go abroad is his ability to discharge his constitutional responsibility in the legislative process while away from the seat of government — which so far as constitutionality is concerned differs little, in terms of legal precepts, from any absence from the national capital, whether the Chief Executive is out of the country or not. He can continue his influence on legislative deliberation by telephonic and other means of communication from abroad as well as from the White House. However, he also has the duty of giving or denying executive approval to Congressional enactments; he must do this personally (that is, he may not do so indirectly by telegram or through the action of a deputy), and his action is subject to a constitutionally prescribed time limit. It is interesting to observe the absence of any reference to Presidential action on legislation in President Grant's memorandum to the House of Representatives cataloguing various Presidential functions away from the seat of government. This was one of the specific issues raised, however, in the preamble to the Sherman resolution, which alleged that when the President is away from the seat of government the Congress cannot properly present legislation to him for approval and that, consequently, while Congress is in session, the President must remain at the national capital.

So far as procedure is concerned, legislative proposals when passed, "enrolled" and signed by the officers of the Senate and

[32]Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 77. He added that the President's exercise of his powers requires "inherently and essentially the exercise of executive discretion as to the fact, the time and the manner of their exercise. This is indeed so obvious as hardly to require mention, except to show that any limitation as to the *place* of their exercise, would in itself interfere with the necessary discretion of the executive and therefore cannot be inferred and cannot exist, in the absence of other constitutional provisions bearing on the subject." *Ibid.*, p. 57; emphasis in original.

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House, according to the Constitution, are "presented" to the President for approval or disapproval. The Chief Executive has three courses of action open to him. He may approve the proposal and sign it; he may veto it by returning it, with his objections, to the house of Congress wherein it originated, and Congress if so persuaded may pass it over his veto; or he may neither approve nor return it "within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him," in which case it becomes law without his approval — unless Congress has adjourned, and then it is automatically disapproved by what is called the "pocket veto." After the expiration of the time limit of ten weekdays — or eleven or twelve calendar days depending on how many Sundays are involved — approval is unnecessary and return is impossible. The matter of timing therefore has an important bearing on the "presentation" of Congressional enactments to the President and his actual location.[33]

The time allotted the President to make his decision does not commence with the date of passage, enrollment or signature by the officers of the Congress, or transmission by Congress, and in some cases not even with the date of receipt in the White House. He has ten days from the time the enactment is "presented" to him in the technical sense — not necessarily handed to him personally but delivered to him or his designated deputy in accordance with understood procedure. When the President is abroad, by mutual agreement "presentation" may be effected by delivery to the

[33]See the Constitution, Article I, Section 7, Paragraphs 2, 3. The first Congress adopted joint rules of the House and Senate in 1789, providing simply that "After a bill shall have thus been signed in each House, it shall be presented, by the said committee [a joint standing committee, comprised of one member of the Senate and two of the House], to the President of the United States for his approbation. . . . The said committee shall report the day of presentation to the President, which time shall also be carefully entered on the journal of each House." (*Annals of Congress,* Volume 1, p. 60.) This statement appears to attribute to Congress a power of determination respecting the nature and timing of the presentation of legislation to the President. These general rules continued in effect for more than a century. See Miller, *op. cit.,* pp. 69-71.

Procedural rules, however, have come to recognize significant pragmatic changes. Thus, *Jefferson's Manual* currently provides: "Under the usual practice, bills are considered to have been 'presented to the President' at the time they are delivered to the White House." Nevertheless, it also recognizes exceptions to this practice, as discussed elsewhere in this analysis. *Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives,* 90th Congress, 1969, p. 37.

The issue of legal restrictions on executive action concerning the approval of legislation generally does not arise as a constitutional problem in other governments. Constitutive acts normally impose no severe time limits on the executive, or they require or permit the chief of state to sign and authorize the head of government, should his signature be required, to delegate to another official the prerogative of signing for the executive.

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White House for transmittal and presentation overseas, personal delivery abroad by Congressional messenger, or deferral either at the Capitol or in the White House until he returns to the United States.

This issue in the consideration of the President's right to go abroad centers on his doing so while Congress is in session. Other Presidential responsibilities vis-à-vis the Congress are of lesser import, except perhaps for such matters as calling special legislative sessions and preparing budgets and messages to be delivered to Congress at specific times.

The issue of Presidential rights and responsibilities was juridically considered by the United States Court of Claims in 1964. Reviewing earlier Presidential practice, it indicated that President Taft, the first Chief Executive to leave the continental United States while Congress was in session, had no legislation presented to him during his absence. President Wilson, as noted, was the first to sign legislation abroad, and since Franklin Roosevelt's administration this has become customary procedure.[34] Practice is clear, therefore, respecting the President's right to sign, veto, or determinedly take no action on legislative proposals and let them become law or suffer the pocket veto, as the case may be. The court also was unambiguous respecting the law on this point, holding that "the President's constitutional power . . . can physically be exercised anywhere," and "he is free to perform his functions at the places he deems appropriate and desirable."[35] It is interesting to contemplate whether the court, by not specifically delimiting its asseverations concerning Presidential approval of legislation, may have intended to establish a broader principle than was required by the case, but in so doing it resolved a good many aspects of the issue of the President's right to go abroad and there perform his executive responsibilities.

In this case, involving Presidential action on a Congressional enactment of 1959 and decided by the Court of Claims five years later,[36] a series of moot questions in Congressional-Presidential

[34]*Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor Corp. vs. The United States,* 337 *Federal Reporter,* 2nd Series, 1964, pp. 627-632.

[35]*Ibid.,* p. 628.

[36]A private bill was enacted by Congress and delivered by a messenger of the House of Representatives to the White House on August 31, 1959. President Eisenhower had made arrangements for legislation to be held pending his return from abroad by having enactments received at the White House stamped with the statement "Held for presentation to the President upon his return to the United States." This was cleared with the leaders of Congress, but on the particular bill in question the White House legislative clerk inadvertently failed to use the special

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relations pertaining to legislation was determined. They included the meaning of the constitutional prescription that legislation be "presented" to the President for approval action, the relevance of presentation to the time allotted the Chief Executive for his determination, the legitimacy of presentation abroad, and mutual legislative-executive accommodation in effecting workable arrangements to protect the legitimate interests of both the Congress and the President in implementing the process. Among other things, the court held:

> . . . the President's limited time for considering a bill does not begin until the measure is *presented* to him. . . . the initiation of that step — presentation to the President — lies with the Congress. . . . In no case, however, does his time to evaluate a bill commence until it is presented to him. A "fundamental purpose of the constitutional provision" is "to provide appropriate opportunity for the President to consider the bills presented to him". . . .[37]

Concerning legislative-executive cooperation in making the system work, it declared:

> . . . Within the constitutional scheme, there is large leeway through mutual arrangement and understanding, for the President and Congress to accommodate each other's needs and interests. . . . If the President feels the need of the full constitutional period, Congress should not be able to diminish it, deliberately or by accident, by delivering bills in such a way that the President would not have the full eleven or twelve days for deliberation and consultation. On the other hand, when Congress affirmatively desires presidential action to be prompt, the President should not be able to evade or prolong the constitutional span by absenting himself or refusing to receive the measure. . . .

The court's conclusion on this point was that "Neither the President nor the Congress should be free to ignore the other's interests; but neither should be dependent on the other's grace."

Addressing itself to the matter of personal presentation — that is, presentation to the President himself — the court specified:

> . . . though personal presentation to the President is not mandatory, either the Congress or the President can insist on such delivery. If personal delivery is not demanded by either side, presentation can be

stamp on delivery of the enactment, although a few hours later, to rectify the error, the White House notified the House of Representatives that the enactment was being "held for presentation." The legislative enactment was presented to the President on his return from abroad, and a week later, while Congress was still in session, the President returned the bill to the House of Representatives with his veto. This was more than ten days (Sundays excepted) from the time the measure was delivered to the White House, but less than ten days from the time the bill was presented to the President. The Court of Claims upheld the validity of the Presidential veto. *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626, 633.

[37]This and the following quotations are to be found in *ibid.*, pp. 628-630.

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made in any agreed manner or in a form established by one party in which the other acquiesces; that has long been done, for normal occasions, by the continued understanding that delivery to the White House is effective presentation to the President. But the right of either side to insist on personal presentation is the device-of-last-resort by which both can ultimately protect their respective interests as sanctioned by the Constitution. . . .

Respecting presentation of legislation when the President journeys abroad, it propounded:

For a President embarking on a trip abroad, there are various choices. He can, if he is adamant, demand that the Congress make personal presentation to him abroad or delay until his return. It is more likely that he will direct that bills be accepted at the White House as if he were present, or that they be forwarded by his staff for presentation to him overseas, or that they be held at the White House to await his homecoming. . . . The Congress may well accede to the arrangement the President selects. But if Congress (or the presenting House) is dissatisfied with that plan and cannot induce the President to modify it, the Congress always has the option of itself sending the bill abroad and presenting it to the President (who has to make himself reasonably available for that purpose).

However, the practice during the overseas absences of Presidents indicated that it was not unusual for them to act "contrary to the assumption that delivery of a bill to the White House necessarily constituted delivery to the absent President." After surveying such practice, the court concluded:

. . . These instances do not prove any binding custom as to the precise meaning of "presentation," but they do show that there is no positive custom or practice that delivery to the White House amounts to presentation when the President has indicated otherwise. They also show that the Presidents have not always felt bound to make arrangements with Congress as to the form of presentation. . . .[38]

As for the development of procedure, a concurring opinion in this case reported that for some decades the normal arrangement was for enrolled bills, signed by the leaders of the Senate and House, to be sent by Congressional clerk to the White House for delivery to a legislative clerk on the Presidential staff; the legislative clerk signed a receipt for it which was then returned to the chamber in which the legislation originated. However, action may be taken to establish some other arrangement, as at *sine die* adjournment of the Congress, or when the President wishes to

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 632. Practice indicates that President Wilson signed four of the five bills forwarded to him while abroad more than ten days (Sundays excepted) after their delivery to the White House. President Roosevelt vetoed one bill and signed two, and President Truman signed four bills and vetoed one under similar circumstances. *Ibid.*

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pursue some alternative procedure while abroad.[39] When President Wilson went to Europe he arranged that legislation, on delivery, was registered as being conveyed to the White House instead of as being presented to the President, and it is reported that the Vice President and the Speaker of the House apparently agreed to withhold their signatures from certain enactments until he returned to the United States — thus delaying presentation to him.

On the advice of his Attorney General, President Franklin Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Vice President and Speaker, instituting the following arrangement in 1943:

> As I expect to be away from Washington for some time in the near future, I hope that insofar as possible the transmission of completed legislation be delayed until my return. The White House Office, however, in other cases of emergency has been authorized to forward to me any and all enrolled bills or joint resolutions. They will be forwarded at once by the quickest means. The White House Office will not receive bills or resolutions on behalf of the President but only for the purpose of forwarding them. As soon as received by the President their presentation to the President will have been completed in accordance with the terms of the Constitution. *I suggest, therefore, that if any bill is forwarded to the White House, the entries on the House and Senate Journals show "delivery to the White House for forwarding to the President."*[40]

Diplomatic archives reveal that as arrangements were being made for Roosevelt to meet with Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin at Tehran late in 1943, Presidential responsibility respecting the approval of legislation became a critical factor in negotiating the meeting site. Stalin proposed convening at Tehran, a position, as it turned out, from which he refused to budge. While the Iranian capital was agreeable to Churchill, Roosevelt regarded it as unacceptable because of its uncertain accessibility. He was convinced that aerial transportation to Tehran, over mountains that sometimes were impassable, was too unreliable to guarantee communication with Washington within his time limit for action on legislation. Eventually he was able to work out the arrangement described, under which he believed he could attend the conference and still fulfill his constitutional requirement.[41]

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 635. For procedure in President Wilson's day, see House debate in *Congressional Record*, Volume 57, Part 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

[40] *Eber Bros. . . . , op. cit.*, p. 636; emphasis in original. The text of the Attorney General's opinion also is given in *ibid.*

[41] Roosevelt wrote Stalin in September 1943: "Personally, my only hesitation is the place but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our Con-

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Under the pressures of assuming the Presidency at Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, and leaving for the Potsdam Conference on July 6, Truman failed to take similar precautions. Nevertheless, he acted on a number of bills more than ten days (Sundays excepted) after delivery to the White House but within ten days after his return to Washington. Clearly he did not regard mere transmittal to a clerk at the White House during his absence as constituting presentation to him, and apparently Congress, failing to demur, accepted this arrangement.[42] When Eisenhower went to the East-West Geneva Conference ten years later and to the North Atlantic meeting at Paris in 1959, on the advice of the Attorney General he formally arranged to have legislative proposals delivered to the White House and held for presentation to him upon his return.[43] Thus, since President Wilson's day procedure respecting Presidential approval of legislation during absence from the seat of government and the country has been refined by mutual executive-legislative accommodation, and has ceased to be a critical legal issue.

On the other hand, the problem is not resolved pragmatically in three respects. Arrangements for Presidential procedure hinge, in part, on the length of the President's absence. Contrary to general belief, his participation in individual summit gatherings is relatively brief. Three-fourths of the conferences and meetings he attends in the United States and abroad are in session for three days or less. The major World War II summit conferences extended over longer periods of time, as have a number of subsequent Presidential tours. By far the longest absence was that of President Wilson who became enmeshed in the Paris negotiations

stitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days, and Tehran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad." A month later he repeated his position, that under the Constitution the President must "receive and return to the Congress, with his written approval or his veto, physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio. . . . Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Tehran. . . ." It was not until he was already on the way to meet separately with Churchill at Cairo that the President resolved his constitutional problem, and informed Stalin: "You will be glad to know that I have worked out a method so that if I get word that a bill requiring my veto has been passed by the Congress and forwarded to me, I will fly to Tunis to meet it and then return to the Conference." Thus, he reduced the criticality of his constitutional difficulty to the vetoing (not the approval) of legislative enactments. For the texts of pertinent exchanges, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 26, 35-37, 46, 50, 62 (note 2), 68, 71.

[42] *Eber Bros. . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 636-637. Truman was away for a month, departing Washington July 6 and returning August 7, 1945.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 635-636.

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for seven months (except for four weeks during which he returned temporarily to Washington).

If the President is away for a few days, many matters requiring his attention, including action on legislation, may be deferred until his return, but if he is away for several weeks not all of his duties unassociated with the trip will be deferrable, and special arrangements will be necessary to handle legislation. Serious problems of this nature are bound to occur if he is abroad for six months or more. While his absence for such a length of time may not be legally challenged, it may be regarded as politically unwise. No President since Wilson has become so highly involved abroad for such a protracted span of time.[44]

Second, a special problem of timing arises in the case of Congressional adjournment *sine die*. At one time it was the custom that the President did not approve an enactment after the adjournment of the Congress which enacted it. This restricted his discretion at the end of a legislative session and clearly required his physical presence at the seat of government. He usually went to the Capitol on the final days of the session to approve and sign legislation passed toward the end. Under this procedure a President who happened to be abroad at the time of adjournment would be denied the opportunity of approving such legislation unless he immediately summoned the Congress in special session — or, simply by being abroad, he could impede the function of Congress by allowing its enactments to be vetoed automatically.

This restricted interpretation of the Constitution was both unreasonable and unnecessary and the procedure has been changed, so that the President now enjoys the full constitutionally prescribed period in which to take action on such legislation.[45]

[44]During World War II Roosevelt spent 37 days away from Washington to attend the Cairo and Tehran conferences and 38 days to participate in those at Malta and Yalta (1945). Truman was away for 32 days to attend the Potsdam Conference (1945). Both did most of their long-distance travel by ship. Since World War II Presidential transportation has been expedited by jet flying. Eisenhower was en route 18 days on his Asian good will tour (1959) and Johnson devoted 17 days to attending the Manila Conference and visiting seven Asian countries (1966). In contrast, Woodrow Wilson left for Paris on December 4, 1918 and returned to Washington on July 8, 1919, although he was in the United States late in February and early in March for about a week (February 24 to March 4, 1919). He crossed the Atlantic four times by ship, and thus spent nearly seven months away from Washington.

[45]Prior to the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution in 1933, when Congress convened on March 4, the matter of presentation and Presidential approval of legislation posed special problems if an old Congress continued into the morning of that date, especially when established procedure required executive action on legislation prior to legislative adjournment. This practice continued until 1920, when, at the close of the second session of the 66th Con-

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Nevertheless, because Presidential delay cannot be limitless, the problem of correlating Congressional adjournment and Presidential foreign trips may not be ignored. The President is well advised to avoid legislative adjournment while he is abroad for any length of time. Because his trips usually are planned well in advance, whereas the moment of Congressional adjournment cannot be precisely foretold — although, by agreement, it might be managed — he needs to arrange that adjournment *sine die* be delayed if this is possible, that the presentation of enactments to him be deferred until his return, or that he exercise his legislative approval responsibility en route.[46]

Finally, legislation enacted at the end of one fiscal year which requires Presidential approval for implementation on the commencement of the new fiscal year may create special problems. Inasmuch as executive approval is a nondelegatable, personal act of the President, he must be available if his action cannot be delayed

gress, President Wilson signed eight bills after adjournment but within the constitutionally allotted time. The President's action was based on the counsel of the Attorney General, June 19, 1920. (See *Opinions of the Attorney General,* Volume 32, pp. 225-238.) This created a new precedent, not available the preceding year when the President returned briefly from the Paris Peace Conference. On this matter, see Taft, *Our Chief Magistrate . . . , op. cit.,* p. 24; Miller, *op. cit.,* pp. 72-76; and Lindsay Rogers, "The Power of the President to Sign Bills After Congress Has Adjourned," *Yale Law Journal,* November 1920, pp. 1-22.

[46]President Wilson's interim return to Washington from Paris, noted earlier, enabled him to be on hand when the 65th Congress adjourned at 12 o'clock noon on March 4, 1919, so that he could carry out his end of session duties. On the other hand, when President Johnson departed on his Asian tour in 1966, he arranged for legislation enacted by Congress in its final week to be flown to him by courier plane.

President Roosevelt, in negotiating the convening of the wartime conference at Yalta, was concerned with the matter of Congressional adjournment and his forthcoming inauguration. He informed Prime Minister Churchill on November 2, 1944: "I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided, first because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with Washington. . . ." and twelve days later he added: "The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. . . . Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third." On November 18 he wrote: ". . . quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth. . . . Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also I have to be here, under the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January." In closing he reiterated his responsibility to be available for the presentation to him for approval or rejection of legislation enacted by Congress. As it turned out, Roosevelt left for the conference on January 22, two days following his fourth inauguration, arrived at Malta on February 2, and flew to Yalta the following day. For documents quoted, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), pp. 13-16.

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without producing serious financial hardship; should he be abroad, either the legislation must be sent to him by special courier or he must return to the United States to deal with it.[47]

Other Juridico-Political Issues

Thus far, this analysis has considered the principal legal issues raised respecting the President's right to go abroad under the United States constitutional system. It remains to review briefly a number of ancillary questions. Under the circumstances pertaining, is the President able to "discharge" his "powers and duties" properly while abroad? Is it prudent for him, at the particular moment, to go to the particular place he intends? Wise for him to absent himself from the United States for any length of time? Politic for him to engage in formal negotiation personally? With specific reference to the case of President Wilson, should he go abroad to a belligerent country in time of war without full assurance that the existing armistice will not founder and hostilities recommence?

While these aspects are scarcely challengeable on juridical grounds, in some respects they bear legal relevance, and they are not without political significance. Although the legal propriety of a Presidential decision to go abroad may be acknowledged, the burden of full political responsibility for the action devolves personally upon the President, whether it be Wilson going to Paris, Roosevelt to Yalta, Eisenhower to eleven countries on a grand tour, Johnson to Manila and Viet Nam, or Nixon around the globe.

Historic judgments are more likely to be concerned with the

[47]Although the site of the Potsdam Conference posed no complications so far as President Truman's constitutional responsibility was concerned, apparently the meeting time did. All three leaders generally favored holding an early conference following the German surrender, but Churchill was particularly anxious to convene no later than mid-June 1945. Truman insisted on deferring the meeting until mid-July because, as he wrote the Prime Minister: "it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before the end of the fiscal year (30 June)." In private conversations with his personal advisers he allegedly emphasized his responsibility to prepare a budget message prior to the end of the fiscal year. This is somewhat perplexing since a check with the Bureau of the Budget reveals the delivery of no such vital message. Nevertheless, under his constitutional requirements the President, late in the fiscal year, may be responsible for dealing immediately with such financial legislation enacted by the Congress as is scheduled to go into effect at the beginning of the next fiscal year. Truman also contended that he planned to travel to Europe by ship, so that for a period of about a week he would have been relatively inaccessible, and he could not know in advance how long the conference would last. For the texts of pertinent documents, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations: The Conference of Berlin, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1960), Volume 1, pp. 4-5, 13, 94.

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politico-diplomatic consequences of such Presidential action — or inaction — than with issues of legal authorization. Even so, the central problem of Presidential ability to "discharge" the required "powers and duties" while abroad is pervasive and warrants further examination. Is it possible for the President, despite his temporary location and his busy schedule, to carry out his executive responsibilities, and does he in fact do so? On the basis of past practice, the President usually goes abroad specifically to exercise the foreign relations functions of his office. That he cannot be fulfilling every executive function at all moments is obvious, regardless of where he may be located. The questions, therefore, are whether his judgment respecting priorities among his responsibilities is sound (which is essentially a political determination) and, more particularly, whether he is delinquent in the performance of any specific obligation (which may be a legal matter, but which normally will be liberally construed).

Transportation and communications facilities determine whether the President can discharge his duties while away from the seat of government. Surprisingly, as early as his era, President Grant saw no serious delimitations in this respect. "Fortunately," he told Congress, "the rapidity of travel and of mail communication and the facility of almost instantaneous correspondence with the offices at the seat of government which the telegraph affords to the President in whatever section of the Union he may be enable him in these days to maintain as constant and almost as quick intercourse with the Departments at Washington as may be maintained while he remains in the capital."[48]

As facilities for transporting the President and for maintaining direct, constant and immediate communication with the nerve centers of governance have developed and improved, it has become increasingly possible for the President, although abroad, to remain well informed concerning the affairs of state and in close contact with officials in Washington. He is better able to do so today than was George Washington when, in 1789, he signed a letter to the Emperor of Morocco — the first summit-level communication of an American President — while he was at Mount Vernon and the provisional capital was located approximately 150 miles away at Philadelphia. With modern jet travel a messenger can reach Washington from any point on the globe in a good deal less time than one could travel between Paris and the capital at

[48] *Congressional Record,* Volume 4, Part 3, *op. cit.,* p. 2999.

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the end of World War I, or, for that matter, between New York and Washington in 1800.

Whether the President actually does discharge his duties while abroad is another matter, essentially a question of fact. Involved are elements of Presidential character and disposition, executive organization, and judgments regarding priorities — which pertain equally whether the President is at the capital, at Camp David, at a summer White House, or in Kabul. Whereas some matters will be postponed during his absence from the country, others, often including some which have nothing to do with his foreign trip, will be handled en route. Presidents are serious about their duties and plan carefully the management of their executive responsibilities while they are away from the seat of government, even if the purpose is simply to vacation or to convalesce in a hospital.

It is current practice for the President to keep key staff members readily at hand at all times and to establish a "temporary White House" wherever he may be, in order not to disrupt the continuity of his executive performance.[49] He remains in constant contact with Washington by means of a direct radiotelephonic circuit to the White House, which can link him with any agency of the government he requires, and technological developments are bound to improve his communication facilities further. Letters, documents and legislative proposals needing his consideration and signature are attended to insofar as possible before he leaves the capital. Depending on the length of time he will be away, the routine signing of certain documents, such as commissions, and sometimes legislation, may be deferred until his return. More pressing correspondence and documents, either prepared by his staff on the spot or flown from Washington, generally are signed en route.

President Johnson carried on as much of the normal business of

[49]In his memoirs, President Truman has written: "When a President of the United States leaves Washington, even on a short trip, many special operations and people are set in motion. But when he travels overseas under wartime conditions, it is a vast undertaking. It is hard to picture all that is involved in getting a President off to a conference such as the one I was about to attend in Potsdam. The fact that this was to be a meeting with heads of other governments called for extraordinary planning of transportation, housing, protection and security, communications, protocol, and staffs. . . . I had to do a great deal of traveling as President, but wherever I went I was accompanied by at least a part of the executive branch of the government. . . ." *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), Volume 1, p. 232. On this point, also see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 506-507.

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the Chief Executive as he could while on his Pacific trip to attend the Manila Conference in 1966. This required a constant flow of cables and other messages, the reception, preparation and transmittal of correspondence, and frequent telephonic consultation with Washington. As noted, the President may even have designated Congressional enactments brought to him halfway round the globe for executive action. Thus, Johnson signed the International Education Act while he was in Bangkok.

Should the President be obliged to curtail his trip and return to the United States to deal with a pressing problem, the Presidential plane can fly him to Washington in only a few hours, and usually an auxiliary plane is held immediately available in the event trouble develops with the principal aircraft. Before the air age, President Wilson had to spend considerably more time crossing the Atlantic by ship in order to return to Washington for a week in the midst of the Paris Conference to defend his negotiations on the League of Nations Covenant, sign legislation, and deal with other matters related to the adjournment of Congress early in March 1919. Sometimes the President schedules a "rest period" during a foreign trip, which affords a planned respite for catching up with his regular responsibilities. In short, while abroad he is disposed to continue as many of his executive duties as circumstances allow, even though they are unrelated to his foreign trip.

Nevertheless, some doubt remains whether the Presidency is as mobile as the President. The belief that the White House is wherever the President chances to be is a myth; prolonged absences from the center of executive activity must impair somewhat the effective performance of some of his duties. When he is on the move or deeply involved in serious discussions or negotiation on the other side of the globe he is not fully accessible to his executive assistants. Unless he is, decisions will be deferred or will be made at lower levels, and in some cases actions may not be taken.[50]

Finally, perhaps the most important problem in this respect is the immediate availability of the President to fulfill responsibilities only he can exercise at such critical times as a Berlin

[50]Dean Rusk put it this way: "Unless the President is accessible, decisions on important matters are postponed by sympathetic subordinates or settled at the level of the common denominator among the departments and agencies concerned." (Rusk, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-363.) Similarly, Louis W. Koenig warns: "In leaving Washington, the traveling President removes himself from vital tasks which only he can do and which may be crucial to his policy projects." *The Chief Executive* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p. 202.

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blockade, a North Korean invasion, or, above all, sudden nuclear attack or the threat of nuclear challenge. This imperative responsibility for decision-making in crises devolves solely upon him, and its proper exercise is rendered more difficult if not impossible when the President is thousands of miles from his intelligence center, a good many of his chief advisers, and the apparatus that has been perfected to assist him in coping with such situations. Rusk has raised the question whether the present strategic situation does not place "a considerable premium upon the immediate availability of the President and Commander-in-Chief." His absence from the United States in the nuclear age — though technically easier and in this era of summit diplomacy more alluring than ever before — suggests what Rusk calls a "contingent" inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.[51] This potential inability may have become far more important to the affairs of state than formulary inability in any juridically definable sense.

Conclusions

In summary, there is no overt or implied constitutional prohibition on the President which legally restrains him from being temporarily away from the seat of government, from going abroad, or from exercising his "powers and duties" outside the United States. The President's responsibility is indivisible and continuous. He cannot delegate part of his powers and duties as Chief Executive temporarily to another officer while he goes abroad, and, except in the event of disability to perform his functions because of illness,[52] they cannot be assumed by another officer as long as the President remains in office.[53]

[51]Rusk, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

[52]In 1958 the President and Vice President concluded and published an agreement to the effect that in the case of the President's "inability" to discharge his functions the Vice President, in accordance with a prescribed procedure, would succeed temporarily to the powers and duties of the Presidency until such time as the President was enabled to resume them. Although the nature of "inability" was not circumscribed in the agreement, presumably it was intended to be applied to physical incapacitation. For the text of the agreement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958* (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 196-197; for later arrangements of this nature, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961,* pp. 561-562; and *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965,* p. 1044. On March 15, 1964, President Johnson revealed that he also had such an agreement with Speaker of the House John W. McCormack; see *ibid.,* for 1963-1964, Volume 1, p. 364.

To provide for Presidential disability, and also for filling a vacancy in the office of Vice President, the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted in

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Because the President remains responsible for the total purview of his duties, it is essential that he be empowered to exercise full discretion as to the method, manner, time and place of discharging them. If he deems it advisable to undertake the performance of certain of these powers in a particular place, even if this be abroad, necessarily his other functions may be performed in that place to the extent this is reasonable and physically feasible. David Hunter Miller applies the obverse principle when he asserts that the fact that the President performs part of his duties in one place

1967. Section 3 specifies: "Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President." Section 4 also enables the Vice President and "a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" to certify to the Congress that the President is unable to discharge his functions, whereupon the Vice President similarly serves as Acting President. This amendment formalized procedures for dealing with disability and possible interregnum, but significantly makes no specific mention of Presidential inability because of absence from the national capital or going abroad. Also see Ruth C. Silva, *Presidential Succession* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951); *A Country Without a Man: A Study of Presidential Disability* (Richmond: Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, 1965); and Birch E. Bayh, *One Heartbeat Away: Presidential Disability and Succession* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1968).

[53]Evidencing the uncertainty surrounding the matter of Presidential succession in the event of disability, Edward S. Corwin queried: "Who is authorized to say whether a President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office? When he is unable to do so, does the said office become vacant? What is it to which the Vice President succeeds when the President is disabled . . . — to the 'powers and duties of the said office,' or to the office itself?" Regarding the cases of disability he examined, he added: "Apparently the most widely held view was that it was the duty of the Vice President alone to decide the issue of 'inability,' since if inability existed it was he who must act; but the case must be a clear one. . . ." (Corwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.) Also see virtually identical phrasing of the questions in the first quotation in Koenig, *op. cit.*, p. 70. Some of the problems raised by Professor Corwin were sought to be resolved by the Twenty-fifth Amendment.

On the matter of temporary inability due to absence, Corwin has written: "While it seems not to have occurred to Washington, in connection with any of his numerous tours, to ask Adams to act for him during his absence, an unwritten rule later developed that when the President was on an extended jaunt, the Vice President should hover in the neighborhood of the Capital. But even this rule was violated in October 1935 when both President and Vice President were out of the country." (*Op. cit.*, p. 403.) He referred to President Roosevelt's vacation tour aboard the *U.S.S. Houston* from the west coast via the Panama Canal — with a brief visit to President Harmodio Arias of Panama — to the east coast (October 3-25) while Vice President John Nance Garner was on a trip to the Far East (October 12-December 20). Garner participated in the installation of Manuel Quezon as President of the Philippines and visited Japan to be received by Emperor Hirohito.

President Eisenhower pointed out that Vice President Richard M. Nixon "helped to make my trips possible by always staying close to the seat of government during any prolonged absence of mine." (*The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965], p. 486.) Nevertheless, both he and the Vice President were simultaneously out of the country on two occasions: in 1953, when the President attended the Bermuda Conference (December 4-8) and

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cannot, as a consequence, constitute an "inability" on his part to discharge the other powers and duties of his office.[54]

Many criticisms may be directed at Presidential foreign trips in general, or at any particular venture abroad in response to the lure of the summit. It may be contended that the Chief Executive is needed at home, that he is unfit for the task, that the trip may endanger Presidential and national prestige, that the objectives of the trip are politically or diplomatically unwise, that the President should avoid the risk of danger to his person in foreign lands, or simply that the trip is unnecessary.[55] It cannot be established, however, that Presidential visits and negotiation abroad are unconstitutional, as long as the President is engaged in the discharge of any of his duties — and judgments on this are likely to be construed liberally in his favor. In this day of international involvement and the ascent to the summit, this reconfirms the genius of the American constitutional system.

the Vice President was away on a 70-day tour of 20 countries of the Far East, South Asia and the Middle East, and in 1957, when Eisenhower left for his second Bermuda Conference on March 20 and the Vice President returned on March 21 from his 22-day African visit to nine nations. Four years later, in 1961, President Kennedy went to Canada (May 16-18) while Vice President Johnson was abroad on a tour of six South and Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong. Thus, while it is still somewhat unusual for the President and Vice President to be out of the country at the same time, it is no longer unique.

A special problem occurs when the country is without a Vice President, as during the first administrations of Presidents Truman and Johnson. At such a time the Chief Executive rarely ventures abroad except to visit Canada or Mexico. The principal exceptions have been Truman's participation in the Potsdam and Rio conferences in 1945 and 1947.

[54]Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[55]On the President's personal participation in diplomatic affairs, see Keith Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), and Elmer Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States* (College Park, Md.: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1958). Shorter analyses include Dean Acheson, "Meetings at the Summit: A Study in Diplomatic Method," Address at University of New Hampshire, May 8, 1958 (Durham: University of New Hampshire, 1958); Johan Galtung, "Summit Meetings and International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research,* No. 1, 1964, pp. 36-54; Miller, *op. cit.*; Richard L. Worsnop, "Heads-of-State Diplomacy," *Editorial Research Reports,* December 1962, pp. 873-892, and "Presidential Diplomacy," *ibid.,* September 1971, pp. 737-758.

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THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE: CURRENT DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES

by John Yochelson

IN two respects Senator Mike Mansfield's unsuccessful attempt in May 1971 to obtain a 50 per cent reduction of U.S. troops in Europe by the end of the year marked a turning point in the American debate concerning NATO. First, the Democratic majority leader raised his challenge from one aimed previously at inducing the Administration to modify the U.S. military posture to one aimed at forcing such change through legislative action. His effort escalated a dispute over policy into a conflict of institutional power between the Senate and the President. Second, Mansfield moved toward transforming a strenuous but limited debate within an American political elite into a matter of popular concern. Intense news coverage awakened a disinterested public, at least momentarily, creating a potential source of leverage for contenders within the elite and probably injecting troop levels into the 1972 election campaign.

In questioning the appropriate expression of the military engagement in Europe, Mansfield evoked an issue that has smoldered and periodically erupted since the "Great Debate" on the NATO commitment in 1951. During the Atlantic Alliance's early years, a wide range of problems related to the U.S. military presence was for the most part thrashed out within the executive branch of the American government, which enjoyed strong bipartisan support from Congress.[1] By the mid-1960's, however, debate widened as a group of Senators led by Mansfield began to doubt the rationale for maintaining the equivalent of five combat divisions in West Germany. Arguing that this stance was unjustified militarily, economically and politically, they threatened passage of resolutions calling for substantial reduction. This tactic proved largely ineffective, particularly when the Nixon Administration announced its determination in the fall of 1970 to

[1]Cf. William T.R. and Annette Baker Fox, *NATO and the Range of American Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), Chapter 8.

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maintain current troop strength until at least July 1972 "unless there is reciprocal action [to reduce] by our adversaries."[2]

Failure to sway Administration policies led to Mansfield's direct intervention to amend them. Timing his initiative with a May 1971 monetary crisis sparked by large speculative flows of dollars to Europe, he proposed a cutoff of funds by the end of the calendar year for any troops in excess of 150,000. The White House, surprised by this challenge, mobilized a remarkable lobbying campaign against it. The effort might have fallen short had not Leonid Brezhnev — in the midst of the Senate debate — suddenly invited the West to enter negotiations on a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. This offer, coupled with the President's announcement of a breakthrough in strategic arms limitation talks, undercut Mansfield by suggesting that negotiations with the Soviets could be fruitful and by pointing up that unilateral cutbacks would prevent the United States from bargaining convincingly for reciprocal reductions from the Warsaw Pact. The Mansfield proposal was rejected by the considerable though not overwhelming margin of sixty-one votes to thirty-six, and a series of less stringent measures was similarly disposed of.[3]

The late spring crisis faded quickly. In spite of efforts to keep the issue alive, public interest waned and the Administration emerged free of Congressional shackles to pursue possible talks on mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR). Nevertheless, the domestic constraints on the American position had been highlighted as never before. Fifty-eight Senators, including some of the most articulate of Mansfield's opponents, had in one form or another expressed opposition to the status quo. Mansfield himself was able to proclaim in remarks before the Senate that the U.S. military presence was now "on the front burner." Thus lines were drawn for the next round of debate.

The Mansfield phenomenon raises important questions regarding the nature of the American NATO debate — its apparent resistance to long-term policy application, its participants and their objectives, its rhetoric and argumentation, and its likely course in the next several years. The debate is inherently relevant not only because it exposes patterns of competition on a major issue but because it provides insights on the international relations dimension of the U.S. engagement in Europe. Despite the fact that

[2]*New York Times,* December 4, 1970, p. 1.

[3]For the final debate and voting on the Mansfield proposal, perfecting amendments and alternatives, see the *Congressional Record,* May 19, 1971, pp. S7363-S7447.

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American troop levels are partially a function of intra- and inter-alliance bargaining as well as of special bilateral relationships, final decisions are invariably made in Washington.[4] This article analyzes the development of the American debate during the Nixon Administration. Part one examines in general terms the scope and structure of the discussion. Part two focuses on objectives, arguments and outcomes in the debates within the executive branch and between it and Congress. The conclusion discusses some of the main factors that will bear upon future decisions.

Scope and Structure of the Debate

On the whole, the politics of the military presence in Europe has been the preoccupation of a policy elite. Troop stationing has generally failed to arouse either the public at large or interest groups outside the foreign policy establishment. The concern of Americans with domestic problems, Viet Nam and the Middle East — compounded by an aversion to cope intellectually with the complex issue of European security — has been translated more into disinterest than hostility. Before the May 1971 confrontation public opinion indicators had never been cited by proponents or opponents of Administration policy. Private interests, which are frequently decisive in other contexts, seem not to have given troop levels in Europe high priority.

It is too early to determine whether the Senate challenge will succeed over the long run in expanding the scope of debate. Mansfield and his colleagues were for the first time able to point to overt manifestations of public concern.[5] Yet the issue failed to sustain a high level of interest, for the likely reason that stationing troops in a peacetime situation is not a matter compelling daily attention. This does not mean that public pressure might not be brought to bear effectively when the problem is next dramatized, or that awareness of a potentially hostile climate of opinion will not affect the perceptions and judgments of the Administration.

[4]The intra-alliance perspective is developed in Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). The inter-alliance perspective is in Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Détente Diplomacy: The United States and European Security in the 1970's* (Cambridge: University Press of Cambridge, 1970). The two most important sets of bilateral relationships bearing on the U.S. military presence yet extending beyond alliance structures are those with West Germany and the Soviet Union, the former because of special offset arrangements on troop stationing and the latter because of global strategic considerations.

[5]Mansfield entered 138 documents favorable and unfavorable to his position in five installments of the *Congressional Record*. See the *Record* of June 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1971, pp. S8379-S8388, S8453-S8467, S8582-S8593, S8705-S8717, S8882-S8896.

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For the moment, however, one of the distinguishing features of the issue is the preponderant role of elite politics.

The policy elite dealing with the European military presence is neither cohesive nor compact. Within the executive branch three cabinet departments — Defense, State and Treasury — have ongoing interests, as do the Bureau of the Budget, the intelligence agencies, the White House staff and the National Security Council apparatus. On the legislative side, eight Senate, House and joint committees are regularly involved.[6] Contending participants frequently call upon a cadre of specialists outside government for advice or for arguments to support their already formulated positions. The outsiders, who are mostly in research institutes or universities, may also exert influence through writings in academic journals, magazines or the daily press. The *Washington Post* and *New York Times* are widely employed as forums for debate within the elite, and their prestigious columnists might be counted as parts of it.

Although the concerned minority has never been in total accord on U.S. military policy in Europe, disagreements during the past five years have reached a peak previously unknown. Long-standing debates within the executive branch became intense in the later years of the Johnson Administration, while the broad consensus between Congress and President was broken on troop levels as on so many other issues. In both cases, parochial interests within the policy elite have gained increasing importance. Since it is recognized that elections will not be won or lost because of the level of American forces in Europe, those who defend or oppose policies can give greater latitude to their own views. Most of the participants know each other well and contend over a wide range of matters. Constant interaction reinforces the role of personal factors, bureaucratic alliances and trade-offs between one issue and another. The psychological and intellectual makeup of individuals has taken on added significance, while the duration of the debate has introduced an element of rigidity in the positions of many.

Coordination of decision-making within the policy elite is difficult under the best of circumstances.[7] The large size and diverse

[6]Senate committees include Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Government Operations and Armed Forces. House committees include Foreign Affairs, Appropriations and Military Affairs. The principal joint committee is the Joint Economic Committee.

[7]A thorough analysis of organizational problems within the foreign policy bureaucracy is contained in I. M. Destler, "Presidents and Bureaucrats," Ph.D. dissertation submitted at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, June 1971.

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interests of the American bureaucracy often lead to intense conflicts within governmental agencies as well as between them. Often participants give the impression that the United States speaks with several voices rather than one. Their public statements are sometimes misleading because they may be intended primarily for domestic effect or consumption abroad. Access to and influence upon the elite poses unusual problems for American allies, whose own politics may be vitally affected by decisions that lie beyond their immediate control. The bureaucracies dealing with the NATO partners can be expected in varying degree to take account of the latter's interests within the counsels of the elite. This indirect access, however, is more often than not supplemented by direct personal contacts in the White House, Congress, and the Defense and State Departments. Through this complex and unwieldy process, the multitude of variables considered are brought into the system. In the end, outcomes behind closed doors are reached for reasons that can never be fully known by outsiders.

Elite politics tends to complicate rather than simplify the analysis of decision-making with respect to the U.S. presence. The "rules of the game" may change, new contenders enter or depart, and organizational patterns and real distributions of power vary. The behavior of the elite lends itself to little predictability because of the interplay of personal and situational factors.

A structure nonetheless exists which gives some form to the issue. The main observation to be made about it is that forces within the political system prevent long-term decisions from being made. This is a fundamental and occasionally overlooked point. Two highly qualified specialists maintained not long ago that "the cloud of substantial U.S. withdrawals has hung over Europe for a dozen years. It will remain until the Mansfield Resolution is fought out and a consensus is reached on how many troops we will keep in Europe and why."[8] The Mansfield proposal has been fought out, yet few would assert that the controversy is over. U.S. policy will be re-argued and the troop level decision remade several times in this decade, as it was in the past. True, a series of short-term decisions, on the pattern observable until now, could provide a continuity resembling a long-term accord on the U.S. presence. It is also true that any reductions in forces will be irreversible unless unforeseen developments occur. The issue,

[8]Leslie H. Gelb and Morton H. Halperin, "Why 300,000 GI's Remain in Europe," *Washington Post*, December 20, 1970, p. D 1.

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however, will be faced repeatedly not only because conditions in Europe will change but because the American political process resists long-term policies regarding a military structure that has become institutionalized during the past two decades.

Five predominantly internal factors contribute significantly to this condition: the budget cycle, the introduction of new military technology, the system of federal elections, the prerogatives of Congress, and the balance of payments situation. Together they act to raise and re-raise the issue in diverse, overlapping contexts.

The annual budget discussion poses the American presence continuously as a problem of bargaining within the executive branch and between executive agencies and Congress. Within the federal bureaucracy each department must compete for its share of funds to be programmed during an upcoming fiscal year. The Defense Department allocation, once determined, must be distributed among military services, weapons systems and geographic areas. This process of matching limited resources against requirements leads to the sorting out and assignment of priorities, usually after much internal negotiation. The sheer momentum of the ongoing military presence in Europe means that it is never considered in terms of a base line zero, but rather in terms of marginal increments or reductions. Nonetheless, each cycle poses new problems whose solutions must be defended before the appropriations committees of Congress. Once routine with respect to most military requirements, this procedure has assumed great importance because of cleavages between the two branches over foreign policy. Congress has an instrument of control built into the system through its power of the purse, a power some members have shown increasing willingness to exercise on a broad range of security issues as they come up for yearly review.

The introduction of new technology, particularly through the planning process of the Defense Department, raises the question of the European engagement in a different manner. The objective is to cost out, develop and implement with sufficient lead time new systems which modernize the American military apparatus. As a result, the physical requirements of forces in Europe become enmeshed in the budgetary process over a three to five year period while at the same time being constantly reviewed and updated. New technology has moved consistently in the direction of substituting hardware for manpower on the ground. In 1956 the Radford Plan envisaged worldwide force reductions on the grounds that small units armed with atomic weapons could replace

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larger, conventional contingents. In the 1960's, the "Big Lift" concept sought to take advantage of progress in air transport to reduce standing forces. Both plans were probably intended to bring about fundamental changes over a period of years, yet both were only partially realized. Their disclosure led to traumatic reaction abroad, especially in West Germany, and to subsequent revision of initial projections. Nevertheless, the impulse to apply new technology to the presence in Europe will continue to be reflected in the defense planning process.

The election system is a third factor militating against long-term solutions. A Chief Executive cannot count on more than four years in office, and his legislative support may change within two. This provides an automatic pressure for short-term agreements — note that President Nixon's 1970 force pledge did not extend beyond his term in office. New administrations have brought important changes in policy. In 1961 John F. Kennedy modified the Eisenhower approach to balance of payments deficits resulting from troops stationed in West Germany. In 1969 the incoming Nixon Administration altered plans-in-being to reduce some forces in Europe.[9] Thus the election system, by insuring relatively frequent turnovers of upper-echelon personnel, tends to encourage periodic reviews of past practices.

A fourth element structuring the troop level issue is the American Congress, whose instruments go beyond the function of voting budgetary appropriations. Other prerogatives include holding closed or public hearings, adopting resolutions, appointing special study groups, or passing legislation on matters peripheral to but affecting the troop level question, such as atomic energy. When, how and why these instruments are used is decided at the discretion of the legislators. Since the mid-1960's the misgivings of the legislative branch have been paralleled by increased use of Congressional prerogatives to question the policies of the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Until 1971, only means short of direct budgetary intervention had been employed to exert influence on the executive branch segment of the policy elite. The threat to deny funds represented an escalation, but it must be seen in the light of the broad powers the legislative branch may exercise.

[9]See *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, Hearing* before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, Part 10, 1970, p. 2067. (Hereafter cited as *Senate Security Hearing.*)

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A final factor that has received much attention is the balance of payments situation. Computations of America's commercial and capital transactions with other countries inevitably include an identifiable negative item: the cost of the troops based in Europe. This drain has touched off heated controversy regarding the economic consequences of troop stationing, the adequacy and implications of agreements aimed at offsetting some of the outlays, and the relationship between military expenditures abroad and the handling of the overall American deficit.[10] The simple and frequent reminder that the U.S. presence in Europe plays a role in balance of payments difficulties provides a lever for those favoring reduction of the American effort on political and military as well as economic grounds. A seemingly narrow debate over the net effects of troop stationing may in reality be part of a wider conflict whose participants have opposing foreign policy and domestic objectives. The use of the 1971 dollar crisis by Senator Mansfield was only the most recent illustration of linkage between unfavorable news on the U.S. international monetary position and demands for cutbacks in military expenditures. This pattern, first established under President Eisenhower, was repeated intermittently during succeeding administrations. As long as the United States incurs deficits — be they for temporary or structural reasons — the economic vulnerability of force maintenance in Europe will continue to be exposed by some members of the elite.

Of course, these five factors cannot by themselves account for the inability of the political system to grapple on a long-term basis with the issue of the European presence. One must consider the mixed pattern of continuity and change in the international environment, particularly in U.S.-Soviet relations. Unsureness about the basis of this relationship has been reflected in confusion over the American NATO contribution, which has in turn been exacerbated by Western Europe's continuing military dependence in the face of economic prosperity. Additionally, domestic malaise and Congressional dissatisfaction regarding U.S. security commitments abroad have affected thinking about NATO and have further increased pressures to make short-term calculations.

[10]For a pertinent overall critique of economic issues see John Newhouse, *et al., U.S. Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs and Choices* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), Chapter 5. On offset agreements with West Germany see Horst Mendershausen, *Troop Stationing in Germany: Value and Cost* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5881-PR, 1968). On troop stationing in the context of balance of payments constraints see Lawrence B. Krause, "A Passive Balance of Payments Strategy for the United States," in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 3/1970 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 339-368.

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The multiplicity of factors conditioning participation, structure and outcomes in the American debate suggests that there is not one single argument between those who favor and those who oppose present policies. Rather, we have an ongoing, multifaceted negotiation whose participants have widely disparate motives, interests and priorities. Bargaining and coalition-building occur within all of the organizations involved, which can rarely if ever be thought of as unitary actors. In simplified terms, however, the fundamental sets of negotiations can be described as twofold: first, within the executive branch over the formation and implementation of policy; second, between the executive branch and Congress over the defense of policy. The two debates are interrelated not only because of legislative constraints on executive decision-making but because Congressmen are themselves actors who can affect the implementation of policies abroad. Participants therefore frequently change positions in a variety of domestic and international contexts. Situational factors — the budget, the balance of payments, the acquisition of technology, the state of Congressional-executive relations — are all significant and may be decisive in either debate. In order to analyze these phenomena in greater detail, it is useful to turn to the development of the dual debate during the current Administration.

The Dual Debate

The dual debate during the Nixon Administration has evolved in two phases. During the first, the executive branch sought to develop a medium-term position on the U.S. military posture in Europe. The main participants were the bureaucratic organizations charged with the required study, although the NATO allies sought entry and influence through a parallel alliance review (AD 70), which was used to legitimize the need for significant conventional capabilities in Europe. At the same time, Senate proponents of substantial reduction threatened passage of the Mansfield Resolution unless the executive branch acted to cut back. Phase one ended with the Nixon decision to hold the line, thereby signaling a subsequent period of Administration defense and Congressional attack that is likely to continue until some manifest change in the status quo has occurred.

The Executive Branch

The striking characteristic of the debate within the Nixon Administration has been the degree of control exercised by the White

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House. Eschewing the example of his predecessor, who called in a respected outsider, John J. McCloy, to conduct a comprehensive examination of the American military presence in 1966-1967, Nixon directed that the machinery of the National Security Council (NSC) be employed for this function. Accordingly, a select number of high-ranking officials met after lengthy preparation at lower echelons to assist in making the final policy choice. The various inputs of governmental agencies were coordinated through the NSC staff, headed by the President's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. By design, this procedure is intended to meet the personal decision-making needs of the Chief Executive.[11] In the formulation of questions, working sessions within the affected agencies, and reviews and presentation of the issues, Kissinger and his staff act to provide as many practicable alternatives to the President as possible.

The Administration appraisal, which began early in 1970 and was delayed several times during the summer, culminated in a National Security Council meeting in November. Three main options were reported to have emerged:[12] (1) maintenance of a force upward of 250,000 as part of a NATO defense capable of repelling a large-scale conventional attack conventionally; (2) reduction to a 150,000-200,000-man force capable of limited conventional defense but tailored to respond to massive attack with "clean" battlefield nuclear weapons; (3) reduction to a force of 50,000 men, which would signify a virtually automatic reliance on nuclear weapons to respond to anything more than a minor border incident.

The President appears to have eliminated the third option, and by maintaining present forces over the short run to have kept both of the others open. Both seem consistent with the strategy of flexible response in seeking a significant measure of defensive capability to reinforce the deterrent posture of the United States. The difference between the two would appear to be that a larger force tends to place the onus for initial use of nuclear weapons on an attacker, who might be required to employ them to achieve needed battlefield superiority. A medium-sized force, on the other hand, might lead to first use by a defender in order to avoid being overrun conventionally. It seems plausible, though by no means

[11]An exposition of this process is in Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, The White House, February 18, 1970. A descriptive analysis is in Brooke Nihart, "New Staff System After One Year," *Armed Forces Journal*, April 4, 1970.

[12]*New York Times*, November 9, 1970, p. 12.

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certain, that the President postponed a definitive choice between the first and second options and concentrated on the tactical issue of maintaining current forces for political reasons. This would enable him to maximize the number of cards in his hand, a reaction conforming to his temperament and taking cognizance of the uneasy relationship between the United States and the USSR.

The mix of factors that influenced Nixon will never be determined exactly. The unknowns of the German political situation certainly encouraged his conservatism, whether one interprets the maintenance of current forces as support of *Ostpolitik* or as a reminder that the Federal Republic ought not to go too far, too fast in normalization of relations with its Eastern neighbors. In either case, the control function of American forces seems to have been an important consideration. The Germans and other Europeans applied considerable pressure on Nixon to oppose reduction. Unpredictable events during the summer of 1970, notably Soviet violation of the Rogers Plan formula on missile construction near the Suez Canal and rumored establishment of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, had also to be taken into account. While neither of these episodes bore directly on the situation in Europe, Nixon may have felt that a force reduction there, with its symbolic connotations, would be interpreted as a slackening of American will in face of the new Soviet maneuvering. It can therefore be argued that his decision was a highly reflexive, personal one, unrelated to the elaborate decision-making structure. This view is supported by the President's statement a full month before the NSC meeting on European strategy that present U.S. forces would not be reduced unilaterally.[13]

The role of the bureaucracy, nevertheless, cannot be discounted. The recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to reduce American forces by 10 per cent was leaked by the White House within days of the key NSC meeting.[14] This would indicate that highly placed officials believed there was some basis for a decision other than the one taken. In rough form, the known positions of some of the major governmental participants could be summarized as follows: The State Department, though divided internally, opposed any reduction because of its demoralizing impact on NATO and its undermining effect upon possible force reduction talks with the Warsaw Pact. This predominant State Department view was basically shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though

[13] *Ibid.*, October 5, 1970, p. 1.
[14] *Ibid.*, November 12, 1970, p. 12.

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for somewhat different reasons. The Chiefs had in mind the adverse consequences of reduction on the military balance of forces in Europe. Other elements in the Defense Department argued that there were simply not sufficient funds to maintain existing force levels at the cost of reductions elsewhere. Secretary Laird appears to have ruled in favor of the latter group. The concern of the Treasury over balance of payments implications seems not to have been decisive. Finally, the White House staff felt generally that any major cut was unpropitious both politically and strategically, although Kissinger was said to have supported some token reductions to placate Congressional opinion.[15]

It is worth noting that disagreement within the Nixon Administration on the approach to the military presence in Europe is much less intense than under previous Presidents. Four years ago Robert McNamara was arguing for a 75,000-man cutback against the opposition of the State Department and his own Joint Chiefs of Staff.[16] The transfer of 35,000 troops to dual bases in the United States emerged in part as a compromise in this internal executive controversy. Under Nixon, steps have been taken to heal old rifts. Secretary of Defense Laird is more disposed to listen to professional soldiers than were either McNamara or Clark Clifford. The political section of the Defense Department, International Security Affairs, has been intentionally downgraded to insure that primary responsibility in this area lies with the White House. In addition, the President's executive style and personal interest as well as the use of his delegated authority by Kissinger tend to encourage coherence.

Undoubtedly the threatening shadow of Congressional action also serves to draw together various groups in the Administration. Despite existing differences among government agencies, none advocates the substantial reductions demanded by Senator Mansfield and his colleagues. Furthermore, the Congressional opposition questions not only the substance of policy but the prerogative of the executive to pursue it. The Administration is thus doubly placed on the defensive. Its meticulous evaluation of the military presence in Europe, the President's consultation of former high-ranking officials from both political parties, and the public explanations of the need for American forces are all elements in the defense of the executive position.

[15] *Ibid.*, December 25, 1970, p. 6.
[16] *Senate Security Hearing*, pp. 2061-2069.

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The Legislative Opposition

The attention given to the arguments of the legislators who oppose the Administration has taken little note of their domestic political objectives. Without reference to these, however, the debate loses much of its meaning. Two different but complementary goals brought together a group of Senators and Congressmen from both sides of the political aisle. First is the desire to influence executive policy in a specific direction, i.e., to move the Administration toward a decisive readjustment of the defense burden in Europe. Basically this means a reduction of U.S. forces, although some legislators would accept a solution short of that if the European partners could be persuaded to subsidize the American presence heavily.[17] The second goal is to use the troops in Europe issue as an opportunity to exert control over the executive. In this sense, some legislators are acting in a broader context of executive-Congressional relations because of general dissatisfaction with the past and present course of U.S. security policy.[18]

The Mansfield Resolution appears to have been expressly designed as an instrument of influence and was so employed by the majority leader. He never brought the resolution to a final vote, despite having found a Senate majority in favor, because the threat of passage was more valuable politically than passage itself. Adoption would not bind the President to reduce forces in Europe, and could put Senatorial sponsors in the uncomfortable position of either admitting their impotence or taking further action under unknown circumstances. Inversely, the possibility that the resolution could be made a matter of record placed the Administration under obvious pressure by publicly demonstrating that present policies lacked solid domestic political support. The Adminstration had to decipher what was meant by the resolution's call for substantial reductions and what the ultimate intention of the Senate opposition might be. The vagueness of the "substantial

[17]This position has been associated with Senator Charles Percy. See Percy's article, "We're Paying Too Much for NATO," *Washington Monthly*, July 1970.

[18]Administration critics in the Senate must be viewed as a coalition of single actors of varying motivation rather than as a homogeneous unit. It has been maintained that Mansfield, on the basis of his overall record of cooperation with the executive branch, is far more interested in the specific issue of troops than the broader question of institutional power. Other Senators such as J. William Fulbright, on the other hand, appear to be primarily concerned with the assertion of Congressional prerogatives. Some of the nuances of position within the Senate opposition were brought out in the May 1971 debate.

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reduction" formula provided important advantages as an instrument of influence: it increased the pressure on the executive, provided a margin of maneuver for both the Administration and the Congress, and strengthened the hand of American diplomats by providing a rationale for demands from NATO allies to quiet opposition at home.

Mansfield, a sophisticated politician with an unusual command of foreign affairs, had used the tactic of the resolution selectively since its introduction in August 1966. Prior to May 1971 his most vigorous attempt to push the Administration into action had occurred during the second session of the 91st Congress (1970), when he gathered fifty-one signatures including those of Republican conservatives such as Peter Dominick and John Williams, moderates such as Marlow Cook and John Sparkman, and liberals such as Edward Kennedy and William Proxmire. During the months preceding Nixon's late-1970 decision, pressure on the Administration was increased through public hearings in the House of Representatives and executive sessions in the Senate. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee counseled the State Department to "let heads of the various other governments realize they had better prepare themselves for a withdrawal of U.S. forces."[19] Senators William Fulbright and Stuart Symington emphasized the deterioration of the American economy and cited the risk of "going broke" spending on conventional defenses.

Failure of the tacit and explicit threats of the legislators to sway the Administration strengthened their desire to control the executive. After the Nixon decision Mansfield warned:

> And may I say in conclusion that it would be my intention not only to try to do something through a sense of the Senate resolution, but I think the time has arrived to go beyond that, and to introduce an appropriate type of legislation to an authorization bill or an appropriation bill at the appropriate time.[20]

His attempt to make good his threat reflected a broader and deeper conflict between the legislative and executive branches which extends to the President's prerogatives to pursue current policies. The Democratic leadership of the Senate, with frequent

[19]Congressman Leonard Farbstein, in *United States Relations with Europe in the Decade of the 1970's, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, released May 17, 1970, p. 53. (Hereafter cited as *House of Representatives Hearings.*)

[20]*Congressional Record,* May 17, 1971, p. S7105 (reprint of December 1, 1970 debate).

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bipartisan support, has challenged the executive authority on matters ranging from dispatching ground forces to Cambodia to the continuation of the anti-ballistic missile program. Most recently this trend has been demonstrated by a spate of amendments aiming at more rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet Nam and by the introduction of legislation to define Presidential warmaking powers. The real issue is one of institutional prerogative: the Senate is determined to assert Congressional authority over an allegedly closed executive unresponsive to the will of the people's elected representatives. From this point of view, the question of the American NATO contribution is one pretext among many, and Mansfield's efforts are directed more at the domestic balance of power than the one in Europe. A Senate colleague offered the following interpretation:

> Putting it in its broadest terms, I would say that his [Mansfield's] objective is a domestic one, a constitutional objective within the United States to restore to the Senate the powers—which over the whole cold war period extending back to our own great depression—those extraordinary powers which the Senate has gradually delegated to the President.[21]

Mansfield is undoubtedly concerned by both the policy and institutional aspects of the American NATO debate. His introduction of binding legislation to enforce a troop cut, however, revealed significant cross-cleavages within the Senate. Dominick of Colorado typified one current of opinion, declaring substantive agreement with major reductions in Europe but opposing the limitations on the executive inherent in the majority leader's proposal; other Senators agreed with Mansfield on the matter of control but found his proposed timetable too drastic; a third faction opposed any immediate unilateral reductions yet felt that the President should be required to report regularly to the Senate on the status of troop level negotiations within NATO and between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.[22] The net effect of these divisions was to dilute the support Mansfield had earlier mustered for his resolution, while at the same time suggesting that if the majority leader had lowered his sights he might have lost fewer votes. Whether because of intellectual commitment, a desire

[21]Senator Charles Mathias at proceedings of the Sixth American-German Conference, in *East-West Tensions VI* (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1970), p. 76.

[22]For Dominick's position see *Congressional Record,* May 11, 1971, p. S6621. Objections to the Mansfield timetable, though primarily tactical, were reflected in the Church amendment requiring a 50,000 rather than a 150,000 man reduction (*ibid.*, May 19, 1971, pp. S7424-S7435). Opposition to immediate troop reduction coupled with the requirement of executive reporting was noted in the Mathias amendment (*ibid.*, pp. S7408, S7420).

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to shake the Administration and the allies, or preparation of a future round of debate, Mansfield refused to soften his stand and was obliged to settle for the indirect pressure brought to bear by his appreciable minority support.

The political maneuvering that has characterized the evolution of the legislative-executive debate has had little effect upon its content. While styles of presentation and relative emphasis have varied according to the circumstances, the basic points of contention have remained the same. They can generally be categorized as strategic, economic and political.

Strategic Arguments. The strategic arguments in favor of a substantial troop reduction proceed from the premise that a force level of 300,000 in Europe is not needed to assure the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.[23] The opposition contends that the American military engagement is based upon compelling economic, ideological, cultural and historical ties. The expression of this engagement need by no means require four and one-third divisions in West Germany supported by a sizeable logistics network. On the contrary, the presence of a much smaller force could suffice as a visible symbol of the American stake in European security. As one Senator exclaimed, "all we really have to maintain in Europe is a garrison, in the sense of showing the flag, showing a commitment to Western Europe; and that garrison could be at any figure — 100,000, 200,000, 300,000."[24]

This view of American forces essentially as hostages has been supplemented by two more sophisticated arguments, whose differences reflect a trend away from the widely accepted flexible response theory of the 1960's. In 1966-1967, many among the opposition maintained that if troops were needed in a contingency, modern air transport could provide them quickly without sacrificing combat effectiveness. This capability was cited in the body of the Mansfield Resolution as one of the principal justifications for reducing standing forces. It implied that air mobility would strengthen the deterrent posture and that defense could be feasible were deterrence to fail. Recently, however, the opposition has developed a second tack — that any large-scale conventional defense of Western Europe is a bankrupt concept. In this assessment the withdrawal of France has deprived NATO of required

[23]The figure 300,000 is deceptive since it includes the Sixth Fleet as well as ground and air forces in NATO countries, Spain and North Africa. At issue are the approximately 220,000 personnel stationed in West Germany. The official strength of the U.S. European Command, 1950-1970, is in *ibid.*, May 13, 1971, p. S6882.

[24]Senator Mike Gravel in *ibid.*, p. S6871.

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depth; the Warsaw Pact can quickly mobilize overwhelming strength; and the existing U.S. force along the central front has such a small proportion of combat personnel that it must rely almost immediately on atomic weapons. Since present American formations provide no really significant conventional options, it behooves the Administration to streamline and adapt the force to meet its essentially tripwire function.[25]

The strategic arguments of the opposition Senators do not convey the isolationism attributed to them in some quarters. The engagement of the United States, if engagement is defined as intervention in case of aggression against Western Europe, is not in question. The Mansfield Resolution insisted that reduction could occur "without affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty," an assertion backed solidly in the 1971 Senate debate.

Economic Arguments. The opposition's adamant refusal to continue shouldering the postwar security burden at present levels is much more vividly brought out in its economic attacks on Administration policy. In the domestic context, the economic critique is the most politically potent and has received greatest emphasis from the proponents of reduction.[26] Three main themes are developed: First, the $14 billion total cost for U.S.-based and European-based American NATO forces is seen as wholly unreasonable in relation to allied defense efforts and the domestic needs of the United States. This gross estimate, which includes all administration and logistics as well as the portion of the strategic deterrent earmarked for NATO support, is viewed as much more than the nation can or should afford. The Administration is held directly responsible for its inability to obtain a more equitable distribution of effort within the alliance. Second, the alleged waste and inefficiency of forces stationed in Europe is cited. Emphasis is placed upon the high proportion of support troops and the inflated numbers of headquarters personnel and high-ranking officers. Using cost-effectiveness criteria, the opposition contends that the American taxpayer is not getting much for his dollar.

The third thrust of economic attack is directed against the balance of payments outlays associated with maintaining

[25]The recent critique has been formulated for the Senate opposition by Edward L. King. See *ibid.*, May 11, 1971, pp. S6680-S6686. King's advocacy of a deterrent posture without a large-scale conventional capability revives an unsettled fifteen-year-old strategic debate.

[26]See presentations of Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Symington and Ellender, *ibid.*, May 11, 1971, pp. S6679-S6680; May 17, 1971, pp. S7083-S7105; May 18, 1971, pp. S7227-S7230, S7242-S7251; May 19, 1971, pp. S7395-S7397.

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American servicemen and their 225,000 dependents in Europe. These expenditures are seen as a major factor contributing to the weakness of the United States' international monetary position as well as an indication of allied unwillingness to provide assistance. The opposition is particularly incensed at offset agreements whereby during the past several years West Germany has purchased medium-term American securities to cover part of the troop stationing deficit. These accords are seen as mere window dressing since the securities will ultimately be cashed in by the German *Bundesbank* for dollars. Thus the Senate opponents contend that the Administration is gravely damaging current and future U.S. economic interests because of an unrealistic commitment to deal with a hypothetical threat. Substantial force reduction should be taken as an initial step in righting the balance of payments situation.

In sum, the expense of current American policy is seen as totally disproportionate to both the benefits derived and the European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance:

> This is a great ride they have taken us on, and I congratulate them on their perspicacity. They have tremendously improved their financial position since World War II, and I give them full respect for being good traders, but I don't like to see the dollar fall apart, which is clearly what is happening today.[27]

The policy imperative to be drawn from this imbalance is that the United States must substantially reduce its NATO contribution and use this lever to force the allies to assume their fair share of responsibility. Since intra-alliance bargaining has failed to achieve acceptable results, America must act to protect the dollar and its economy as well as to restructure NATO.[28]

Political Arguments. The political arguments of the legislative opposition stress the failure of present policy to reflect the new realities of the 1960's and 1970's. The threat of war with the Soviet Union in Europe is said to have become increasingly remote, particularly in the climate attending West Germany's initiatives to improve relations with the East. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated that Soviet forces are intended to control populations in Eastern Europe rather than attack the West. Therefore, it is argued that the United States can

[27]Senator Symington, *Senate Security Hearing,* p. 2205.

[28]In order to provide meaningful savings, units withdrawn from Europe would have to be deactivated rather than returned to dual bases in the United States (see *House of Representatives Hearings,* p. 459). The implication of a unilateral reduction of the size of the armed forces may in part explain the neo-isolationist label attached to the Senate opposition.

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afford to reduce, but there are few grounds to expect the Soviets to do likewise because their troops serve an internal bloc function. At the same time, however, the thinning of the American presence would deprive the Soviets of one of their justifications for remaining in Eastern Europe and thereby make their position less tenable in the long run. The inability of both Democratic and Republican administrations to adjust the military posture to these factors is laid to an encrusted civilian bureaucracy and a military establishment desiring above all to perpetuate itself. This has made something sacrosanct of force levels in Europe, which should in fact be trimmed in keeping with Nixon's declared objective of lowering the American military profile abroad.

The Administration's Defense

The Administration has systematically sought to answer its Congressional critics.[29] Basically, the White House has responded to the rhetoric of retrenchment and new realities with the rhetoric of potential disaster. The American military presence is seen, in spite of its expense and its possible inequities, as part of a policy which has been a major security achievement. Those who would unilaterally reduce the force structure in Europe are portrayed as moving the United States from known success into unknown instability. The theme of untold military and political consequences, particularly at a time when the process could be controlled through East-West negotiation, recurs with great frequency in the defense of current policies.

With respect to strategy, the Administration points out that a credible and effective posture requires a full range of conventional and nuclear choices that can only be assured with substantial ground forces. In deterring the Warsaw Pact the West must have a convincing defense below the nuclear threshold in addition to a strategic retaliatory capability. American troops, the only ones in NATO tied by national bonds to the bulk of the nuclear forces of the alliance, provide the necessary options and must be present in large numbers. The Big Lift concept for deployment of troops to Europe during emergencies is a useful adjunct but no substitute for forces on the ground. A major unilateral reduction would have three negative effects on the American strategic position: (1) the

[29]Comprehensive statements of the Administration position are found in Undersecretary of State Elliot R. Richardson's address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, January 20, 1970 (reprinted in the *Congressional Record,* May 17, 1971, p. 7095), the testimony of Administration witnesses in *Senate Security Hearing,* and the President's February 25, 1971 report to Congress, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* pp. 24-45.

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military capabilities of forces in Western Europe would be severely weakened; (2) unilateral reduction would be interpreted as a weakening of political determination to use the deterrent; (3) the balance of forces outside Western Europe would be disturbed, notably in the Middle East where both superpowers are heavily committed. Unilateral reduction would be tantamount to disengagement.

The economic defense of present policies is a more delicate problem because it touches an area of shared interests between the Administration and the legislature. Privately, members of the executive branch have been most unhappy over the American share in NATO. The attempt to redistribute this share is a major diplomatic objective of the United States. In the international context the principal means used to extract concessions from allies is the Senate opposition, which American officials argue cannot be coped with unless the Europeans increase their efforts.

Here at home the executive branch is obliged to accentuate allied contributions and underplay the economic costs involved in troop stationing.[30] It is pointed out that the allies spent almost $23 billion on defense in 1969. The $14 billion cost of our NATO contribution is seen as clearly affordable and not disproportionately great in relation to the allied effort or the American gross national product. The five-year NATO burden-sharing scheme is hailed as a major achievement that will relieve the United States of expenditures to improve the alliance infrastructure. Present accords to offset balance of payments losses are defended on the grounds that they make up for 80 per cent of the military drain in West Germany on a yearly basis. Thus the net annual deficit attributable to troop stationing in Europe is said to be closer to $1 billion rather than the figure approaching $2 billion sometimes cited by Administration critics. The effects of this outflow are further lessened by the German central bank's pledge to refrain from converting dollars into gold (on the understanding that U.S. forces will be maintained).[31] In addition, it

[30]For a summary of the Administration's economic defense, see material supplied to an Administration supporter, Senator Henry Jackson, and read into the *Congressional Record,* May 18, 1971, p. S7239.

[31]This pledge, made in a letter from the former head of the *Deutsche Bundesbank,* Karl Blessing, to the U.S. Treasury, has been operative since March 1967. The Blessing letter does not exclude the *Bundesbank's* prematurely cashing medium-term securities into dollars under some conditions, nor does it guarantee the continuation of *Bundesbank* policy in the event of major American withdrawals.

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is emphasized that the budgetary costs of maintaining divisions in the United States would be greater than they actually are in Europe. Finally, the inequalities that exist are justified in terms of overriding national interest:

> We know the Allies could and should do more in their own defense. There is some imbalance between their efforts and ours, although the extent of the imbalance is often exaggerated. . . .
>
> In any event, alliances of sovereign states are seldom characterized by perfect concord and identical views about what constitutes a fair division of labor and sacrifice. Whatever we may feel about our allies' performance, our own decisions on this matter must rest upon a cool and objective calculation of the national security interest.[32]

Arguments based on national interest shift the defense of current policies to political terrain, where the Administration feels that it has a stronger position. The contention of the executive branch is that while the Soviet Union's goal of bringing Western Europe within its orbit has not changed in twenty-five years, Soviet tactics have been modified because of NATO's firm stand. A withdrawal of large numbers of American forces after such a heavy and successful investment might fatally weaken the reliability of the Atlantic Alliance and drive Western Europe toward political accommodation with the USSR. A unilateral reduction would inevitably be viewed throughout Europe as a sign of American weakness or disinterest. Lacking the military strength or political unity to defend themselves, the European allies would ultimately succumb to Soviet pressure. Most important, the influence of the United States in shaping the kind of Europe consistent with American interests would be sharply reduced. The standing forces are the most tangible evidence of the American stake in Europe, and a source of leverage upon friends and adversaries alike. To give up this counter precisely when hopes have been raised for MBFR, when the outcome of *Ostpolitik* remains critical and while the SALT talks are in progress would be folly.

The Fundamental Cleavage

The contrasting arguments show how far apart members of the policy elite remain with respect to this issue of prime importance. Their differences merit attention both because they represent alternatives for the future and because they reflect the deep-seated disagreement at the root of the system's inability to achieve consensus. Beneath the rhetoric of debate lie not only conflicting

[32]Hon. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, *Senate Security Hearing*, p. 2216.

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domestic political objectives but quite different conceptions of the rationale for the American presence. For critics of the Administration, the Cold War justification of the current military stance is neither credible nor realistic. The unpublicized basis for the presence — influencing West European politics — is neither desirable nor worth the price. The American posture is inconsistent with renewed European prosperity, the thaw in East-West relations, the revolution in weapons and transportation technology, the economic difficulties of the United States, and the increasing list of unmet domestic needs.

For the defenders of current policy, on the other hand, the shadow of the Cold War lurks in the delicate and unpredictable process of détente. The American presence remains part of the political, military and psychological underpinning that has enabled some positive development toward détente to occur. The utility of U.S. troops as an instrument of bargaining and control remains high in relation to the risks of its abandonment.

This fundamental cleavage is part of the political heritage of the 1960's. The stakes on both sides are great, and the conflict extends to broader issues of America's international role. For these reasons, short-term outcomes are unlikely to bring an orderly conclusion to the debate.

Looking Ahead

A medium-term projection of the American debate cannot be attempted without postulating basic conditions in the domestic and international environment. It is tempting and perhaps plausible to start from the supposition that a major reversal of internal and foreign priorities will not occur in the United States, a profound transatlantic political or economic crisis will be avoided, and the ambivalent relationship between the nuclear giants will not be transformed. In effect, this would mean "more of the same."[33] If such is the case, the American debate over the next three to five years will be characterized by increasing pressure to reduce the European presence significantly. In part this pressure will be due to the Congressional dissatisfaction discussed. Possible conversion to a small high-salaried volunteer army could also be an internal factor of importance. Further incentives toward reduction could be expected from greater East-West normalization,

[33]Implicit in these postulates is the assumption that the President-elect in 1972 will continue to oppose major unilateral reductions in Europe. During the 1971 Senate debate three Democratic hopefuls — Humphrey, Muskie and Jackson — declared themselves against the Mansfield proposal. Senators Bayh, Harris, Kennedy and McGovern voted in favor.

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British entry into the Common Market and developing West European arms cooperation.

Under the postulated circumstances, the key to the American debate will be how strongly demands for reduction are reflected in the domestic arena and to what extent they can be controlled or directed by the executive. The impetus to reduce can be expected to affect the perception of both sponsors and opponents of current policy — the former being reluctant to undertake sweeping change until progress toward a European settlement becomes more evident, the latter pressing for large alterations. Three minimum preconditions would seem necessary to give the executive a real chance of retaining the initiative domestically: (1) The holding of MBFR negotiations with the Warsaw Pact would be the greatest single asset of the Administration, provided some occasional progress could be reported. Domestic critics would be muffled on grounds that they were undermining the American position — a pattern already visible during SALT. A successfully negotiated agreement would do much to dampen the opposition, although most experts suggest that the process would be at least as complex as that experienced for strategic arms limitation. (2) An acceptable burden-sharing performance by the NATO allies would lessen criticism. On the other hand, the unwillingness of the Europeans to increase or at least maintain current efforts would gravely damage the alliance's support in the United States. (3) Some accommodation on the matter of executive and legislative prerogatives in foreign policy is necessary. Senator Mansfield's escalation of this aspect of the conflict was momentous, and an Administration's inability to defuse the situation could seriously affect its chances of gaining needed legislative support. One would expect the broad problem of executive-legislative prerogatives to depend heavily on outcomes in Southeast Asia, where the issue has received greatest attention.

But even if all preconditions were met, skill and circumstance would also be required to enable an Administration to retain its liberty of action. The ability of the executive to control the process of scaling down in Europe will probably reflect its success in limiting the scope of the domestic debate. The Administration can be expected to lobby vigorously to prevent the U.S. presence from becoming a major issue of public concern—fearing that the general climate of opinion might be hostile to maintenance of the expensive military apparatus. Strong pressure is likely to be placed on Congress to demonstrate that the security issues are too

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sensitive to be raised. Only in the last resort could a President be expected to take his case to the people.

If a skillful and lucky executive does succeed in retaining control, it would not be surprising to see more than two American divisions in Europe in 1975. This prediction cannot be made, however, without emphasizing the factors that could change the dimensions of the problem. The course of NATO politics, the relationship with the Soviet Union inside and outside Europe, the failure of SALT or the postponement of MBFR, and the political situation in West Germany could greatly modify the views of the American foreign policy elite. Mass public opinion or private interests could be drawn into the debate, particularly if a trade war develops between Western Europe and the United States. Failure to disengage from Viet Nam and a further worsening of the balance of payments could work to change the current policy stance. The outlook for the future is by no means clear. Some reduction is on the way, but the real questions are when, by how much, and under what circumstances.

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IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW CHINA POLICY

by Gerhart Niemeyer

"ONE cannot simply ignore the existence of 700 million Chinese." For many, this assertion comprises all that is significant about the problem of recognizing one or the other government of China. The statement, however, has nothing to say about whether Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Kai-shek rightfully represents the 700 million Chinese. Mao, to be sure, can make his will prevail among the people of the mainland. If the sheer fact of power were allowed to be the last word on such a question, one would have to conclude that in the 1930's Al Capone rather than the mayor represented the city of Chicago, that during both world wars the German High Command rather than the king stood for the Belgian people, that Hitler rather than the conspirators of July 1944 embodied the true Germany. In the latter case, admittedly marginal, the German resistance consisted of men and women of all sections of the political, social and cultural spectrum, linked together in their "common sense" awareness that "Germany" was not merely a matter of numbers but also of moral substance which Hitler, while swaying the millions, was distorting to serve his own purposes. A regime bent on destroying the German sense of rightness could not claim legitimacy even though it controlled the vast majority of Germans.

Legitimacy of government had once before become a major international concern. In 1814, when the Allies marched into Paris and Napoleon fled, they perceived — thanks mainly to Talleyrand's penetrating understanding — that lack of legitimacy had been a crucial factor in the incessant wars Napoleon had inflicted on Europe, and that legitimacy of government in France was no exclusive concern for the French. Only a government sharing its people's values, traditions and beliefs was capable of eliciting trust and voluntary obedience and thus domestic peace. Lacking legitimacy, Napoleon's regime remained beset with perpetual fear for its internal and external security and endemically resorted to force and public fraud.

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I

The choice between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek turns on the question of which should be recognized as the legitimate representative of China, rather than which can manipulate the larger number of Chinese. This question is not as marginal as that of the German resistance. According to both sides, there is an unfinished civil war in China, with one contestant occupying a much larger part of the national territory than the other. More important than territory, however, is the matter of quality and substance. Mao is the leader of an ideological movement patterned on that of Soviet communism. Contemporary totalitarian movements are not parties within the framework of traditional political systems; rather, each of them constitutes a world hostile to the environment and closed in on itself.

> . . . within this hierarchically organized world the fighters for world conquest and world revolution are never exposed to the shock inevitably generated by the discrepancy between "revolutionary" beliefs and the "normal" world. The reason why the movements in their pre-power, revolutionary stage can attract so many ordinary philistines is that their members live in a fool's paradise of normalcy; the party members are surrounded by the normal world of sympathizers and the elite formations by the normal world of ordinary members.[1]

When in power, totalitarian movements place themselves in the position of a network of offices ranking above the state and its functions. They look on themselves not so much as stewards of the national tradition and the people's weal but rather as bases for the attainment of ultimate ideological goals. They are fully aware that they must keep both aloof and mobile; they cannot afford to share the values, habits and outlooks of the subject peoples, because such "residues of the past" constitute mortal dangers for the "movement." Lenin warned that "The force of habit is a terrible force." W. Bergengruen observed the alienation of the Nazis from Germany:

> Sometimes it was almost as if the men of the party and its affiliated bodies were members of an army of invasion or occupation who had insufficient command of the language of the country they had conquered and in consequence learned little of the conversations and thoughts of the suppressed natives.[2]

Similarly, Hannah Arendt points out that "the famous 'Right is

[1]Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 368.

[2]Quoted in Hans Buchheim, *Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 94.

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what is good for the German people' was meant only for mass propaganda; Nazis were told that 'Right is what is good for the movement.' "[3] Lenin also proclaimed party interests as the sole content of "communist morality."

Is it possible for totalitarian movements in the course of time to overcome their basic alienation from the political community and acquire legitimacy of government? In the case of Mao, some evidence seems to support a positive answer. Unlike the Soviet communists, Mao seems to have succeeded in creating something like a "civil theology," a semi-mythical, semi-moral structure of symbols linking his regime to the cultural tradition. Robert J. Lifton has analyzed Mao's attempt to attach to himself the ancient Chinese myths of kingly and imperial power.[4] *Mao Tse-tung's Thought* is composed of excerpts from his writings removed from their original ideological context so that they may appear as pearls of universal wisdom and be substituted for traditional Confucian thought. But evidence to support a negative answer is equally strong. The Cultural Revolution was a massive and deliberate attack against the very core of Chinese culture, comparable to the Soviets' continuous warfare against Russian Christianity and the freedom of Russian literature, and it went even further in its intent to destroy the authority of parents and teachers. Moreover, Mao's *Thought* recently has again been de-emphasized: the regime seems undecided whether to rely on a traditional mythico-moral or an ideologically communist orthodoxy. Finally, the extraordinary military mobilization to which the Mao regime has resorted during its political crises is testimony to the fears besetting these rulers, in spite of the brave populist face they show externally.

By contrast, Chiang Kai-shek has governed in a spirit of respect and reverence for the traditional order of China. While running a tightly authoritarian establishment, he has not dedicated his power to the subversion of China's substance. In morals, habits and customs, rituals and beliefs, he has acted as a steward of a great heritage, while providing his people with the benefits of a rapidly expanding economy. The natives of Taiwan may look on him as an intruder, in the same way the people of Hawaii would resent the presence of the U.S. government if that government were forced, by political enemies, to take refuge in Honolulu. The situation admits of little doubt: By all the above criteria of authority,

[3]Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 412.
[4]Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968).

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Mao's regime is not legitimate. Chiang Kai-shek's government, while introducing modernizing influences into Chinese society and its institutions, has maintained its link with the legitimizing principles of the Confucian tradition, the renovating movement of Sun Yat-sen, and the traditional pattern of Chinese habits and customs. On this basis, it qualifies as the legitimate government. One regime wields power as the enemy of China's order; the other, as its protector and servant.

II

Governmental legitimacy belongs to a realm of juridico-moral imponderables that appear to rely on "life as it ought to be" rather than "life as it is," to use Machiavelli's terms. "Life as it is" is taken to mean power relations, a field of energies that seems to obey its own autonomous rules and to deserve close study and attention even to the disregard of moral, legal and other qualitative realities. In that field what counts is not who ought to command but who actually does command a nation's resources. This idea governed the development, in the nineteenth century, of the British doctrine that recognition of a foreign government should follow upon *de facto* control without raising *de jure* questions: power had to deal with power, on the premise that the certainty of the facts of power would promote peace and minimize disorder. During the same period, the former eighteenth-century concept of the balance of power, which did embrace moral considerations, was replaced by the idea of an equilibrium of forces — even though it never became clear whether the equilibrium consisted in the relationship of respective military units, or of respective military units proportionate to respective geographic positions, or of respective military units proportionate to respective intents. Nineteenth-century literature on this subject was never as precise and representative of practice as that of the eighteenth century; while factors other than sheer forces were considered relevant in practice, statesmen articulated views best epitomized by Stalin's remark: "The Pope — how many divisions has he?"

The new China policy of the U.S. government seems to stem from this nineteenth-century *Realpolitik*. Its rationale runs somewhat like this: Both the Soviet Union and Peking have nuclear weapons. Their dispute, regardless of whether it should be considered fundamental or accidental, has engendered mutual fears of attack in both capitals, fears that must be treated as a major fact of world politics. As Kautilya put it: The neighbor of my

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enemy is my friend. If the United States can establish relations with communist-controlled mainland China, the move promises to restore a certain mobility which world politics has not known for a quarter of a century. A mere shift of diplomatic accent in the direction of Peking could so change the situation that, other things remaining equal, the United States could greatly improve not only its own position but also the prospect of a peace-promoting equilibrium in the world. If this reasoning is valid, the new China policy must be called a stroke of genius; though success is not positively assured, it might be regarded as a distinct possibility.

Nineteenth-century *Realpolitik* was based on the then valid general assumption that international problems sprang from the competition and rivalry of state governments for rank, wealth, prestige and territory. These relations occurred between units motivated exclusively by "national interests," i.e., aspirations conceived by governments for the sake of their people's weal. Concrete patterns of interests were determined by technical, economic and political currents of the century: rising national self-consciousness, economic expansion into underdeveloped areas, worldwide steamship-carried trade. All such interests were in their nature limited, utilitarian and ultimately negotiable. Since the 1930's, or at any rate the 1940's, this pattern has given way to a new one, in which world political problems have been generated predominantly by the expansionist drives of ideological mass movements controlling the resources of great nations for their strategic goals. "National interests," in the sense of geographic, economic, demographic and technical requirements of state power, have been incorporated into overarching ideological strategies centering in the stark alternative between subjection and resistance to ideocratic totalitarian rule. The world arena can no longer be understood as the scene of conflicts between comparable national power interests; rather, international conflicts arise between poles of qualitative difference, namely, between extant societies and ideologically-motivated regimes. This fact has governed not only the thoughts of political leaders but the power energies confronting each other. It is the one by which to gauge the implications of the new U.S. China policy. In addition to those anticipated by the Administration, there may be several other implications:

(1) Assuming that the policy consists essentially of a "shift of diplomatic accent," it will take on significance as a shift away from

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the anti-communist government of Chiang Kai-shek and toward the communist regime of Peking, particularly since an anti-communist government-in-being exists on a part of Chinese territory, a flesh-and-blood alternative to the communist regime. No such alternative was in existence — not even in exile — when the United States recognized the Soviet regime. Thus, more than in 1934, this shift is bound to be interpreted as a deliberate preference of the United States, even though that cannot be the intention of the U.S government. Surely this is the message that will be received by the anti-communist governments of South Korea and South Viet Nam, particularly in view of announced withdrawals or reductions of U.S. forces in those areas.

(2) Our "shift of diplomatic accent" will be read similarly in Asian countries contiguous to totalitarian power centers. These friendly states so far have looked on resistance as a policy with good future prospects, mainly because of steadfast U.S. determination to shore up such resistance with military and economic aid and, in an emergency, deployment of American troops. Their policy now seems deprived of that margin of security which in the past made it look reasonable. If Washington's friendliness with Peking were interpreted as implying that "the enemy of my friend is my enemy," the smaller rimland nations of Asia would have reason to consider themselves bereft of any support and would be forced to seek redress from the nearby communist superpower.

(3) On a wider scale, one might venture the thesis that the system of alliances built by the United States since 1949 owes its existence to a single central motive: fear of, and resistance to, communism. It is true that from the beginning there prevailed a kind of uneasiness about the negative character of this motive and its potentially provocative effects, and there have been repeated attempts to impart to NATO, particularly, a positive and community-building mission. But these attempts have consistently come to naught, so that common defense against a dreaded political fate has turned out to be the sole effective cement of alliance. The "welfare clause" belongs to the institution of government rather than to the councils of an alliance. All the same, uneasiness about the anti-communist motivation never disappeared. After gathering strength in France and Britain, it finally led to the official abandonment of anti-communism by the U.S. government in 1962-1963, as proclaimed by President Kennedy's American University speech of July 1963. Yet a curious and persistent gap between the words of our leaders and the deeds of

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our nation — a discrepancy cutting both to the left and to the right — allowed American actions to continue on an anti-communist course in Asia while seeking an accommodation with communist power in Moscow. The full impact of the 1963 disavowal of anti-communism could not be felt until U.S. action in Asia conformed to the "accommodation" course chosen in regard to the Soviet Union. President Nixon's new China policy thus is likely to have far greater repercussions in the U.S. alliance system than he intended, because it would appear to other countries to be the logical extension of previous policy.

The discrepancy between words and actions that has characterized American policies since World War II may continue to have some effect, in which case certain of our allies might well take our actions toward the Chinese communists no more seriously than our previous assertion that anti-communism had ceased to be our motive. They might figure that the repugnance Americans feel for communism is a motive so deeply rooted that nothing we say, and nothing having the character of a mere gesture, could detract from the efficacy of that fundamental emotion: regardless of our professions to the contrary, they could still count on us to fight against communism in any emergency. If that were to be the case, we could still retain at least some of our European and Middle East allies, though in any event we would be bound to lose allies and friends in East Asia.

(4) A more serious erosion of anti-communist determination, however, could affect the capability of this country to produce and wield arms. Three factors have so far combined to discredit anti-communism: First, Americans have a sense of highly idealistic, moralistic fairness that finds us always ready to blame ourselves for any friction or fall-out, a most lovable trait provided it does not lead to wholesale distortion of reality, which in the case of the Cold War it has tended to do. Second, we suffer from a nuclear bomb complex, replete with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an "utter destruction of life on earth" syndrome, and a profound sense of guilt for having invented and for possessing nuclear weapons. Third, many Americans have lost faith in their nation as a result of its role in the Vietnamese conflict — a war justifiable as a battle of local resistance against communist expansion. American leaders failed to justify the war in these terms because they had committed themselves to "accommodation" with Soviet Russia; thus our role failed to make sense and the war came to be looked upon as "imperialist," "immoral," "illegal," and "inhuman." A large

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number of Americans experienced a substantial waning of their civic loyalty as a result of entertaining such ideas; the erosion occurred precisely at the point where their conduct could bear on the capacity of this nation to mobilize its resources for action in world politics.

The new China policy seems to provide new fuel for such notions, as it is bound to persuade many other Americans that communism is no longer a threat, that we do wrong in maintaining a hostile stance toward it, and that our armaments particularly are excessive and at the margin even superfluous, since there is nobody we have to fear. Manifestly, it is not the Administration that supports such conclusions; but it is significant that, upon announcement of the new policy, those who in the past had favored friendship with Communist China emerged triumphant and "vindicated," and were hailed by the press as unerring prophets of "truth." Similar sentiments may prevail in the Senate; if so, the Administration will experience increasing difficulty in obtaining support for adequate U.S. armaments and troop deployments. Those who continue to consider communism a real threat and fear that coalition governments with communist participation are a distinct possibility for Southeast Asia and some Western countries will find it increasingly difficult, in a climate of euphoria, to mount a rational defense of their view and will seem to speak from mere emotion, in consequence suffering the fate of Cassandra and Laocoön. Since the Soviets are arming at a rapid pace, we may find ourselves doomed, by widespread convictions, to suffer from a progressive erosion of will to maintain adequate arms and overseas bases.

III

The present pattern of world politics differs from that of the nineteenth century. Then, conflicts were about the relative power of states under governments that could legitimately claim to represent "the nation's" interests; now, they stem from the goals of ideological regimes that control but do not legitimately represent nations. This lack of legitimacy engenders an endemic peacelessness that is as characteristic of the era of totalitarianism as it was of the Napoleonic era. "All nations," Metternich wrote in 1807, "have made the mistake to attach to a treaty with France the value of peace, without immediately preparing again for war. No peace is possible with a revolutionary system, whether with a Robespierre who declares war on châteaux or a Napoleon who

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declares war on powers."[5] Nothing can assure communist parties of ultimate security as rulers; they are bound to govern in a perpetual state of anxiety that turns outward in irremediable hostility against the world. In this situation, what could be the advantage of "restored mobility" in global diplomacy? If the mobility could be attained as a sheer increase in available options, it would be hailed as a great and indispensable gain. Achieving mobility, however, can be in our interests only if, while in pursuit of it, "other things remain the same" — "other things" meaning public support for national security policies and the loyalty of America's allies. This "if" may be among the casualties of the present situation.

In the century of "power politics," domestic support could by and large be counted on as a constant; the spirit of nationalistic loyalty seemed capable of enduring policy changes and other vicissitudes without flagging. In the international power equation, the only variables then were military hardware, raw materials and productive capacity. Today, faced with conflicts stemming from the threat of totalitarian regimes, we find that attitudes regarding their ideologies affect basic civic obedience, readiness to serve in the armed forces, and willingness to support military expenditures and certain foreign policies. "National power" has acquired an ideological dimension that was absent from the nineteenth century. There can be no such thing as pure "power politics" today. Every policy is influenced by its own ideological significance, which affects not so much the confrontation with the enemy on the plain of power conflict as the moral, civic and psychological components of one's own strength. It is therefore highly improbable that a policy aiming at a new fluidity in our relations with communist regimes will succeed in leaving "other things equal."

The German press has hailed the Four Power Agreement on Berlin as a breakthrough into a "new era" in which everything will be better than before. Yet the agreement in effect removed the character of Berlin as Germany's capital; one cannot assume that this change will leave German political consciousness the same as before, and German political consciousness is all that can maintain the cohesion and stamina of German armed forces under NATO command. In a policy of resistance to the expansion of communist rule, every move carries an implication beyond the

[5]Quoted in Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), p. 12.

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deliberate intent of Western political leaders. One wonders whether, in such a situation, a stance often derogatorily dubbed "rigid" is not precisely the most adequate one. In view of nuclear weaponry, we cannot count among our alternatives the choice that Pitt could make — to wage ceaseless war against Napoleon until he was defeated. Our resistance must be devised so as to avoid war.

When we moved from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" we ended up in Viet Nam; as we proceed from "containment" to "mobility," will we be likely to reap only profits? Can our sense of purpose be maintained under rapidly shifting relationships with various communist-controlled powers? Will an illusion of instant peace overtake us and make us reluctant to bear the burden? Will we forget the plight of those who had the courage to resist communism under the muzzles of communist tanks and rockets? Will we give assent to the use of our power as a "benevolent force?" Will we even consider it safe to have such capabilities as would enable us to act as a great power among states? Viet Nam brought us a war on two fronts; of the two, the home front turned out to be decisive. From now until the end of the era of totalitarianism, no American government can adopt a policy solely on the basis of its anticipated external effects — its impact on "the others." One part, the decisive part, of any policy is inevitably "us."

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VIET NAM AND U.S. DIPLOMACY, 1940-1970*

by Paul M. Kattenburg

IF we are to begin drawing some overdue lessons for American diplomacy from the long record of our involvement in Viet Nam, it is essential to place the history of Viet Nam since 1940 and our relations with it since the beginning of World War II in the perspective of our global perceptions, attitudes and policies during this thirty-year period. Close juxtaposition of Viet Nam on the one hand, and U.S. world policy on the other, allows us to examine the simultaneously developing issues that conditioned, modified and re-affected our actions in that theater. Doing so by dividing the history of the period into short slices sets the focus on their highlights and saliences and facilitates recall of the perceptions on which actions were taken and must properly be judged.

Today, for example, we may question the wisdom of sending maximum economic-military assistance to the French and later to Diem in 1950-1955. But at the time these moves appeared as logical extensions to such actions as deploying U.S. troops to NATO in the post-Korean phase of our containment policy, efforts to defeat other communist-led insurgencies or movements in Asia and Latin America, or alliance-building from Iceland to the Philippines for the purpose of holding back Soviet and Chinese power. Similarly, when we began to disengage somewhat from Viet Nam in 1955-1960 — diminishing not our aid but certainly our concern — we were at the same time seeking détente with Khrushchev in a world slowly evolving from rigid bipolarity to the communist bloc polycentrism and Free World multipolarity of the ensuing decade. In other words, Viet Nam actions were not taken in a vacuum and should be evaluated in context.

Slicing the three decades on the first and middle years of each is convenient with respect to Viet Nam, since at each of these five-

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year points there were significant breaks or turns. In 1940, Japan arrived; in 1945, she left; in 1950, de Lattre de Tassigny was riding high on gallant French schemes for victory and Vietnamization; in 1955, Ho was ruling the North and Diem (just barely) the South; in 1960, the South was again under siege; by 1965, its position was so desperate that only direct American intervention seemed able to save it; in 1970, the Americans were leaving Viet Nam.

Our objective is to recount and analyze these five-year slices of history, apposing Viet Nam on the one side and U.S. world policy on the other. The hope is that some valid propositions respecting American behavior will emerge, which can be appraised with a view to guiding our path better in the future.

I

At the opening of the global war of 1940-1945, France's fall in Europe shook Viet Nam to its core. In the form of Japan, this shattering event introduced into the peninsula an "Asian hand" quite different from the fatigued and waning Ch'ing influences from China felt earlier: Japan was ruthless, efficient, above all modern. The Vietnamese communists began to receive aid not only from Yenan or pro-Yenan quarters (actually, they furnished little), but also from the United Kingdom, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT). Dormant noncommunist nationalist elements, quashed by French police action before World War II, started to revive under the protective umbrella first of the Japanese and later of the KMT. The latter, it must not be forgotten, occupied Viet Nam north of the 16th Parallel in the first postwar year, while the British were performing a similar task south of that line.

America's wartime postures and policies reflected a strong and pervasive anti-colonialism directed at Southeast Asia as a whole but perhaps most strongly at Indochina. This showed itself in Roosevelt's well-documented post-1940 deprecation of the French, whether in Europe, in exile or in Indochina. From such attitudes the nationalists and pro-communist partisans in Viet Nam took hope, and OSS operations in and out of Kunming and Kandy lent further credence to the notion that a national, even if communist-dominated, regime might be allowed to emerge in Viet Nam after Japan's defeat. These "signposts," however, were contradicted by the absence of any carefully thought out U.S. or interallied postwar planning for the region. At war's end the United States

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was content not to have to put forces on the mainland of Southeast Asia, and to let the Chinese KMT in the North, the British in the South, and later the French (in returning trickles) regain control of Indochina.

In Viet Nam, the immediate postwar period witnessed the decisive ascent of Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh communists, soon to call themselves the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, over Vietnamese nationalism. Between 1945 and 1950 this took place in the South as well as the North and the Central provinces: the feeble non-communist nationalism that had made its reappearance in "united fronts" as Japan exited the scene was soon crushed between the pincers of communist intransigence and returning French authority.

The French-Viet Minh accords of early 1946 seem in retrospect to have followed de Gaulle into retreat — as he left power the best and last hope for some form of understanding between Ho and the West disappeared. Having failed in their initial efforts to negotiate re-entry, the French launched a major war in December 1946 to eliminate Ho's forces. In 1948 they gave the non-communist nationalists the *coup de grâce* in the Baie d'Along accords. These resurrected the worthless Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, and led directly to the five-year exile in the United States and France of Ngo Dinh Diem, the only significant personality to have emerged as a potential rallying point for the noncommunist nationalists. In early 1950, following the French lead, Washington recognized Bao Dai as chief of the French Union state of Viet Nam although his powers were wholly minimal.

Here at home, the wartime pre-eminence of military strategy, and its separation from policy, gave way in 1945-1950 to an abrupt assertion by the United States of power diplomacy. Our anti-colonial posturing and professing of principles receded before the necessity of giving Europe, and thus France, priority in U.S. decision-making. The rise of nationalism in Viet Nam, its incipient control by the communist Lao Dong, and the fruitless nature of French political and military efforts during this period were duly reported to and probably understood in Washington. But our priority interest in keeping France in Europe free — and by extension France in the world strong — combined with a then only dimly perceived sense of threat from Ho's communism to push us into backing the French. In Indonesia, by contrast, the United States operationalized its anti-colonialist attitude, supporting Sukarno against the Dutch in the United Nations and

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elsewhere. Because France was both stronger and more important than Holland, Ho more questionable, and his country ostensibly weaker than Sukarno's, we adopted seemingly contradictory policies toward these two Southeast Asian troublespots.

Any remaining vacillation in U.S. policy ended with the Chinese communist victory on the mainland in 1949 and the Korean War. By mid-1950, we were beginning to provide substantial military support to the French forces; our first military advisory elements had arrived in Saigon. But Washington had not yet clearly perceived that communist control of China had disrupted the power equation in Viet Nam, much as it had in Korea. Vietnamese communism now began to receive decisive backing — at first only moral — from a major and contiguous world power.

As the decade closed, the menace of uncontained, Soviet-directed communist world power seemed all-threatening to Washington. In the resistance against it, the uniqueness of particular situations tended to be lost. Pro-colonial forces were often confused with genuinely national ones if they opposed communist movements; the potential role of China as an independent communist power was underrated; and Ho's popularity, basic self-reliance and peculiar blend of Western and Eastern communism were too easily dismissed.

II

By the end of the period 1950-1955, Ho's control of the North had been achieved, the French had fought and lost their war, and the Diem regime had established a precarious existence in the South despite opposition from the multiple centrifugal forces at work in that region. For Diem's government and for the implementation of the principal political provisions of the July 1954 Geneva accords, 1955 was a key year.

We may place in quotation marks the "victory" the nationalist communist (Viet Minh) forces won in their "eight years of arduous struggle" that ended with the Geneva settlement. Although Khrushchev exaggerates the point in his memoirs, he is probably right in making note of Viet Minh weakness in 1954. Giap's soldiers were not capable of much more effort; they needed the period of recuperation, consolidation and revival they obtained in 1955-1960. Because of the emphasis given to the single battle of Dien Bien Phu, it is sometimes forgotten what costs and

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sacrifices the eight-year war against the French entailed. Fought in all three regions of Viet Nam, with forays into Laos and Cambodia, it was marked not only by sustained guerrilla operations but by large-unit quasi-conventional battles, as in the Tonkin Delta (1952) and Tuy Hoa (1953), involving armies on both sides frequently as large as those which contested the battlegrounds south of the 17th Parallel in 1965-1970. At the peak of its strength the French Army in Indochina neared 500,000 men, although these troops were predominantly African rather than metropolitan French. They also included Vietnamese *suppletifs* who formed the nuclei of later South Vietnamese regular and irregular forces.

Successively, Giap defeated Salan, de Lattre and Navarre (not to count the earlier Leclerc whose death possibly saved him from the same fate) with troops from all over Viet Nam, on battlefields all over Viet Nam. The enormity of the effort needs underlining. The settlement at Geneva promised Ho a fairly certain chance to achieve within two years the all-Viet Nam victory he had so long pursued. It paved the way as well for the badly needed period of remission which was to follow.

By July-August 1955, however, the outcome that had appeared so certain at the signing of the Geneva armistice was in doubt. Two factors had arisen that were not in the 1954 calculations on either side of the Viet Nam equation. First, the obdurate Diem had emerged in control in Saigon after unexpectedly defeating the several factions arrayed against him; even General J. Lawton Collins, the special U.S. envoy of the period, had not thought he could bring this off. Collins and the last French general, Paul Ely, departed as Diem, on the strength of a popular plebiscite in October 1955, proclaimed the Republic of Viet Nam with himself as President. Second, and in some ways more important, by the end of 1955 it had become clear to chancelleries close to the Viet Nam problem that the Soviet Union had deserted Ho Chi Minh on the diplomatic front.

It may be conservatively estimated that more than a dozen formal communications flowed from the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) in Hanoi to the Soviet Geneva Co-Chairman between mid-1954 and late 1955 requesting him and the British Co-Chairman to bring about the interzonal (North-South) consultations called for in the 1954 accords. These were slated to begin on July 1, 1955 to lay the groundwork for the all-Viet Nam elections to take place in July 1956. The notes, while duly

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transmitted by the Soviets to the British Co-Chairman and by the latter to Washington and other interested quarters, remained unanswered because of an apparent lack of interest in the question in Moscow.

Despite all later propaganda to the contrary, Ho was probably no great believer in the provision in Article 7 of the final Geneva declaration for "democratic institutions [to be] established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot." This declaration in any event remained unsigned by the Geneva participants (only the armistice agreements were actually signed at Geneva) and both the United States and South Viet Nam issued specific reservations on it. What Ho seems to have wanted was to engage in talks of some kind with "the other zone" — and by this he meant both Diem and the French authorities in the South.

Ho continued to hold the French responsible for the implementation of the accords, despite Diem's increasing assertion of independence and the precipitate French military withdrawal in 1955-1956. "Consultations between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards," also called for in Article 7, might in the DRV's view have prepared the way for some forms of interzonal collaboration, even if at first only in functional domains (for example, postal exchange and health measures). This might eventually have produced a type of umbrella coalition regime with dominant DRV participation, which might in turn have presided over some simple form of plebiscite for reunification and thus have fulfilled the Geneva election provisions.

None of this came to pass. Neither Indian qualms on the issue — Delhi, as Chairman of the International Control Commission created at Geneva, was supervising the implementation of the accords — nor British reservations about Diem's growing independence, nor the sense of fair play of the Canadians as pro-West member of the ICC, affected Moscow's impassivity. Polish diplomats serving as the ICC's third, and pro-communist, member were managing to convey to Western and neutralist chancelleries, and to the Australians who were by now taking an increasingly strong stand on Diem's side, that South Viet Nam, once detached from the North at Geneva, had been written off in Soviet eyes. In November 1955, as official documents when later released will evidence, Molotov bluntly dismissed the Indochina item from the agenda of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference; even the United States had been willing to have the matter discussed.

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Diem's anti-consultation and anti-election posture was thereby assured of success, and the perception grew in Washington that, by tacit agreement of the superpowers, there were to be two Viet Nams as there were two Koreas, two Germanys and two Chinas.

The period 1950-1955 marked the high tide of U.S. containment policy in Asia. While using restrained counterforce to restore the status quo in Korea, the United States proceeded to contain Soviet and Chinese power through security pacts with Japan, 1951; ANZUS and the Philippines, 1952; South Korea, 1954; SEATO, 1954; and the Republic of China, 1955. We stood fast in the Taiwan Straits; helped Magsaysay put down the Huks and reconstruct his country; at least morally supported British counterinsurgency action in Malaya; began providing military assistance to Thailand and Pakistan; and denounced nonalignment by Nehru and the Chou-Sukarno "Spirit of Bandung." Nor were these policies confined to Asia. In Central America, we aided Castillo-Armas in ejecting the leftist Arbenz; in Europe, we left little doubt that Christian Democratic regimes suited our then current value-pattern and that we had little interest in German SPD (Socialist) susceptibilities toward rapprochement with the East; in the Middle East, we assisted the overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran, brought Turkey into NATO, and inspired the formation of the Baghdad Pact.

In the context of these perceptions and policies, assistance to the Catholic Diem (Christian Democratic by European standards, mandarinal to the Vietnamese, and benevolently authoritarian in U.S. eyes), in his effort to perpetuate a two Viet Nams solution, seemed a reasonable course. It was made even easier because our bureaucratic-military machine was already geared for Indochina support; shifting to Diem's benefit what we had been doing a good many years for the French was no problem. Moreover, 1955 had demonstrated not only Diem's apparent strength, but the inconsequence of Soviet support for Ho. Here again, there was a tendency to treat China as a Moscow satellite and to underestimate her independent potential to affect events in Viet Nam.

III

The 1955-1960 period of remission in Viet Nam, both North and South, dovetailed with the U.S. search during that time for some relaxation in the global tensions of the Cold War. A thaw was evident in the spirit of the 1955 Geneva Summit; various, though repeatedly abortive, explorations of disarmament pro-

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posals; and Washington's tendency to accommodate to and with Khrushchev where possible while holding Free World lines firm. This early search for duopoly and détente culminated in the 1959 Camp David meeting. It foundered shortly thereafter on a cascading series of events: the U-2 flight and the aborted Paris Summit; the intensifying crises over Berlin, the Congo and Laos; and Castro's initially uncertain but soon threatening steps in the direction of Soviet alliance. By 1960, unremitting hostility had re-emerged between the two great camps. Washington, preoccupied with elections and events in the Caribbean, hardly sensed the intimations of Sino-Soviet conflict in the wind.

In Viet Nam, similarly, the respite from tensions gave way by the end of this period to renewed hostility between the two zones. The North had used the truce for needed recovery and consolidation, not without considerable turmoil as in the bloody agrarian reform riots and purges of the late 1950's in Thanh Hoa. The South had made a new start under Diem, and by 1959 Washington considered the Republic of Viet Nam mature enough to permit the withdrawal of a number of private American advisers. In the U.S. view these advisers, whom Diem prized more than the military and economic assistance he was accepting in profusion, tended to be dysfunctional in a period when "the Vietnamese should stand on their own two feet."

This early version of Vietnamization was responsible for the rise in influence over Diem of his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu's ill-conceived schemes for national and social revival in South Viet Nam, coupled with his and Madame Nhu's conspiratorial intrigues, in turn led to the increasing oppressiveness and miscalculations of the regime, with the result that opposition to it began to mount rapidly.

The DRV resolved in or about 1959 to resume armed struggle as a means of accomplishing reunification. Three main reasons account for the timing. (1) The diplomatic approach, tried via the Soviet Union in 1954-1956, had failed. Nothing had signified this failure more clearly, on the heels of Soviet abandonment of the interzonal consultations issue, than Nehru's assent in mid-1956 to Dulles' decision to double the size of the U.S. military mission in Saigon. "MAAG" had consisted of 350-400 men when the Geneva armistice was signed, and the armistice provisions precluded its augmentation. In the ensuing two years, however, hundreds of thousands of French forces had left Viet Nam. Nehru, recalling the disinterest the Soviets had shown in late 1955, agreed with

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Dulles that doubling the number of U.S. military advisers in Saigon could hardly tilt the Viet Nam balance. By the end of 1956, MAAG personnel reached some 700, of which about 300 were there on strictly temporary assignment.

(2) The North had substantially recovered by 1959 from its pre-1954 exertions. The foundations of a communist regime were now solid in areas from policy control to propaganda; a new military generation had come of age; and the so-called Southern cadres, anxious to renew the fight for final victory, were chafing at the bit. The Southerners consisted of over 100,000 Vietnamese communists[1] transported North in Polish ships under the Geneva repatriation provisions. The same provisions had allowed for the movement of nearly a million predominantly Catholic civilian refugees from North to South.

(3) The South under Diem had done much better than expected. Waiting longer might completely extinguish the fires of revolutionary expectation, although Nhu's transgressions were beginning to rekindle them. Now was the time for Hanoi to act: the United States was ever so slightly letting go; opposition to Diem-Nhu within South Viet Nam was mounting; and the Soviet Union, capping its disdain for the DRV's thus far "legal road to struggle," was proposing both Viet Nams for membership in the UN General Assembly (first in 1957). We can only surmise what advice the Chinese gave at this stage, but presumably Viet Nam was not an improper area in which to teach Kremlin revisionists a lesson in revolutionary struggle and the strategy of protracted guerrilla war.

Thus, the communist cadres left behind with their weapons in the South in 1954 were reactivated; trickles of Southern cadres were reintroduced from the North via the Laos trails and organized into secure rear bases; and in these bases they were joined by a growing local opposition to Diem-Nhu. By 1960, when the National Liberation Front was proclaimed, its strength was not unsubstantial. Washington may have discounted this to a greater extent than Saigon; at any rate U.S. officials were slow to analyze the NLF's roots, composition and means of support.

To the United States, again, communist power appeared monolithic and centrally-directed: it was showing its teeth in South Viet Nam after it had roared in Berlin, triumphed in Cuba

[1]The exact number is a subject of dispute. In his book *The Two Vietnams* (New York: Praeger, 1967), Bernard Fall reports that the DRV informed the French government that 87,000 troops and 43,000 civilians came to the North.

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and scored gains in Laos. The great temptation was to assess these situations as part of a world phenomenon crudely activated from Moscow. In the process of succumbing, we tended to lose sight of the particularities. Failing to grasp the current and potential meaning of the Sino-Soviet conflict, or of de Gaulle's revolt against U.S. hegemony in Europe, we did not undertake a serious review of the new diplomatic-political equation we were confronting. Instead, with the victory of the New Frontier, the United States was about to embark on one of the strangest aberrations in its diplomatic history. Liberal leaders and decision-makers, hypnotized by the misconceived selflessness symbolized in the assertion "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty," were inspired to engage in manipulative nation-building and programmatic overseas development schemes of unparalleled scope. And this at a time when American power, until then supreme in the postwar world, was beginning to confront emerging nuclear parity and to lose the cutting edge it had so long enjoyed.

IV

During 1960-1965, everything seemed to fall apart in South Viet Nam, while nothing seemed able to stem the triumphant tide of northern and southern Vietnamese communism.

The set of decisions made in late 1961 which led to our escalative reinvolvement must be viewed against the backdrop of a series of grave difficulties that had rudely challenged New Frontier perceptions and predispositions even before they could be put to the test. Thus Viet Nam 1961-1962 is directly related to the humiliating outcome of the Bay of Pigs incident, Kennedy's bruising confrontation with Khrushchev at Vienna, the frustrations of accommodating to the Berlin Wall, and failure in arriving at an acceptable settlement in Laos until mid-1962. Consider further the hand-wringing over our "Uncertain Trumpet"; the necessity to devise a doctrine of flexible response with its attendant requirements (never fully appreciated by our allies) of limited-war strategies and strengthened general-purpose forces; and the elevation of hazy notions of "counterinsurgency warfare" onto the altar of high doctrine. In this light President Kennedy's decision to increase the size of the U.S. military mission in Viet Nam by a factor of 1,700 per cent — to some 12,000 from the 700-

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man level maintained for almost six years — becomes more readily understandable.

By late 1962 close to 15,000 Americans had been fielded to drive Diem's reluctant army against an NLF which by that time was well armed and well trained. Until 1962 the sanctity of the 1954 Geneva armistice agreements — if not the political ones — had ostensibly been kept. While some external arms aid had been introduced on both sides of the 17th Parallel, this had been done only in quantities and categories technically commensurate with the so-called replacement provisions of the accords. The new U.S. leadership, however, never doubting either its conception of the threat or its capabilities to meet it, now discarded even the appearance of abiding by the Geneva armistice provisions or by the understandings worked out in 1956 between Dulles and Nehru.

It might be argued that, given its notoriously weak institutional memory, the U.S. government had lost knowledge of these post-Geneva understandings. But this is a specious argument: The Kennedy Administration in 1961-1962 was determined in any event to ignore and thus to breach them. It obtained a measure of support for its course of action when the International Control Commission, in 1962, slightly censured the DRV for breaches of the armistice; but the ICC also mildly censured the Saigon authorities, a fact conveniently forgotten when Washington issued its first White Paper. Thereafter the ICC — powerless to cope with the titanic struggle about to erupt — tended to abdicate its functions in Viet Nam. North Viet Nam, faced with the introduction of thousands of U.S. advisers into the South, lost whatever degree of restraint it might still have had toward sending the remaining Southern cadres into the intensifying battlefields of South Viet Nam. Soon these were reinforced by other activists, technicians and even small-unit forces from North Viet Nam. Thus the most crucial watershed in this thirty-year period had been passed.

To account for the escalating U.S. involvement, we must examine the "counterinsurgency," "nation-building" and institution-tinkering proclivities of the new U.S. policymakers. The bureaucracy, in particular the "jelly bowl" in the Department of State, could normally have been expected to resist the imposition of these innovative schemes and ideas. But contrary to the conventional wisdom in this case, the bureaucracy responded with alacrity to the impulses from on high, especially because those on high came armed with boundless self-confidence and strong in-

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tellectual credentials. The point is not that the bureaucracy really accepted, for example, the then frequently expressed notion that a "war of national liberation," if successful in Viet Nam, would automatically spread to and be equally successful in, say, Peru. The thinness of such reasoning was too obvious. State Department officials were far too steeped in knowledge of their particular areas, and in advocacy of their own special interests of the moment, to pay such notions much heed — although some perhaps gave them lip-service.

What did appeal to the bureaucracy, particularly in State, was the vast vista of career embellishment and program direction opened up by the "nation-building" schemes of the leadership. Accordingly it fell in with the view, not that "wars of national liberation" would necessarily spread, but that our models for countering them and for building stability and promoting "development" in the Third World might become stillborn — by action of Congress if for no other reason — if they failed in Viet Nam. With their demise would dwindle the opportunity to "re-establish State's leadership" in program management and direction, which the White House emphasis on operations and on "doing," instead of on the traditional modes of diplomacy, was making irresistibly attractive.

But as traditional modes of diplomacy were ignored, precisely that which the "program managers" feared most began to occur: counterinsurgency, which we really did not know how to employ since we hardly knew what it meant, failed us in Viet Nam and elsewhere and was in turn discarded; our aid and development models began to crumble around the Third World and were gradually dropped; and State's leadership increasingly gave way to the ascent of the military in U.S. decision-making. In truth, it could be argued that the effects of "non-victorious counterinsurgency efforts will spread."

The DRV-supported NLF onslaught of 1960-1965, which set the stage for these policy fiascoes, was assisted by the increasingly faltering and ultimately disastrous performance of Diem-Nhu. Seizing the NLF struggle as an opportunity to broaden their own role and maneuverability in Diem's Catholicized (and, at the end, heavily autocratized) state, the Buddhists and other surviving nationalists sought in 1963-1964 to build a broader coalition government; this role was denied them both by Diem-Nhu and their immediate successor, the Army, which finally moved against Diem in a coup that was at least "climatized" by the United States. By

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regarding the successive Buddhist protest waves in South Viet Nam as basically communist-inspired — they may well have been supported by the NLF — and by acquiescing in or even encouraging their suppression under Diem and his many successors, we dealt the final blow to the last postwar emanation of non-communist Vietnamese nationalism. The United States fixed steadily, however futilely, on successful prosecution of the war and stood by, arms folded, as the nationalist movement expired during the coastal Central Viet Nam uprisings of 1964 and 1966. Thereafter, the Vietnamese state of Ky and later that of Thieu failed to recover the one essential element of nation-statehood: genuine national political myth. The government remained an apolitical military-bureaucratic structure, fashioned according to the American "nation-building" model, remote from the psychological needs of the Vietnamese people and handicapped by lack of cohesion and effectiveness.

V

Graduated U.S. reinvolvement in 1960-1965 was thus premised on the nation-building *weltanschauung* that had come to dominate global U.S. policy during this period. In an era of imminent nuclear parity, the United States expected the main Soviet thrust to occur in the Third World. That challenge was met in some areas, for example in Cuba, but lessons learned from these contests were not necessarily applicable to other parts of the Third World, particularly those in which the United States lacked the overwhelming tactical power predominance it enjoyed in its Caribbean backyard. Yet in Viet Nam in 1965-1970 we misapplied escalative-type strategic scenarios devised for other situations and times.

The strategy that had worked well in the Cuban missile crisis and the quasi-viable doctrine of flexible response that had maintained the status quo in Berlin could not be automatically replicated in the Vietnamese context. Whereas the two superpowers had played non-zero-sum in the Cuban crisis and in Europe, there was only one such player in Viet Nam. Hanoi was not impressed by flexible response, measured counterretaliation, or tacit signaling; it was playing ruthlessly to win and paying heed only to explicitly declared (and, therefore, in the U.S. public context, quasi-self-enforcing) intentions. It did not entertain "rational," cost-benefit intellectual bridges between ends and means.

Moreover, our bombing policy was from the first counterpro-

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ductive for three main reasons, all of which were ignored or derided in Washington. First, North Vietnamese targets were nonrecurrent or one-time targets; that is, once taken, they could not be replaced and thus threatened with destruction again. Second, though forced to rely more and more heavily on Chinese and Soviet military equipment and supplies that we could bomb, North Viet Nam was never (and strove never to place itself in the position of becoming) totally dependent on such assistance to accomplish its objectives. Third, the NLF was acquiring DRV supplies not only through the linear means (e.g., roads, trails, coastal ship movements) fixed in the consciousness of U.S. target-planners, but also and in significant amounts by the "web" system on battlefields (captured enemy supplies) or open markets (Hong Kong, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, even Saigon), and pre-positioning them carefully for later use.

Consequently, the campaign of carefully restrained, slowly intensifying bombing instituted in 1965 to bring the DRV to negotiate mutual withdrawal from South Viet Nam was a nonstarter from its inception. The ancillary objective, to diminish the flow of men and supplies to the South, was not met because we ran into the same type of constraints experienced earlier with bombing campaigns in Korea and elsewhere; we should have known that the difficult terrain configurations would limit the effectiveness of aerial bombardment.

On the southern battlefields, the Vietnamese communists again won in 1965-1970 the type of "victory" they had gained in 1950-1955 — though without the dramatically decisive battle that Dien Bien Phu had been. The "victory" left them greatly weakened and exhausted but forced the principal enemy to give way (literally, to go away). It may be perfectly true that the United States was not defeated and that South Viet Nam still exists, but the Vietnamese communists were nonetheless victorious in the same overall sense they had been in 1954. Had the United States been willing in 1969, as the French were in 1954, to conclude a Geneva-type agreement, it is obvious that the only agreement conceivable would have left Hanoi substantially in control — whether or not Hanoi had, in reality, lost the TET offensive or the United States had been compelled to withdraw because of domestic political rather than battlefield developments. Whatever degree of independence South Viet Nam may retain in the future, and for however long, it is almost inconceivable that the communists will not play a major role in its destiny.

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During this final period, U.S. world policy accommodated itself to, and in effect became, U.S. policy in Viet Nam. What had started as a minuscule problem in the world storm of 1940 had become the storm center. That this had happened, and that no route of escape could be found, is perhaps the most damning commentary on the lack of finesse and analytic skill in the American diplomacy of the 1960's. From 1965 to 1969, an uncontrolled (and probably uncontrollable) civilian bureaucracy interacted with an equally self-propelled military establishment, ever more overestimating its needs, to accomplish vague and diffuse ends. How far diplomacy had sunk! For there is no gainsaying that at least until mid-1968 there was no statesmanship at the helm capable of restraining this out-of-control monster and diverting him from his futile quest. The lesson of the late 1960's must be primarily that of learning to contain the pressures of the military-bureaucratic juggernaut, once unleashed, and of learning to hold back the inflated rhetoric with which policymakers, once out of perspective and consumed by a single, central obsession, stick tenaciously to the proposition that they could not possibly have been "all wrong." Thus, mechanical slogans — "we can't let it go down the drain now"; "the credibility of our commitments is at stake all over the world"; "our allies are watching our performance"; "pacification is succeeding"; "Vietnamization will work" — were propounded as substitutes for thought, surrogates for analysis.

VI

Before examining more closely our failures and mistakes in Viet Nam, it might be useful to allude briefly to the moral and ethical questions underlying so much of the current debate. Despite all the horrors and tragic aspects of U.S. involvement, we have also managed to accomplish a lot of good. From roughly 1950 on, but on a vastly expanded scale after 1961, U.S. aid in one form or another — from techniques for raising piglets to building the most sophisticated military and civilian facilities — has assisted hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese individuals in all walks of life, social units and organizations. That a great deal was constructed in Viet Nam with U.S. aid, directly for individuals or indirectly through institutions, cannot be ignored in any fair evaluation of our role. Yet it is overlooked in much of the current debate on the morality of the war. Whether or not in providing this aid we promoted the welfare of more people than we helped to destroy must

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at least be considered — even if these material accomplishments turn out in the long run to have been futile exercises from the viewpoint of American and Vietnamese interests. It is also inconceivable that in striking a "moral balance" we can forget the evil the Vietnamese communists wreaked, or for that matter their positive achievements. We should be prepared to examine our faults on a purely nonethical, utilitarian level. But if a moral or ethical balance on the U.S. involvement is to be drawn, then it must include the good and the bad on both sides. The task is enormously difficult if not futile.

Returning to the more manageable task of evaluating our diplomacy, it is hard not to conclude that the United States went badly astray after 1960 in Viet Nam. Our global posture from 1940 to 1960 matched our legitimate world needs and concerns. Very few U.S. officials after the 1954 Geneva settlement honestly believed that we had gained more than a brief respite in the Vietnamese struggle. One breathed easier after 1955, when Diem seemed to be in control, and after 1956, when no direct push had come from North Viet Nam. But no illusions were entertained, certainly before the late 1950's, that the situation had been saved in a permanent sense — that the weak state in South Viet Nam and the tenuous partition drawn at Geneva would last indefinitely. The mistake of these years, particularly after 1955, was that our course of action inevitably, if imperceptibly, paved the way for the vastly enlarged involvement of the subsequent decade. This is when knowledge, discernment and discrimination could have saved us from later folly.

As to knowledge of Viet Nam — its peoples, culture, travails, tortuous history, infinitely complex aspects — we had too little to start with, and gradually lost what we had as soon as we began to remove our expert advisers to Diem with the onset of apparent stabilization in the late 1950's. Thereafter people with accurate knowledge and long memories of Viet Nam were rarely if ever again properly heard. World conceptual models came to take the place of area-oriented ones. There was also, after 1960, a clear and sometimes fierce rejection of history, which shows up unmistakably in the tenor and substance of post-1960 intragovernmental debates over Viet Nam policy. It was as if the history of the colonial period, of French political efforts, of Vietnamese internecine political feuding, and even of our own intricate dealings in the immediate post-Geneva period, had no relevance to the situation the new policymakers were inheriting.

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Some top decision-makers who arrived in 1961 were unwilling to accept the Geneva agreements for what they had really been — a short-term respite. They also persisted in rating North Viet Nam's small industrial-economic base — admittedly a painfully constructed stake — far higher in the DRV's scale of values than the revolutionary nationalist mission it had so assiduously pursued and for which it had bled so profusely in the French war. This was a serious mistake in judgment, based on a faulty knowledge of history and the perverse economic-development determinism that characterized so much U.S. policy thinking in the 1960's. Even at the level of military strategy and tactics, the experiences of the French war were judged largely irrelevant, if not wholly ignored.

As to discernment and discrimination, it was precisely in 1961 — when we should have ceased doing what we had been doing instead of compounding our errors — that we failed conspicuously to reassess the crucial elements in the situation. If up to 1961 communism still seemed monolithic in Asia and Europe and Ho Chi Minh a "puppet" of Moscow or Peking, after 1961 these perceptions were wrong and dangerously out of date. If up to 1961 containment of China on the early 1950's model still made sense, after 1961 the model was not only out of date but the objective could have been related to Viet Nam far more effectively by making use of the 1954 Geneva neutralization provisions rather than models of counterinsurgency. Whereas up to 1961 Diem still exercised effective if increasingly precarious and unpopular control, after 1961 he could have maintained his rule only if major changes had been wrought in the social and political fabric of Viet Nam. If up to 1961 Diem still represented genuine noncommunist Vietnamese nationalism, after 1961 that claim became more and more tenuous, while the communist championship of the national mystique never weakened. If up to 1961 U.S. nuclear military power was still essentially hegemonic and U.S. economic resources for large-scale dispensation abroad were largely unimpaired, after 1961 they were not. If up to 1961 the U.S. social order still seemed stable, after 1961 (by virtue of internal factors whose potential dynamism should have been predictable) the portents of a breakdown were visible. The task of statesmanship is to discern these changes. It is, of course, much easier with the advantage of hindsight to make harsh judgments. But the fact is that American statesmen did not perceive these changes, so that U.S. policy was ill-prepared to cope with them.

While 1961 was the principal watershed year in the history of

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U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, 1965 was also a critical year — the last year in which our losses could, with minimum irreparable damage, have been cut. But by 1965 the civilian leadership of the government — at State, Defense and the White House — was searching desperately, not for a way out, but for a way to fight the war better, because by then it had staked so much on our posture and policies. State failed abysmally to conduct the kind of review of the stakes that it should have undertaken, although some elements within it tried. Along with the White House, it continued to think within the same parameters and to pursue the same "diplomacy" — only now the U.S. military had to assume an increasingly predominant and thankless role.

In turn, as the civilian leadership at Defense saw its efforts and methods fail one by one and realized that State and the White House were unable to suggest viable diplomatic alternatives, it plunged deeper — in some instances even having to pressure the military establishment to go along with it — on a course premised on erroneous judgments and assessments: of the possible effects of bombings, the chances for successful employment of massive alien forces in Viet Nam, the vulnerability of enemy logistics modes and methods of supply, the motivations of the South Vietnamese Army and particularly its leadership, the cost-benefit calculations of the Vietnamese rural population, the mercurial nature of the Vietnamese urban masses.

There is little in all this for which our military leadership can directly be blamed. Unwillingness to recognize and admit earlier mistakes in high places, combined with the powerful momentum of current policies, swamped the reason and perception of top American civilian policymakers in all key departments in 1964-1965. On the charitable side, one might adduce the physical and mental exhaustion that overtakes them in moments of "crisis management" — moments they abhor for their disorderliness (and tend to postpone as long as possible by deferring the necessary reviews and decisions that might avert them), yet embrace avidly because of their exhilaration when they inevitably occur.

VII

The following list summarizes twelve major errors in our diplomacy toward Viet Nam since 1940.

(1) *Diplomacy by nonoperationalized principle.* This error is best illustrated by the tendency to posture in anti-colonialist poses during World War II and then failing to follow through with

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carefully thought out operational plans or even to examine closely the requirements of a postwar political settlement in Southeast Asia from the standpoint of U.S. interests. This category also includes the reiteration of slogans with little meaning in the concrete Vietnamese situation, as mentioned above.

(2) *Refusal to define the desired outcome.* Regrettably, "What can we do about this today?" was considered to be a more important question in relation to our diplomacy in the 1950's and 1960's than the more contemplative query, "What is it we wish to achieve here?" Surely in connection with Viet Nam most observers would agree that there was throughout a general reluctance to define our goals and purposes in clear, explicit, understandable and meaningful political terms. Even desired or acceptable outcomes tended to be slighted in the meaningless rhetorical definitions of goals sometimes put forward for the benefit of domestic opinion, such as "resistance to communism," "self-determination for our allies," "the capacity to develop a viable state."

What were our political purposes on the mainland of Southeast Asia? Could we accept neutralization or bufferization of the area? Was the requirement of self-determination fulfilled if the Vietnamese, left to themselves, produced a coalition regime? Was Khanh, or Ky, or Thieu, better to leave in office than Big Minh, or Minh and the NLF, or someone else? If we were for Diem and he was decimating the Buddhists, were we not then against the Buddhists? (We said no!) If we were against Diem, and he had to go, who should take his place? The top bureaucracy and decision-making elements were inordinately reluctant, at almost all times, to come up with specific answers to these questions.

(3) *Tendency to equate ideologies.* This we did, irrespective of their application to particular leaders, locales or situations. The United States has tended throughout the thirty-year period to regard democracy as capable of representing in Southeast Asia, and specifically in Viet Nam, the same set of values as in the United States, or for that matter Latin America. Conversely, we tended to equate communisms, drawing few if any distinctions between the Marxist-Leninism overlaid with Stalinism of the Soviets, the Marxist-Leninism overlaid with Confucianism of Mao and the Chinese, the Marxist-Leninism overlaid with the anti-colonial nationalism of the Vietnamese, and any other communism. That Ho was a communist was sufficient information.

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Neither the peculiar East-West blend of his Marxism-Leninism, his long association with French communists, his relations with people as diverse as Soviet agents, Chinese communist officials and members of Southeast Asian royal families, nor his potential as a Titoist in Southeast Asia was ever thoughtfully examined — certainly not after 1945-1950. Equations of this order, even if not seriously made by experts, led principal decision-makers to accept the delusions of assumptions, such as the one which held that national liberation wars, if successful in the unique setting of postwar Viet Nam, would spread rapidly and automatically to such entirely different settings as, say, Peru.

(4) *Tendency to equate alliances.* In this case, a rhetorical assembly of nations in Southeast Asia, labeled SEATO and convened initially by the U.S. Secretary of State for the purpose of assuaging an apparent setback in the area, somehow magically assumed in our eyes the qualities of a real alliance like NATO. Yet the members and structures of NATO and SEATO differ entirely as to regional cohesion; character of commitment; strength, stability and development; commonality of purposes, and assessment of threats.

(5) *Proclivity for duopoly in the management of world power.* This is illustrated by the tendency, especially marked after 1960, to cling to a perhaps unconscious, certainly unstated but nonetheless tenacious belief in an underlying commonality of interests between the Soviets and ourselves. This premise led us to believe after 1954 that the partition of Viet Nam, arranged and, as we have seen, confirmed with Soviet help, gave Moscow a stake equal to ours in its maintenance. (Reasoning by analogy, U.S. officials expected the Soviets to cooperate with us in Laos.) We projected the premise into a continued, though repeatedly disappointed, belief that the Soviets would lend us a helping hand in settling the war and later in "arranging" postwar Southeast Asia.

(6) *Perceptual blindness as to political systems.* This is demonstrated by the failure ever to consider seriously whether the communist mode of social, economic and political organization, particularly as tailored by the DRV-NLF for application to Vietnamese conditions and as presented by them in a strongly nationalist package, might not in fact have suited Viet Nam and its people far better than the more artificial creations imported from the West. Though this view found increasing, if silent, responsiveness among both U.S. officials and the public as our Viet Nam disasters grew, it was never translated into policy.

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(7) *Predilection for operations.* True to the Seabee motto in World War II — "the possible we do today, the impossible we do tomorrow" — U.S. diplomats and, of course, the U.S. military have tended to feel that anything can be achieved if we work at it hard enough. This proclivity for operating against all odds, instead of analyzing the odds, leads to milling about in the management of programs without advancing an inch toward the goals. In 1967-1969, for example, the Department of State (and AID) were far more concerned with "staffing and running" CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support) than with analyzing what we were trying to do in Viet Nam, and why. Programmatic approaches in foreign affairs are not only costly in economic terms and risky in political terms; they can also rapidly lose themselves in futility when the meaning of diplomacy becomes lost to the diplomats. Diplomacy is the strategy of moving from present place to desired position without the use of force in international affairs. It has little in common with management — the strategy of optimizing output at lowest unit cost of production.

(8) *Transposition of method.* This is illustrated by the belief that counterinsurgency techniques that worked in Malaysia and the Philippines would work in Viet Nam. It entailed, in the first place, a failure to view Viet Nam in historical continuum and to associate the developments of 1960-1965 with those of 1945-1955, thereby ignoring the importance of the nationalist mystique in which Ho Chi Minh had draped his legions. But it also demonstrated a failure to appreciate the specific character of a principally ethnic Chinese challenge to Malayan ethnic supremacy in the Malaysian case, and of Magsaysay's American-inspired socio-political methods in a milieu receptive to American direction and activity in the Philippines case.

The application of escalative games and scenarios from one locale to a totally different situation, without due regard for the validity of the process, illustrates the same weakness. U.S. officials tended to assume that if the Soviets backed down in the face of a graduated application of force by the United States in the Cuban missile crisis, the North Vietnamese must back down in the face of a similar graduated application of force against their country.

(9) *Advocacy system of decision-making.* This is one of the most serious deficiencies in the U.S. approach to foreign policy and diplomacy. Under the system, every U.S. field representative and responsible policymaking bureaucrat finds himself engaged first and foremost in a constant struggle to promote the parochial

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interests — in this case, Viet Nam and the need to keep the Saigon government alive — that have been assigned to his care. This situation is due in part to the organizational structure of the decision-making machinery itself. The temptation to slip from being "Officer in Charge of Viet Nam Affairs" to "Officer in Charge of Promoting Viet Nam Interests and the Interests of the U.S. Embassy in Viet Nam" is well-nigh irresistible. Not only is it not an officer's responsibility to be concerned with "the problem next door, or down the hall, or two continents removed," there is actual disincentive to his mixing in these. This leads rapidly to single-minded immersion with local matters of current concern (known in our Foreign Service as "localitis") and to the loss of perspective noted for the period 1965-1970. It is buttressed by a system of rewards which encourages an Ambassador, a Country Director, or even an Assistant Secretary to curry favor with Country X, evaluates the success of his mission by measuring the degree of X's satisfaction with his efforts, and thus often determines the extent of American largesse dispensed to X.

The lesson here is to curb these advocacy tendencies and counterpoise them with the weight of an "American national interest" discerned somewhere within the decision-making machinery and more clearly enunciated from the top than previous U.S. administrations have done. This process seems to have been introduced with the "open options" and "closed decisions" system elaborated by President Nixon and his White House staff. If a vastly expanded National Security Council staff was the price to pay to realign the badly skewed wheels of advocacy within the increasingly rudderless and overexpanded bureaucracy of the 1960-1970 period, it is a small price indeed.

(10) *Predilection for closed-system thinking.* How top decision-makers and bureaucrats failed repeatedly to assimilate or even to become aware of differing views, perceptions and analyses of the same problem must be a constant wonder to those who observed U.S. policy in Viet Nam closely between 1950 and 1970, particularly during the 1960's. After all, many noted academics, journalists, politicians, businessmen, concerned laymen and others were stating as early as 1964 (1962, in some instances) what has now come to be the accepted wisdom with regard to Viet Nam. Why did the serious, high-level men who played war games at Defense in the fall of 1964 to simulate and measure the potential effects of escalation against North Viet Nam, and who saw at least some of their illusions shattered in these exercises, refuse to accept

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advice or learn from their mistakes? One can only hope that in the future the charmed-circle existence of many foreign policy officials will be less inviolate. This process might be speeded along by the occasional dismissal of someone at or near the top for persistent and obvious errors of perception, judgment and execution.

(11) *High rating of power holder of the moment.* U.S. officials held the belief that each Vietnamese leader was about as good as another; that their idiosyncrasies, character, outlook and capabilities had little relevance as long as they managed to achieve and hold power. Thus, we held in high regard Bao Dai's reasonably capable Prime Minister Nguyen Van Tam (1951-1953); transposed that regard easily to Buu Loc (1953-1954); and, after a year or so of uncertainty — not as to his character but as to his capacity to hold power — to Diem. From Diem, we thought the transition would be easy (or at least feasible) to his Vice President, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, whom we dropped the moment he lost power. (He was ignored and allowed to live an increasingly bitter existence after 1963.)

Where Big Minh (General Duong Van Minh) and Tho had failed, we thought Nguyen Khanh could succeed, since he had seized power. And as Khanh in turn gave way to Quat, Hung, Khiem, Ky and finally Thieu (not to mention several others), our heroes multiplied almost as rapidly as their stock declined. The only moral may be that whoever is in power at the moment receives U.S. support. But surely the lesson must be that all leaders are not created equal, and that differences among them deserve closer analysis, even if they all bear a strong resemblance to some Washington stereotype of the "Asian strong man," benevolently inclined.

(12) *Maladroit diplomacy.* We often showed clumsiness and gaucherie (counterbalanced only at times by cleverness, as in Dulles' deals with Nehru) in the purely diplomatic aspects of the Vietnamese question. The rebuffs to de Gaulle during World War II were repeated to the same statesman in 1963-1964 when he had the temerity to offer us a way out — one that was never seriously considered in Washington.

We were crude and inept in our handling of Italian, Polish, U Thant, and especially British mediation efforts, amply documented in such books as Chester Cooper's *Lost Crusade*[2] and more recently by Harold Wilson in *Life*;[3] our use of the Cana-

[2](New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970).
[3]May 21 and 28, 1971.

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dians as messengers but rarely if ever as advisers; our undignified pressuring of countries that were potential troop contributors; our thoughtless dropping of former Vietnamese friends once they had served their purpose; our kowtowing before minor Vietnamese figures; our failure to seek, find and use proper mediators among neutralist Asian statesmen; and in many other ways.

VIII

In the spring of 1965, as the record will some day make clear, there was an opportunity to negotiate through the French "on the basis" of the Pham van Dong "Four Points." This, too, we failed to consider seriously — with tragic consequences. The question must surely be raised whether the final outcome in Viet Nam will be different to any significant degree from what would have resulted from such negotiations — except for the some 45,000 American and countless Vietnamese lives lost.

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ALTERNATIVE FUTURES IN THE CUBAN REVOLUTION*

by Desmond P. Wilson, Jr.

TO prognosticate the behavior of a nation in foreign affairs, most investigators follow similar, well-established procedures. They try to identify the critical factors or variables in a situation, then put them together in a model that distinguishes the feasible, real-world options from those which are purely conceptual possibilities. This is the procedure used in this study.

If an investigator chooses his subject carefully and works with a country like Cuba, whose power to act in foreign affairs is circumscribed, the task of projection is often greatly simplified. Should he choose a country like Japan, which has tremendous power — both actual and potential — he has a more complex problem. This is particularly true if the projections are extended ten years or so into the future.

Projecting Cuba's future is further simplified in this article by certain assumptions about U.S. and Soviet behavior. One assumption holds that U.S.-Soviet relationships will continue to be more antagonistic than cooperative in world affairs, although both powers will seek to avoid a general nuclear war. Another assumption is that U.S. policy will continue to seek the end of communist rule in Cuba and its tie with the USSR. However, without a serious provocation, U.S. actions will fall short of an invasion of the island or other overt uses of military power to force a change in Cuba's government. Expressed in tandem, these assumptions hold that the essential military deterrent relationships between the United States and the USSR will continue, influencing both powers to avoid activities in and around Cuba that would precipitate the other's forceful response. Their validity appears to have been tested and to have survived a series of Soviet naval visits to Cuba that began in July 1969. Some of these visits threatened to undermine the 1962 Washington-Moscow "understanding" reached as a result of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and reportedly led to statements that the understanding did in fact exist and

*The ideas expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Center for Naval Analyses, the United States Navy or any other of the Center's sponsoring agencies.

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would not be challenged.[1] Thus, the alternative futures of interest are those that could be shaped mainly by Cuban or Soviet initiative under the circumstances prevailing since the 1962 missile crisis.

Given these assumptions, Cuba has three options. The first one is essentially the present situation: continuation of a highly authoritarian government which labels itself communist and maintains close ties to the Soviet Union. Internally, this would mean continuity in power for the revolutionary elite, maintenance of a totalitarian apparatus, and refusal by the Cuban regime to establish any meaningful rapprochement with the United States.

The second alternative future is a return to U.S. hegemony. This kind of change would probably come about rapidly and violently — perhaps as the result of an insurgency. Marxist-Leninist terminology would call it a "capitalist restoration," although the economic forms that would emerge from such a development are not at all understood. In any case, under this outcome the United States would find itself suddenly confronted with all the economic dependency problems the Soviet Union now has with respect to Cuba, plus other political and economic problems unique to the island's reversion to its former patron.

The third option, which has gained some attention in forecasting circles, is evolution toward greater international autonomy.[2] In this future, the revolutionary elite would probably maintain continuity of power and the economy would come to operate in an environment relatively free of overwhelming Soviet or U.S. dominance. Cuba would become what is sometimes described as a "Yugoslavia in the Caribbean."

These are the alternative futures for analysis and comparison: the "Castro Model," the "Batista Model," and the "Tito Model." The argument is developed here that the emergence of Cuba as a Caribbean Yugoslavia, in many respects the most attractive of the three alternatives, is the least likely. For the next five years or so, Cuba's real options appear to be confined to the present situation or a reversion to U.S. hegemony.

Specifying the more likely and eliminating the less likely futures rests on comparing them across three structuring factors or

[1]"U.S., Russia Dispute Cuba 'Pact' Claims," *Washington Post,* November 15, 1970, p. A-12.

[2]Cuba's possible evolution toward this position was considered in an article by a former State Department Research Director for Latin America, John Plank, "We Should Start Talking with Castro," *New York Times Magazine,* March 30, 1969.

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independent variables: the island's economy, the political behavior of Cuba's leaders, and the behavior of Soviet leaders toward Cuba. Each of these variables is evaluated for possible changes that would be critical enough to alter Cuba's future.

Client Economy

One of the most fundamental structuring factors is the island's economy. With a 1970 population estimated at 8.5 million, Cuba has large requirements for outside help. The amount and composition of its needs, combined with the shipping required to move its trade, seems to eliminate all but major economic powers as patrons. The United States was the patron from 1901 until 1960, when the USSR became Cuba's major trading partner. For example, in 1959 the United States accounted for 67 per cent of the total Cuban trade turnover (exports plus imports); by 1961 Cuba was dependent on the Soviet Union and other communist states for nearly 75 per cent of its foreign trade. (See Table I.)

Sugar dominates the economy, accounting for about 80 per cent of exports and 28 per cent of national income.[3] Because of large increases in sugar production worldwide, the market price remains low at about four cents per pound. Thus Cuba continues heavily reliant on subsidized markets for its sugar exports. The Soviet Union, itself one of the largest sugar producers in the world, takes about two million tons of Cuban sugar annually, much of it at subsidized prices.[4]

Another important economic vulnerability is petroleum. Cuba uses roughly 90,000 barrels a day or 4.9 million metric tons an-

Table I

DISTRIBUTION OF CUBA'S FOREIGN TRADE

(percentage of total—exports plus imports)

	1955	*1957*	*1959*	*1961*	*1963*	*1965*	*1967*	*1969*
United States	68.4	64.4	67.2	3.7	2.6	0	0	0
Other Free World	25.2	30.1	31.9	21.8	25.1	26.3	23.9	28.4
Soviet Union	3.0	2.6	.5	45.6	39.8	48.1	54.3	48.5
Other Communist	3.4	2.9	.3	28.8	32.4	25.5	21.8	23.1

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of International Trade 1955-58,* and Department of State, *The Battle Act Report 1970.*

[3]Economic Research Division, Chase Manhattan Bank, "Cuba," *World Business,* July 1969, p. 17.

[4]U.S. Department of Agriculture, *1969 Yearbook of International Sugar Organization.*

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nually. Almost all of this is imported from the Soviet Union. The island must also import substantial amounts of food, raw materials, semi-finished goods and some consumer items.

Shipping for Cuba's trade is a particularly sizeable burden given the fact that most of it comes from the USSR. From the Black Sea port of Odessa to Havana the distance is 6,000 miles, or over 12,000 miles round trip. It has been estimated that in maintaining the "oil bridge" to Havana the Soviets keep from twenty-one to twenty-eight tankers continually shuttling between the two states. This is roughly 8 to 10 per cent of the Soviet Union's tanker assets.[5] Another measure of the shipping required to carry Cuba's trade is the total number of ships calling in Cuban ports. Data for 1966, made available by Congress, placed this figure at 840 merchant ships (dry cargo and tanker), of which 616 were flag ships of communist states — mostly Soviet.[6] Thus moving Cuba's trade is a substantial effort involving what are probably opportunity costs for more economically productive ship uses.

The island's client nature is further aggravated by the poor showing of the economy, noted by most observers and by Fidel Castro himself in a remarkable speech following the 1970 sugar harvest. Many consumer items remain in short supply and are rationed. Long lines for available goods are common in urban areas. Once one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America, Cuba's per capita national income is reported to have fallen from $415 in 1958 to about $375 in 1967[7] — despite the fact that the gross national product rose between those years from $2.7 billion to $3 billion. Food production is also diminished. According to a U.S. Department of Agriculture expert, total Cuban food production in 1968 was 10 per cent less than the 1957-1959 average and was 25 to 30 per cent less on a per capita basis.[8] As a result, Cuba, an agricultural country, must import substantial quantities of food.

Even production of sugar, the mainstay of the economy, has not fared well despite the record-breaking 8.5 million tons produced in the 1970 harvest. The 1970 harvest was the focus of a long and much touted national campaign to achieve ten million tons. Because it was such a major effort, it reportedly wrought disloca-

[5]Desmond P. Wilson, Jr., "Cuban-Soviet Relations: Conditions and Constraints," in Richard F. Staar, editor, *Aspects of Modern Communism* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 391.

[6]U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967: Hearings,* 90th Congress, 1st Session, July 1967, p. 94.

[7]Chase Manhattan Bank, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[8]"U.S. Expert Cites Cuban Food Decline," *Washington Post,* January 7, 1969, p. A-9.

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tions and penalties in other sectors of the economy. In the 1971 harvest it became apparent that higher levels of Cuban sugar production could not be sustained. The record is a spotty one, as shown in Table II.

TABLE II
CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION, 1960-1971
(millions of metric tons)

	1960	*61*	*62*	*63*	*64*	*65*	*66*	*67*	*68*	*69*	*70*	*71*
Production	5.9	6.8	4.8	3.8	4.5	6.1	4.5	6.2	5.3	5.5	8.5	5.9
Goal	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.5	7.5	8.0	9.0	10.0	7.0
Shortfall	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.0	1.3	2.7	3.5	1.5	1.1

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, *1969 Yearbook of International Sugar Organization.* The established goal for the 1971 harvest and the actual production for 1970 and 1971 were reported in the *New York Times,* January 25, 1971 and July 27, 1971.

Without timely economic support from the USSR, begun in 1960, Cuban leaders probably could not have persisted in the radical direction imparted to their revolution. Subsequent costs to the Soviets for their decision to aid Cuba have not been trivial. Their assistance has consisted of balance of payment credits, medium- and long-term economic development credits, and sugar subsidies. These outlays, estimated at $500 million for 1969, are considered beyond Cuba's ability to repay.[9] Another estimate places total Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba through 1969 at $4.6 billion, of which $1.4 billion is grant military aid and $3.2 billion is economic assistance.[10]

There are thus two points to keep in mind regarding Cuba's economy: (1) The structure of the economy will continue to make it highly dependent on substantial outside help. (2) The extent and character of the assistance required effectively limit Cuba's possible patrons to either the USSR or the United States. The shipping necessary to carry its trade and the problem of absorbing and subsidizing a portion of its sugar production seem to rule out any patron-like role for the Chinese People's Republic

[9]For judgments about Cuba's ability to pay for its excess of imports, see Department of State, "Cuba," *Background Notes* (Washington: GPO), December 1967 and December 1968.

[10]U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cuba and the Caribbean, Hearings,* 91st Congress, 2nd Session, August 20, 1970, p. 18.

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through the 1970's. Other powers, such as the West European states or Japan, are unlikely to find Cuba attractive enough to expand their trade with the island substantially over the 1957 peak, which collectively amounted to 33 per cent of Cuba's total foreign trade. Some of the West European states have sugar surpluses of their own and reportedly have sought small sugar quotas for the export of these surpluses.

Even if it should somehow become feasible for third powers to liberate Cuba from its economic dependence on the USSR, the Cuban communists probably would not take any actions to move Cuba away from the protective orbit of the Soviet Union. While the client nature of the island economy was important in shaping the Soviet-Cuban alignment initially, political considerations of power and elite survival in Havana are now most important. This is the second of the structuring factors to be considered.

Political Behavior of Cuba's Leaders

Since coming to power in 1959, the Castro regime has evinced in its political behavior a deep sense of insecurity. This appears to stem from both real and contrived problems. Unquestionably the location of Cuba close to the United States and remote from the USSR, the dramatic events associated with the Cuban revolution since 1959, the weak and dependent nature of the island's economy, some uncertainty as to future Soviet support, and the inability of the Soviet Union to defend its client locally from the United States have a great deal to do with the paranoid behavior often attributed to Fidel Castro and his followers. However, even if the environment for Cuba were to become more congenial, it is doubtful that its leaders would modify their hostility toward the United States or the Organization of American States (OAS).

Cuba's revolutionary government is likely to continue to view as threatening any bridge-building with the United States that could influence expectations of change among the Cuban people. The possibility of a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement would add to the difficulty of suppressing the forces of liberalization within Cuba, forces whose invigoration could threaten communist control.[11] Not only do Cuba's rulers realize that their socialist experiment is

[11]There is substantial literature on administrative behavior in totalitarian systems, particularly communist-ruled systems. Three works from this body of literature were consulted for this study: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Sigmund Neuman, *Permanent Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Richard R. Fagen, "The Cuban Revolution: Enemies and Friends," in David J. Finlay, *et al.*, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

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an irritant to the United States and much of Latin America, they are aware that the very existence of more open, democratic systems is a threat to political elites in closed totalitarian systems. In their case the problem is acute because of Cuba's remoteness from the USSR. For this reason the regime is opposed to any extensive opening of communications with the United States lest it trigger irreversible counterrevolutionary forces. Revolts in East Berlin and Hungary and the liberal interlude in Czechoslovakia were put down by Soviet arms. Cuba's rulers could not count on this timely support.

Aside from whether they are justified in seeing an external threat, they now need to construe their environment as menacing in order to rationalize many of the conditions and programs in their island domain. Consequently, there can be no compromise with "imperialism" and the forces of "counterrevolution." Evolutionary socialism and nonalignment may be possible in parts of Eastern Europe, but probably not in Cuba. It is doubtful that the present leadership of the Cuban regime would even permit extensive relations to develop with other Western Hemisphere states unless they are embarked on a socialist and revolutionary course — witness the budding friendship with Chile. Even if the United States and the OAS were to ease or end the economic and diplomatic isolation of the island, the Cuban communists would no doubt judge a closed society to be more promising for their own survival and act to limit or closely control relations with their neighbors.

Castro gave clear expression to the above interpretation of revolutionary Cuba's situation in a major foreign policy speech in Havana on August 24, 1968.

> . . . It is all the more necessary to express our position, because some speculations have been made about possible improvement of relations between Cuba and the United States.
>
> The revolutionary government has at no time expressed the slightest interest in improving its relations with the imperialist U.S. Government. It has not shown or will it show, nor will it pay the least attention or express directly, or indirectly, tacitly or expressly, any kind of consent to discuss with that government as long as it is a government which represents the bulwark of reaction in the world, the international gendarme, enemy of revolutionary movements, aggressor in Vietnam, aggressor in Santo Domingo, and interventionist in revolutionary movements. This has been, is, and will be unquestionably the position of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.
>
> Never, under no circumstances — the comrades of our Central Committee know this, they know that this is the line adopted by our com-

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mittee — that never, under no circumstances, even in the most difficult circumstances, will this country approach the imperialist government of the United States, even if one day it puts us in the position of having to choose between keeping the revolution alive or taking such a step. Because, gentlemen, beginning at that moment, no revolution would continue living.

If one day this revolution, in order to survive, has to pay for its security and survival the price of concession to Yankee imperialists, we would prefer — as our people prefer — that this people sink with our revolution rather than survive at such a price.[12]

The Cuban Prime Minister has continued to maintain this position in many speeches through the fall of 1971. He has extended his rejection to include the OAS.

The Spanish dictionary has no more adjectives to describe the O.A.S. Our dictionary has no words to express more clearly that Cuba will never rejoin that cesspool, that filth, that cadaver.

There is no way, no way whatsoever, to explain clearly enough that we do not want to be involved anymore in this reconciliation chit-chat, or be considered as possible candidates for reintegration into the O.A.S. Press dispatches constantly appear reporting endless discussions saying that if the sanctions are lifted Cuba will rejoin the American system, and things of that ilk. This has been said a thousand and one times. We hope they are not planning to make us members by force. We know — oh, boy, do we know — that no one can get us to do anything against our will. And in the case of the O.A.S., we would not join through force or through diplomacy; through neither enticement nor force: Let there be no doubts![13]

Castro thus makes it plain: Cuba would betray its revolution if it re-established relations with Latin American governments other than "revolutionary states" which had ended their subservience to the United States.

The island milieu helps to mold the outlook of Cuban leaders. This is not to say that the personality or the personal decisions of Fidel Castro are insignificant; rather, geographic, political and economic circumstances shape and severely limit the context in which any governing Cuban communist must operate. While the words in the above speeches were Castro's, they could be spoken by any subsequent leader who seeks to continue the revolution in Cuba along Marxist-Leninist lines.

Variation on Three Themes

The political behavior of Cuba's leaders is typical of threatened

[12]Havana Domestic Television and Radio in Spanish, 0102 GMT, August 24, 1968.

[13]Speech by Fidel Castro at the University of Havana, August 27, 1971, reported by Havana Prensa Latina in Spanish, 1653 GMT, August 30, 1971.

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elites. Its stimulus is a politics of survival. Preservation of the regime demands zealous society-wide conduct that adheres to ideological norms. Frequent purges, Red Guard-like activities, cultural revolutions, and militancy in both domestic and foreign policies serve to insure such conduct and to rationalize totalitarian controls. In the case of Cuba the politics of survival for the leadership seems to cluster around three themes: overt emphasis and reliance on ties with the USSR, emphasis on altering Cuba's external environment through the export of revolution, and emphasis on altering the internal environment by intensifying the revolutionary process within the island.[14] Since Castro came to power in January 1959, all three themes have been present in various mixes. Usually one has been dominant for a period as the focus for propaganda and programmatic efforts.

The first of the themes, emphasis on establishing close ties with the USSR, emerged in late 1959.[15] Castro and his followers initially sought Soviet aid by confronting Moscow with an increasingly radical, pro-communist revolution, which also appeared reasonably secure from the type of counterrevolution encountered by Guatemalan communists in 1954. Success for the Cuban regime came in February 1960, when First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan signed the first significant Soviet-Cuban trade and aid agreement. Subsequently, Soviet-Cuban economic, political and military ties continued to develop, while U.S.-Cuban ties deteriorated. Cuba's move toward alignment with the Soviet Union was highlighted by the break in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the declaration by Castro that Cuba was a "socialist republic" and that he was leading the island to communism. In January 1962 Cuba was excluded from the Inter-American system by the OAS, making its isolation in the Western Hemisphere almost complete. In April 1962 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formally recognized Cuba as a fraternal socialist state, and sometime between the spring and summer of 1962 the decision was made to install Soviet missiles in Cuba. That Soviet decision further committed the prestige of the USSR to the Castro regime and probably marked the high point in Cuban-Soviet relations.

[14]Another description of the themes is strategies for attaining national goals. The ultimate goal is presumably a communist society and a similar external environment. The proximate goals are survival of the system and its leaders.

[15]For an analysis of the early maneuvering by Castro and the Cuban communists to secure the backing of the USSR for the Cuban revolution, see Edward Gonzales, "Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals and the Soviet Response," *World Politics*, October 1968.

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Following the missile crisis in late 1962, relations with Moscow seemed less congenial as the Castro leadership began emphasizing the second of the policy themes — the export of revolution to Latin America. Later characterized by "Che" Guevara's famous exhortation to "create two, three, many Viet Nams" in the continent, external militancy was the dominant mood in Havana from 1963 through mid-1967. The regime took action either to inspire or to instigate revolutionary activities. Efforts to this end included propaganda broadcasts inciting anti-government movements, guerrilla warfare training, formal political indoctrination or both for over a thousand Latin insurgents visiting Cuba, modest financial support for various revolutionary groups, and direct arms support in at least the one known case of Venezuela. In addition, the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) and the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) were established in 1966 in Havana to coordinate worldwide revolutionary efforts. While incidents of violence inspired or instigated by Cuba have occurred throughout much of Latin America, the principal targets seem to have been Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia.[16] However, the regime's efforts to export revolution, never very successful, sustained a setback with the death of Guevara in mid-1967. The collapse of Guevara's efforts in Bolivia, combined with the alleged refusal of the Moscow-oriented communist parties in Latin America to support Castro's insurgency, and the growing effectiveness of counterinsurgency forces were probably important factors in Castro's change of emphasis to the third major theme — intensification of the revolution within Cuba.

In late 1967, domestic revolutionary activities began receiving most of the attention of the Cuban government. Much of the population was mobilized to achieve agricultural and industrial production goals. Over 58,000 small businesses were nationalized in the first few months of 1968 on grounds that they were run by profit-making "parasites" and were sources of "counterrevolutionary" activities. Propaganda exhorted the people to be vigilant, to work hard, and to sacrifice so that the revolution could become a "peaceful example" of the advantages of socialism for Latin America.[17]

[16]U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967 Report*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967 (Washington: GPO, 1967).

[17]Fenton Wheeler, "Less for Cubans," *Washington Post*, September 19, 1968, p. G-6.

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Now, with both the much publicized sugar cane harvest of 1970 and the disappointing 1971 harvest completed, emphasis on intensifying the revolution within Cuba appears to be waning. The regime may be developing "new" programs to maintain its revolutionary identity and momentum — perhaps some new form or higher level of Soviet-Cuban cooperation or a renewed effort to export revolution, probably with support to urban insurgents. Whatever new emphasis may come to the fore, it is not likely to be slanted toward rapprochement with the United States. Castro and his followers have demonstrated again and again by their behavior and their statements that they regard any improvement in relations with the United States as a threat to their survival.

The Nature of the Soviet Tie

The third factor that determines Cuba's future is the Soviet commitment. From policy statements and past economic agreements it is evident that the Kremlin leaders have assumed responsibility for the economic and political survival of a communist regime on the island. In doing so they must have considered the client nature of Cuba's economy, the lack of economic alternatives permitting political survival of the island regime, and the probable outcome for Cuba if Moscow's aid and trade were terminated or substantially reduced.

The prestige and reliability of the USSR as a "responsible" great power and the "motherland" of revolutionary socialism encourages the survival of socialist Cuba and its communist leadership. Cuban leaders not only have identified themselves as Marxist-Leninists and their country as "socialist," but have attempted to apply their ideology in administering the island nation. The Soviets have acknowledged Cuba's socialist development, and thereby have tended to validate its claim for Soviet support. Kremlin spokesmen have described Cuba as a "fraternal" and "socialist" state[18] and have given periodic assurances that the island will receive "all 'round support," including defense support, from the USSR and other socialist states. But while Soviet aid has been adequate for the Castro regime's survival, it has not been lavish. Furthermore, its quantity and timing have probably been regulated to help control or limit some of Cuba's policies with which Moscow was not in full accord.

[18]For example, Leonid Brezhnev in his address before the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in January 1969, said "Cuba is not alone; it belongs to the community of socialist states."

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Some Kremlin responsibility also extends to military security, which is made difficult because of Cuba's location. Despite its large and well-equipped military forces, the island remains an enclave and is locally indefensible from a determined attack by the United States. As a consequence, its security from invasion rests in part on the nuclear deterrent posture of the USSR and in part on whatever U.S. vulnerabilities the Soviets can threaten. Soviet defense of the island thus relates to the larger Cold War relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, with bearing on nuclear and conventional deterrence at all points of confrontation between the great powers.

Security against internal uprisings presents a different problem and probably is the greatest threat to the Cuban communists over the long run. The island's remoteness from the USSR makes it unlikely that the Soviets would be able to suppress a "counterrevolution" similar to Hungary's in 1956 or Czechoslovakia's in 1968. In addition, Kremlin leaders could not ignore the prospect of a confrontation with the United States if they attempted to move troops and equipment from the Soviet Union into Cuba to put down a popular uprising. While the possibility of a popular uprising may trouble them, the Soviets probably do not regard it as an insurmountable problem. If the United States can be deterred from giving active support and material backing to insurgents, local uprisings in Cuba may be locally defeated. By their nature, totalitarian regimes are efficiently organized to forestall or defeat insurrections; with its substantial military force, Cuba need be no exception. Castro's security forces have already been effective in controlling the population and in eliminating both urban and rural-based insurgents.

Despite the disadvantages in its patron role, Moscow seems to consider retention of its commitments to Cuba preferable to withdrawal from those commitments. A possible "bourgeois restoration," even in distant Cuba, could not be dismissed lightly in the Kremlin.

Soviet Options and Cuba's Three Modes of National Action

An apparent Soviet decision to make the best of a difficult situation and support Cuba still leaves a range of choice for Soviet leaders. They must decide what specific content or character to give to the alliance. Their problem is a complicated one. Somehow they must balance their relationship with Cuba against their global interests and relationships with the United States. If they

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make it convincingly clear that they intend to fulfill their responsibilities to Cuba over the long term, they can diminish the Cuban communists' sense of insecurity. This may have a dampening effect on the militancy of Cuba's foreign and domestic policies. Conversely, the less confidence the Cubans have in the Soviet commitment, the more militant they are apt to become in their struggle to survive, and in their efforts to coerce greater Soviet support.

Soviet naval visits to Cuba may be a particularly useful method of demonstrating Moscow's commitment. Seven visits by Soviet general purpose naval forces took place between July 1969 and November 1971. However, the Soviets must worry about U.S. reactions to perceived violations of the "understanding" that emerged from the 1962 missile crisis. If Soviet naval visits become even more common, the distinction between an intermittent presence and a permanent presence will be difficult to maintain. Also subject to continuing ambiguity will be the distinction between some general purpose naval forces and naval forces capable of strategic offensive missions. Thus the kind of Soviet commitment which would significantly reduce Cuban insecurity is apt to deepen U.S. enmity if not bring about a crisis confrontation.[19] On the other hand, a policy that minimizes the Soviet "presence" but is short of abandonment of the island is no solution either; Cuba can still implicate the USSR in its militant foreign adventures and its compulsive revolutionary behavior. The Soviets might well reason that involvement at modest levels of assistance provides them with as much control as they can reasonably hope for under the circumstances.

This interpretation seems to correspond with the real world of Soviet-Cuban-United States relationships. Driven by the insecurity of the Cuban communist regime, conditioned by nuclear deterrence and the larger adversary U.S.-USSR relationship, and maintained by the Soviet Union because Castro's Cuba could not survive otherwise, the Moscow-Havana alliance is an anomaly that is likely to persist.

[19]Another confrontation of force over Cuba may have been narrowly averted in 1970. It was reported in the *Washington Post* of October 1 that the Soviets might have started to build a naval base at Cienfuegos capable of supporting submarines. This was denied by the Soviet Union, and on November 17 State Department officials confirmed that Moscow had given private assurances that it would not introduce "offensive weapons" anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. In return for the Soviet promise, Washington was understood to have pledged not to invade Cuba.

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Conclusions

The argument developed here supports the following conclusions on the future of the Cuban revolution:

(1) Well into the 1970's, Cuba's alignment and dependency options will remain confined to either the USSR or the United States. The island's client economy, and above all the Cuban revolutionaries' perceptions of their environment as inherently hostile, combine to preclude evolutionary socialism and development of a more open society along the lines of a "Yugoslavia in the Caribbean."

(2) Within Cuba the process of revolution will continue until the communist regime either collapses as a result of Soviet abandonment or is overthrown. Hostility and near paranoia are endemic in the situation of the Cuban revolutionary elite. Therefore, possible United States or OAS initiatives to improve relations with Cuba are likely to be rejected.

(3) Soviet policy can probably mitigate the intensity and militancy of the Cuban revolution. The more the Cuban communists are assured of enduring Soviet support and a continued Soviet "presence," the less militant they need be to survive.

(4) Whether by plan or circumstantially, the USSR has become committed to support the distant and vulnerable Cuban regime. Were the Kremlin to terminate its support and disclaim further responsibility, this would almost certainly lead to collapse or overthrow of the regime and to the end of the socialist revolution in the island. In that event Cuba would probably re-enter the Western Hemisphere's system of states and turn to the United States for assistance. Despite their difficulties with Cuba, therefore, the Soviets are not likely to abandon their client. The historical evidence of the relationship points in the direction of continued ties. Moreover, because of the larger Soviet-U.S. competition the Cuban revolution will continue to be an international concern with global and not simply regional implications.

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APPRAISING THE OSTPOLITIK

by Lawrence L. Whetten

AFTER little more than one year in office, the Brandt Government of the Federal Republic of Germany scored two major diplomatic breakthroughs in the East—the USSR-FRG treaty and the Polish normalization treaty — reopened a dialogue with Czechoslovakia, and substantially increased commercial activities by signing liberalized five-year trade agreements with all East European countries except Bulgaria. These and related developments promised a greater impetus in improving relations between West Germany and the East than the cumulative efforts of the Western allies over the previous quarter-century. The impressive successes of the *Ostpolitik*, however, have been compromised by the initial failure of Bonn's *Deutschlandpolitik* to establish a corresponding degree of rapport with East Germany or to promote a viable solution to divided Berlin simultaneously with the breakthroughs in Moscow and Warsaw. The chief source of European tension — the German problem — remains largely unaltered, and reconciliation between the FRG and Eastern Europe has so far been slow and difficult.

Sufficient accommodation has been registered, however, so that political relations in Central Europe, even between the two Germanys, cannot be returned to the level of hostility and distrust witnessed in the 1950's, and as recently as 1968, without a cataclysmic upheaval and surge of tensions. It seems safe to speculate that recent events have probably precluded a direct rearward march to the Stalinist era, when threats and reprisals virtually froze diplomatic activity. This is a period of change of scale unknown since before the Second World War; a transition without reliable precedents in the memories of contemporary statesmen and diplomats. Only scant evidence is available upon which to base even tentative answers to questions that have plagued analysts for years and new queries that have arisen only months ago.

For example, is the Warsaw Pact now more or less reliable as a political instrument than it was in the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion? Following the explicit negation of Bonn's policies as the

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"main threat" to East European security and the acceptance of West Germany's political respectability, what new cohesive matrix can be supplied to insure endorsement of Soviet discipline in the East? Has a greater degree of coalition politics, à la Rumania, been accepted by the Kremlin and how should this be measured? The East Europeans, through the reduction of the German menace and Bonn's renunciation of territorial claims and recognition of existing borders, now enjoy greater mental security than at any time in the past thirty-five years, but does this inject more or less latitude in the formation of national policies? As the bloc countries increase their measure of security, will the Soviets' top priority aim of stability be enhanced proportionally? Are there natural levels to the extent of West German influence acceptable in the East? Are they much beyond the present level? With Germany's traditional economic and cultural avenues for influence largely curtailed, what new resources can be drawn upon to strengthen Bonn's desire for political stature? Integration with the West has not given Bonn the decisive leverage it needs to attain its main national objective — German reunification; if it cannot use its *Ostpolitik* to achieve this aim, what options are applicable? What are the parameters of German reconciliation acceptable to Bonn, East Berlin, Moscow and the Western allies? Has the relevance of allied authority and influence been weakened or strengthened by the *Ostpolitik*? Have American withdrawal symptoms contributed to or impeded a solution of the German problem? In the age of Western military drawdowns, what new NATO strategy and aims could best strengthen the allies' support for Bonn's goals? In light of the success of *Ostpolitik,* are Bonn's Western partners likely to reappraise their attitudes toward German reconciliation?

What is the impact of strategic nuclear parity on intra-European relations and great-power relations? Has Moscow's enhanced global stature induced a more lenient German policy? How can Moscow be expected to employ its new power to cultivate a deferential West German attitude toward Soviet interests? Finally, can German nationalist sentiments sustain the losses inflicted by the *Ostpolitik* and the continued frustrations in the *Deutschlandpolitik* for more than several years without degenerating into demands for drastic action — which might entail a more aggressive policy toward the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a Gaullist line toward the West and neutralist stand toward the East, firmer demands in European councils for greater

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political power, or, conversely, a gradually increasing indifference toward the interests of Bonn's allies?

Such questions must be answered in the 1970's if Western policy is to provide reasonable controls over the historic Russian-German love-hate attraction. A survey of the implications of both the *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* may not lead to appropriate solutions at this juncture, but it might afford guidelines for further research and additional queries.

II

A leading figure among the German expellees, Johann Gradl, stated in 1964 that the Germans could not overcome the division of Germany by recognizing it. Remarks in this vein, typical for the time, appear now to have been shortsighted. Only through recognizing the partition and accepting the existence of two Germanys has sufficient progress been registered in improving relations with the East to produce the present stilted dialogue across the Elbe.

For years Western leaders formed their public stance toward the East in terms of promises and visions, but without a concrete program for achieving these aims. After 1956 it was frequently argued that the most durable solution to the German problem would be within the context of a new European order. The immobility of policy in both East and West stemmed from inability to devise suitable models for the new order. When individual East European states attempted in 1956 and 1968 to formulate their own programs, the Western nations demonstrated such circumspection that they implied acceptance of the Soviet understanding of spheres of influence and Moscow's concepts of the new order within its spheres. On the other hand, the USSR was unable to expand its plan for a new Europe beyond stabilizing its security system in Eastern Europe; its program did not elicit wide support in the West. The stalemate fostered passivity and public apathy in the West but not in the East, where the people remained more aware of the vestiges of war.

In general, Western hopes for a new order were based on achieving a German peace treaty that would produce satisfactory solutions to the residual effects of the war and correspondingly reduce the sources of European tensions. Disarmament and, later, arms control schemes were envisioned as measures to decrease the risks of potential imperfections in these solutions. The legacy of

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"package deals" persisted longer in the West than in the East. For example, Khrushchev proposed in 1963 a nonaggression pact similar to the recently concluded Moscow-Bonn treaty, but it was rejected in Germany by both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as superfluous and dangerous; without solutions to the political problems, it was reasoned, military détente would weaken the West's most important leverage. Only gradually did the West perceive that a policy of small, confidence-building steps could advance ultimate aims.

A variety of influences generated the new awareness and the shift in orientation. Domestic West German pressures that had made the Grand Coalition imperative, i.e., the combination of hopes and frustrations and the now-or-never atmosphere, released new demands for an activist platform. (It is noteworthy that the SPD rank and file became more assertive than the national committee in seeking an opening to the East.) The changing nature of the policies of Bonn's allies also had a crucial bearing: the 1960's witnessed de Gaulle's flanking movement to the East, Kennedy's search for alternatives to confrontation, Johnson's obsession with the Far East, a wind-down in Western integration, and NATO's acceptance of Soviet strategic equality and the eclipse of asymmetrical deterrence. From the Eastern side, signs of polycentrism gave rise to speculation that a more individualistic Western approach toward the respective East European countries could foster the growth of nationalistic aims, allowing a policy of small steps greater latitude. Rumania's independent-minded policy had been instructive. For one and a half years after establishing diplomatic relations, both Bucharest and Bonn had been subjected to concerted polemical attacks and discriminatory policies. But after the 1968 Prague crisis it became apparent to many Eastern leaders that it was both necessary and desirable to deal directly with the West Germans in further stabilizing developments in Central Europe.

In Chancellor Willy Brandt's view, there were four main reasons for the change in Moscow's German policy: the Soviets' growing concern with the Chinese threat, their desire for broadening economic and technological contacts with the more advanced Western industrial states, the requirement for them to reach a *modus vivendi* with the United States, and their realization after bringing Prague to heel of the need to participate in the détente to the same extent as their allies. "What makes the present process

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of détente so important," Brandt said at the end of 1970, "is the fact that it is going with the Soviet Union and not against it."[1]

While it is difficult to identify direct cause and effect relations in the policy changes of the FRG and the socialist countries, one decision can be categorized as an important stimulant of the transformation in East European policy. Bonn's gradual acceptance of the status quo and abandonment of its policy of strength triggered forces in the East that inevitably challenged the traditional stand. In turn, these forces generated responses allowing the FRG to relax further its own terms for accommodation. (Contrariwise, East Germany hardened its terms for rapport in rough proportion to the softening of those of its allies.) More than any other single factor, the loosening of the FRG position, especially since 1969, seems to have been the catalyst for the East's receptivity to Bonn's *Ostpolitik*.

German awareness of the possibilities in the East became most evident among the SPD, yet the party had no grand design. Even after taking office, Brandt expressed notions and aims but no comprehensive action program. The lack of a total plan was most obvious in the inter-German talks, where the distance between the two parties could not be bridged even on single issues. While the willingness of the other socialist states to explore an agreement on limited topics minimized the need for a broad perspective, the claim of being guided by realities and the need for more intermediary steps[2] was no substitute for a general strategy the public could grasp. A more elaborate formulation could have minimized the popular shock over the results of the three-pronged West German offensive — against the Soviet Union, East European countries and East Germany.

III

What have the West Germans actually gained in the first year and a half from Brandt's *Ostpolitik*? Were the Soviet and Polish treaties successes or sacrifices?

From the Western viewpoint the long-range impact of the treaties appears to be mainly beneficial. Several reasons may be cited: (1) Because their ratification by West Germany has been contingent on a favorable Berlin solution, the entire normaliza-

[1]Interview in *L'Express*, reprinted in *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn) (hereafter cited as *Bulletin*), December 15, 1970.
[2]Katharina Focke, "New Ways to Cope with Old Problems of Divided Germany," *Bulletin*, June 16, 1970.

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tion process has been refined to a single frame of reference. The FRG has accepted the existing realities in the East and now requires that the East follow suit with respect to Berlin. This should significantly strengthen the allies' bargaining position in the Berlin talks. They must now both extend and accept concessions largely within the context of the Moscow treaty.

(2) FRG national aims of self-determination, or nonintervention in domestic affairs, and refusal to recognize the GDR have been upheld. No important issue or principle was traded or weakened, except the commitment to an international peace treaty. While Bonn initially argued that the Moscow treaty would neither prejudice nor anticipate a final settlement, the acceptance of the Soviet-Polish demands has conveyed a *de facto* peace arrangement.[3] Since these and subsequent accords were firmly linked to a Berlin solution, the necessity for a final peace conference may be substantially reduced.

(3) The USSR has now accepted the respectability of the Federal Republic. Bonn's political aspirations in both East and West can no longer be taken by the socialist countries as a disturbance of the peace. This is the most significant contribution to date toward intra-European cooperation.

(4) Bonn learned a lesson from its attempts in 1967-1968 to make gains in Eastern Europe at Moscow's expense. In 1969 it started at the top and made an adjustment with Moscow its leading priority. This new configuration was more acceptable to Moscow and as Bonn gradually dropped its defensive posture against the East and expanded the latitude of mutual cooperation, its stature in the West also increased substantially. The opening to the East is the second step, as integration in the West was the first, toward establishing Bonn's political authority commensurate with West Germany's economic status as the world's third or fourth industrial power. These coordinated steps allow Bonn for the first time to extend its policy aims beyond those of the Weimar Republic — namely, integration in the West — to security and settlement in the East, rather than manipulation and expansion. It is too early to predict the durability of the new normalization policy, but as it is now exercised it represents one of the most important alterations in Germany's traditional Eastern policy in this century.

(5) The strategy of small steps and the piecemeal approach to stability and security have proven more successful than former

[3]See Foreign Minister Walter Scheel's extensive argumentation, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 15, 1970.

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comprehensive peace plans. The *Ostpolitik* has been the best example in the history of East-West relations of the merits of confidence-building through micro-diplomacy. It is likely to complement the formula of other Western countries and NATO as they seek a military disengagement and political détente.

(6) In the wake of the Soviet and Polish treaties, there is a growing feeling among West German analysts that Moscow is attempting to return its European policy to the context of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe. It has recognized that the FRG is the chief source of European stability and instability and has elected to drop its former policy of ostracism for one of mutual cooperation. While the distance between cooperation and condominium of the 1939 variety remains wide, it is essential that the FRG, as the second European power, act positively to establish and preserve leverage against the USSR. The Moscow treaty provided Bonn with its first substantial initiative and may serve as an important prerequisite to a future all-European community.

(7) The sacrifices embodied in both treaties are more than symbolic gestures that the Germans have accepted at last the consequences of their aggression (welcomed by friends and foes alike). They are an essential step toward rectifying the war guilt and political paranoia that has afflicted so many Germans and their foreign policy. These treaties afford West Germany a measure of international rehabilitation and restored self-respect that is indispensable for a durable solution to the German problem.

(8) Critics have charged that the treaties also represent a moral step backward, allowing for the acceptance of injustice and a new climate of cynicism in which the communist system is regarded as being different from, but as good as, a free society. The futility of the twenty-year-long anti-communist campaign, however, warrants a new approach. The barrenness of the effort has not been due to lack of Western humanity or moral virtues, but to the misuse of arguments against communism, stemming largely from confusion between national communism and Soviet expansionism. Available evidence indicates that peaceful competition between the two political and economic systems can be reasonably expected to lead to more emphasis on human rights than in the era of anti-communism and international tensions.

(9) The *Ostpolitik* has undoubtedly opened new economic opportunities. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag, has predicted that the pro-

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portion of Eastern trade in total West German foreign trade may increase from its present 4.2 per cent to 8 or 9 per cent. He has also cautioned against immediate optimism because of the restraints experienced by the socialist countries, namely, lack of convertible currencies, strict bilateralism, poor quality industrial goods, and inadequate marketing techniques for competition in the West. At the same time, he pointed out that there are several largely unexplored areas of cooperation for Western firms, such as buying and selling licenses and technological know-how, marketing Eastern products within Eastern Europe itself and third countries, and financing correlated production in the socialist countries.[4] If such activities prove profitable, traditional restraints may be gradually neutralized and West Germany could become the dominant technological power for Eastern Europe.

(10) The responses of Bonn's allies to the *Ostpolitik* are critical criteria for its success. Fears have been expressed in the West that Moscow either would be insensitive to Brandt's delicate domestic balance and not endorse his claims to the status quo in Berlin, or would tempt him to make excessive concessions in a desperate effort to win both at home and abroad. Those who charged that Bonn's center of gravity was being shifted to the East by Brandt's "mad race to Moscow" paid insufficient attention to the decline of countervailing Western forces, such as the eclipse of French influence and the still uncertain utility of the British-West German rapprochement. But the *Ostpolitik* crystallized many traditional apprehensions.

Adelbert Weinstein, a leading West German defense analyst and correspondent for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sympathized with these fears.

> The Ostpolitik is made by us instead of by the Americans. When confronted with possible consequences beyond its control, a world power cannot but worry. . . . In our situation one cannot seek a fair opening toward the East and pursue classic western policy without creating suspicion. . . . Hence the American decision to maintain the U.S. troop presence in Europe can also be interpreted as a precautionary move not only towards the Soviet Union.[5]

Other West German analysts were less sensitive to Western concerns and cited a long history of grievances stemming from the allies' indifference toward vital FRG interests.

[4] *Die Welt*, August 12 and *Bulletin*, August 4, 1970.
[5] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 23; *Die Welt*, December 12 and 14; and *Rheinische Post*, December 15, 1970.

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The Western position in Germany first cracked when the Kennedy government gave preference to its relationship with the Soviet Union over its policy of alliance. . . . When Washington abandoned the project of a joint NATO nuclear force; when McNamara started looking for new pseudo-rational concepts for the defense of Europe, the idea of equal protection for all NATO members waned and the FRG's faith in NATO received a shock from which it has never fully recovered. . . . [This was amplified by] the Allied passivity at the erection of the Berlin Wall; the American campaign against the formation of a German-French bloc; the French campaign against an intimate German-American relationship . . . Gaullist resistance against West European integration; and British opposition to the WEU. . . . Even before it had digested the reorientation of de Gaulle's European policy toward Moscow, the FRG was confronted with Washington's and London's signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, even though they knew that the Soviets interpreted it as an anti-German pact. Today Senatorial pressure for troop withdrawals spreads doubt about the alliance to the most remote German village. It is surprising that despite so many blows the Germans have remained reliable partners. . . . [But] unless the West, particularly the U.S., is prepared to lose the struggle over the FRG, it must correct past errors. . . .[6]

Such complaints by a right-of-center analyst, Dieter Cycon, make the pledges of solidarity by FRG leaders inadequate for many Western statesmen. Brandt has affirmed many times that the opening to the East is important but not vital to West Germany, while Western integration is a vital interest. Brandt termed the EEC Hague summit meeting of December 1-2, 1969, for example, "the most important event in foreign affairs since I have come to office."[7] Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt has remarked: "Without a firm foundation in NATO there can be no sensible policy of détente in Europe. It would be sheer folly if one attempted to conduct one's policy in the East from any other basis than that of firm Western solidarity."[8]

The difference in the three positions — apprehension, grievances and allegiance — should not impugn the sincerity of each conviction. Closure of the gap will depend increasingly on the prevailing Western, and especially the American, attitude toward the FRG. The United States must adjust its thinking and accept the realities of Europe in the 1970's. The Federal Republic is the dominant military and economic West European power. Its stunted political stature in part devolves from the preservation of artificial alliance restraints due to fears of latent German na-

[6] *Die Welt,* September 28, 1970.
[7] *Bulletin,* March 10, 1970.
[8] "Perspectives of the Alliance," Speech at the WEU Assembly, *Survival,* February 1970, p. 43.

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tionalism and Soviet expansionism. But each year the FRG becomes less a Western dependency, over which certain sovereign rights must be retained. Since the Potsdam peace treaty has been diluted for all intents and purposes by bilateral treaties with the socialist states, the allies' legal prerogatives will remain technically binding but increasingly less applicable. Thus, the demands of the 1970's are that the Western allies accept the FRG as a fully sovereign partner and proceed to establish a more genuine relationship based on equality and independent national interests.

IV

The final argument regarding merits of the *Ostpolitik,* from the Western viewpoint, is the impact it has had on the West German citizenry. Before the signing of the Moscow treaty, the semi-official Institute for Applied Social Sciences revealed that 79 per cent of the interviewees in a recent poll favored the government's conduct of the *Ostpolitik* and only 8 per cent dissented. But more indicative of public sentiment and the durability of the government's policies were the results of six provincial elections held in 1970.

TABLE I

PARTY GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE FEDERAL LÄNDER ELECTIONS IN 1970 COMPARED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE 1969 GENERAL ELECTION*

State	*CDU/CSU*	*SPD*	*FDP*	*Electorate*
Hamburg	−1.2%	+0.7%	+0.8%	1,381,000
North Rhine-Westphalia	+2.7%	−0.7%	+0.1%	11,875,000
Lower Saxony	+0.5%	+2.4%	−1.2%	5,085,000
Saar	+1.8%	+0.9%	−2.3%	783,000
Hesse	+1.3%	−2.3%	+3.4%	3,835,000
Bavaria	+2.0%	−1.3%	+1.4%	7,265,000

**Source: The German Tribune,* December 10, 1970. (Many analysts compared the 1970 results with those of 1966, which is highly inaccurate because of major changes in issues. For Polish reaction and correlation with Warsaw negotiations see *Kurier Polski* and Radio Warsaw, June 15; and *Trybuna Ludu* and *Zycie Warszawy,* June 16, 1970.)

In the 1969 general elections the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union received 46.1, the Social Democratic Party 42.7 and the Free Democratic Party 5.8 per cent of the votes. Since the SPD/FDP coalition had only a 2.4 per cent plurality, the CDU claimed that the coalition did not reflect the

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public will. Its platform during the six *Länder* campaigns was the rectification of this "trick" and the excessive inflation. The SPD/FDP campaigned primarily on the progress of the *Ostpolitik* and economic reforms. The first test in Hamburg in March 1970 was a major disappointment for the CDU. Rather than a groundswell against the government, the voting gave both of the coalition parties gains. In the next three elections in June, "the little general election," the results were inconclusive; losses were traded for gains by the two larger parties. Only the FDP sustained heavy damage, and the CDU had to shift to the opposition in Hanover, Lower Saxony's capital city. The November elections in Hesse and Bavaria were more crucial. The SPD lost significantly in Hesse, its traditional stronghold, but the FDP made impressive gains in both contests.

The details of the Hesse campaign are the most revealing, since a similar *Länder* election had served as the weathervane for the collapse of the 1966 CDU-SPD coalition. The SPD lost 8-9 per cent in the industrial precincts of southern Hesse, but only 0.5 per cent in the more rural north. The reason for the sharp drop was worker dissatisfaction with price instability (a traumatic issue in Germany), the usual bi-election woes of the ruling party, and the loss of the youth to the CDU; foreign policy matters appeared to be of marginal significance. Herbert Wehner acknowledged after the defeat that for the first time in recent history the SPD could no longer call itself the "young" party. The CDU had successfully remodeled its image and had fought a vigorous campaign with young, energetic local candidates.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the 1970 elections that will bear on the conduct of West German foreign policy. First, the CDU does not have the strength to topple the present government through electoral appeal before the 1973 general elections (though defections from the FDP deputies could reduce the coalition's majority). Likewise, the SPD lacks the strength to call a general election before 1973 in order to increase its working majority, yet the new strength of the FDP has injected greater reliability in the coalition. The SPD is likely to give increasing priority to price stabilization at the expense of other issues (the inflation rate had been cut from over 5 to 3.6 per cent by the end of 1970), but will interpret its generally strong showing against the CDU as a mandate to continue the pace of the *Ostpolitik*.

While the revitalization of the CDU led to important local victories, the party's national leadership remained seriously disabled

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by rivalry among the established personalities. The inability of the existing leadership to agree on an alternative Chancellor after one and a half years in opposition and their bungling of the Bahr Papers affair (the premature publication of the draft treaty), whereby they presented the government with the opportunity to harden its demands in Moscow and at the same time undermine the CDU's effective opposition to the treaty, were widely regarded as marks of immobilism and indecision. This paralysis at the top has encouraged the rise of more youthful leaders. A younger group of *Bundestag* deputies will be less susceptible to traditional conservative arguments against the *Ostpolitik*. Indeed, it may be concluded from the 1970 *Länder* campaigns that should the CDU win in 1973 it will not be interested in, or capable of, reversing the gains accrued from the SPD's offensive in the East. The most feasible CDU alternative will be to control and pace the extent of the rapprochement.

V

While there were important shortfalls in the *Ostpolitik*, primarily in relations with East Germany and negotiations over Berlin, there were important long-range gains for Bonn's relations with Eastern Europe. The controversy over the Soviet and Polish treaties precipitated within the FRG charges and countercharges about which side had capitulated. One school of thought held that the FRG had forced the USSR to accept its interpretation of regional security and stability: "The renunciation of the use of force does not require forgoing our constitutional aims, merely the use of force to attain them."[9] The other school argued that the basic Soviet objective, to foreclose the achievement of Bonn's national goals at any cost, had not been abandoned or compromised by the Moscow treaty, and may even have been advanced. "The weaker party to a treaty inviting such conflicting interpretations can only lose in a controversy over its meaning."[10] But these arguments were simplistic; developments in 1970 were the result of adjustments in the traditional positions of both the FRG and the USSR.

It is more problematic to plot the long-range profits and losses for the USSR in its new relationship with the FRG. For more than twenty years Moscow's aims in Eastern Europe have been to consolidate and legitimize its rule. An important instrument for this

[9] *Die Welt*, June 26, 1970.
[10] *Ibid.*

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purpose was the specter of West German imperialism, which, raised to doctrinal proportions, became the primary *raison d'être* for Warsaw Pact solidarity.[11] These tactics were sufficiently successful to enable Moscow to alter its German policy after the construction of the Berlin wall and offer in 1964 to open a dialogue with Bonn. Prague, Warsaw and especially East Berlin reacted so sharply, however, that Moscow accepted their argument that the Warsaw Pact could deal with the FRG only from a position of strength and unity. West German diplomacy in the East to that point had had the effect of aligning the northern tier countries, which feared Bonn's territorial claims, directly behind East Germany's growing assertiveness in challenging both Bonn and Moscow. Rumania viewed this collusion among the northern members of the bloc as a dangerous step toward greater Soviet hegemony and a sound reason for formulating a two-Germanys policy, a precedent subsequently adopted by other East European countries.

The utility of this breakthrough for Bonn was compromised by rising uncertainties in Czechoslovakia and the determined opposition of West Germany's own conservative political factions. The Prague crisis forced a growing realization in Bonn that its policy of strength had been proved unsuccessful and that Moscow's consolidation of the East was sufficiently complete that it could not be reversed. The FRG gradually accepted the fact that its national aim of reconciliation with the other German entity could be made only on Moscow's terms, namely, the endorsement of the status quo in Eastern Europe as the matrix in the USSR's stabilization program. Grasping the dimensions of this fact was a slow process, however; as late as in his January 14, 1970 address to the nation, Brandt stressed the opportunities for political gains afforded by the East's disarray.[12]

At the same time Moscow was becoming increasingly aware that it could not complete its consolidation of Eastern Europe without dealing with the West Germans, who would not agree to a multilateral approach because it would enhance recognition of the GDR. The Soviet courtship of de Gaulle had demonstrated the futility of trying to bypass Bonn in settling Central European problems. West Germany's central position in European affairs, its

[11]Fritz Ermath, *Internationalism, Security and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe 1964-1968* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5909-PR, March 1969).

[12]*Bulletin, Supplement,* January 20, 1970. For a rebuttal on this point, see *Frankfurter Neue Presse,* January 15, 1970.

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amazing technological capabilities, and its contiguous position along Moscow's strategic security frontier made direct contact with Bonn unavoidable. But the USSR could not invite the FRG to participate as a peace partner in Central Europe—the long-standing Gaullist desire—without making important concessions to West German interests. The initial concessions and probably the most durable were the abrogation of Bonn's threat status and the Pact's commitment to its respectability. While the East European people will continue to fear and hate Germans for many years, the Pact's formal commitment to Bonn's international respectability has introduced a fundamental change in East-West relations and Central European diplomacy. It is important to note that these changes in Soviet policy were made without West Germany either manufacturing its own nuclear weapons, as France did, or receiving substantially greater support through the West's nuclear posture. West German participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group has not increased Bonn's access to nuclear weapons.

Yet alterations of Warsaw Pact aims and methods of policy formulation were fraught with uncertainties about the entire fabric of Eastern solidarity and raised questions about appropriate parameters for autonomy, coordination and security. Could the Pact's decision-making apparatus be decentralized in accordance with Rumania's demands for genuine coalition politics without impairing Moscow's interest in preserving regional stability? Did Moscow's gradual display of deference toward the national interests of its allies represent a trend or merely a momentary expediency? What were the dangers of establishing such precedents and would they effect new power relationships within the Pact?

VI

The use of force against Czechoslovakia and its threatened employment against Rumania established the upper tolerance levels for East European maneuverability. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited socialist sovereignty has been denounced by ruling and nonruling communist parties alike, but its implications have been clearly understood and accepted by countries like Rumania. Bucharest's return to Pact councils and deliberations was a signal that it acquiesced, however reluctantly, in the priority Moscow attached to socialist discipline on issues of vital interest to the Kremlin. Rumanian diplomacy since Prague has been designed to establish new areas of maneuver and wider freedom of action below the Soviets' level of tolerance. A *modus vivendi* was worked

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out in the spring of 1970 that partially confirmed the interests, and met the demands, of both parties. Rumania accepted the importance of conformity and discipline on selected issues, and Moscow could proclaim the Brezhnev Doctrine successful. But the Soviets recognized Bucharest's special status within the Pact and right to establish national priorities within the general parameters of socialist policy.

With Rumanian conformity, Moscow's Pact policy became clearer. Its chief demand was apparently that its allies remain "little Europeans" and refrain from undue objections to Moscow's great-power policies. As a result, all Pact members accepted legally binding commitments to aid the USSR in the event of Chinese aggression and have assiduously refrained from contesting Moscow's active participation in the defense of Egypt.[13]

On its part, the USSR had already agreed to greater coordination of regional policies and to push more vigorously for a European security conference as called for in Pact meetings from March 1969 through July 1970. The failure of the West to accept the Pact's terms for an intra-European gathering and the growing indications of moderation in Bonn's *Ostpolitik* prompted a change in priorities in December 1969, agreeable to all except the GDR. The Pact decided to place more emphasis on bilateral solutions to national problems while holding the multilateral approach in reserve, to be used as a means of pressuring the West but mainly as the vehicle for maximizing gains made in the bilateral agreements. The preference for bilateral negotiations opened the way for a broader application of the normal processes of diplomacy and the adjustment and compromise required for its successful practice. It also required new methods and instruments for policy coordination. To date, this has been most noticeable in the accelerated pace of individual contacts among leading national figures; no institutional modifications have yet come to light.

The immediate implications of the nationalist approach to foreign policy, however, became readily apparent. In the first treaty signed between the FRG and the USSR, Moscow virtually abandoned the policy aims of its allies. No mention was made of the Munich Agreement, of recognition of the GDR, or of the

[13]In contrast, the protest at the Czechoslovak Writers Congress in July 1967 against Moscow's Middle East policy set the stage for the movement that began three months later to oust Novotny. The anti-Semitism that swept Poland in 1967 and 1968, stemming from the Middle East war, was a contributing factor in that country's worsening economic stagnation. In addition, Rumania seized the Middle East crisis as a major point of challenge against Soviet leadership.

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sanctity of East European borders in terms acceptable to its partners. This was an abrogation of the Pact's aggregate demands for détente, regularly reiterated since the 1966 Bucharest Declaration. In establishing such a powerful precedent for separatist national contacts with the chief European antagonist, Moscow was forced to grant similar prerogatives to the East Europeans. Furthermore, by accepting something less than what the Czechoslovaks, Poles and East Germans regarded as nonnegotiable terms, the Soviet Union will no longer be able to pose as the absolute guarantor of East European interests as it did before August 1970. While the physical security of these three Pact allies was not immediately endangered, their negotiating position on their most important national grievances was seriously undermined. The East Europeans could only conclude that they had been left to their own resources; an important beginning had been made in transforming the processes of conflict resolution and political détente from international to national preferences.

It is not surprising, therefore, that each of the major negotiations conducted during 1970 gradually assumed individual characteristics. The case of Poland is instructive. From 1956 to 1958, Poland set terms for establishing normal relations with the FRG similar to those recently accepted, then shifted emphasis to military disengagement in the various Rapacki plans of 1958, 1960 and 1962 and the Gomulka plan of 1964. After that date, however, Warsaw became virtually locked in tandem position behind the GDR on all aspects of the Pact's policy toward Germany. When Bonn's policy began to loosen in the mid-1960's, Polish policy aims had become firmly subordinated to those of the GDR, whose main objective was to insure Pact solidarity for the legitimization of its Socialist Unity Party (SED) rule. Poland was unable to assert an independent initiative.

Gomulka's May 17, 1969 speech reflected a willingness to sacrifice this linkage in return for firm guarantees that Bonn would recognize Poland's security interests through the renunciation of all claims to Germany's former eastern territories. Once the talks with the FRG were firmly underway, however, Polish national prestige became so heavily committed to a successful outcome that the Gomulka Government had no choice but to continue negotiating for the best possible terms. It could not afford to overlook such an important opportunity to advance its traditional aims and, therefore, could not return to its former preference for securing East German goals. Poland rejected the Moscow formula

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of "unreserved [German] respect" for its borders and continued to hold out for "final, unequivocal recognition." The compromise wording was substantially stronger than the Soviet position, indicating the different values Warsaw and Moscow placed on the same issue. Nevertheless, Poland not only dropped its former demands for West German recognition of the GDR, but reversed itself by agreeing to establish full diplomatic ties with Bonn.

This shift of position does not indicate as yet a desire for autonomy on the scale Rumania has asserted, but it suggests a growing reluctance to support the demands of others at Poland's expense. Given this interpretation and the consequences of the December 1970 food riots, Warsaw can be expected to adopt a more assertive policy in both political and economic areas. Such a development may assist Czechoslovakia to formulate a more nationalistic policy and East Germany to modify its intransigent aims without impairing Poland's reliance on Soviet strategic protection.

Thus the forces for rapprochement in Eastern Europe that have required solutions to national grievances have gained a marginal ascendancy over those demanding subordination and solidarity of purpose. Moreover, by accepting the commitment to long-term détente, Moscow has opened Eastern Europe to penetration by West German influence, and to confusion about new standards for proper socialist behavior and appropriate relationships between great and small powers. West German influence may become an important factor in shaping these modalities in intra-Pact relations. It would be unwise, however, to imply that Moscow will remain insensitive to these potentially dangerous forces in its vital sphere of influence. The Kremlin can be expected to improvise new checks and balances to supplement those of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the bilateral defense treaties; and Soviet armor will remain the basic guarantor of East European respect for vital Soviet interests. Nonetheless, in the next decade Moscow will have to assess and accept to a greater degree than before the individual interests and demands of its allies. More than ever, consensus will have to be negotiated rather than imposed. It remains to be seen whether this process will strengthen or weaken the military potential of the Warsaw Pact.

VII

The chief obstacle to the further improvement of Soviet-West German relations has become not the fundamental policies of

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either state, but those of East Germany. Up to the signing of the Four Power Berlin accord, East Berlin had successfully obstructed Bonn's ratification of the treaties with Poland and the USSR and thereby blocked the forward progress of the *Ostpolitik*. It had also become the principal antagonist of the USSR within Pact councils, amplifying its former role as the monitor of Pact policy and relations with West Germany and taking over Rumania's role as the focal point of dissent. The East German government can be expected to play an even more adroit and determined game than Rumania, for the stakes are higher; it is threatened by isolation from its allies, subversion by West German liberalism, and dissent by a potentially restive populace.

During 1969 and 1970, the East Berlin regime pursued an assertive foreign policy, unprecedented in its short history, directed against both the FRG and its socialist allies. This was an inevitable by-product of the new challenges from both quarters. As the threat from the West diminished, the GDR's strategic leverage in the Pact was reduced proportionally; it could no longer demand its allies' unequivocal support for its interests as compensation for its exposed position.[14]

A more important gauge of the changing nature of the GDR's relations with its principal partners was the treaty provisions they recently negotiated. East Germany's allies decided to compromise with the FRG on issues of vital importance to East Berlin rather than sacrifice on matters each regarded as important to its own national interests. The new tenor was confirmed at the Pact's December 2, 1970 summit conference called to "ratify" the Polish and Soviet treaties and to consider the latest Western bid for détente. The conference dropped the customary vituperation against West German militarism; advocated pursuit of détente rather than confrontation; paid tribute to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties; called for *de jure* recognition of the GDR, but not as a precondition for any additional moves toward détente, such as a European security conference; and for the first time did not oppose Bonn's formula for relations between the two German states. This altered Pact position indicated that East Germany's Walter Ulbricht had lost much of the leverage he used to com-

[14]In October 1970 the Warsaw Pact conducted the largest peacetime military maneuvers of record, including 100,000 men from the seven member nations. Holding the Pact exercise for the first time in the GDR was regarded as a gesture of support for East Berlin. However, it remained only a gesture, unrelated to important political priorities, and it is likely to be the last of its kind, both in location and scale.

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mand against his partners — especially since the fall of Gomulka, the last senior Pact party leader — and that his allies would continue to place national interests above GDR objectives.

Ulbricht was sensitive to the changing environment. Speeches he delivered after August 1970 and before his partial retirement were noteworthy for their omission of many maximum demands and a lack of indirect censure of his partners' "perfidy." When the Soviets agreed to drop the last five points in the Bahr Papers, in the wake of the public furor over Bonn's "capitulation," the East German policy had to be substantially recast. The last five articles would have satisfied the GDR's demands; it was now forced to place greater emphasis on unilateral initiatives and national resources. The new approach became apparent as early as June, at the SED's Thirteenth Central Committee Plenum, when Ulbricht adopted a remarkably conciliatory tone and admitted that the West German government might be subject to serious pressure because of domestic opposition to the Bahr Papers.[15] In conformity with practices already adopted by other Pact members, East Berlin's vitriolic denunciations were shifted away from Bonn and directed against the West German opposition's policies and the subversive designs of the imperialist class. Further hints were offered at the Rostock festival a month later, in July, when both Ulbricht and Foreign Minister Otto Winzer stressed peaceful coexistence as the basis for improving relations with Bonn.[16] The efforts of other socialist countries were called important contributions to coexistence and the normalization of German relations. Such remarks were in sharp contrast to those associated with the earlier German summit meetings and were generally regarded as an attempt to alert the SED party cadre of impending changes. When the Bonn-Moscow treaty was signed in August, the GDR cabinet officially stated that "normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG, on the basis of equality, has become a realistically soluble task." Although the statement erroneously charged that "The obligations entered into by the USSR and the FRG in the treaty consequently require that normal diplomatic relations between the GDR and the FRG be established henceforth," it implied that interim solutions were now feasible.[17]

Ulbricht followed the Pact summit meeting of December 2 with a speech to the Fourteenth SED Party Plenum. Reflecting the

[15] *Neues Deutschland*, June 16, 1970.
[16] *Ibid.*, July 14 and 17, 1970.
[17] *Ibid.*, August 15, 1970.

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altered stand taken by his allies, he omitted any reference to West Berlin as an independent entity and called only for a lowering of the FRG's profile in the city. The main thrust of the speech was a plea for negotiations between the German states as equals on "mutual transit traffic." His conditions, however, were that Bonn suspend all "illegal state interference in West Berlin." While these terms were unacceptable to Bonn, they represented a substantial shift in East Berlin's position. Finally, he expressed "agreement" on the Polish policy reversal which sanctioned the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG, clearly abrogating the "Ulbricht Doctrine" that had proscribed the Pact nations from extending recognition until the FRG established relations with the GDR.[18]

The revision in East Germany's policy since the two German heads of state met in Kassel in May 1970, including the regime's avoidance of recrimination against its allies, may have stemmed from the conclusion that the trend was both irreversible and could afford important gains for East Berlin. The breach in the common front made by its allies' insistence on higher priority for national interests rather than international commitments would allow East Germany to demand the same prerogatives. Indeed, greater emphasis on the individualist approach could strengthen the GDR's bargaining position against both East and West; it had unique leverage in Berlin and after its partners had resolved their own national grievances against Bonn, East Berlin would have a freer hand in balancing the Soviets against the West Germans.[19] This new pressure can be used most effectively, however, if the GDR modifies the intransigent stand it took at Kassel. Accordingly, during the summer of 1970, the GDR set the stage for a more adjustable policy toward Bonn and the basis for its own *Westpolitik*.

VIII

After Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited both the FRG and the GDR in October, it was announced that the dialogue between the two German states would be reopened. Because Bonn refused to reopen the talks at the summit level, as East Berlin sug-

[18] *Ibid.*, December 10-14, 1970.

[19] This widening freedom of action was enhanced by the timely re-emergence of a potentially powerful ally, Communist China, evidenced by the reappointment of twenty-four of its former forty ambassadors, including those to all communist states, even Yugoslavia. Chinese diplomacy will be a valuable support for East Germany's orthodoxy and maneuvers against Moscow. See V. Kostov, "Is There Something New in Peiping?," *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), November 17, 1970.

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gested, Chancellory State Secretary Egon Bahr was designated Bonn's representative for the exchange conducted with Michael Kohl, his counterpart in the East German premier's office, in East Berlin on November 27 and December 23. It was agreed that only practical problems should be discussed at that level of exchange. East Germany sought to put on the agenda the status of West Berlin and access rights, but Bonn held that these items remained under the purview of the allies and preferred to discuss improvement in problems such as communications.[20] Little was achieved at the meetings and the talks were temporarily suspended.

Developments surrounding the Bahr-Kohl talks suggest that the GDR has made important tactical changes which may improve the prospects for a long-range adjustment, primarily on the issues of recognition and West Berlin. In October, Premier Willi Stoph had firmly rejected Brandt's thesis of "unity of the nation" and denied that there could ever be anything like "inner-German relations."[21] Subsequently, the Fourteenth Party Plenum reaffirmed the unique aspects of East Germany's national character as the grounds for international recognition. The reiteration indicated that there had been no erosion in the ultimate value the SED places on these issues, but the party appears to have realized that they can no longer be placed in the forefront of its *Westpolitik*. This awareness is due not only to the pace of its allies' adjustment, but to the unofficial stiffening of Bonn's terms for recognition.

As early as January 1970, SPD deputy leader Herbert Wehner, the party's most flexible spokesman, predicted that a situation will arise in which people will no longer argue about the recognition or nonrecognition of the GDR but will ask whether contractual agreements between East and West Germany can be concluded. Opponents charged that Wehner had accepted recognition in principle, but proponents expanded his argumentation. Recognition alone has several drawbacks: (1) Bonn could not make a case for recognizing the GDR under German public law; (2) recognition under international law connotes that both countries consider each other foreign states; (3) refusal by one country to recognize another is not identical with considering the other nonexistent; (4) full recognition of the GDR would entitle East Berlin to consider all refugees living in the FRG as citizens of the GDR and

[20]In April 1970 a partial agreement was reached, calling for an increase in the number of telephone lines between the two German states from 34 to 74 and the number of telex lines from 19 to 35, at the price of DM 30 million annually.

[21]*Neues Deutschland*, October 7, 1970.

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subject to GDR public and criminal laws; (5) recognition of the GDR would virtually negate Four Power responsibility for all Germany and would undermine West Berlin's legal basis and security; (6) after obtaining diplomatic recognition, the GDR could cut all remaining ties between the two parts of Germany and thereby reinforce the partition rather than perforate it; (7) the partition is a political, not a constitutional, matter and recognition of the GDR would reduce Bonn's leverage against a fully sovereign state to ameliorate the division; and (8) there is no evidence that Moscow will accept full independence until legal guarantees can be provided by both German states that the USSR's political influence in German matters will be assured.

The importance of such West German exchanges was shown by the gradual public acceptance that, in Wehner's words, "recognition of the GDR would be too little," or that the formulas of the legal accords were less crucial than the political content behind them. West German recognition would have to be dependent on the GDR's acceptance of substantial additional political conditions for mutual accommodation. Coexistence is not enough; a degree of intra-German settlement is required. While a peace treaty seems no longer probable, the German people must seek an adjustment that relieves their grievances but does not obviate their claims to a final settlement.[22]

Thus while the GDR was hardening its position on recognition during the period of the German summit talks, the West German public was becoming increasingly aware that recognition was not the main issue involved in a mutual accommodation, as the East Germans claimed. Accordingly, the West German political parties were able to close ranks sufficiently to deny the GDR any tactical leverage. In view of this relatively united West German stand, the GDR was forced to delegate a lower priority to recognition and either elevate the importance of practical questions or side with its allies on the criticality of Berlin in the overall German problem and European détente.

The Four Power Treaty on Berlin signed in September 1971 represents a victory against East German intransigence. Both the Soviets and the Western allies made significant concessions in the Berlin treaty that made East Germany the principal loser. Its traditional claims that West Berlin existed on its territory were not upheld. Its insistence upon the right to regulate transit traffic

[22]*Die Welt,* January 28 and February 18; *Telegraf,* March 8; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* May 19; *Die Zeit,* May 29, 1970.

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as a manifestation of East Berlin's sovereign rights was nullified. The confirmation of the manifold ties between Bonn and West Berlin voided its former claims that West Berlin was an independent entity. Finally, the Four Powers failed to confirm the constitutional linkage between East Germany and East Berlin, a long-standing GDR demand. Instead, Four Power responsibilities and privileges were reaffirmed in a manner that explicitly restricts East German claims to regulate access between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and efforts to obstruct the normalization of relations between the two entities. The Four Power Treaty thus delimits GDR claims in the Berlin issue and explicitly focuses East German aspirations on the technical aspects of improving relations with West Germany.

The Four Power Treaty also marks an important step in the FRG's quest for political stature. In the past Bonn's obsessive concern with East German reactions to every FRG policy has been a serious constraint on its search for political recognition. A Berlin accord will allow the full fruition of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and relegate its *Deutschlandpolitik* to a less urgent category. In this event a gradual defusing of the German policies of the GDR and the FRG might allow both German states for the first time to consider the German problem with less attention and apprehension from their respective allies.

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NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A PRELIMINARY QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW*

by Werner Feld

THE purpose of this article is to examine the actual and potential impact of nongovernmental entities on the international system through the presentation of selected statistical data. Despite the present inadequacy of statistical information in certain areas, the data will serve to highlight the roles some of the nongovernmental entities may play in world politics. Moreover, the compilation of these data drawn from a variety of sources may aid us in identifying crucial gaps in pertinent research. While a major project has been initiated to intensify the collection and collation of needed data,[1] the full accomplishment of this goal is likely to be several years away.

The long-standing view that states are the exclusive actors in the international system has been questioned increasingly during the last twenty-five years.[2] Not only have international organizations such as the United Nations or the European Economic Community been accepted as important actors in this system, but nongovernmental entities of varying kinds, including perhaps groups of guerrillas,[3] have been recognized as acquiring international actor status when they engage in behavior that transcends national boundaries and play purposeful roles affecting the international arena. The traditional nongovernment organizations, usually called NGO's, are best known for activities that either aim at changes in the international system or have a bearing

*This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1970 convention of the American Political Science Association. The original title was "The Changing Impact and Incidence of Nongovernmental Organizations: A Quantitative Approach."

[1]Workshop in International Organization Data, International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 17-20, 1971.

[2]See, for example, John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics*, July 1957, pp. 473-493. But see also his essay, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in James Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (revised edition, New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 76-89.

[3]Although there is disagreement regarding the rights and obligations of such groups, guerrillas may fall in the same category as the *levée en masse* which has been given legal status under international law. For details see Oscar Svarlien, *Introduction to the Law of Nations* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955), pp. 378-380.

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on it. Their diversity is staggering. Reaching into every aspect of human activity, they have been organized to advance the interests of manifold groups, professions and industries, to promote a cause or movement, or to carry out special undertakings such as administering relief. Still others engage in scientific research or simply confine their attention to disseminating information. Generally, traditional NGO's operate as nonprofit organizations although the objectives of some of them include the maximization of members' profits.

NGO's may have a universal character such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or may limit their activities to an international region as in the case of the Union of European Industries (UNICE). However, they may also be intranational: a group of educators or religious leaders may become international actors by privately or publicly appealing to their counterparts in another country to press for governmental adoption of a specific foreign policy position. In a more complex and sophisticated example, an association of manufacturers in Country A may seek to induce a labor union in Country B to urge its government to give A's government a free hand to exploit the markets or raw materials in a third country or region. As a reward, the manufacturers' association promises to cut back exports of a given item to Country B, thereby creating increased demand for the domestically produced item and enhancing the union's job and bargaining opportunities.[4]

A second major category of nongovernmental entities capable of affecting the international system is comprised of multinational corporations and transnational joint business ventures. Multinational corporations own property and operate in a dozen or more countries, which enables them to escape the full control of the respective governments. They have special opportunities to influence the politics of these countries either directly or through international transactions and thus emerge as important international actors.[5] Some multinational enterprises have a greater productive output and maintain larger bureaucracies than many small nation-states.

[4]This and the preceding example are taken from J. David Singer, "The Global System and its Sub-systems: A Developmental View," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *Linkage Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 21-43. For additional examples of complex border-crossing linkages between intranational entities, see *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

[5]Cf. Raymond Vernon, "Multinational Enterprises and National Sovereignty," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1967, pp. 156-172, and "Economic Sovereignty at Bay," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968, pp. 110-122, especially p. 114.

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Transnational joint business ventures involve the border-crossing collaboration of legally independent enterprises. This increasingly popular entrepreneurial arrangement enables the partners to exert coordinated influences in the countries where their companies are located which in turn may bring about changes in the international system. Examples of such ventures are the transnational collaborations of Fiat and Citröen in the European Common Market and similar undertakings between firms in developed and developing countries.[6]

In addition, political parties can sometimes be regarded as nongovernment organizations playing purposeful roles of more than national dimension. Obviously, parties in totalitarian systems are part of the governmental machinery and therefore fall outside the scope of our study. Communist parties in democratic countries, however, are "nongovernmental" and are known to have engaged in activities to influence the international system or its subsystems. A case in point is the continuing endeavor by the communist parties of France and Italy to prevent supranational progress in the European Community.[7] Also, since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, followed later by the EEC and Euratom, relationships among the Christian Democratic, Liberal and Socialist parties of the Six have suggested possible transnational efforts toward changes in the regional subsystem of Western Europe.[8] Finally, we should note the attempts made during the last few years to create truly European parties dedicated specifically to the promotion of European unification — the *Europa Partei* and the *Parti Socialist Européen,* for example. These parties have not had much success, but they exist nevertheless.[9]

Why is it that these nongovernmental entities can become actors on the international stage dominated by the governments of sovereign states from 1648 to the early part of the twentieth century? E. Raymond Platig argues that to the extent a government's power is less than total, individuals and groups within its territory

[6]Wolfgang G. Friedmann and George Kalmanoff, *Joint International Business Ventures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), and Werner Feld, "Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration in the Common Market," *International Organization,* Spring 1970, pp. 209-238.

[7]Cf. Werner Feld, "National-International Linkage Theory: The East European Communist System and the EEC," *Journal of International Affairs,* Winter 1968, pp. 107-120.

[8]See Guy van Oudenhove, *The Political Parties in the European Parliament* (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1965), *passim.*

[9]Cf. *Agence Europe Bulletin,* May 19, 1969.

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can and do enter into independent transnational relations and activities, thus affording them the opportunity of becoming direct actors in the international system.[10] While we accept this basic rationale, we should point out that national governments at times encourage and support the transnational activities of national and international nongovernmental entities, especially if these activities tend to buttress governmental objectives. As Platig himself states, the practices of governments vary greatly as they attempt to encourage, monitor, restrict, manage or control the international transactions resulting from initiatives other than their own. In this connection the kind of power individual nongovernmental actors possess is bound to be an important consideration.

Our comments so far have concentrated on identifying nongovernmental entities that can be accorded international actor status. Another introductory note concerns the delineation of the international system in which these entities play actor roles. For our study, this system is worldwide but has a number of subsystems, in most cases bounded geographically, which are affected by their membership in the global system. Within this system and its subsystems our focus is on political phenomena. All other phenomena, especially those of an economic and social nature, are of interest only as they pertain to, influence or shed light on the political determination of the system. As a consequence — and following James Rosenau here — the environment of the international *political* system consists of all those events and conditions, both human and nonhuman, which, while nonpolitical in nature, may affect the behavior of nation-states and other actors as well as the operation of the system.[11] Obviously, the boundaries between the international political system and its subsystems on the one hand and the various environments cannot be drawn distinctly. It is equally obvious that the interaction between the political and economic systems is rich.

The variety of interests represented by nongovernmental entities and the manifold objectives pursued by them in the international arena suggest that inputs into the international

[10]"International Relations as a Field of Inquiry," in Rosenau, *International Politics . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 6-19, especially pp. 16-17. For a comprehensive legal view of international NGO's see J. J. Lador-Lederer, *International Non-Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities* (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963), pp. 11-20, 59-70 and *passim*.

[11]*International Politics . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 73-75. For a more extensive analysis of the global system and its subsystems see Singer, *op. cit.* For the determination of subsystem boundaries according to criteria of socio-cultural homogeneity, economic interdependence, political views and participation in intergovernmental organizations, see Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

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political system emanate from diverse segments of the system's environment. To measure the impact of these inputs in terms of changes in the system is a difficult undertaking. In the first place, the specific effects of nongovernmental actions are hard to determine because most changes in the international system are brought about by multiple causes. Second, were we able to isolate monocausal-effect relationships in particular cases, meaningful data may not exist. To assemble such data would require far-reaching and costly interview surveys, and even if these could be undertaken their yield might not meet expectations. Third, to evaluate the degree of change it is necessary to identify goals and determine the extent of goal attainment. Especially in the field of international business, this information could be difficult to come by because respondents might be reluctant to reveal their accomplishments or failures.

The problems of measurement are compounded by the fact that the impact on the international system is often only indirect, perhaps the result of a chain of events in which both nongovernmental and governmental actors participate. For example, multinational corporations with parent companies located in Country A make investments in Country B affording them substantial control of one of that country's strategic industries, say, electronics. The government of Country B seeks to counteract this control by inducing transnational technological collaboration between its remaining individual electronics firms and similar firms in Country C. The collaboration may lead eventually to an alliance between Countries B and C. This in turn may upset relations between Countries C and D, causing a variety of reactions affecting the international system.

In face of the above problems we must depend on certain indicators and inferences in estimating the impact nongovernmental entities have made or are likely to make on the international system. One indicator would be the changing incidence of these entities: a growth pattern would permit the inference of overall success in goal attainment. Analysis of the geographic and functional distribution of growth would suggest additional inferences regarding the direction of the impact. Other indicators for traditional NGO's may be trends in the strength of headquarters staffs, financial resources, and their capabilities to interact with and influence intergovernmental organizations and national governments. Some of the foregoing indicators also apply to multinational and transnational business activities. In addition, various aspects and trends of investments, profitability, and the

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degree of control of major industries by foreign enterprises provide indicators from which inferences regarding actual and potential changes in the international political system may be drawn. As we will see in the following pages, the use of these indicators depends on the availability of pertinent data. Since such data are more plentiful for traditional NGO's and international business activities than for other categories of nongovernmental entities — transnational parties, for example — we have limited our detailed examination to the first two groupings and will begin our discussion with the NGO's.

Traditional NGO's

The Union of International Associations has set up a number of criteria for international NGO's covering aims, membership, governance and financing. Aims must be genuinely international in character and manifest the intention to engage in activities in at least three countries. Membership must be drawn from individuals or collective entities of at least three countries and must be open to any appropriately qualified individual or entity in the organization's area of operations. The constitution must make provisions for members to elect the governing body and officers periodically. The voting procedure must be structured in such a way as to prevent control of the organization by one national group. Substantial financial contributions to the budget must come from at least three countries. As a consequence, many "international" societies and unions in North America whose funds are derived wholly from U.S. members are excluded.[12]

The Growth of NGO's

International NGO's as delineated above are assumed generally to date back to 1846 when the World's Evangelical Alliance was founded.[13] Their dramatic growth from 1860 to 1968 is illustrated in Figure I. Increases in the number founded are especially pronounced in the periods during which major wars (for example, the Russo-Japanese War and World Wars I and II) ended or those immediately following the end of hostilities, and they show decided dips during periods of rising international conflict and wars such as the time spans from 1911 to 1920 and 1931 to 1940. This

[12]Cf. *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1968-69), p. 11.

[13]According to Lyman C. White, *International Non-Governmental Organizations* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 279, note 5, the first international NGO was the World Alliance of the YMCA's, founded in 1855. White contends that the Evangelical Alliance was not a truly international NGO because "its so-called members . . . [were] mere subscribers to its publications, without any voting rights."

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FIGURE I

GROWTH PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COMPARED WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1860-1968

Key: Number of NGO's represented by entire bar
Number of IGO's represented by solid part of bar

Figures represent cumulative number of organizations founded by the end of each time period

Source: Adapted from Donald C. Blaisdell, *International Organization* (New York: Ronald Press, 1966), pp. 9, 11; and *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1968-1969, 12th edition), p. 13.



	1860	1861-1870	1871-1880	1881-1890	1891-1900	1901-1910	1911-1920	1921-1930	1931-1940	1941-1950	1951-1960	1961-1968	*Mean*	*Cor. Coef.*
centage	NGO	80%	133%	76%	59%	96%	59%	75%	27%	67%	66%	66%	73%	0.6107
rease	IGO	100%	150%	100%	10%	18%	46%	63%	23%	113%	75%	61%	69%	

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suggests that strife and turmoil impede the establishment of international NGO's,[14] while the settlement of devastating wars coupled with bitter memories of misery and deprivation seems to stimulate their formation, reflecting a revived spirit of border-crossing cooperation. A similar situation is noticeable in the growth pattern of intergovernmental organizations (IGO's) since 1860, also shown in Figure I. Expanded international cooperation after the two World Wars is clearly evidenced by sharp increases in IGO foundings between 1921 and 1930 and from 1941 to 1960. Equally visible is the distinct dip in increases during the 1931-1940 span.[15] Overall increases in the number of both entities show a respectable correlation, with r being .61.

Table I provides a functional breakdown of international NGO's for selected years. Commerce and industry groups lead the field followed by health and scientific organizations. It is also noteworthy that those in the economic sector show a much higher growth rate from 1909-10 to 1968-69 than other groups. Besides the active NGO's listed, we find that according to the 1968-69 compilations a substantial number (674) were inactive or dead. While not all NGO disappearances may become a matter of record, the figures shown are suggestive. It may be a syndrome of our troubled times that in this category fall 103 international relations groups, almost as many as those in the active column (125). On a smaller scale, for organizations concerned with politics the inactive and active figures are nearly equal. The high percentage of inactive NGO's in these two fields and the much smaller percentage in all other fields may offer some indirect evidence for the argument that the dynamics of functionalism are more effective when pragmatic, "low politics" interests and objectives are pursued and less effective when the pursuit involves "high politics" and strongly opposed ideological commitments.[16]

[14]Cf. Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of International Non-Governmental Organization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization,* Summer 1971, pp. 420-442, especially p. 425.

[15]J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, in "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships," *International Organization*, Summer 1970, pp. 520-547, use slightly different data for IGO's founded. These disparities, perhaps due to definitional differences, do not affect the general growth trend. Within the European context we find similar correlation between the creation of IGO's and NGO's inasmuch as the formation of community NGO's clusters around the establishment of the Common Market. See Donald J. Puchala, "Patterns in West European Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* December 1970, pp. 117-147.

[16]Cf. Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. xxxiii.

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TABLE I

FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL NGO's

Category	*1909-10*	*1956-57*	*1966-67*	*1968-69*	*Dead or Inactive* 1966-67	*Dead or Inactive* 1968-69
Bibliography, press	19	26	58	69	28	29
Religion, ethics	21	70	93	103	60	61
Social sciences	10	57	80	90	34	35
International relations	12	61	111	125	101	103
Politics	3	13	15	22	21	21
Law, administration	13	28	48	54	31	32
Social welfare	10	52	76	88	50	52
Professions, employers	2	67	93	105	34	35
Trade unions	1	48	63	70	21	22
Economics, finance	3	15	35	40	15	15
Commerce, industry	5	123	211	233	31	34
Agriculture	5	27	76	83	24	24
Transport, travel	5	40	72	76	15	15
Technology	8	36	83	102	26	27
Science	21	69	137	152	49	53
Health, medicine	16	100	173	214	35	36
Education, youth	10	56	91	105	31	33
Arts, literature, radio	6	34	70	75	28	29
Sport, recreation	6	51	90	93	16	18
European Common Market and EFTA business and professional groups	—	—	245	273	—	—
National organizations in consultative status with UN	—	12	15	16	—	—
TOTAL NGO's	176	985	1,935	2,188	650	674

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations (1st, 6th, 11th and 12th editions). The compilers of the 1909-10 edition defined "international" in a more restricted sense than is customary today. After discussions with the UN Economic and Social Council officials in 1950, the Union of International Associations adopted criteria allowing the inclusion of regional bodies (involving three countries or more) which had been excluded in 1909-10.

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Table II furnishes data regarding the number of states from which members are drawn and the geographical distribution of NGO's by continents and international regions. A substantial majority (1123) draw their members from 25 or less states while

TABLE II

NGO MEMBERSHIP DISTRIBUTION
BY NUMBER OF STATES AND CONTINENTS

Part A

Number of States From Which NGO Members are Drawn (1968)*

	0-25	*26-50*	*51-75*	*76 and more*
Number of NGO's	1123	394	137	70

Part B

Distribution of NGO Membership by Continents (1968)*

	Europe	*America*	*Asia*	*Africa*	*Australia*
Number of NGO's	1604	1160	1021	830	722

Distribution of NGO's by Membership Coverage of One or Several Continents*

Africa-America-Asia-Australia-Europe	550
Africa-America-Asia-Europe	167
America-Asia-Australia-Europe	103
Africa-America-Australia-Europe	23
Africa-America-Asia-Australia	7
Africa-Asia-Australia-Europe	4
America-Asia-Europe	105
Africa-America-Europe	29
America-Australia-Europe	16
Africa-Asia-Europe	14
America-Asia-Australia	4
Africa-America-Asia	4
Africa-Australia-Europe	2
Asia-Australia-Europe	1
America-Europe	80
Asia-Europe	39
Africa-Europe	15
Asia-Australia	9
Africa-Asia	5
Australia-Europe	2
America-Asia	1
Europe	454
America	71
Africa	10
Asia	8
Australia	1

Source: *Yearbook of International Organizations* (12th edition, 1968-69), pp. 52-240.

*The data in the *Yearbook* for individual NGO's are not always complete and therefore the figures given in the first and last sections of this Table do not add up to the total in Table I. Figures in the middle section cannot be added since individual NGO's may have members on several continents.

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TABLE II (continued)

Part C

Number of National Representations in International NGO's in Percentages per Region 1951-1966

Region	*1951*	*1956*	*1960*	*1962*	*1964*	*1966*
North West	66.2	63.5	58.3	57.8	54.5	53.5
Latin America	15.5	17.2	16.4	15.9	16.5	16.6
Arab World	3.5	5.4	4.8	5.2	5.2	5.3
Western Asia	6.6	6.7	8.5	7.4	7.7	8.3
Communist Asia	.1	.4	.3	.3	.5	.5
Eastern Europe	7.9	6.6	7.5	7.7	8.0	7.9
Black Africa	.2	.3	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.8
Remaining areas	0	0	.9	1.0	.9	1.1
Sum	100.0	100.1	100.2	100.1	100.0	100.1

Source: Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of International Non-Governmental Organization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization,* Summer 1971, pp. 420-442, Table 6.

relatively few (70) have members from 76 or more states.[17] As to distribution by continent, 1604 list members from Europe and only 722 have members in Australia. Many NGO's, of course, have members on more than one continent, as shown in Part B of Table II. Roughly one-quarter of them (550) cover all five continents, and may therefore be considered truly universal. At the other end of the scale are NGO's limiting themselves to one continent, and in this category 454 are operating exclusively in Europe, which is not astonishing in view of the large number of European IGO's. On the other hand, very few NGO's have confined their activities to Australia, Asia and Africa. Most of the organizations operating there are in the four- or five-continent category, attesting perhaps to the need the societies on these continents have for international linkages in pursuit of their overall goals.

Instead of using continents as units of NGO distribution, Kjell Skjelsbaek has focused on international regions whose boundaries are determined by their components' economic and political similarity rather than territorial contiguity or geographical proximity. He distinguishes eight regions: North West (North America, Western Europe, Israel, Cyprus, Australia, New Zealand,

[17]Skjelsbaek, *op. cit.*, using different data sources, states that the mean number of countries which have individual citizens, national organizations and/or governmental agencies affiliated with international NGO's has risen from 21.0 in 1951 to 25.7 in 1966 (p. 426 and Table 2). Sixty-one per cent of the NGO's surveyed on this subject expect the number of their national branches to rise in the future.

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Japan and South Africa), Latin America, the Arab World, Western Asia, Communist Asia, Eastern Europe and Black Africa, plus assorted remaining countries. Part C of Table II shows the number of countries with representation in international NGO's in percentages per region from 1951 to 1966. Notable are the marked percentage decreases of the advanced industrialized countries of the West and a slow ascendancy of the Third World regions, except for Black Africa's upward surge. Communist Eastern Europe, on the other hand, exhibits remarkable stability.[18] We should point out, however, that continental or regional distribution of representation in NGO's maintained by citizens of various countries says nothing about its strength; representation may be quite small or quite large in individual countries.

The location of headquarters of international NGO's conforms to their distribution by continent. Europe is the undisputed leader in the number of headquarters locations, most of them in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union serves as headquarters for only four nongovernmental organizations, although its citizens are members in about 200.[19] Since 1956 a number of African countries have become hosts of NGO's in keeping with the sharply rising African representation in such bodies.

NGO Impact on the International System

The growing incidence of international NGO's, as demonstrated, throws no light on their activities with respect to the international system. Table III moves a small step in this direction by providing data over time regarding the number of NGO's which have consultative relations with different universal and regional organizations. It includes the note that not only international but also a few national NGO's have been admitted as consultants.[20]

The remarkable increase of NGO's accorded some kind of consultative status suggests that access to the decision-making process of intergovernmental organizations is valued highly and perceived as important by the NGO's in pursuit of their international objectives. The swiftest growth in consultation relationships with NGO's has been recorded by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the

[18]For additional analysis see *ibid.*, pp. 430-432.
[19]Lador-Lederer, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
[20]Cf. Article 71 of the UN Charter.

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TABLE III

NGO's ACCORDED CONSULTATIVE STATUS BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS*

International Organization	*1951-52*	*1958-59*	*1962-63*	*1966-67*	*1968-69*	*Growth based upon 1951-52 = 100*
ECOSOC	212	302	332	360	379	178
ILO	5	47	58	81	87	1740
FAO	10	40	51	79	96	960
UNESCO	99	125	200	250	273	275
WHO	26	46	57	68	75	288
ICAO	17	26	27	28	28	164
ITU	18	23	28	30	26	144
WMO		11	11	15	15	136
IMCO			11	11	17	154
IAEA			19	19	19	100
UNICEF		57	70	75	76	133
IRO	9					
UNCTAD				17	17	100
COUNCIL OF EUROPE				76	76	100
OAS				48	48	100
TOTAL	396	677	864	1157	1232	

*Most of these NGO's are of the international kind, but a few national NGO's have also been granted consultative status: 12 in 1956-57, increased to 16 in 1968-69. They include some important American organizations, for example the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Source: Adopted from the *Yearbook of International Organizations* for the years shown.

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United Nations (FAO). Although the inference seems warranted that these relationships provide a significant part of the lifeblood for most NGO's, some observers consider the instrumental value of their consultative status to be exaggerated, especially in view of the continuing rise in the number of consulting arrangements.[21] Nevertheless, the importance of this access is indicated by the reserve IGO's often display toward NGO's, an attitude that has grown more intense as the number of these groups has multiplied. To appear hospitable without making the job of consultation unmanageable, some of the intergovernmental organizations such as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the ILO, and others have set up different classes of consultative status for the NGO's. For example, ECOSOC has three classes: "I" for NGO's concerned with most of the ECOSOC activities; "II" for organizations with special competence in a few ECOSOC activities; and "R" for *ad hoc* consultations of certain groups. Similar triple categories are used by FAO and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The ILO and the Council of Europe have two classes, one for groups with "important interest" (ILO) or "extensive competence in an important field" (Council of Europe), and the other for special or limited interests.

Applications for consultative status are decided on by a special NGO Committee of ECOSOC. Considerable political logrolling has characterized this process. The Committee, after scrutinizing available data on size, spread of membership, operating budget, and range and kind of activities, recommends whether the NGO in question should be admitted and, if it is accepted, the category to which it should be assigned. From 1947 to 1951 NGO's with legally constituted branches in Spain were excluded from consultative status. During the Cold War the Soviet Union waged a long-standing battle for the admission of certain groups that, according to Western countries, did not support the "purposes and principles" of the United Nations. Complaints were registered in the Committee that some NGO's received government subsidies and consequently were subject to undue influence. Delegates of some developing countries have felt that NGO's currently enjoying consultative status were predominantly "Western oriented." On the other hand, Committee members from the Third World have tended to vote admission on the basis of applicants' policies

[21]See Persia Campbell, "Do NGO's Have a Role?," *International Development Review*, September 1969, pp. 34-39; and Walter R. Sharp, *The United Nations Economic and Social Council* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 39-40.

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and capabilities with respect to providing technical assistance to developing countries.[22]

Obviously the various types of consultative relations with intergovernmental organizations give the NGO's opportunities to lobby for the attainment of their goals and it is fair to assume that the higher the consultative status, the closer the relationship and the more effective the exertion of influence on decisions affecting the international system. But an important *caveat* must be sounded. Although ideas and information offered to delegates of IGO bodies with which NGO's enjoy consultative status are considered carefully, the delegates often wait for specific instructions from their governments before taking actions on NGO proposals. Efforts to influence the policies of United Nations and other IGO bodies are therefore more effective when they begin at the national rather than the international level.[23] From another aspect, NGO's may often become instruments of implementation at the disposal of IGO's. While this can add power to the NGO's goal attainment potential, it also gives IGO's special means of influencing national governmental agencies, since national authorities may use NGO's at times for carrying out technical and administrative matters.[24]

Despite the above reservations, the assumption remains valid that, in general, the number of intergovernmental organizations with which NGO's have consultative status and the rank of this status, have a direct bearing on the latter's capability to influence the international environment. This assumption can be confirmed to a substantial degree by examining some of the NGO's that have been accorded consultative status with six or more IGO's.[25] In this category is the International Chamber of Commerce, undoubtedly the most influential group in the business sector. The ICC has greatly advanced economic intercourse and has influenced appropriate legislation in different countries for this purpose. One of its most outstanding contributions was the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. The Court has dealt with over a thousand commercial cases, filling a need that perhaps no official agency

[22]See Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 38, 42; Campbell, *op. cit., passim*; and Kiichiro Nakahara, "International Pressure Groups and the UN Enlarged ECOSOC," *Behavioral Science Research* (Tokyo) (1970), No. 7, pp. 39-49. Nakahara's study includes a particular roll call vote on admission of three NGO's (p. 47), and the distribution of voting power in the NGO Committee of ECOSOC (Table 5, p. 40), which shows overrepresentation of Western and Eastern Europe; see also Table 4, p. 39.

[23]Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[24]For examples see Lador-Lederer, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[25]For details see *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1968-69), pp. 22-23.

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could meet.[26] While less prestigious than the ICC, and acting for institutions of little wealth, the International Cooperative Alliance has seen a substantial rise in its international influence and now represents several million consumers in the world. Politically, it opposes totalitarian regimes and sympathizes with the international objectives of the Free and Christian trade unions. The International Organization for Standardization, which holds top honors in terms of consultative status with IGO's, operates in a pedestrian field, but its long-range contribution to international cooperation by breaking down the barriers resulting from differing technical standards may be substantial. In the agricultural sector the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, formed after World War II, occupies a prominent place as a consultant, although it lacks the international influence of its industrial counterparts and the political prowess of the national farm organizations. The reason may be that farm problems in most cases depend on national structures and conditions; for domestic political reasons, the national governments are intent to exercise maximum control over agricultural questions.[27] Only when a number of countries seek to regionalize their agricultural activities, as in the EEC, do farm NGO's seem to be able to exert substantial influence beyond the national confines.

In the field of labor, all three major international union associations fall into the top category for consultative status. The legislative and political actions of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in the international arena have been perhaps the most important. Both the ICFTU and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), which was recently renamed World Confederation of Workers (WCW), are now seeking to engage in transnational bargaining on working conditions and later on wages. The ICFTU also has pursued definite aims in the developing countries, especially in Africa, where it is attempting to bring the budding labor unions under its wing and has often had to battle the communist-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).[28] In addition, it

[26]For additional details see White, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-32, and Jean Meynaud, *Les groupes de pression internationaux* (Lausanne: Etudes de Science politique, 1961), pp. 369-371.

[27]Meynaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-372.

[28]See, for example, John Norman, *Labor and Politics in Libya and Arab Africa* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1965). See also Heinz O. Vetter, "The Trade Unions as a Link Between the Nations," *DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) Report* (1970), Vol. IV, No. 7/8, p. 65.

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sponsors national legislation favorable to the organization of viable labor unions. The more specialized international union associations and some of the essentially national unions such as the UAW and the AFL-CIO pursue similar goals and also enlist their members for technical assistance missions in developing countries in order to enhance the skills of indigenous labor. Whether international or national, the powerful trade union organizations endeavor to influence the politics evolving from within the complex United Nations system in such a way as to keep any increase in private investment in developing countries from infringing on their specific goals. Thus, the conflict of special interests characteristic of national development objectives exists also at the international level, and organizational rivalry plays an important role on both levels.[29]

One of the attractive features of NGO activity is that it can supply much needed aid without political implications or suggestions of patronage. This has helped on many occasions when governmental initiatives might have been impossible. A hospital built by dint of NGO efforts on the edge of a desert in Africa can bring comfort and health to the surrounding villages without the government of the country having to sacrifice any of its declared foreign policy positions. As a consequence, international NGO's have been able to achieve outstanding successes in child care, medical aid, stilling the pangs of hunger and quickening dormant minds, and the countries benefited have not had to abandon their freedom of action in the international community.

Speculation as to whether joint representation in NGO's by countries of the Western and communist blocs may have a beneficial effect on the prospects for international peace led Louis Kriesberg to undertake a study of international NGO's in which both the United States and the Soviet Union were represented.[30] Analyzing the membership of the more than 1500 listed in the 1962-63 edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations,* he found that the superpowers jointly participate in 192 NGO's — which excludes those with only a regional focus and thus of little interest to Washington and Moscow. Joint representation is most likely in NGO's concerned with substantive issues about which there is a high consensus between the two countries. When consensus is low, complementarity of interests may bring about joint

[29]Cf. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[30]Louis Kriesberg, "U.S. and U.S.S.R. Participation in International Non-Governmental Organizations," in Louis Kriesberg, editor, *Social Processes in International Relations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 466-485.

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representation. Kriesberg points out that NGO's dealing with science, technology, medicine and sports, about which the United States and the Soviet Union have relatively high consensus, tend toward a lower level of activity and less centralized decision-making than organizations devoted to social, economic, moral or political matters. These findings indicate some of the limits national and political differences impose on the role NGO's can play in the development of a world community and suggest that, at least so far, joint representation by opposing bloc countries in NGO's has made a minimal contribution toward attaining world peace.[31]

As we have mentioned, international NGO's may enjoy the support of national governments if their international goals and interests coincide. This support, about which complaints are voiced at times, may take the form of financial assistance either directly from the government or indirectly through foundations. Adequate financial resources and budgets clearly add to the effectiveness of NGO's in the international arena,[32] yet many of these organizations are strapped financially and can afford only small paid staffs or must limit themselves entirely to volunteer workers.[33]

International and national NGO's may also form coalitions for the pursuit of their international objectives, thereby enhancing their goal attainment potentials. To this end, the international NGO's have formed an umbrella group of their own, the NGO Conference, which seeks to coordinate activities, facilitate contacts with IGO bodies, and discover ways in which "collective" advice may be given in the consultative process.[34]

The impression emerges that NGO's do succeed in bringing about some changes in the international system. However, their impact is undramatic, diffuse, slow, and suggests no single direction. The input into the international political system emanates from all functional and geographic segments of the environment as well as from national and international subsystems. Any hope that the spreading web of NGO activity might advance the integration of mankind and thereby contribute to prospects for international peace is sustained by little concrete evidence. One reason for the spotty and fragmentary NGO record of achievement

[31]See also Skjelsbaek, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-440.

[32]Up-to-date information on this subject is lacking in the 1968-69 edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. For some earlier data see Skjelsbaek, *op. cit.*, p. 427 and Table 4.

[33]Cf. James E. Knott, *Freedom of Association* (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1962), pp. 67-83.

[34]Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

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may be that many of these groups lack sufficient organizational and financial resources. Such resources usually are found in multinational corporations and transnational joint business ventures, and it is to this category of nongovernmental entities that we now turn our attention.

Multinational Corporations

It has been estimated by some observers that within the next decade 75 per cent of the world's productive capacity will be controlled by a small group of 300 multinational corporations (MNC's),[35] which might employ as much as 20 per cent of the labor force on this planet. Although this assertion has been disputed, it underscores the dynamism inherent in profit-oriented entrepreneurial activities supported by vast resources and the potential of these private entities to produce a more spectacular impact on the international system than the traditional NGO's.

Disagreements exist as to the precise definition of a multinational corporation.[36] For this study the basic notion is that of a number of affiliated business establishments functioning simultaneously in different countries, joined together by ties of common ownership or control, and responsible to a common management strategy. From the headquarters company (and country) flow direction and control, and from the affiliates (branches, subsidiaries, joint enterprises) flow products, revenues and information. Management may be organized in either monocentric or polycentric fashion. In the former case, top management is centered in one headquarters company; in the latter, management has been divided into geographic zones and a separate headquarters company has been established for each zone.[37]

MNC Pattern of Growth

As with the NGO's, we hypothesize that the growing incidence of multinational business enterprises is an indicator of their relative success in attaining international goals. The geographic pattern of growth and the type and nature of their expanding operations may suggest the directions and intensity of their impact on the international system and its subsystems.

[35]Cf. A.J.N. Judge, "Multinational Business Enterprises," *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1968-69), pp. 1189-1214, and Philippe Heymann, "Une question du vie ou de mort: une politique industrielle européene," *Communauté Européene* (March 1970), pp. 25-30.

[36]Judge, *op. cit.*, pp. 1190-1193.

[37]Cf. E. J. Kolde, *International Business Enterprise* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 218-220, 251-252.

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The spread of MNC's can be seen from case studies of 187 U.S. corporations with subsidiaries in at least six foreign countries undertaken by Raymond Vernon at Harvard University's School of Business. Table IV shows the numerical increase of these corporations that have expanded beyond the national boundaries since 1901 and the proliferation of their foreign subsidiaries. While the number of parent systems engaged in activities outside the United States rose by about 800 per cent, their foreign subsidiaries exhibited a phenomenal sixty-fold expansion.

Figure II compares the growth of the 187 U.S. multinational corporations with that of the traditional NGO's. Although there is a certain degree of parallelism, the rapid rate of growth of the MNC's began earlier, and the parent system expansion has slowed down since 1955. On the other hand, the curves for subsidiary proliferation and NGO expansion continued upward in 1968. The configuration of the parent system and subsidiary curves seems to suggest that a saturation point in the number of large U.S. multinational parent systems has been reached. At the same time, most of these corporations continue to enlarge their foreign operations, perhaps to pre-empt international production and marketing opportunities and to stifle the aspirations of ambitious newcomers whether they be Americans or of another nationality. The proliferation has been greatest in Europe (about 43 per cent), followed by Latin America (23 per cent) and Canada (13 per cent).

The remarkable expansion of foreign subsidiaries has spread not only toward markets for the products of MNC's, but also to the sources of raw materials. In both these areas U.S. multinational corporations in the petroleum and nonpetroleum extractive industries have at times shown explosive growth, attesting to their potential power to influence the international system. Of course, American oil companies do not control the petroleum of the world. Especially since World War II, British, French and Italian companies have also gone "multinational" and have taken advantage of the enormous rise in demand for oil as well as the discovery of rich new finds all over the world. While U.S. nonpetroleum extractive industries have likewise recorded a rapid expansion of interests since 1910, the spread in extraction activities is much slower than that in manufacturing and marketing; in fact, extraction subsidiaries showed an absolute decline between 1957 and 1967. At the same time West European firms such as Pechiney of France and others have moved into the multinational game and

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TABLE IV

INCREASE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES
(187 SELECTED U.S. CORPORATIONS)

Expansion in Number of Parent Systems

Country or Region	*1901*	*1913*	*1919*	*1924*	*1929*	*1939*	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*	*1967*
Outside U.S.	23	47	74	93	123	153	168	182	186	187	186
Canada	6	27	54	65	92	123	137	158	176	179	174
Latin America	3	9	16	23	36	72	113	143	179	185	182
Europe	22	37	45	64	95	116	129	154	180	187	185
EFTA	18	29	38	50	86	102	113	130	166	183	181
European Community	15	25	29	47	63	80	84	116	166	185	179
Southern Dominions	2	8	14	21	34	63	77	95	129	154	154
Asia + Other Africa	0	4	8	12	23	33	51	71	103	153	158
Japan	0	1	3	3	7	10	9	26	50	111	117
Other Asia + Africa	0	3	7	11	23	30	49	63	87	123	133
Arab World	0	2	2	2	4	7	11	17	26	32	37
Black Africa	0	0	0	1	4	4	3	8	24	53	62

Proliferation of Foreign Subsidiaries

Outside U.S.	107	255	390	591	987	1763	2289	3114	4796	7379	7927
Canada	9	36	86	123	215	353	473	600	792	1017	1048
Latin America	12	27	49	86	139	315	606	856	1341	1813	1924
Europe	83	173	218	327	530	883	904	1165	1872	3140	3401
EFTA	36	80	104	136	242	419	449	562	881	1335	1405
European Community	43	83	101	156	238	370	397	513	869	1540	1675
Southern Dominions	3	13	22	33	53	120	172	250	399	639	648
Asia + Other Africa	0	6	15	22	50	92	134	243	392	770	906
Japan	0	1	3	4	8	11	11	57	68	197	233
Black Africa	0	0	0	1	6	4	9	42	65	142	166
Arab World	0	3	3	3	7	16	29	43	56	77	88

Source: James W. Vaupel and John P. Curran, *The Making of Multinational Enterprise* (Cambridge: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1969), pp. 11, 123.

FIGURE II

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE GROWTH OF SELECTED U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE EXPANSION OF NGO's



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are now engaged in extraction activities in foreign countries.[38]

Although American MNC's have shown the most spectacular growth during the last fifty years, multinational parent companies are found today in many countries. As of 1969, 7046 parent companies with affiliates in one or more foreign countries had headquarters in fifteen European states and the United States. Of these, U.S. corporations constitute 40 per cent. Table V provides a geographic distribution of these parent companies and the countries in which they have subsidiaries and affiliates. The figures given are for countries or areas, not the number of subsidiaries and affiliates in an individual country, which may be considerable. Considering that the 7046 parent companies have 26,396 links with foreign countries through their affiliates, the average company has links in 3.75 countries. In the case of European parent companies alone, the average drops to 2.48 countries.

Table V reveals that 53 per cent of these links are with Europe, 22 per cent with the Americas (exclusive of the United States, which is classed with the developed European countries rather than the developing countries of Latin America), 11 per cent with Africa, 9 per cent with Asia, and 5 per cent with Australia. These percentages indicate that the majority of multinational operations remain concentrated in the developed countries but that the Third World is not far behind. While the United States has the largest number of MNC's with affiliates in most countries, followed by the United Kingdom and West Germany, it is not surprising that in Africa, because of former colonial ties, the U.K. has more than twice as many affiliates as the United States. France is a close third in this respect.

There is a certain distortion in the overall picture presented because reliable and pertinent figures for Japan and Canada were not available, but the Table nevertheless provides useful data regarding the extensive MNC network.

MNC Impact on the International System

In 1968 sales of goods produced by American subsidiaries were estimated at about $200 billion a year, compared with U.S. export sales of only $34.6 billion and a GNP of $360 billion for the whole EEC area. American industry abroad has become the third largest economy in the world, outranked only by those of the domestic United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the foreign

[38]For additional details see Raymond Vernon, "Foreign Enterprises and Developing Nations in the Raw Materials Industries" (1969, mimeo.), especially the Tables on pp. 6 and 10.

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TABLE V

NUMBER OF PARENT COMPANIES IN WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND U.S.A. HAVING SUBSIDIARIES AND ASSOCIATES IN A GIVEN FOREIGN COUNTRY

(Numbers are shown in parentheses)

Country of Subsidiary or Associate	*Country of Parent*														
	Austria (38)	Belgium (197)	Denmark (82)	France (471)	West Germany (801)	Italy (101)	Luxembourg (11)	Netherlands (222)	Norway (78)	Portugal (1)	Spain (9)	Sweden (349)	Switzerland (1032)	U.K. (1651)	U.S.A. (2816) Total Parent Companies (7046) Totals
Europe and U.S.A.															
Austria	—	3	4	10	230	8	2	14	—	—	—	19	54	40	86 470
Belgium	2	—	6	144	107	22	2	119	3	—	1	32	57	198	461 1154
Denmark	1	2	—	7	33	4	—	13	22	—	—	86	8	60	97 333
France	3	80	20	—	306	50	7	78	5	—	2	44	119	321	760 1795
West Germany	22	23	38	127	—	32	4	110	12	—	2	100	216	298	772 1756
Italy	11	24	8	118	149	—	1	33	3	—	—	32	100	161	492 1132
Luxembourg	—	21	3	20	35	13	—	4	—	—	—	4	11	22	35 168
Netherlands	2	34	14	45	147	6	1	—	2	—	2	51	36	210	530 1080
Norway	1	2	15	10	10	1	—	4	—	—	—	88	7	39	66 243
Portugal	—	11	1	23	19	6	—	14	1	—	4	16	15	54	48 210
Spain	2	23	4	112	99	22	2	28	1	—	—	20	37	120	233 703
Sweden	2	3	40	12	54	4	1	17	38	—	—	—	16	85	172 444
Switzerland	12	16	6	94	246	27	4	30	4	—	—	48	—	143	558 1188
U.K.	8	26	28	98	116	14	2	65	15	—	1	75	63	—	936 1447
U.S.A.	5	15	10	64	108	21	2	85	13	—	—	48	52	446	— 819
Subtotal	71	283	197	884	1659	230	28	564	118	—	12	663	790	2197	5246 12942

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TABLE V (continued)

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	West Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	U.K.	U.S.A.	Totals
Other Europe																
Cyprus	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	12	7	22
Finland	—	1	6	1	9	—	—	4	1	—	—	60	4	20	34	140
Greece	2	5	1	14	21	9	—	10	—	—	—	3	4	18	69	156
Ireland	—	4	—	2	10	2	—	11	—	—	—	3	3	326	81	442
Turkey	3	2	—	9	17	5	—	7	—	—	—	5	5	8	57	118
Other West Europe	1	—	—	3	3	2	—	2	—	—	—	1	5	32	10	59
East Europe	8	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	14
Subtotal	14	13	7	29	61	19	—	36	1	—	—	76	21	416	258	951
Africa	1	124	15	513	130	58	1	104	10	—	2	33	36	1347	568	2942
Americas (exclusive of U.S.A.)	8	39	17	216	260	92	4	131	14	1	1	152	121	953	3671	5680
Asia	8	12	21	61	108	12	—	66	4	—	1	33	41	638	1472	2477
Australasia and Oceania	2	6	3	20	41	8	—	16	2	—	—	23	23	790	470	1404
TOTAL	104	477	260	1723	2259	419	33	917	149	1	16	980	1032	6341	11685	26396

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations (12th edition, 1968-69), pp. 1199-1202.

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production of U.S. companies increases about 10 per cent a year, twice as fast as domestic economies. Yet the production of U.S. subsidiaries abroad comprises only half of the $400 billion worth of goods currently produced under international investments. Over the last two decades these investments and the resulting output of goods have been growing approximately twice as fast as world GNP. If these rates are maintained, the world economy may be more than half internationalized by the end of the century.[39]

International investments are potential agents of economic, social and political change regardless of whether they are made in developed or developing, Free World or communist countries. They therefore are important indicators for measuring the impact of multinational enterprises on the international system. They influence the balance of payments of countries involved, may lead to control of strategic industries against the desire and best interests of host governments, add to the export totals of countries in which new factories are built, and provide investing corporations with bargaining leverage regarding prospective host country laws and regulations — particularly if the infusion of capital can be shifted to a neighboring country with impunity, as is possible in a customs union or free trade area. Moreover, they may affect domestic politics because wage scales and working conditions are likely to be improved in countries where investments are made and job opportunities may be impaired in the parent company's own country. Bidding up labor costs may cause inflation, and borrowing by multinational companies in countries with weak currencies may tend to weaken these currencies further. Finally, investments abroad may reduce the parent government's control over the corporation and thus give management greater operational latitude, for example in circumventing export embargoes through shipment from foreign subsidiaries. In some circumstances, a multinational corporation may appeal to its parent government to intervene through diplomatic or even stronger means to protect it against unfriendly action by host governments. But international investments may also supplement the foreign policy goals of the parent government insofar as they help developing countries to attain a higher economic level and greater political stability, or promote national security by ensuring the flow of needed raw materials.

[39]Cf. Judd Polk, "The Rise of World Corporations," *Saturday Review*, November 22, 1969, pp. 32 ff.

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Although worldwide international investment figures are not available, Table VI provides statistics on direct U.S. investments abroad and foreign investments in the United States from 1950 to 1969. It reveals that foreign investments have been expanding but that their rate of increase is below that of U.S. investments. Hence, the American net investment position has been advancing regularly, amounting in dollar terms to more than $70 billion, with an inferred positive impact on earnings of more than $8 billion a year. However, direct investments are not the only criterion for the spread and effectiveness of foreign subsidiaries. At present, capital for investments in foreign subsidiaries often flows from Euro-dollar issues floated in Europe.[40]

A geographical and functional breakdown of U.S. investments abroad can also be found in Table VI. Their growth is most impressive in Europe, induced undoubtedly by the rapid industrial

TABLE VI

VALUE OF DIRECT U.S. INVESTMENTS ABROAD AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1950-1969
(billions of dollars)

	1950	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*Annual Growth Rate*
Direct U.S. Investments (Book value, mainly subsidiaries of U.S. companies)	11.8	59.3	64.8	70.8	10%
Direct Foreign Investments	3.4	9.9	10.8	11.8	6.5%

Distribution Pattern 1969

Country or Region	*Total*	*Manufacturing*	*Petroleum*	*Mining & Smelting*	*Other*
Europe	21.6	12.2	4.8	.07	4.5
Canada	21.1	9.4	4.4	2.8	4.5
Latin America	13.8	4.3	3.7	1.9	3.9
Other Areas (mainly developing countries in Asia and Africa)	14.3	3.6	7.1	.9	2.6
TOTAL	70.8	29.5	20.0	5.7	15.5

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business,* October 1970, pp. 21-38, and U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce.

[40]For details see *The Euro-dollar Market and Its Possible Policy Implications,* Paper No. 12 regarding Economic Policy and Practices prepared by the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1970.

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expansion resulting from the lowering of trade barriers and a consequent rising level of demand. In the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where multinational operations are increasing, a large part of the funds expended has gone into oil installations.

The main investors in the United States have been companies in the United Kingdom and Canada, but since 1965 the Netherlands and Switzerland have also taken on important investment positions. As of the end of 1969, Canadian and Swiss investments were concentrated in manufacturing industries, the substantial investments of the United Kingdom were in finance and insurance, and the Dutch had their major stake in the petroleum industry.[41]

An overall, though rather rudimentary, view over time of direct foreign investments by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, broken down by regions, can be gained from Table VII. While net investment positions have grown across the board, the percentages by region present a different picture. They manifest substantial percentage increases in investments in the EEC and Australia but significant decreases of American and British investments in the developing countries. West Germany had invested 23.5 per cent of its total foreign investments in developing countries in 1967; no figures are available for earlier years. The regional investment percentages are mixed with respect to EFTA and Japan, while U.S. investments in Canada as well as West German and British investments in North America have remained relatively stable.

In 1966 the portion of worldwide investments made in the developing countries amounted to 33.45 per cent. As in the case of U.S. investments, a higher percentage of total investments in the Third World (nearly 50 per cent) is devoted to oil and other extractive industries, and only about 22 per cent to manufacturing industries for which the developing nations have urgent need.[42] Nevertheless, even extractive industries often create new social infrastructures by providing the schools, housing, health facilities and transportation necessary to conduct their business. In addition, local engineers and technicians can learn from exposure to the training methods and experience of their counterparts

[41]For details see U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business,* October 1970, pp. 35-36.

[42]See OECD, Report by Development Assistance Committee, DAC (68) 14, Annex C, April 23, 1968.

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TABLE VII

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

(billions of dollars)

		EEC	*EFTA*	*North America*	*South America*	*Africa**	*South Africa*	*Asia***	*Japan*	*Australia*	*Developing Countries*	*TOTAL*
U.S.	1959	2.194	3.106	10.171***	8.218	.520	.343	2.026	.210	.739	10.764	29.735
	1967	8.405	9.477	18.069	10.213	1.610	.667	3.414	.868	2.345	15.237	59.267
U.K.	1960	.503	1.330	1.725	.346	.749	.620	1.171	.007	1.036	2.609	7.080
	1966	1.063	2.012	2.352	.586	1.003	1.023	1.832	.015	1.829	3.372	10.778
Germany	1965	.527	.475	.337	.337							2.079
	1967	.891	.636	.505	.391	.148	.030	.080	.017	.046	.634	3.014
					Percentage Distribution							
U.S.	1959	7.4	10.5	34.2	27.6	1.7	1.2	6.8	0.07	0.2	36.2	
	1967	14.2	16.0	34.5	17.5	2.7	1.1	5.7	1.5	4.0	25.0	
U.K.	1960	7.4	1.9	24.4	4.9	12.0	8.7	16.5	0.1	14.6	36.8	
	1966	9.9	2.8	21.8	5.0	9.3	9.5	17.0	0.1	17.0	31.6	
Germany	1965	25.3	23.0	16.2	16.2							
	1967	29.6	21.1	16.7	13.0	4.9	1.0	2.6	0.6	1.5	23.5	

*Does not include South Africa

**Does not include Japan

***U.S. investments in Canada

Source: Hamburg, Germany, Chamber of Commerce.

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TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, EXPORTS AND GNP OF SELECTED COUNTRIES (1968)
(billions of dollars)

	U.S.	*U.K.*	*France*	*Germany*
Foreign Investment	64.8	16*	8.8*	4.3*
% of Exports	190.6%	104.5%	68.8%	17.3%
% of GNP	7.5%	15.5%	7.0%	3.2%
Exports	34.6	15.3	12.8	24.9
% of GNP	4.4%	14.9%	10.1%	18.8%
GNP	865	103	126.6	132.7
Sum of Foreign Investment and Export as % of GNP	11.5%	30.4%	17.1%	22.0%

*Estimate

Source: Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* (1970), Office Statistique des Communautés Européenes, *Foreign Trade* (1970, No. 6), and *Vereinigter Wirtschaftsdienst Bulletin,* October 6, 1969.

brought in by management from the advanced countries.[43] However, investments in manufacturing industries are apt to produce more lasting benefits in developing areas because the technological and managerial skills thus introduced are likely to spread as educational levels rise. As a consequence, new industries may eventually be established and run by citizens of the developing countries. This could effect an overall improvement in social and economic standards which, in turn, might contribute to greater political stability among the new nations.

Another dimension of direct foreign investments by MNC's can be seen when these investments are related to exports and the GNP of the country housing the parent system. Both foreign investments and exports are to a large degree manifestations of nongovernmental initiatives capable of influencing the international system. Table VIII reveals that in 1968 foreign investments by U.S. companies were nearly twice as large as exports,[44] but represented only about 7.5 per cent of the GNP

[43]Cf. *The Multinational Company and National Development: A Lamp Anthology* (New York: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 1970), *passim,* and Neil H. Jacoby, "The Multinational Corporation," *The Center Magazine,* May 1970, pp. 37-55, especially pp. 43-44. See also Harry G. Johnson, "The Multinational Corporation as Development Agent" and Paul Streeten, "Obstacles to Private Foreign Investment in the LDCs," *Columbia Journal of World Business,* May-June 1970, pp. 25-30 and 31-39 respectively.

[44]For an analysis of whether direct foreign investments displace American exports through the establishment of production facilities abroad, or supplement exports, see Marie T. Bradshaw, "U.S. Exports to Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms," *Survey of Current Business,* May 1969, pp. 34-51.

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generated during that year. The United Kingdom, ranking second in number of multinational corporations and foreign investments, shows about equal amounts for investments and exports, but the investments constitute 15.5 per cent of GNP. On the other hand, the foreign investments of French firms are lower than France's exports, which run to 68.8 per cent, and in Germany these investments constitute only about 17 per cent of exports. The respective investment proportions of GNP for France and Germany are 7 and 3 per cent. Germany's exports, however, make up nearly 19 per cent of GNP, while U.S. exports amount to a little more than 4 per cent. Thus, although Germany's capability of influencing the international system through foreign investments has been relatively small, its potential as measured by GNP is considerable and the foreign investment trend of German firms points upward.[45] In view of the frequently heard complaints about American industrial imperialism, we should stress that direct foreign investments of U.S. corporations are not out of line with the mean ratio of investments to GNP for the four countries analyzed (8.3 per cent); only the ratio of Germany is exceeded substantially. If the figures for both foreign investments and exports are summed and then related to GNP, the United States shows the lowest percentage of all four countries. Hence the overall potential of U.S. private enterprises to influence the international system and its subsystems may not be as great as the foreign investment figures alone seem to suggest, and the potential of the Germans may be greater than it appears at first glance.

Foreign Investment Profitability

Although marketing strategies, tariff barriers, the ease of technological research, and production and transportation costs are important motivations for business enterprises to multinationalize their operations, the maximization of profits remains the pervasive catalyst for investments in different parts of the world. As a consequence, a major reason for the initiation, continuation and enlargement of foreign investments is the degree of their profitability.

Despite a number of dips, Figure III shows the relatively high profitability of U.S. direct investments abroad broken down for developing and developed areas over the period from 1960 through 1969. During the 1960's the average annual yield of these investments was 12.6 per cent. While yields in the developing

[45]Cf. *Vereinigter Wirtschaftsdienst Bulletin*, April 20, 1970.

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FIGURE III

RATES OF RETURN ON U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD AND DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING, EXCLUDING PETROLEUM



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business,* October 1970, p. 33.

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countries were consistently higher than those in the developed countries, most of this difference reflects earnings in the petroleum producing areas. When rates of return on manufacturing are compared, yields in the developed countries and the Third World are about the same, amounting to about 11.8 per cent for the decade. In 1969 the rate of return on all U.S. foreign direct investments rose to 13 per cent, exceeding that of domestic yields.[46]

In addition to the $5.6 billion earned in 1969 by U.S. direct investments abroad, royalties and fees received by U.S. corporations from foreign affiliates, having grown sharply in recent years, reached almost $1.4 billion in 1969. European operations contributed the largest share, confirming that advanced technology exported from the home country produces considerable income for the American parent company.[47]

Countries hosting U.S. subsidiaries have also benefited from the operations of these companies and have steadily increased their share of the profits. The recent successful pressures of the oil-producing countries to expand their portion of the profits is only the latest evidence of this trend. At the same time, as we have seen, the degree of profitability of U.S. foreign investments has not always remained steady: during the early 1960's it declined in Europe while the investments of European firms in the United States were increasing in yield. The expansion in European operations in the American market then foreshadowed is now clearly visible.[48]

Another benefit for host countries stems from the fact that multinational corporations are the dominant institutions transferring industrial technologies across national borders. By providing a major supplement to many countries' investment and technological capacities, these companies can make substantial and unique contributions to the growth of their hosts, especially if the latter lack the necessary capital or particular skills.[49]

Foreign Control of Host Country Industries

A final indicator of the impact multinational corporations

[46]Domestic yields were lower than yields abroad in the early 1960's but exceeded them in 1966. This gap was gradually closed during the next few years when expansion abroad was particularly strong.

[47]See U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, October 1970, pp. 31, 34.

[48]See James Leontiades, "The European Challenge: A Response," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, July-August 1970, pp. 9-16.

[49]See John H. Dunning, "Technology, U.S. Investment and European Economic Growth," paper prepared for Conference on the Multinational Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969.

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might have on the international system and its subsystems is the degree of control they exercise, individually or collectively, over host country industries. Such control provides these firms with the potential means to influence the international behavior of host governments, or at a minimum to restrict their freedom of external action.

Few precise data are available on the control of industries by foreign firms in individual countries. Some examples are found in Table IX, which shows the degree of control over selected Canadian and West European industries. Parts A and B of this Table indicate that in Canada (1963) and Germany (1968) foreign con-

TABLE IX

FOREIGN CONTROL OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES

(percentages)

Part A: Canada*

	End of 1959 Controlled by:			*End of 1963* Controlled by:		
	Canada	*U.S.*	*Other*	*Canada*	*U.S.*	*Other*
Manufacturing	43	44	13	40	46	14
Petroleum and Natural Gas	27	67	6	26	62	12
Other Mining and Smelting	39	53	8	41	52	7
Railways	98	2	0	98	2	0
Other Utilities	95	4	1	96	4	0
Merchandising and Construction	91	6	3	88	7	5
Total	68	26	6	66	27	7

Part B: Germany (1968)**

Average foreign control 18.7, of which U.S. share is 44

Petroleum Products	84
Food Processing	48
Fibers, Rubber and Asbestos	35
Electric Equipment	31.4
Steel, Machinery, Autos	25

Part C: U.S. Share of Refinery Production Capacities***

	January 1964	*January 1969*	*January 1970*
Federal Republic of Germany	31.2	37.9	38.2
France	19.6	16.8	20.1
Italy	23.0	27.9	27.8
Netherlands	39.3	47.5	54.8
Belgium/Luxembourg	17.0	43.9	46.8

Sources:

*Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *The Canadian Balance of International Payments 1963, 1964 and 1965 and International Investment Position.*

***Vereinigter Wirtschaftdienst Bulletin,* October 6, 1969.

***Rainer Hellmann, *Weltunternehmen nur amerikanisch?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1970), p. 62.

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trol was heaviest in the field of petroleum products, where it reached 74 per cent and 84 per cent respectively. In Canada foreign control is also strong in manufacturing and mining and smelting industries, amounting to about 60 per cent. As expected, a large number of the controlling multinational companies in Canada and Germany are American.[50] Part C of Table IX shows the increasing share of oil refining capacities in the EEC that has fallen under the control of U.S. firms. By 1970 the refining capacities of the Benelux countries were more than 50 per cent controlled by U.S. companies, whereas in France the degree of control reached only 20 per cent.

As far as West European industry as a whole is concerned, the largest U.S. investment has been in the oil, chemical, transportation equipment, metals, machinery, electrical and food sectors. From 1963 to 1967, takeover bids by U.S. companies in the automobile industry brought their share of this market to more than 30 per cent. The share of U.S. companies in the computer industry in Europe was estimated in 1969 at 80 per cent.[51] In Australia foreign firms owned about one-quarter of all business corporation assets in 1965. In Brazil they controlled about one-fourth of the country's rail and electrical industries and about 18 per cent of its manufacturing.[52]

The assumption of foreign control over strategically important industries has created fears in host governments that parent countries may regard a multinational corporation as an instrument of policy and require its companies to act contrary to the national interests of the host country. Thus, while host governments appreciate the benefits they derive from the transfer of technologies, they may be apprehensive lest such transfers be withheld in the case of serious needs. Moreover, MNC's pursuing their own self-interests may use the transfer of technology to bargain for more favorable and flexible treatment.[53]

Host governments may also be apprehensive about the ability of multinational companies to affect tax receipts. This can be done

[50]For further details on foreign-controlled firms in Canada see Thomas L. Powrie, "Foreign Investments in Canada," in Sidney E. Rolfe and Walter Damm, editors, *The Multinational Corporation in the World Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 86-106, especially pp. 93-94.

[51]*Communauté Européene,* September 1969, p. 9. For further details see Hellmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-96.

[52]Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[53]For additional details see James Brian Quinn, "Technology Transfer by Multinational Companies," *Harvard Business Review,* November-December 1969, pp. 147-161.

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through allocating production to facilities in low-tax countries or by manipulating profits on items that can be moved across national boundaries from one subsidiary to another for assembly or sales so that most profit per item accrues in countries with the lowest tax rates.[54]

To prevent foreign control of strategically important companies and industries and to forestall the dilemmas described above, host governments, both in industrially advanced countries and the Third World, have employed weapons ranging from the stimulation of adverse public opinion to a variety of legal measures. The most extreme of these measures is expropriation, which has been carried out in several developing countries.[55] In addition, host governments have attempted to supervise foreign subsidiaries by placing constraints on the practice of maximizing profits through the use of multinational facilities.[56] In this respect, multinational enterprises face five possible regulatory situations: (1) both parent and host (or all) governments have the same (or similar) regulations for the enterprises and their affiliates and enforce compliance; (2) although governments are in disagreement regarding regulations, all are attempting to compel a particular behavior; (3) governments are in disagreement and some are attempting to compel particular behavior while others are not; (4) governments have the same (or similar) regulations but there is no enforcement; (5) governments are in disagreement about what is desired from the enterprise and there is no compulsion from any government. In some of these situations, the power of the multinational company to circumvent governmental policy is increased, in others it is nearly obviated.[57] The diagram presents the five situations graphically.

In Situation 1 the multinational company retains little choice because the same response or action is required by all governments concerned. In Situation 2 it has the choice of limiting its exposure

[54]See Sanford Rose, "The Rewarding Strategies of Multinationalism," *Fortune*, September 15, 1968, p. 100 ff., especially p. 104.

[55]Cf. William R. Hoskins, "How to Counter Expropriation," *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1970, pp. 102-112.

[56]A systematic screening of all proposed foreign investments has been in effect in France since the early 1960's, and the problems of General Electric, Westinghouse and Fiat in seeking to invest in important French industrial enterprises are well known. No statistical information is available on the number of rejections, but they are said to average between four and six a year. In important cases the rejections may find their way to the press, in others the principals involved may shun publicity.

[57]Adopted from Jack N. Behrman, "The Multinational Enterprise and Nation States: The Shifting Balance of Power," *The Multinational Corporation* (Conference held at the Department of State, February 14, 1969), pp. 19-21.

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REGULATIONS OF PARENT AND HOST COUNTRIES



to the governments imposing the least burdensome regulations. This has been the response of many companies to regulations imposed in the developing countries; they have stayed out of the economies of some countries completely. Similarly, in Europe multinational enterprises have concentrated their activities in carefully-selected countries, avoiding those inclined to insist on strict and damaging control. In Situation 3 the margin for avoidance of bothersome regulations is enlarged.

Situations 4 and 5 give the companies maximum leeway and therefore they may choose strategies or activities which gain the most for their objectives. Many multinational corporations have been operating with these advantages and the more they are able to exercise their own choices in setting patterns of economic and commercial behavior, the more they are in a position to dictate the next step for the governments with which they deal. The governments then tend to play the role of "reactors" rather than initiators or controllers.

Transnational Business Collaboration

Transnational business collaboration, engaged in by independent national enterprises as well as multinational corporations, may be defined as a long-term collaborative effort across national boundaries going beyond mere export and import trade relationships. It aims at partnership in a broad sense, ideally with a well-defined common interest, and suggests a border-crossing interlacement of efforts on the part of the entities involved. Its forms vary. The tie between the collaborating units may be an agreement which leaves their corporate structures untouched and excludes any investment schemes among the partners. A more intense collaboration can be created when the agreement includes the financial participation of one of the partners in the enterprise of another. In a number of instances new corporate structures have been established, either in the form of a holding company, a

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jointly-owned subsidiary, or even two corporations, as in the well-known case of Agfa Gevaerts.[58] Wholly-owned subsidiaries may also be classified as border-crossing collaborative efforts.

The effects of interlacement flowing from transnational collaboration are likely to go beyond the direct benefits sought by the joint ventures if a substantial number of enterprises in two or more countries are involved. Inasmuch as a variety of national and international political consequences might be produced, the growing incidence of such collaboration and the spreading web of interlacement resulting from it would be indicators of the potential impact these joint business ventures might have on the international system and its subsystems. The interlacement effects are apt to be especially significant if the countries involved are pursuing a regional economic integration scheme, as in the European Economic Community (EEC) or the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

Among the member countries of the EEC a rising trend of transnational business collaboration has become manifest during the last decade. Both large enterprises and smaller firms have engaged in collaboration ventures in order to benefit from the expanded internal market of the EEC, make use of economies of scale where this should prove advantageous, and optimize the allocation of resources.

Statistical information on the growth and scope of transnational business collaboration in the EEC, on which we want to focus in the following pages, is less than satisfactory because it does not cover the full range of collaboration endeavors, comes from differing sources, and lacks data on the size of many of the entities involved, especially their sales records, capitalization and employees. Only when rather large enterprises are participants in transnational ventures — and quite a few of Europe's large corporations are — can the latter information be found periodically with relative ease.[59] Nevertheless, the statistics available are suggestive and the data presented in Table X, covering collaboration ventures involving financial participations and the establishment of subsidiaries, indicate a definite upward trend in border-crossing endeavors. We should note, however, that over the years there have

[58]In this venture, the most prominent producers of photographic equipment in Germany and Belgium, AGFA A.G. and Photo Produits Gevaerts, established two new corporations in 1964, the Agfa-Gevaerts A.G. in Germany and the Gevaerts-Agfa N.V. in Belgium, each of which has the same capitalization and is owned equally by the founding companies.

[59]In *Fortune's* annual listing of the top 200 industrial companies outside the United States since 1963, for instance.

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TABLE X

GROWTH OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS COLLABORATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
1961-1969

Year	*Collaboration Ventures Including Financial Participations Without Assumption of Control and Jointly-Owned Subsidiaries Between Common Market Enterprises*	*Mergers and Financial Participations With Assumption of Control Between Common Market Enterprises*	*Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries from Member State to Member State*	*Total*
1961	104	19	241	364
1962	114	11	232	357
1963	61	28	195	284
1964	123	34	273	430
1965	140	17	247	404
1966	112	31	320	463
1967	104	32	328	464
1968	160	35	304	499
*1969	83	50	160	293
Total	1001	257	2300	3558

GROWTH OF INTRANATIONAL COLLABORATION VENTURES
1961-1969

Year	*Collaboration Ventures Including Financial. Participation Without Assumption of Control*	*Mergers and Financial Participation With Assumption of Control*	*Total*
1961	100	131	231
1962	141	162	303
1963	55	157	207
1964	132	172	304
1965	177	228	405
1966	205	221	426
1967	166	253	419
1968	231	272	503
*1969	145	265	410
Total	1352	1861	3213

*The first six months

Source: Adapted from Commission des Communautés Européenes, *La Politique Industrielle de la Communauté* (Brussels, 1970), p. 92.

also been failures of collaboration ventures and some wholly-owned subsidiaries may have been abandoned. Since failures are rarely publicized widely, it is difficult to estimate their numbers.

If we compare the figures for the growth of transnational business collaborations with those of intranational collaboration ventures in the Common Market, also shown in Table X, we find that the latter have enjoyed a substantial increase as well. In fact, in 1968 and the first six months of 1969 intranational ventures outnumbered transnational undertakings. Two major reasons may

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account for this. First, the absence of a uniform European company law and other legal and fiscal obstacles have made it difficult to negotiate transnational mergers. Second, the spreading virus of nationalism caused by de Gaulle's aversion to political unity in Western Europe has had its effect on business decision-making in all EEC countries; a wider outlook can be expected in the post-de Gaulle period.

The most forceful initiators of transnational collaboration ventures are the Germans, French and Dutch. The country on the receiving end of the largest number of initiatives is Belgium. In addition, Luxembourg and Italy are more often receptors than originators of border-crossing initiatives. While both Germany and France increased their role as initiators of ventures from 1968 to 1969 and decreased their role as receptors, the Netherlands has advanced on both counts. The increase in German-French transnational collaborative activities correlates well with the flow of trade between France and Germany, which more than quintupled from 1954 to 1965. By 1965 German exports to France constituted 13.1 per cent of the Federal Republic's total exports, and in the French case exports to Germany amounted to 21.5 per cent. This trend has continued and in 1969 Germany and France were each other's largest export customer.[60]

While the statistics presented show the pattern and rising incidence of transnational business collaboration in the Common Market, it is not easy to determine and measure the effects of this development on the international subsystem represented by the EEC and perhaps on the international system as a whole. We can assume that the participation of enterprises in transnational undertakings should enhance the progress of economic integration in the EEC. However, what kind of political transformation or changes in the international system these transnational entities might bring about depends in great part on their specific political objectives and their capacity for goal attainment.

From interviews conducted during 1968 and 1969[61] with executives of enterprises engaged in transnational collaboration in the Common Market it is apparent that the following objectives have high priority:

[60]See Werner J. Feld, *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries: Its Implication for Political Integration* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 14-15; Donald J. Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration," *International Organization*, Autumn 1970, pp. 732-763; and *OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade*, January 1971, pp. 60, 64.

[61]For a full discussion of the whole topic see Feld, *Transnational Business Collaboration . . . , op. cit.*, especially pp. 57-68.

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(1) Elimination of restrictions on foreign investments and capital movements.
(2) Elimination of border customs check points within the Common Market.
(3) Harmonization of fiscal laws.
(4) Harmonization of national laws setting technical standards for industrial products.
(5) Creation of a European patent law.
(6) Elaboration of a "European company" statute either through Community regulation or the promulgation of identical national laws.
(7) Liberal application of the EEC anti-trust laws.

These objectives are also supported by many firms not engaged in transnational ventures. For the collaborating firms they are especially significant because of the direct effect their attainment would have on the initiation of collaboration agreements and the economic results to be expected therefrom. Strangely, promoting coordination of economic and monetary policies among the member governments, which would have beneficial effects on the joint ventures, seems to warrant less attention.

If the above objectives were attained, implying the full harmonization of pertinent national laws and policies, EEC member governments would be understood to have assumed the obligation to make no future unilateral changes in these laws and policies. As a consequence, the autonomy of the national governments would have been reduced, while the power of the European Community institutions would have been enlarged correspondingly. Thus, a significant change in the Community system would have taken place, suggesting progress toward political integration with all its implications for the international system.

At present, attainment of the major political objectives pursued by enterprises engaged in transnational collaboration is still elusive. There is strong support for them on the part of European and national interest groups, and for most of the goals the Community Commission also has provided substantial support and initiative. However, favorable action by the Council of Ministers has been lagging behind the Commission proposals. In addition, the member governments, on whose concurrence the harmonization of laws, procedures and policies depends, have shown little enthusiasm for the full implementation of actions the Council has agreed upon, although some progress has been made.

Tentative Conclusions

It is evident that the rapidly increasing number of enterprises

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transcending national boundaries has produced a spreading network of multinational and transnational operations, covering developed as well as developing countries of the Free World. The powerful tools for economic, social and political change available to these entities in the form of investments clearly make them potentially important actors in the international system. Our data indicate that they have used their strong financial resources to expand worldwide investments steadily and substantially during the last twenty-five years. This investment trend suggests gradually changing relationships in the international political system which can affect the power positions of system actors, influence the customary pattern of international intercourse and challenge the traditional notions of national sovereignty.

What are the implications for peace flowing from these widespread business activities? Can they make a more effective contribution to peace than traditional international non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations? While this question in itself merits a comprehensive investigation, space permits only a few comments here. There can be little doubt that the operations of multinational corporations and transnational joint business ventures spread new technologies in various host countries and produce new managerial, administrative and technical skills. These effects are especially significant for developing countries inasmuch as they tend to raise economic levels and enhance political stability in these areas. In turn, politically stable developing countries attract new international investments, further improving the prospects for peace. Unfortunately, however, political stability often suffers from other factors such as clashing ideologies of power-hungry leaders. Moreover, as we have observed, some of the activities of multinational corporations produce friction and strife and thereby have a dysfunctional effect on the quest for international peace. Certainly enterprises engaged in the production and international sale of arms serve a different cause.[62]

An interesting dimension to the peace theme is the rising interest of multinational corporations during the last few years in extending their investments to the communist world. Since 1966, Fiat, Renault and Western firms in other industrial sectors have contracted individually or through specially organized consortia to erect various factories in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[63]

[62]Cf. George Thayer, *The War Business* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).
[63]See Hellmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-27.

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The international consequences of such investments have not been fully explored. But it is apparent that a growing propensity for the production of consumer goods is likely to change the social and political culture of the communist countries. As the population becomes accustomed to the amenities of motorization and other consumer-oriented products, it may be difficult for the communist leadership to impose external policies which would reduce the availability of the newly found pleasures of life. The potential magnitude of these changes is enhanced by the dynamics inherent in profit-oriented business activities and the unique capability of the multinational and transnational enterprises to transfer sophisticated technologies. In the future the benefits of technological transfers and increased employment through new investments by multinational corporations may constitute more important motivations for foreign policy decisions of governments, especially those of smaller countries, than the traditional considerations of international trade and security.

Despite the insufficiency of data it is clear that the degree of control over host country strategic industries by multinational corporations headquartered in other countries is a valid indicator of the latter's impact on the international system. Such control can be a highly explosive and divisive issue and may lead in certain cases to serious confrontations between powerful private groups and national governments as well as between different governments. As we have seen, a number of governments have sought to restrict the activities of international corporations on their territory; others, however, offer incentives to investments coupled with concessions in the matter of governmental regulation.

On the level of regionalism, transnational business collaboration may serve as a special shock force to induce changes in traditional patterns of the political ecology; this may happen, for example, in the EEC if the current trend toward such collaboration continues. However, the effective contribution of transnational enterprises to these changes also depends on other forces, especially the attitudes and behavior of major elites influential in the domestic political realm.

On this highly impressionistic basis of judgment, the long-range benefits flowing from the expanding and increasingly close-knit network of multinational and transnational business operations appear to outweigh their harmful effects. We may hypothesize that the more equal the benefits distributed in a particular region or

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universally, the higher the contribution to integration and peace should be. Moreover, because of the powerful means for change at their disposal, these operations can more effectively contribute to peace than the activities of traditional NGO's and most functionally-oriented IGO's. The data presented appear to confirm our earlier intuition that the impact of multinational corporations and transnational joint business ventures on the international system and its subsystems is actually and potentially much more far-reaching and intense than that of the NGO's. In neither case, however, is this impact likely to be immediate and dramatic. Rather, it will be gradual and incremental, its detailed consequences becoming visible only after careful scrutiny.

Although the statistical information currently available is sufficient to be suggestive for important aspects of the effects of nongovernmental entities on the international system, gaps in the data preclude a full-range exploration at present. The collection of additional data to which we referred at the outset of this article will in due time furnish new empirical bases for the refinement of indicators, will encourage further theoretical efforts, and may stimulate coordinated research of specific cases.

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PUERTO RICO: WHITHER COMMONWEALTH?

by Juan M. García-Passalacqua

THE case of Puerto Rico seldom attracts world attention. When it does, the news is startling. The reader will remember the attempt to assassinate President Harry S. Truman, the shooting attack on the floor of the United States House of Representatives and the heated debate in the United Nations, occurrences of the 1950's related to the political condition of this small island in the Caribbean.[1] Twenty years later, Puerto Rico is again moving toward international prominence. The developing crisis can affect the American nation's posture before the world, and especially before Latin America, in the coming decade.

The Dialectics of Political Status

There are fundamental laws that govern historical development and change. The historical process of a society like ours is not an agglomeration of succeeding events, but responds to an underlying structure. Our existence has been and is shaped by two contradictory realities whose tension and conflict provide driving forces for change.[2]

These two realities have existed since 1898. They are, on one hand, an ever closer union with the United States and, on the other hand, an increasingly strong affirmation of our nature as a people. History has moved gradually in opposite directions on both counts, but gradual changes can, when internal tensions

[1]See Ramón Medina Ramírez, *El Movimiento Libertador en la Historia de Puerto Rico* (Santurce: Puerto Rico Printing and Publishing Company, 1945) for the revolutionary activity. For the case before the United Nations, see Jorge Morales Yordán, "The Constitutional and International Status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," *Revista del Colegio de Abogados*, November 1957. The Cuban delegation sponsored the inclusion of the "Puerto Rican case" in the agenda of the 1971 UN session. (*Claridad*, August 1, 1971, p. 4.) Its suggestion was not acted on, and it announced that it will try again next year. (*Claridad*, October 10, 1971, p. 11.)

[2]We are obviously following Hegelian lines in our analysis. For a popular summary, see "Dialectics," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Volume 14, Chicago, 1967. To elaborate our bias, we agree on the existence of "the granite foundations of objective historical necessity." Cf. P. Frolich, *Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work* (English translation) (New York: Ryerson Press, 1940), and her own *Reforma o Revolución* (Spanish translation) (Mexico City: Grijalbo S.A., 1967).

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reach a breaking point, give rise to new directions in a people's life. We are at that breaking point.

Puerto Rico has been going through this process at faster speed since the 1940's. In the realm of politics and economics the island is being absorbed by the political and economic might of the United States. In the realm of society and culture our people are nurturing and affirming their traditions and idiosyncrasies. Are these opposite trends irreconcilable? Is their polarization inevitable? Some think so.[3] Before we can reach a conclusion we must examine previous attempts at synthesis.

In the late 1940's several articles published in our press invited the people to ponder on "new roads to old objectives." In those articles, Luis Muñoz Marín, leader of the Popular Democratic Party, then in power, rejected independence as his ideological goal and defended a new type of political condition for the island, which on July 25, 1952 became known as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (in Spanish, *Estado Libre Asociado*).[4] In 1950 Puerto Rico had gone through a significant uprising in favor of independence. At that time, anyone unfurling the Puerto Rican flag of the lone star in the blue triangle or singing our traditional anthem, *La Borinqueña,* was in danger of going to prison. In 1952 more than 100,000 people voted for independence, and the independence party became the second largest force in island politics. The majority party immediately began to talk about "two kinds of independence" and with surprising ease adopted the formerly persecuted symbols for its new political creation, Commonwealth status.[5]

However, the need for an ideological synthesis to support the new creation was so evident that Muñoz himself made an attempt at it in an article published in 1953, in which he redefined the word *patria* (the homeland), not in "abstract" terms but in terms of "the people." Arguing that the economic well-being of the people dictated a nonnationalist stance, he endeavored to reconcile the traditional Puerto Rican patriotism, *puertorriqueñismo,* with

[3]This is the position assumed by Rubén Berríos Martínez and his followers of the *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño.* It has not been adequately expounded except in speeches and newspaper articles. For analyses of such statements, see *San Juan Star,* October 7, 1969, p. 19; November 11, 1969, p. 21; December 23, 1969, p. 37; May 5, 1970, p. 25.

[4]See Antonio Fernós Isern, *Puerto Rico Libre y Federado* (San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1951), especially pp. 20-42, on Muñoz' original theory regarding the "associated" status that would be "neither a state nor a republic."

[5]1L.P.R.A., sections 31-40. Cf. also Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Documents on the Constitutional History of Puerto Rico,* second edition, 1964.

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the economic realities that he felt required the existence of Commonwealth:

> We must be always changing, adapting, improving, enlarging, and intensifying our way of doing things to keep it dynamic. This is so because, although we have a flexible means of attaining our objective, the objective is fixed and unchangeable. It has always been the same and will always be the same: it is to bring economic freedom, real freedom, full freedom, to the flesh-and-blood human beings who are our people, to the *patria* — "the homeland *and* the people."[6]

The political situation changed swiftly in 1956. The pro-independence party lost second place in an unexpected turnabout in which the Statehood Republican Party registered a gain of 88,000 votes over its 1952 showing. The majority party accordingly undertook to distinguish between "federated" statehood and "associated" statehood, as Commonwealth began now to be termed. The reasons for this ideological inconsistency in our people are still obscure. Analysts have indicated that the turnabout was due to three factors: the appearance of a new Republican gubernatorial candidate, Luis A. Ferré; the near admission of Alaska and Hawaii as States of the Union; and violent pro-independence acts committed frequently between 1952 and 1956. Whatever the reasons for it, a pro-statehood upsurge began.

Since before World War II, the local Republican Party had represented those who believed in ever closer relations with the United States and in statehood as the goal. Its platform espoused 100 per cent Americanism, and cultural assimilation was its ideological tenet.[7] However, on July 27, 1963 a remarkable incident occurred. One of the members of the Republican duumvirate, industrialist Luis Ferré, gave a speech — discordant at the time — alleging that statehood did not imply the obliteration of the Puerto Ricans "as a people." Obscured by his fellow Republicans' adherence to total Americanization, the speech went almost unnoticed. But four years later its author became the undisputed leader of the statehood movement, now labeled the New Progressive Party, and reintroduced the concept as *Estadidad Jíbara,* the *jíbaro* being the traditional man of the mountains, the folk hero of Puerto Rican culture. The slogan was obviously a simplification of the idea originally expounded in the 1963

[6]Luis Muñoz Marín, "Development through Democracy," *The Annals,* January 1953, p. 8.

[7]Aida Negrón de Montilla's *Americanization in Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1971) is the first thorough study of this movement toward assimilation, at least within the educational system.

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speech. Those around Ferré retreated from 100 per cent Americanism (or at least muted it for a while). Suddenly they promoted a bill to commemorate the *Grito de Lares* (a Puerto Rican uprising for independence a century before), the lone star in the blue triangle was displayed by old Republicans together with the Stars and Stripes, and even the local Exchange Clubs became interested in visiting the honored seat of revolution on the patriotic occasion of the *Grito's* 101st anniversary. The search for a synthesis on the statehood side had begun.

Governor Ferré disclosed the new ideological position of the pro-statehood movement in a speech delivered on October 12, 1969, on the *Día de la Raza* in honor of the island's discovery and colonization by the Spaniards. He argued that Puerto Rico "is progressively gaining more self-knowledge as well as self-government," attacked as "naive and mistaken" the assimilationist policies of the U.S. colonial government in Puerto Rico up to 1948, made an impassioned defense of *puertorriqueñismo,* and added: "Nationhood is a political, social and human concept. *Patria* is an adherence of the heart to the place of one's birth. Our nation: the United States. Our *patria*: Puerto Rico."[8] He went on to say that statehood should not, under any conditions, imply cultural assimilation for the Puerto Ricans. Citing anthropologists, court cases and common sense, he stated: "I shall always oppose assimilation with all the strength of my spirit."

Both the *Estado Libre Asociado* and the *Estadidad Jíbara* have been attempts to achieve a synthesis between our closeness to the Colossus and our self-respect as a people, to prevent polarization between Americanization and nationalism. One concept is nineteen years old, the other almost half of that. Both are equally crude still. There is one important difference: Commonwealth exists and *jíbaro* statehood remains in the realm of conjecture. But the latter is on the march.

Commonwealth may contain the seeds of its destruction without ever becoming a thesis. What people today are calling "polarization" is not a phenomenon of the whole of our society, but one occurring within Commonwealth as a historical construct. The Commonwealth solution is in danger of failing as a synthesis because its two components are apparently each going their own way. Yet *jíbaro* statehood may have within itself the danger of nonrealization. The bluntness with which several of the men in power are pretending to push our people toward statehood "now"

[8] *Mensaje del Hon. Gobernador Luis A. Ferré en Ocasión del Día de la Raza* (mimeographed), pp. 4-5. Translation mine.

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might be resented, for "now" is quicker than the people want. It could fail as a synthesis if one of its components so overpowers the other as to make it unworkable.

What this all means is simple. We are a people and we are going to remain closely tied to the United States. But political juggling and short-range balancing acts cannot constitute a historical synthesis. A true synthesis between our *puertorriqueñismo* and our inevitable relation to the United States must be produced. Our people are ready for it. We have reached the point where internal tensions give rise to new directions.

The Social Tensions

The 1970's will be a decade of trial for Puerto Rico. Pressed by the velocity of modern life and events, contemporary man has made of each decade a relevant span of historical time. If our island's recent history were judged in terms of decades one could say that we had come since the 1930's of turmoil and despair through the social reform of the 1940's and the economic development of the 1950's to the negative period of political decadence in the 1960's. The question remaining is where our destiny as a people will lead us in the next ten years.

The 1930's found Puerto Rico devastated by a hurricane and ailing from an economy in the hands of four absentee-capitalist sugar corporations, a famished rural proletariat living in great misery, an incompetent colonial government, and local political forces split between a coalition of bourgeois oppressors and an emerging, weak and equally bourgeois socialist movement. The whole system went into crisis as the decade ended, when the colonial government was faced with militant violence and responded in kind, leading to a political massacre and widespread despondency.[9]

The 1940's began with an electoral confrontation between the rigidly conservative economic and political elite in power and a new generation of liberal socialists preaching economic and social regeneration. The people were wary of change in the beginning, but as the decade advanced they cast their lot with the renovators. Laws and institutions were all redesigned to carry out an ambitious plan of social justice. The economic and social order felt the impact of reforms. It was our finest hour.[10]

[9]See, e.g., Rexford G. Tugwell, *The Stricken Land* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1947).

[10]See Henry Wells, *The Modernization of Puerto Rico* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

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As the 1950's approached, the leftist renovators lost their influence to the technocrats, who prompted a shift of emphasis toward the industrial production of wealth rather than its radical redistribution. This benefited their own middle class but bypassed the social ills of the proletariat which had triggered the electoral revolt. The new economic priority required a more comfortable and closer political relationship with the United States. Commonwealth, defined as a "permanent union" in the early 1950's, evoked an abortive violent reaction from the nationalist radicals, causing in turn a stronger conservatism in the former renovators. The imagination of the ruling elite dried up as it became content with what it had already achieved: continued economic growth and permanent political union.[11]

Yet only in the 1960's did political decadence become evident. A new youth movement of leftist and strongly Puerto Rican liberals was organized within the ruling elite of the Popular Democratic Party early in the decade. But what was essentially an ideological movement became hopelessly entangled in the question of succession to power. It allied itself with Roberto Sánchez Vilella, aging Muñoz Marín's anointed successor, who won election as Governor in 1964. Before the election of 1968, he broke with Muñoz and tried to save the renovation movement by succeeding himself in the governorship as the candidate of a new party. He and his young supporters were soundly defeated in their confrontation with the by now solidly conservative old guard.[12] All they achieved was the consolidation of a strong new pro-statehood opposition, the New Progressive Party, which elected Luis Ferré to the governorship and won control of the House of Representatives. The decade ended in the defeat of the old generation.

We have now entered the 1970's. The currents that have been feeding our history in the last four decades will continue to flow. Emphasis on economic growth and permanent union will remain prominent, but the cultural and social trends abandoned along the way will, by their own historical strength, claim the attention they deserve. The priorities shunned in the past will determine the priorities of our future.

[11]See Luis Nieves Falcón, "El Futuro Ideológico del Partido Popular Democrático," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (University of Puerto Rico), September 1965. For an elegiac description of the ideological change see David F. Ross, *The Long Uphill Path* (San Juan: Talleres Gráficos, 1966).

[12]See Juan M. García-Passalacqua, *La Crisis Política en Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1970). For subsequent events see Wells, *op. cit.*, "Epílogo," Spanish edition (San Juan: Editorial Universitaria, 1971).

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Economic prosperity seems assured. Virtually all experts predict the continued expansion of the developed world economies. Ours will, in all probability, follow suit. Puerto Rico's gross national product in the fiscal years ending in 1969 and 1970 soared to $4 billion; the economy — contrary to Cassandran advice warning that a pro-statehood electoral victory would bring economic recession — registered once more the standard 10.5 per cent increase that has occurred every year since the take-off period of the late 1950's.[13] Equally predictable seems the trend toward closer political assimilation. The pro-statehood government is consolidating its long-range position by achieving control of most of our important social institutions and taking steps to assure Congressional consideration of the Presidential vote for all Puerto Ricans. There is talk of holding a plebiscite on statehood before 1976. A petition to Congress for statehood will not come in the decade, but the Presidential vote will probably be requested. Political assimilation, and the marginal pro-independence extremism that accompanies it, will both make progress together.

But neither economic growth nor political union, important as they might be, will characterize the coming years. Generational revolt and a renewed demand for social justice will set the tone of the 1970's.

The basic difference between the past era and the one just beginning is that the last four decades were dominated by a single generation and its values of economic prosperity and political union with the United States. The new generation that faces the tasks of the future feels essentially Puerto Rican (within or without the Union). It is self-assured and self-reliant. It has no identity crisis or colonial complex regarding the United States, as had its predecessor. It is composed of two groups, equally the result of our new affluence. One group lives by its bourgeois values and exemplifies them by being civic leaders or champions of commerce and industry. The other rejects those values and goes into studies or activities with a social-service function. One is essentially conservative, the other liberal or radical. Both are young. No one knows which of these two tendencies will prevail,

[13]Commonwealth Planning Board, *Preliminary Report on the Economy for 1969-70*, p. 5. Cf. *San Juan Star*, July 15, 1970, p. 1. For a critique of the report see *El Día*, July 23, 1970, p. 1 and subsequent dates. Effects of the recession in the United States are now being felt. Economic growth has continued at a 10.7 per cent rate in 1970-1971 (*San Juan Star*, July 21, 1971, p. 1) but by means of increasing government expenditures and a higher public debt, while manufacturing and tourism both lag.

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or who the new leaders will be. But one thing is certain: as the decade ends, new leaders will be in command in Puerto Rico.

The key to the future of this new generation lies in the people. Social inequity remains the essential element of our historical reality, four decades notwithstanding. When compared with the neediest regions of the United States, Puerto Rico is a poor island. Poverty is not the worst of it. The top 20 per cent families receive 50 per cent of the available income and the bottom 20 per cent only 4 per cent.[14] While the rich grow richer, and the new bourgeoisie becomes more content and politically active, the old and the new proletariat are thrown farther and farther behind in the struggle for human progress. Some day, during this decade, they may rise in anger. Social injustice, sidelined since the peaceful revolution of the 1940's, may raise its ugly head to haunt that revolution's children and challenge its inheritors. The poor may hold the trial of the young in the 1970's in Puerto Rico.

The Possibility of Civil War

The emergence of a new generation in politics and a new militancy in the poor is accompanied by political and ideological polarization which might lead us to civil war. This conclusion is substantiated by two important interpretations of our present situation published recently: Henry Wells' *The Modernization of Puerto Rico*[15] and Maldonado Denis' *Puerto Rico: Una Interpretación Histórico-Social*.[16] Analyzed together, as they must be, these books point out the ideological, intellectual and existential polarization occurring in and about Puerto Rico today.

Puerto Rico has reached a critical stage in its historical evolution. Wells poses the problem accurately when he states that there is no inevitability of progress from traditionalism to modernity, and that there have been developing societies where a progressive trend has been reversed. Maldonado poses the crisis when he states that in the long or the short run the confrontation between the outright defenders of Americanization and the genuine Puerto

[14]See Escuela de Administración Pública, "Seminario Sobre el Problema de la Pobreza en Puerto Rico," April 29-30, 1970 (mimeographed), and Luis Nieves Falcón, "Demythology of the Showcase," *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1970, for excellent analyses of all aspects of this problem. It contains the seeds of a class struggle. See also *San Juan Star*, August 7, 1971, p. 24.

[15]*Supra*, note 10.

[16]Manuel Maldonado Denis' *Puerto Rico: Una Interpretación Histórico-Social* (Mexico City: Editorial Siglo XXI, 1969) is the best exposition of an emerging pro-independence historical school.

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Ricans will manifest itself. Such a confrontation, if violent and bloody, will radically affect our future. Thus, another way must be found.

The social integrity of the Puerto Rican people in the past two decades has been based largely on the values of material prosperity. As more and more is achieved in that realm, the intellectual and political leaders of the new generation will tend to reject such values as predominant, and begin to search for other values to take their place. On the leaders of the new generation and their search for the true values of our people rests the responsibility for the ultimate solution.

Wells conceives our recent history as a confrontation of traditional Hispanic and modern American values. He asserts that Americanization began immediately after the U.S. invasion and has been going on ever since. By that he means mainly that the desired means and ends of our people have become oriented toward improvement in the material conditions of life. He specifies three factors that have promoted Americanization: the U.S. military government in the early 1900's, the emergence of the pro-welfare Socialist Party around 1920, and most importantly, the predominance since 1940 of the Popular Democratic Party and of its leader, Luis Muñoz Marín.

Wells proves that between 1937 and 1948 the political elite decided to abandon the pro-independence, deference-oriented values and concentrate instead on wealth and well-being as paramount objectives, emphasizing welfare. Their decision was supposedly made on the basis of learning that such was our *jíbaros'* choice. (That choice is adroitly illustrated in the book by an anecdote in which a *jíbaro*, when asked to name his favorite saint, points at Muñoz and calls him "our Sancocho," the name for a local "mainstay" dish.)

Maldonado agrees that the alteration of Muñoz' ideology was a turning point in the history of Puerto Rico. But he finds the changed course dismal, arguing that the abandonment of socialist and independentist leanings and of deference values, instead of leading to progress and modernization as Wells maintains, has prevented us from realizing any structural change in our society and from solving our problems, so that we have come to depend more and more on the United States.

Wells claims that our people's character has been drastically changed by the modernization process and that Puerto Rico is fast

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becoming urban, industrial, middle-class, comfort-oriented, security-conscious and motivated toward education. He sees us continuing up the welfare road. The *jíbaro* is no longer the rule; the bourgeois is the Puerto Rican of today. But, he argues, they share the same welfare-oriented values, and the modernization process will lead to the extension of those middle-class values to the entire population. He adds that the ever-growing middle class tends increasingly to vote for statehood because it feels that more material benefits can be accumulated thereby, and because it still shares the old *jíbaro* fear of radicalization in independence. Americanization and modernization, in the sense of adherence to those values, have — in Wells' opinion — won the day. Maldonado Denis agrees to the extent that the tenure in power of the Popular Democratic Party has created a new middle class which shares American values and has a "proclivity to annexation," but expresses hope for the role of deference-oriented people.

We therefore remark two authors who, departing from completely different ideological and intellectual premises, agree on a set of facts and on where the Puerto Rican situation is leading. Ironically, it is Wells who pictures the dilemma with much greater clarity:

> The plain truth is that there can be no end to the debate about political status as long as commonwealth lasts. . . . The Puerto Rican political community is deeply split on the status question, almost the only divisive issue in Puerto Rican politics. If either one of the truly final solutions (statehood or independence) was to be accepted, the new entity would have to contend with thousands of citizens intransigently opposed to its existence. The upshot would almost certainly be political instability and turbulence, or possibly even civil war.[17]

Statehood won covertly in the last elections, and the specter of civil war is here. What now? The answer is in neither Wells' nor Maldonado's book. It is in the hands of the young men and women of our society, among whom a worldwide phenomenon is occurring: the generational revolution.

Today in Puerto Rico there is a swing away from traditional to modern values. No one can deny that. But there is much more. The most important occurrence in Puerto Rican life since the early 1960's has been the emergence of young leaders for whom wealth, well-being and know-how are not the ultimate attainments. There has been a shift in emphasis from welfare to

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 262-263.

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deference, from money to ideals,[18] in a new search for *dignidad.* Having come up from destitution, having seen the dubious results of twenty years' adherence to materialism and its inability to eliminate the prevalence of poverty, many of the new generation are discovering that gold has lost its brilliance. Our young leaders are beginning to live by more than their stomachs. As Professor Wells himself recognizes, the most modern of all nonmaterial values is primeval and the most important for all ages: man's freedom.

Our young people are now in search of freedom. They share modern values, but they want modern deference values above and beyond those of welfare. They want shared power, equality, legality, and they want them first and now. That is the crux of the matter. The desire for Puerto Rico's freedom in one of the "truly final" solutions of statehood or independence is growing fast. But it is also leading our people toward a dangerous and perhaps terrible confrontation. Commonwealth, the third alternative, the dike staving off disaster for almost twenty years, has always been preached as a value of the stomach. This is the hour of the heart. Unless a third alternative can represent a value not of welfare, but of freedom, it will be meaningless. A new synthesis will have to be found, or the confrontation will occur.

The Growth of Radicalization

Given the generational revolution oriented toward deference values, an increasingly active poor population conscious of the unevenly distributed wealth, and a progressively polarized political situation, radicalization is spreading to all parts of the political spectrum. In little more than a year, from January 1969 through early 1970, there were fifty-nine terrorist bombings in our island, causing a total loss of $4.5 million.[19] The forces of

[18]This phenomenon, observed by us in the early 1960's (see *Panoramas* [Mexico], November-December 1964, pp. 55-65), has by now become commonplace and universal in Western civilization. Cf. Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* (New York: Random House, 1970) and the host of other books in all languages on the subject of the youth counter-culture. Of particular merit is Daniel Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism, The Left Wing Alternative* (London: Deutsch, 1968).

[19]Cf. *San Juan Star,* June 30, 1970, p. 31; August 4, 1970, p. 21. Revolutionary theory was expounded by Juan Mari Bras in a speech published in the newspaper of his pro-independence movement, *Claridad,* June 21, 1970, pp. 6-7, and revolutionary practice was attested to by Captain José Enrique Sánchez, of the Commonwealth Police, before the U.S. Permanent Senate Sub-Committee on Governmental Investigative Operations on July 29, 1970. See *El Mundo,* July 30, 1970, p. 1.

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rightist and leftist extremism are shaping up among us. There are in Puerto Rico 72,034 persons with a license to bear arms. The mixture of ideology and weaponry is a highly volatile one.

What has revolution meant for us? Our major uprising began October 30, 1950. The spark was an incident in a town called Peñuelas between a group of Nationalists and the police. Another group of revolutionaries attacked the Jayuya police station and burned it to the ground. Two Puerto Ricans tried to kill President Truman at Blair House in Washington. A group of Nationalists attacked La Fortaleza and died in the streets. Police stations in several towns were attacked, as well as federal offices. Pedro Albizu Campos, the revolutionary leader, was taken prisoner after a gunfight. The National Guard was called into service and its tanks and airplanes were sent to quell the revolt. Puerto Ricans killed Puerto Ricans for one long, anguished day. But seventy-two hours after it had begun the most important revolutionary movement in our history was crushed by the local government. The fruit of revolution was defeat.

What about the people? The revolution's most dramatic impact on Puerto Ricans as a whole was a gunfight between a popular barber in Barrio Obrero and a contingent of police. Not because of its ideological implications or for its revolutionary fervor, but because it was broadcast "live" on radio station WIAC from the street in all its details, including zooming bullets.[20] That was the extent of popular participation.

In the absence of the people's involvement, the revolutionaries of the time became profoundly bitter. Their despair can be best understood from César Andréu Iglesias' excellent novel *Los Derrotados*,[21] published six years later, in 1956. It is the story of Marcos Vega, a young man arrested in the 1950 incidents without even having fired a shot. Some of Marcos' dispersed thoughts tell us about the anguish of the Puerto Rican revolutionary. He wants to participate in something big, something that will "really awaken the people's benumbed conscience." He feels that independence is no nearer, since the people "are not more willing to sacrifice than before, and they continue to support the government." Introspection comes next: "If only what is reasonably practical, what is locally realistic, would rule our actions, there would be no life but the common life, the day-by-day one, the boring life

[20]Ramírez, *op. cit.*

[21]César Andréu Iglesias, *Los Derrotados* (second edition, Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1964).

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of the contented and satisfied man." And then, a desperate realism: "Will there be change? Will there be independence? No! Witless slaves of routine, mediocre colonized people!"[22] Marcos Vega is a defeated man. Our people shun revolution.

But what if the situation has changed? Perhaps now the people are ready for revolution and counterrevolution. The clue that revolution is near can be discerned from increasing talk about revolution, increasing consciousness about social tensions, increasing cramp and irritation in a society. These things are present in Puerto Rico. But, as Crane Brinton says, such talk must be "really in the air, and not simply in the mouths of professional seers or timid conservatives."[23] In Chairman Mao's formulation, "The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them."[24] Such a situation does not exist in Puerto Rico.

Talk about revolution on one side and about preventing a communist takeover on the other is not among the people. Mostly it comes from hopeful professional revolutionists or timid conservatives. The 1950 revolt was an affair between a number of Nationalists and the local government. The people stayed glued to their radios. Until and unless the people move, both violent extremes are doomed to defeat.

In the absence of civil war, there remain two possible alternatives regarding the future of Puerto Rico: continuing polarization or the development of Commonwealth. Let us examine each in turn.

Polarization: Statehood or Independence?

To Pablo García-Kuenzli, an ideologue of the Ferré Administration, polarization means that present-day Puerto Ricans worry little about the status issue and could live with either statehood or independence equally well.[25] The weight of his argument is to eliminate the Commonwealth alternative as a "nonethical" solution to the status conundrum, thus leaving only statehood or independence as viable alternatives.

His essay begins with the assertion that Puerto Rico has already

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 54. Translation mine.
[23] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960).
[24] *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 48 (from a speech delivered on January 27, 1934).
[25] Pablo García-Kuenzli, *El Proceso de Americanización en Puerto Rico* (San Juan: Editorial Análisis, 1969).

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been Americanized, but that the process usually understood by the term "Americanization" has also created "a people" in Puerto Rico. To prove his point he lists at least twenty instances in which Puerto Ricans in recent years have been exalted to important positions in the United States as "typical Americans." He adds a list of the elements of our daily life that must be traced to the United States and concludes that as far as material things are concerned, our life is essentially "American."

On the Puerto Rican side, García-Kuenzli claims that what has been considered a "Spanish culture" has not been so and that, rather, a cultural phenomenon called *tropicalismo* has typified Puerto Rico since 1942. This he defines as the alienation, apathy and indolence resulting from fear of the sea, from our existence as a military base and from the fact of our stranded population. To this component he adds the American influence, the values of modernization, industrialization and rapid social change. However — and this is the hinge on which his thesis turns — he maintains that the "values" of both influences have been essentially the same.

Both Americans and Spaniards, García-Kuenzli notes, were pragmatists, loved gold and practiced materialism as a way of life. He asserts that the Spaniards who stayed in Puerto Rico had these characteristics because, as the defeated, they could not or would not go to America in search of the glories of the great *conquistadores*. He concludes that those shared values of the American and Spanish cultures constitute the Puerto Rican soul.

García-Kuenzli finds that the aspect that has distinguished Puerto Ricans from all other peoples is the question of status. In noting the three traditional alternatives, he devotes only two paragraphs to statehood, summing up its "ethics" as voluntary moral and legal subordination to the interests of the American nation. Commonwealth comes under heavy attack, and is qualified as contradictory, confused and ambivalent. The absence of sovereignty, he believes, ethically emasculates the Commonwealth alternative. Ambivalence and a double moral standard characterize Commonwealth supporters when they attack nationalism in Puerto Rico but do not oppose nationalism in Washington or Viet Nam. For this reason, he considers Commonwealth lacking in "ethical" values. The immorality, he claims, was in trying to make permanent what was an excellent temporary solution, to transform a means into an end. As for independence, he points out the inability of the defenders of violent revolution to achieve in-

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dependence in the past and says this has been so simply because the people do not want it.

García-Kuenzli goes on to comment that in the last thirty years our people have gone from covertly supporting independence (1940) to covertly supporting statehood (1968) and asks whether this is a healthy sign for any society. His answer is framed in his thesis of *tropicalismo,* the tradition of Puerto Rican marginality and alienation from government, institutions and religion which prompts pragmatism and individualism, the taking of things "as they come," and thus generates a peculiar ethics for the Puerto Rican people. But in the author's view the Puerto Ricans are now more than a "people"; they are rapidly becoming a race in the sense of having common physical and spiritual characteristics. This race, he states, feels that the status of the homeland is only a minimal matter, a mere vehicle of its creative expression. To him, this is a "virtue" qualifying Puerto Rico equally to be a State of the Union or an independent republic.

The relevance of García-Kuenzli's essay is that polarization is not only occurring, it is being justified theoretically on the basis that Commonwealth is an "unethical" solution. He concludes: "Puerto Rico represents a people in search of a status, not a status in search of a people. Puerto Rico will follow him who accepts the solution opposite to his own as equally true, and more still, who is willing not only to execute the will of the people, but to build constructively within it."[26] However, it is too early to say that Commonwealth is dead.

Variations on the Commonwealth Theme

The local debate on the development of the present political condition, Commonwealth status, as an alternative to both independence and statehood began several years ago when Muñoz Marín delivered his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1959. His theme was that our island had achieved, in creating Commonwealth, "a breakthrough from nationalism." Delivering an impassioned plea against nationalism, he stated that Commonwealth was a permanent status, not an interim arrangement on the way to independence or statehood.[27] This became his party's dogma. However, between 1959 and 1969 all efforts at improving and making the creation permanent were defeated by a

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 16. Translation mine.

[27] Luis Muñoz Marín, "Breakthrough from Nationalism," Godkin Lectures, Harvard University, April 28-30, 1959. Cf. *El Mundo,* June 26, 1970, p. 1.

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combination of factors, mainly local politics and a lack of understanding in Congress.

On July 22, 1970, former Governor Sánchez Vilella (now head of the People's Party, a PDP splinter party) proposed in a television speech a "new pact of association with the United States." He stated that Commonwealth as it is "no longer serves Puerto Rican reality well" because it does not reflect our economic development, democratic institutions, political dignity or cultural identity. He argued that Commonwealth had failed to obtain the powers our people need to solve our problems, and as such it was heading for "a colonial fall." Besides, no one under forty had participated in its formulation. To correct this situation he proposed his "new pact," giving Puerto Rico authority over immigration, voluntary military service, membership in international organizations, commercial treaties with other nations, territorial waters, television and radio communications, minimum wages and labor relations, and other powers.[28]

On November 19, 1970 the Popular Democratic Party elaborated on its position. At Aguas Buenas, the party approved a pronouncement on political status, in part pressured by the People's Party formulation. But what its drafters called "a reaffirmation" of its "essential ideological posture" was in effect a substantial departure from it. The PDP spoke in favor of common citizenship and "permanent association" with the United States. The "association" approach was one that Muñoz had refused to use since the resurgence in 1956 of the statehood movement — he had preferred the term "permanent union." The difference between "association" and "union" is important to those initiated in the PDP's internal circles. It signifies the party's two factions on political status, some determined that Puerto Rico should be closer to, others that it should be farther from, the United States. Aguas Buenas was a triumph for the separatist faction, even if Commonwealth remained as the ideal.

Distinguishing themselves from the PP's position, the PDP ideologues stated that Commonwealth was "imperfect" rather than "useless" in its present form. It needs "improvements" to give it more political authority and juridical capacity, they said. Thus, several "modifications" were offered. They proposed a consultation process on defense matters and military service, the denuclearization of Puerto Rico, the abandonment by the Navy of

[28] *San Juan Star*, July 23, 1970, p. 1.

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Culebra Island, jurisdiction over immigration, and distinction of local and federal jurisdiction in coastwise shipping, customs, income tax, labor relations, minimum wages, air and sea transport, mass communications, international and political treaties, and other matters.[29]

Fascinatingly enough, neither the Popular Democrats nor Sánchez said that most of these proposals had already been made in secret to the government of the United States and had been rejected. It is a matter of record that such a "new" compact was proposed to the Kennedy Administration in 1962. The answer, contained in a memorandum signed by Harold F. Reis (then a member of Robert Kennedy's staff) was clear and unequivocal: "If that's what you want, you might as well ask for independence, and we will favor it."[30] So much for the possibilities of a "new" compact of association if it entails only secret negotiations as were those of 1962, instead of open discussions with the United States.

On July 4, 1971 Governor Ferré joined the ranks of the ideologues of Commonwealth. In a carefully worded section of a speech,[31] he stated that his goals for Puerto Rico could be achieved only within "permanent union" and the "most complete enjoyment" of our common citizenship. "Union" was obviously a rebuke to the PDP's "association" stand and a return to Muñoz' semantic formulations. "Most-complete-enjoyment-of-common-citizenship" was again the adoption of Muñoz' idea of the early 1960's that Commonwealth could be developed through obtaining the Presidential vote for Puerto Rico. However, Ferré added a strictly new element as his ideological understanding of Commonwealth: that Puerto Ricans, as American citizens, deserve by right of citizenship full participation in all federal programs on the same basis and to the same extent as U.S. citizens living in the States.

Ferré rejected as "dangerous" the PP's and PDP's proposals to "alter" Commonwealth, and stuck to it "as it was adopted by our people in 1952," based on the principles of "permanent union and

[29]For the official texts of the two similar proposals for the development of Commonwealth, see *Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico* (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 684-700.

[30]See García-Passalacqua, *op. cit.*, Chapter III, for a detailed account of the events leading to this rejection. The memorandum is found in the Puerto Rican files of the U.S. Department of Justice.

[31]*El Mundo,* July 5, 1971, p. 14-B has the complete text of the speech. For a preliminary formulation, see "Discurso del Hon. Luis A. Ferré, el 25 de julio de 1970," in *San Juan Star,* July 26, 1970, p. 1.

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common citizenship." The 1952 formulation, he added, was the one he had sworn to respect and support when he became Governor. To reject the principle of "union" was to withdraw our island from the United States and thus run the risk of heading toward "separation," obviously meaning independence. All proposals for greater power for the island would "debilitate" common citizenship, since they were "inconsistent" with it, and would "imperil" permanent union. The result would be a "new and different" Commonwealth, with weaker ties to the United States. The future of Commonwealth, he concluded, must be headed toward "true permanent union" with the United States — in other words, statehood. What kind of statehood? One of "absolute political equality and the preservation of our personality as a people."[32]

The issue has been joined. On one side, "association." On the other side, "union." That is, at last, clear. Our people, who still steadfastly decline to decide between statehood and independence, will be able now to decide between the nearest thing to each under the Commonwealth stamp. The yearling of 1952 is now an adolescent beset by an identity crisis. In the 1972 elections Commonwealth will remain our political status but Puerto Ricans will have to decide which of two completely different versions of Commonwealth they want to endorse.

When the campaign is over, when the returns are in, we will witness a people as divided as ever. The leaders then will have only one recourse: to get together and agree on where Commonwealth is going. More than a plebiscite — which would be

[32]Speaking in Miami, also on July 25, 1970, pro-statehood Senator Justo Méndez offered his concept of the development of Commonwealth, one in clear agreement with Ferré's. He elaborated on an idea that had been expounded for the first time by Dr. Ramón Mellado, Secretary of Education, in a July 4, 1970 speech. Mellado proposed a union between commonwealthers and statehooders, both known as believers in "permanent union" with the United States. (*El Mundo,* July 5, 1970, p. 17-C.) Méndez was more sophisticated. He redefined Commonwealth. Méndez spoke of Muñoz' speech, and agreed with the PDP leader that Commonwealth is "a contribution to modern federalism" and deserves to be treated as such, not as a colonial situation. He proposed, in no uncertain words, that commonwealthers and statehooders of good will join in the search for common ground in which to develop and strengthen the Commonwealth. He recognized the compact theory, adhered to the "dynamics of its growth," and endorsed its potential. Finally, he called for a clearly defined and mutually agreed blueprint for the growth of Commonwealth. (*Discurso pronunciado por el Hon. Justo A. Méndez en la Ciudad de Miami el 25 de julio de 1970* [mimeographed]. Cf. *El Día,* July 27, 1970, p. 4.) Méndez' position might lead eventually to a statehooder split in Puerto Rico, since other renowned leaders such as Mayor Carlos Romero Barceló favor statehood "now," forgetting the delicate question of whether Congress is willing to grant it. See *San Juan Star,* June 10, 1971, p. 3 and June 15, 1971, p. 20.

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equally inconclusive — we will need another call for a Constitutional Convention, where all democratic parties can be represented, and where an explicit, full-scale discussion can determine whether Commonwealth should move toward "permanent union" or "free association." Then, and only then, may our people be on the road to a final decision.

Conclusions

Whether Puerto Ricans are drawn into a civil war on the independence issue, or ask Congress for statehood, or call for a Constitutional Convention to redefine our relationship with the United States, world attention will soon concentrate on our small Caribbean island. Any of the three prospects would be a critical development in Puerto Rican and American history.

The Puerto Ricans are not a revolutionary people, yet we have heard the rumblings of civil war in the streets, and on March 11, 1971 four persons were killed and more than sixty wounded in a violent confrontation between pro-American and anti-American students at the University of Puerto Rico.[33] We are on the verge of a major crisis that will involve U.S.-Puerto Rican relations and challenge the position of the United States with regard to our island.

The crisis, however, can be helped toward a peaceful democratic solution by procedural means. While Puerto Ricans' dialectical tensions concerning our status vis-à-vis the United States will not subside overnight, they can be channeled to nonviolent means and toward a new synthesis if both major parties, the pro-statehood New Progressives and the pro-Commonwealth Popular Democrats, will join with other political parties in a Constitutional Convention. This could be held soon after the 1972 elections to propose a rewriting of the Federal Relations Act, which now legally regulates U.S.-Puerto Rican relations.[34] The results of the Convention would then be submitted to Congress, and continuous public negotiations between the Convention and

[33] *El Mundo,* April 25, 1971, p. 24-C.

[34] The Federal Relations Act, 1L.P.R.A. 192-215, is an obsolete and confusing collection of remnants of the Foraker Act of 1901 and the Jones Act of 1917, edited on the basis of P.L. 82-600 (64 Stat. 319), regulating the relations between Puerto Rico and the United States. Proposals for improvement of the legislation have been numerous in the last fifty years. See *Informe de la Sub-Comisión del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico Sobre los Comités Ad Hoc,* February 20, 1969 (mimeographed), pp. 6-19.

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Congress should ensue.[35] Such negotiations would provide the leaders of the new generation with the forum in which to produce a true synthesis between the dialectical forces shaping our destiny. Only thus can the democratic process determine Puerto Rico's future.

[35]The idea of calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose a total revision of the Federal Relations Act was originally conceived in conversations with then Governor Sánchez Vilella. (García-Passalacqua, *op. cit.*, p. 40.) It was revived in a column by this writer in the *San Juan Star,* July 28, 1970, p. 27. At the request of Roberto Rexach Benítez, a young member of its directorate, the Popular Democratic Party adopted the suggestion in its "Pronunciamiento de Aguas Buenas." (*San Juan Star,* December 9, 1970, p. 27.) For a view contrary to ours by a distinguished Popular Democrat, see columnist Alex Maldonado's position in favor of the status quo in Puerto Rican relations with the United States, in *El Mundo,* August 5-6, 1971, p. 7-A.

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SUPERVISION, CONTROL AND INSPECTION OF ARMAMENTS: 1919-1941 PERSPECTIVE

by Richard Dean Burns

FOR the past five decades one of the most vexing problems of arms control and disarmament deliberations has been that of international supervision, control and verification of armaments.[1] While the attention focused on these issues during the lengthy interwar disarmament negotiations did not approach the emphasis given them in the post-1945 discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, inspection and supervision were a serious point of contention during the earlier period. Throughout the past half-century, the demand for international controls has stemmed from a single, consistent fear: that an aggressive government might ignore its pledge to reduce its military forces or to keep them within prescribed limits, and thus treacherously gain a significant advantage over those nations holding to their bargain.

Much has been written about various aspects of this problem; about the necessity, risks, legality and general workability of arms inspection, supervision and control systems.[2] Analysts have usually employed a scenario or abstract context in which to develop and test their various theoretical contentions. This essay offers a more modest theme based on examining the difficulties in the way of arms supervision and verification experienced during the interwar decades.[3] It will briefly note the divergent national attitudes

[1]I have often used supervision and control, and inspection and verification interchangeably when dealing in general terms with these broad functions. Arms control specialists currently apply specific definitions to each, but during the interwar years such was not the case. This article, where essential, distinguishes between "verification" and "inspection": the former being the process of determining compliance with an agreement; the latter, *one* of the methods employed.

[2]See, for example, Seymour Melman, editor, *Inspection for Disarmament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958); Donald G. Brennan, editor, *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), Part V; J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962); Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk, editors, *Security in Disarmament* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); and such journals as the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Journal of Conflict Resolution* and *Disarmament and Arms Control.*

[3]It is unfortunate that the historical dimensions of this issue have not been more widely examined, because political leaders and their technical experts have been

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stimulated by comprehensive disarmament schemes, sketch the types of control and verification systems actually employed in the interwar arms treaties, and probe some of the problems encountered by those systems.

I

National positions or attitudes on inspection and supervision of armaments have vacillated widely.[4] A look at American and Soviet policies clearly dramatizes this fact. U.S. policy has moved through at least four distinct phases between 1919 and 1970. From 1919 to 1931, officials in Washington sought disarmament treaties but opposed the creation of any international system of controls and verification that might impinge upon national sovereignty. From 1932 to 1945, American policymakers advocated a routine, automatic "on-the-spot" inspection system to investigate alleged evasions and endorsed general supervision, first by the League of Nations and later by the United Nations. The United States at this time did not, however, insist that all disarmament accords must contain these procedures. From 1946 to 1954, the American position became much more rigid as inspection, supervision and control became, in the so-called Baruch Plan, the *sine qua non* of any disarmament treaty. This attitude held that any disarmament agreement must not only involve the inspection and supervision of nuclear and conventional armaments, but contain enforcement sanctions as well. Since 1955, American policymakers have

making decisions regarding supervision and inspection systems largely on mechanical grounds. When "historical" judgments have been made, they have been grounded — implicitly or explicitly — on little more than personal impressions, and these impressions have been generally negative. Thus Senator Barry Goldwater has observed that disarmament agreements "will not work in the world of today" because "they have not worked in the world of yesterday." (*Why Not Victory?* [New York: MacFadden, 1963], p. 79.) Former President Lyndon B. Johnson once expressed the opinion that the naval limitation treaties of the 1920's and 1930's "only led the world down the road to war." More specifically, Harold Stassen claimed historical justification for insisting that inspection and supervision were "the first requirement for a sound [disarmament] agreement." While pleading America's case before a United Nations disarmament committee in 1955, Stassen argued that "history indicates that agreements without adequate inspection lead to doubts and suspicions and uncertainty and new tensions between signatories . . . . in fact, agreements without adequate inspection have been counter-productive in earlier periods. . . ." U. S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959* (Washington: GPO, 1960), I, 510.

[4]See Richard Dean Burns, "Origins of the United States' Arms Inspection Policies, 1926-46," *Disarmament and Arms Control,* Spring 1964, pp. 157-169; and "International Arms Inspection Policies Between World Wars, 1919-1934," *The Historian,* August 1969, pp. 583-603. For post-1945 negotiations, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961) and John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, *The Politics of Disarmament* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

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recognized that their previous insistence upon a comprehensive disarmament package, based on "foolproof" controls, was far too extravagant and, essentially, unrealistic. As a result, they have sought arms control agreements of more limited scope and have undertaken to tailor verification and supervision mechanisms to the needs of each specific arrangement.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's policy crisscrossed that of the United States. In 1928 Moscow came out in favor of a permanent international system of control to be established three months after a general disarmament treaty went into effect, and of a special Commission of Enquiry to be created for "on-the-spot" inspection of suspected violations. Yet its June 1946 reply to the Baruch Plan found the Soviet Union retreating from its earlier stand: controls were to be created, after disarmament took place, under the direction of the United Nations Security Council, but with each permanent member of that body retaining its veto power over on-site inspection activities.[5] To the USSR, inspection without disarmament was espionage. Moscow's attitude toward inspection and supervision has not, however, remained completely negative. On those occasions during the late 1950's and 1960's when serious arms control negotiations were undertaken — e.g., those leading to the Antarctic and Test Ban treaties — the Soviets generally conceded the necessity for some system of verification and supervision.

During the interwar years other nations similarly, if not so dramatically, adjusted their policies regarding inspection and control. Italy opposed international controls in the 1920's, but reluctantly agreed in 1932 to accept them if a substantial arms reduction took place. In Germany, the Weimar government was disposed toward an international system of supervision and inspection —and so apparently was Hitler's regime during its first two years— as long as it was applied equally to all nations. Japan consistently objected to inspection and supervision throughout the 1920's on grounds identical to America's initial objections; when the United States and the other powers shifted their positions, the increasingly military-dominated government in Tokyo steadfastly held to the prerogatives of national sovereignty.

The British governments of the 1920's endorsed Washington's rejection of international inspection and supervision. They, too, altered their stance once they realized that a control system was a prerequisite for any agreement on general disarmament. But

[5]*Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, op. cit.*, I, 18.

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British support for on-site inspections waned in 1935 when they feared that scrutiny of their production centers might reveal their precarious military condition; only with German and French reciprocity would the British join any agreement.

France's attitude poses a more complex puzzle. From the beginning (1919) the French held that inspection and control were vital to sustaining disarmament, particularly the disarmament of the vanquished Germans; yet when the other nations came around to this view but insisted that equality should prevail, Paris avoided such mutual commitments by escalating its demands. Basically the crux of the matter lay in Franco-German relations, for the revisionist-minded Germans claimed equality in armaments while the fearful French insisted on a guarantee of security which included, ultimately, the application of sanctions in case of any treaty violations.

Taken broadly, these shifting national postures suggest that positions and negotiations regarding inspection, supervision and control during the interwar years were more often inspired by the demands of day-to-day politics and national security than by abstract principles. Thus a nation's alteration of its policies seems to have involved less an abandonment of technical or moral inhibitions than a desire to retain or enhance its own relative position in a fluid international power structure.

II

Although the foregoing review suggests changing, often divergent, national attitudes toward the *idea* of an institutionalized system of supervision and inspection, it must not be overlooked that every arms control agreement during the interwar years employed regulatory mechanisms of some form or another. There were at least five methods of control and supervision which, for the purpose of analysis, may be described as (1) on-site supervisory commissions, (2) reporting commissions, (3) enquiry commissions, (4) notification procedures, and (5) mutual self-enforcement. These regulatory systems were supported by essentially two methods of verification: on-site inspection and national military intelligence agencies. Neither the control and supervision systems, nor the verification methods, functioned exclusive of the other; rather, they were concomitant activities.

While a detailed analysis of each regulatory mechanism would be impractical here, representative examples can be mentioned to

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illuminate the essential characteristics of each.[6] The best known of the on-site regulatory systems were the Interallied Military, Naval and Aerial Control Commissions created after World War I to supervise the disarmament of the vanquished Central Powers.[7] These Commissions were headquartered within the nations under supervision and were staffed by appropriate military personnel drawn from the ranks of the victors. The most elaborate, and certainly the most contentious of them were those established in the Versailles Treaty for Germany. Divided into subcommissions and scattered throughout the Weimar Republic, their duties were to supervise German efforts to meet the stipulated reductions of armaments. Reporting authority, through a rather tedious chain of command, began with the Control Commissions and ultimately came to the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, which represented the Allied Powers. The Conference of Ambassadors, speaking for their governments, possessed the right to invoke sanctions should it determine that evasions warranted such drastic responses.

The "reporting commission" system, best demonstrated by the Straits Commission provided for under the Lausanne Convention of 1923, was largely an auditing scheme. Although it was located in Turkish territory, the Commission's primary duties consisted of monitoring warships traversing the Straits. Until it was eliminated by the Treaty of Montreux in 1936, it maintained a surveillance of the Soviet Black Sea fleet and sought to restrict the passage of foreign warships through the Straits to a comparable ratio. The Commission lacked the power to employ sanctions and confined itself to informing the League of Nations Council, through its annual reports, of naval activities in and around the Straits.[8]

Most "commissions of enquiry" drew their assignments and their authority from the League; as such they either served on an *ad hoc* basis or as permanent bodies. The Aland Island Convention of 1921 provided an example of the former, while the League's Mandate Commission represented the latter. In the

[6]Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, *Disarmament in Historical Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between World Wars, 1919-1941,* four volumes (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Report RS-55, 1968).

[7]As provided for in the Treaties of Versailles, 1919 (Germany), St. Germain-en-Laye, 1919 (Austria), Neuilly, 1919 (Bulgaria), and Trianon, 1920 (Hungary).

[8]David Hunter Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), II, 294-295. Another League-sponsored reporting commission, established by Article 8 of the Covenant, called for the annual reporting and publishing of national armaments.

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Aland Island Convention, Finland agreed "not to fortify" the Aland archipelago in the Gulf of Bothnia (as had the Russians in an 1856 pact). If any signatory power or powers believed that the terms of this convention were being evaded, charges were to be presented directly to the Council of the League of Nations. The Council, after inquiry into the matter, was empowered to decide what measures should be taken. The effectiveness of this control method was, however, never tested. Certainly the most severe test of the "enquiry commission" method of arms supervision came when the League's Permanent Mandates Commission undertook in the 1930's to determine if the Japanese were honoring their pledges not to fortify their Central Pacific island mandates.[9] From 1932 to 1935, the Mandates Commission sitting in Geneva pondered Tokyo's annual reports and interrogated the Japanese representative regarding increasing expenditures for harbor improvements and other similar construction programs. Lacking the authority to visit these islands without Japanese permission — which Tokyo ingeniously neither granted nor denied — the skeptical commissioners ended their inquiry without resolving American and British suspicions of vindicating Japan's compliance.[10]

The system of "notification procedures" developed within the framework of the naval limitation agreements of the 1930's. The Turko-Greek pact of 1930, which sought to stabilize naval forces in the Aegean Sea, and the Turko-Soviet protocol of 1931, which proposed the same for the Black Sea, both stipulated that any increase in naval armaments would be preceded by a six-months notice of intentions. The idea of "notification" was expanded by the Anglo-German naval pact in 1935 to include the reciprocal exchange of information concerning the construction of warships. The London Treaty of 1936 saw the full flowering of notification procedures. It provided for the annual exchange of detailed information by each nation of its building, acquisition and modernization programs. The technical particulars of this activity, such as tonnage, armaments and speed, were to be appended to the yearly summary. (In the case of new ship construction, technical information was to be forwarded no later than four months prior to the keel laying.) None of these naval agreements contained provisions for "enforcement sanctions," but they provided "escape"

[9]The Mariana, Caroline and Marshall islands.

[10]Richard Dean Burns, "Inspection of the Mandates, 1919-1941," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1968, pp. 445-462.

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mechanisms allowing for the addition of naval armaments by one nation to be offset by the other signatories without terminating the basic agreements.

Arms control and limitation treaties that did not employ one of the above methods of supervision may be classified as "self-enforcing." But it should be hastily emphasized that even those agreements using some form of controls also leaned heavily on national self-restraint and integrity. The mechanism functioning here, if it may be called a mechanism, was recognized mutuality of interest.

Perhaps Gene Lyons has best explained the rationale of this system: "A major requirement of arms control agreements is that they be effective, that is, that there be reasonable expectation that the participating nations will comply with the rules of conduct they have agreed upon." Post-World War II discussions of arms control too often have tended to equate "effectiveness" with "punitive sanctions" and, consequently, they have lost sight of the fact that "nations will come to agreement on arms control only if it is in their interests to do so."[11] Most statesmen of the interwar decades recognized the value of mutual interest and its logical extension of self-enforcement. The Washington Naval Treaty (1922), the London Naval Pact (1930), the Spitsbergen Convention (1920), the limits on submarine warfare (1930, 1936), and the Geneva Gas Protocol (1925) stood as prime examples of their faith in "self-enforcing" systems.

Governments employed two methods during the interwar decades to verify compliance with arms control agreements: on-site inspection and national military intelligence agencies. On-site inspection systems represented the most easily identifiable regulatory organs and were closely tied to the more formal control mechanisms. The Interallied Control Commissions for Germany present the best example of them. In an operational sense, these Commissions corresponded more closely to the French interpretation of the word *contrôle,* which implied surveillance, verification and auditing, than to the Anglo-American definition which suggested the exercise of authority over the actual disarmament process and implied effective enforcement powers if necessary. Consequently, the Interallied Control Commissions functioned largely as bookkeeping agencies, utilizing occasional on-site inspection tours to verify German-prepared records for their compilation of progress (or delinquency) reports on disarmament ac-

[11]Gene M. Lyons, "The Problem of Compliance Under Arms Control Agreements," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Volume VII, No. 3 (1963), p. 351.

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tivities. Initially, the Straits Commission also employed on-site inspection tours to verify the razing of Turkish coastal fortifications and the demarcation of demilitarized zones around the Straits; however, once this task had been completed, the Commission relinquished its inspection powers.

During the interwar years all arms control agreements were constantly under surveillance by each nation's intelligence agencies. For a long time nations have routinely monitored the development, construction and deployment of their neighbors' military and naval forces; it was not surprising to find intelligence offices continuing, and even expanding, these activities as a means of verifying compliance with arms control treaties. Procedures used by the various governments in maintaining this form of surveillance have been remarkably similar; the principal differences, from state to state, have usually hinged on the financial resources each has been willing to devote to data gathering and processing. Traditionally, military and naval attachés, with their specialized knowledge, professional camaraderie and diplomatic privileges, have been the key ingredient in this process.[12] Their information is analyzed together with other data routinely gathered from professional journals, government publications (particularly budgetary documents), tourist accounts, newspaper reports and clandestine sources.

III

Having reviewed the characteristics of interwar control and verification systems, it is appropriate to sketch the issues and problems arising from their application. In this regard, three related questions may be posed: (1) Were there any essential differences *in effectiveness* between the formal, highly organized on-site systems and the more loosely regulated control mechanisms? (2) Is it likely that a greater employment of on-site control and inspection systems would have lessened the element of distrust between contracting nations? (3) Were the regulatory systems adequate to prevent any evasions of arms control treaties which, by capitalizing on the element of surprise, might have altered the world or a regional balance of power?

The record of compliance is mixed; on the whole, those nations which had mutually agreed to uphold specific arms control provisions appear to have honored their obligations. The most

[12]See Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

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notable exceptions to this general assessment were the violations of the Geneva Gas Protocol by Italy and Japan, and the failure of the Submarine Protocol to limit sea warfare.[13] The most serious breaches of treaty commitment occurred with respect to the terms imposed on the vanquished Central Powers in 1919. The significant role reciprocity played in determining compliance is underscored by Germany's interwar record: the Weimar Republic condoned evasion of the Versailles Treaty, yet the Nazis honored their 1935 pact with Britain.[14]

As the Germans unquestionably — and in some instances systematically — evaded the Versailles dictum, one may wonder whether contemporary assessments of these violations were accurate. Interestingly, verification of German disarmament from 1920 to 1935 was almost evenly divided between the on-site inspection activities that ended in 1927 and the more traditional military intelligence operations which continued. Evidence indicates that both methods functioned exceptionally well; that until at least 1934, the British and French governments possessed remarkably accurate information concerning German evasions. To give one example, the French rather successfully, through the Control Commissions, kept the German General Staff physically separated, while British military intelligence was able to document its reformation in 1929 through the aid of the German Army's own telephone directory.

There is little evidence that extensive on-site control and inspection systems will, by themselves, eliminate international mistrust, for the basic element involved here is less mechanical than it is psychological. If, for example, a system should report no "significant" violations during a period of mounting political tensions stimulated by other foreign policy differences, would the recipients be convinced that these reports were accurate? Would they be likely to magnify "minor" disagreements emerging from the implementation of an arms control treaty out of their technical proportions, thus widening the overall political tensions? Would these recipients, because of their preconceived suspicions and mistrust, have confidence in their own control system when put to the test in a crisis situation?

Historical experience indicates that they probably would not.

[13]Richard Dean Burns, "Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-41: A Case Study in Arms Control and Limited War," *Military Affairs*, April 1971, pp. 56-63.

[14]Burns and Urquidi, *op. cit.*, Chapter 18; and D. C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement," *Journal of Modern History*, June 1956, p. 160.

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The German evasions of the 1920's and early 1930's scarcely impaired immediate French security, yet they did seem to confirm what the French desired to believe: that the Germans were treacherous, untrustworthy and unrepentant. This influenced and inhibited French diplomacy to such an extent that it was unable to seriously consider revision of the Versailles Treaty when military sanctions to compel full compliance were ruled out. Because of Japan's aggressive activities in Manchuria and China, American officials became convinced by the mid-1930's that the Japanese were turning their Pacific mandated islands into military bases as part of a well-planned overall strategy to drive the United States out of the Western Pacific. In spite of the fact that Japanese construction was minor and that it was limited to facilities that could be justified for civilian as well as military uses, the Americans "saw" what they expected to see. There is no reason to believe that on-site inspections would have altered greatly the response to this process of selective perception.

Finally, if the interwar arms control agreements failed to prevent war, it does not necessarily follow that these measures were either purposeless or dangerous. Although they contained certain inherent risks, they also served in most instances to relax regional tensions and, thus, to enhance the signatories' security. Their proponents expected too much of them and their detractors too little. Neither faction seemed ready to accept the agreements for what they were: treaties registering a temporary first step toward more stable relations among nations.

When war enveloped the various signatory nations during the late 1930's and 1940's, verification systems had performed their tasks. There is no evidence that any unsuspected treaty violation provided an aggressor with a particular advantage in overturning the global or regional balance of power. All of this suggests that, while the post-1945 era poses new problems, especially in military technology, the political dimensions of arms control may be much the same as before. Certainly the psychological dimensions are.

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PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME OF SWEDEN*

by Henry J. Abraham

ALTHOUGH most of my Swedish friends and acquaintances in academic circles would disagree emphatically, Olof Palme, Sweden's controversial Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, is very much a Swede. If Ingmar Bergman's work and theme portray the dreamlike, haunting aspects of the Swedish character in search of human perfection, Olof Palme personifies its tough, driving, pragmatic, "no-nonsense" qualities. He is undoubtedly a leader embattled but he remains convinced that, notwithstanding contemporary political reverses, he will emerge triumphant in the long run. In a number of intriguing ways his model — at least in his conversations with Western Hemisphere observers — would seem to be Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was a master in the game of parlaying short-run reverses into long-run gains.

I

Now forty-five years of age, Palme was born into a family of upper-class background, and his most vitriolic opposition today stems from that stratum of Swedish society which views him as a traitor to his class — shades of FDR's experience! Gunnar Palme, his father, was a prominent business executive who died when Olof was six. Elizabeth von Knieriem Palme was an upper-class Russian refugee of Balto-Germanic ancestry who became active in Sweden's Conservative Party. Their son's latter-day description of his heritage is that his mother belonged to Baltic "poor gentry" and that on his "paternal side he descended from a Dutchman who moved to Sweden where he waxed rich and thus could afford university studies for his sons to become clergymen."[1]

A dedicated student, Olof attended *Sigtuna humanistiska laroveck* (the Sigtuna Foundation's boarding school), whence he was graduated at seventeen. He then entered his country's military service, attaining the rank of lieutenant in the cavalry. Following his discharge he came to the United States to attend Kenyon College, a fine Episcopal church-affiliated liberal arts

*The author is indebted to Mark A. Aronchick for valuable research assistance in connection with Parts II and III of this article.

[1]*Current World Leaders Almanac,* Winter 1970, p.v.

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college for men (co-educational as of 1970) in rural Gambier, Ohio, where, on completing one year of study, he received his B.A. degree in Political Science in 1948 (as did the author). Twenty-two years later Kenyon would award him the honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.

The molding of Palme's political and social consciousness progressed while he was at Kenyon. Characteristically reserved and aloof in a foreign setting, the young Swede nonetheless entered fully into college life. Not only was he an excellent student; within limits, he became "one of the boys." He played on the varsity soccer team, waited on tables in the Commons, and participated in Kenyon's ubiquitous beer-laced bull sessions. As he put it twenty years later, "I felt very much involved. I wrote and talked and acted."[2] He believes his "activist image developed at Kenyon." One of his favorite enterprises was to hitchhike to nearby Mount Vernon, Ohio, to study labor union organizational activities at such industrial establishments as the local Timken Roller Bearing Company plant. His observations would stand him in good stead in his political career as an "intellectual convert" to socialism — though he traces his predispositions in this regard to childhood visits with his maternal grandfather in Latvia, where he witnessed abject poverty.

After he received his B.A. he used his trusty thumb for a four-months journey across the United States, alert especially to the existence and life-style of the working class. He was fascinated by this experience which afforded him, in his words, "a fantastic grasp of the lower side of America."[3] Altogether his sojourn as a student in the United States engendered a genuine affection for our land. It is not true, as is often alleged, that Palme dislikes and/or is hostile to America. What he obviously dislikes and vocally rejects, personally as well as professionally, are certain of our policies, above all our Indochinese involvement. The vast majority of Swedes — both pro- and anti-Palme — join him in regarding the Viet Nam campaign as not only disastrous but stupid politically, sociologically, economically, strategically and militarily.

His sense of political commitment heightened materially, Palme returned to his homeland late in 1948, and soon headed the Swedish delegation to the International Union of Students Convention in Prague. There he took the occasion to deliver an

[2]*New York Times,* November 7, 1968, p. 10.
[3]*Ibid.,* October 21, 1969, p. 2.

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attack on Stalinism and found himself embroiled in an altercation with members of the Russian delegation. Deeply sympathetic then to Czechoslovakia's plight, he would, two decades later, condemn and demonstrate against the Soviet takeover of that troubled land, just as he would against U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. The historical analogy, he contends, has been deliberately ignored or played down by those who take him to task for his contemporary views on our Indochina policy.

II

When Palme formally joined the Social Democratic Labor Party (*Socialdemokratiska Arbeterpartiet*) in 1949 his main concern became that party's programmatic quest for increased economic egalitarianism — a theme that is still a veritable passion with him and that was the focal point of much of the domestic opposition that came to a head early in 1971. In 1950 he embarked on a course of legal study at Stockholm University, where he received his law degree in 1951. But he did not neglect his commitments to political activism. In the following year he helped to organize the Swedish National Union of Students. Serving as that body's President, to the displeasure of certain Communist factions, he led a host of protests and demonstrations and soon became known as the "enfant terrible of Swedish politics,"[4] a "rebel without pause."[5] His political star rose when Prime Minister Tage Erlander discovered the peripatetic student leader and made him his private secretary in 1954. It was not long before he was widely recognized as the "uncrowned crown prince."

Palme drafted speeches for the Prime Minister, who encouraged the young leader to offer advice on political strategy and tactics and treated him as an equal in ideological discussions. Concurrently, he pursued organizational work with Social Democratic youth organizations. In 1955 he became a member of the Board of the Workers Educational Association, which, *inter alia,* was deeply concerned with across-the-board financial aid to education and educational ameliorations for adults as well as the young. The collective limelight ultimately propelled Palme into Parliament (*Riksdag*): in 1957 he was elected to its First Chamber (today it is a unicameral body) as representative from Jönköping. Six years later, in 1963, his boundless energy, hard work and

[4] *Ibid.,* November 7, 1968, p. 10.
[5] *Ibid.,* October 21, 1969, p. 2.

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omnipresence won him an appointment to the Erlander Cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio, working daily at the elbow of the Prime Minister. Occasionally he served as Acting Foreign Minister. On the side he acted as his party's spokesman in a celebrated cross-country debate with the formidable liberal theoretician, Herbert Tingsten, on "the end of ideology." Tingsten's basic contention was that there was no meaningful ideological distinction between Liberal-Centrists and Social Democrats. Whatever the theoretical *cum* philosophical merits of this view, it did not prevail at the ballot box.

In 1965 Palme became Minister of Communications, an ideal forum for an advocate of expanded public-service radio and television. He also took an immediate hand in the incipient program to change vehicular traffic from left to right of the road, which came to smooth completion two years later. When his stay at the Communications post terminated in 1967, he willingly switched to another post for which he was ideally suited, the Ministry of Education, where he concentrated on such programs as internal reorganization of the schools, higher education research and adult education. Yet his wide-ranging style enabled him to continue to be concerned with radio, television and cultural matters. At the same time, because the Social Democrats had suffered a considerable setback in the municipal election of 1966, Palme launched into a feverish political speaking and organizing campaign so that the party might face the 1968 *Riksdag* elections with strength. He picked up a host of "I.O.U.'s" during that two-year period, and when he led his party to victory in 1968 he was one of the best known and most contentious public figures in Sweden. As the *New York Times* observed that November: "Ask young people in Scandinavia to name the region's most exciting politician and the likely answer is Olof Palme."[6]

On his part, Palme clearly relished the limelight, and he did not shun controversial issues. Thus he began to speak out against Greek militarism and colonialist governments in Africa, against Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia and U.S. policy in Indochina. His exhortations on economic egalitarianism made him a hero to Sweden's idealistic youth as well as to social democratic theoreticians. Yet while seemingly embracing radical programs and movements, he was deeply committed to gradualism — Tage Erlander's concept of "socialism with a gradualist approach." Repeatedly decrying "instant reform," notwithstanding radical

[6]November 7, 1968, p. 10.

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charges of being "wishy-washy," he cultivated reformist pressures against the backdrop of Erlander's impending retirement after twenty-three years at the helm of government and party. When this took place in October 1969, Erlander's long-time aide, friend, adviser and hand-picked successor, forty-two-year-old Olof Palme, was sworn into office by King Gustav Adolf VI at the Royal Palace. The occasion marked the investiture of the youngest head of government in Europe by the oldest reigning monarch.

The new Prime Minister's first response at a press conference following the ceremonies was both typically Palme and typically Swedish: he was eager indeed — as he would always be — to clear up "misunderstandings" about Sweden's foreign policy, "but we are not prepared to change any policy."[7] This was an obvious allusion to the tenaciously held Swedish conceptualization of neutralism and neutrality. The Swedish posture has been enormously difficult for the United States to accept and comprehend, and it has given rise to unnecessary tensions between historic friends. A closer look at the crisis in understanding between the two governments, with particular emphasis on the Viet Nam issue, is warranted in any attempt to analyze Sweden's youthful leader and his policies.

III

Sweden's claim to demonstrable neutrality may be viewed as a fetish by a good many observers, and considered to be of questionable validity by others, but it has been the bedrock of Swedish policy for generations. Certainly since 1815 that neutrality has been maintained in all wars — though the Soviets would hardly define Sweden's posture during the Russo-Finnish conflict as neutral, and it could be contended that during World War II "neutrality" was interpreted differently by the pro-German Swedes on the east coast of their land and those sympathetic to the Allies on the west coast. Be that as it may, no citizen of Sweden today could attain an important post in public life in the absence of a commitment to neutrality, notwithstanding the heightened Swedish "international consciousness"[8] for which Olof Palme became the spokesman in the mid-1960's, or the centuries-old Swedish commitment to play the role of international mediator and savior.

Most Swedes readily seconded the Social Democratic Party leadership's substantive and procedural disapproval of the grow-

[7] *New York Times*, October 15, 1969, p. 4.
[8] *Current World Leaders Almanac, op. cit.*, p. vi.

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ing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. They agreed when Erlander and Palme rejected all attempted American explanations of a policy rationale as both self-serving and illogical — in the words of John F. Kerry, a leader of the Anti-Vietnam War Veterans, "the biggest nothing in history."[9] As these feelings intensified in 1965, Palme devoted part of an important, generally well received address in Gavle to slashing criticism of the American presence in Indochina. Three years later, in February 1968, when he was Minister of Education, he joined the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow in the now famous protest march in Stockholm organized by the Swedish Vietnam Committee, a group headed by the renowned economist and sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal. This action prompted President Johnson to call our Ambassador to Sweden home for "consultations," leaving the post vacant for almost two years. According to Palme and other Swedish officials, what was not generally known was that Palme had not been informed until approximately an hour prior to the march that the North Vietnamese envoy had asked to see a "Western type demonstration" and had quickly been invited by the committee — but not by Palme — to participate. Given that surprise development, Palme decided to join the march anyway, reasoning that his nonappearance would inevitably be regarded as a snub to the envoy.[10] Six months later he participated in a large demonstration against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Not only did the Swedish government refuse to be particularly impressed by America's angry reaction to Palme's public show of support for Viet Nam and criticism of the United States, but Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson announced in September 1968 that Sweden had decided to give North Viet Nam "humanitarian and reconstruction aid." Unfortunately, Nilsson neglected to explain that while the humanitarian aid would commence at once, help toward reconstruction would be extended only *after* the end of the war. Moreover, it is alleged that he inadvertently skipped over a sentence in his prepared speech in which he voiced the hope for Swedish aid to South Viet Nam, too, after the war.

Whatever the facts concerning these events, there was no doubt about the newly-sworn Prime Minister's sentiments and views when he conducted his first press conference in October 1969. In response to a question, Palme stated frankly that he felt "abso-

[9]As quoted in the *New York Times*, May 8, 1971, p. 28.
[10]As reported by Werner Wiskari in *ibid.*, January 4, 1970, p. 22.

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lutely more sympathy" for the Hanoi regime than for the one in Saigon; Saigon was "not representative of the Vietnamese people but speaks for a relatively small clique." Though readily acknowledging that North Viet Nam "is a dictatorship and not a democracy in our sense," he expressed the conviction that its government was "representative of the people."[11] Like Sweden, he pointed out, Viet Nam is a small country, and when "we protest injustices there, we are in effect standing up for our own right to survive as a small country."[12]

Advised by one of the newsmen that Thomas Gleason, President of the militant International Longshoreman's Association (ILA), threatened to blockade Swedish ships in east coast U.S. ports unless the Swedish government revised its policy vis-à-vis Hanoi, Palme expressed regrets about Gleason's threats but made clear that the announced $40,000,000 aid to Hanoi over the next three years would not be altered. Pressed concerning Sweden's willingness to give sanctuary to American deserters, the Prime Minister not only pointed to pertinent Swedish law and custom, but called attention to long-standing Anglo-Saxon common law traditions and directed questioners to specific U.S. legislation on the matter. Moreover, he suggested that if Washington wanted to have rational discourse on the subject, and explain where, in its view, Sweden erred, it would be wise to have an American Ambassador in Stockholm for that purpose.[13] (One was finally sent in the spring of 1970.) When taunted that, on balance, Sweden's neutrality seemed to be "a hoax," Palme calmly explained the essence of that neutrality — as he had often done and would do again, soon, in the United States: "Our neutrality does not condemn us to silence. . . . Neutrality does not mean isolation. We naturally feel involved and cannot (nor will we) turn our backs on the outside world."[14]

IV

The fledgling Prime Minister now commenced to travel abroad, true to the pledge of "international consciousness," and undertook highly successful official visits to Bonn, London and Paris. Momentarily at least, and in part in response to urgent representa-

[11] *New York Times,* October 15, 1969, p. 4.
[12] Steven Kelman, "Letter from Stockholm," *The New Yorker,* December 26, 1970, p. 42.
[13] As quoted by Cyrus L. Sulzberger, *New York Times,* November 28, 1969, p. 38.
[14] "Neutrality, Not Silence," *Vital Speeches,* July 15, 1970, p. 578.

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tions by Swedish industrialists and financiers who feared serious business losses in the American markets, Palme not only toned down his drumfire criticism of U.S. Indochinese policy (until the Cambodia incursion) but announced at year's end that he had accepted an invitation to visit the United States in May or June 1970 to receive an honorary degree from his alma mater. Evidently efforts to obtain an official invitation from Washington had been rebuffed by the Nixon Administration, yet Palme was quite willing to settle for the medium of a private visit; this would afford him the flexibility and informality an official one might not.

Those who believed President Nixon might change his mind were wrong: when the Swedish leader's plane landed at Dulles Airport in Washington on June 4, 1970, there was no red carpet, no crowd, no Swedish flag, and only a middle-level State Department official to greet him. The American press, on the other hand, was eager to meet with Palme, and he granted an almost immediate forty-minute press interview at his Mayflower Hotel suite. Ultimately a three-and-a-half-hour meeting with Secretary of State Rogers was arranged, following which the Secretary publicly expressed to the Swedish Prime Minister this country's appreciation of Sweden's continuing efforts on behalf of American prisoners of war held by North Viet Nam.

On the day after his arrival, Palme addressed the prestigious National Press Club on a favorite theme, "Neutrality, Not Silence." It was an eloquently-composed, expertly-delivered lecture underscoring worldly interdependence without the surrender of national mores or philosophical commitments, and it endeavored to explain basic Swedish policy:

> We are indeed acutely aware of our limited possibilities to influence the course of events, but we try with some consistency to take up problems that are decisive for our common future on the premise that peace and goodwill shall prevail . . . . the relations between the American and Swedish people are characterized by a long tradition of friendship. . . . I have seen Sweden characterized as anti-American. . . . We in Sweden have not for a minute seen things that way. . . . The roots of international tensions are to be found in internal problems. Our first contribution to international cooperation should be to promote the development of our own countries.[15]

President Nixon never did receive Prime Minister Palme, yet while the Swedish leader was still in the United States, visiting President Rafael Caldera of Venezuela was given the full pomp and circumstance treatment. Palme contented himself with a

[15] *Ibid.*

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useful session with Senator J. William Fulbright, the "dovish" chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and a less happy one with an acerbic David Frost on television. Then he was on his way to Ohio and Kenyon College.

Olof, as his 1948 fellow-graduates admiringly called him, was in brilliant form in the role of distinguished alumnus and statesman, both in casual conversation and in his address following receipt of his honorary degree. He delivered a superb statement on contemporary social responsibilities under the most trying circumstances: some eighty noisy, demonstrating longshoremen had been imported by bus to central Ohio for the occasion by ILA leaders Gleason and Brennan, yet Palme refused to be shouted down. The Kenyon amplifying system was working that day, for some unexplained reason, and he managed to make himself and his message heard. It included the appropriate thought that "if dialogue dies, democracy dies with it." At the end of the speech Kenyon's President William G. Caples remarked to the assembly of 1,000 visitors: "It is tragic that those who needed most to hear your words refused to listen."

Generally pleased with his visit, and strengthened in his resolve to continue Sweden's neutralist stance, Palme returned home — via three days in Moscow, where he made clear once again Sweden's disapproval of Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia — to face a difficult election battle in September 1970.

V

The Social Democrats were particularly vulnerable to formidable opposition from three centrist political parties, the Liberal, Center and Moderate, on the major domestic issues of economic "egalitarianism," inflation and "law and order." There was little, if any, meaningful disagreement with the basic thrust of Palme's foreign policy, although his thinly-veiled disinclination to follow Britain, Norway and Denmark in overtures toward membership in the Common Market caused waves in the business community, which feared that Swedish exports would suffer from the EEC tariff walls. Declaring that "our neutrality is not negotiable,"[16] Palme in March 1971 rejected full membership in the Common Market. Sweden would seek mere association because "an abandonment of national rights of decision-making in important fields is not compatible with a Swedish policy of neutrality."[17]

[16] *International Herald-Tribune,* March 19, 1971, p. 1.
[17] *Ibid.*

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When the votes for the new unicameral *Riksdag* were tabulated, Palme's forces had lost their absolute majority in the 350-member body: the Social Democrats received 45.3 per cent of the vote — down from 50.1 per cent in 1968 — and 166 seats. He would henceforth have to rely on the sporadic support of one or more of the opposition parties, or, failing that, on the seventeen representatives of the Communist Party, elected with 4.8 per cent of the vote. An alliance with the Communists would not be new in Swedish politics. It might mean rough sailing, even in the foreign policy sector, but the bastion of neutrality would not be likely to tumble. In any event, the Palme Government seemed assured of three years in office, perhaps a bit uncomfortable in its minority role but confident and secure. The record of his government during 1971 has confirmed this assessment — despite some resultant "brinkmanship," primarily on the labor scene, and persistent attacks on his domestic program, especially his determination to work toward an "equalization" of wage scales by lessening the differences in income and privilege between Sweden's professionals and white-collar workers and its blue-collar workers.[18]

VI

"Confident and secure" is an apt description of Prime Minister Palme's contemporary attitude. When he granted a lengthy visit to his erstwhile college classmate in his modest office in the functional new *Riksdag* building and in the streets of *gamla stan* (the Old Town) toward the end of March 1971, I was struck again by his energy, spirit and thirst for knowledge. He had just finished reading not only Townsend Hoopes' *The Limits of Intervention,* but the intriguing Scammon-Wattenberg tome, *The Real Majority,* and was keenly alive to the latter's central thesis. Possessed of a quick mind and sharp intellect, he is at home with ideology but is no ideologue. He is a shrewd, practical, ambitious political leader, a "no-nonsense" public figure of remarkable strength, charm and urbanity, who is every inch a Swede and who will always be a battler for the causes in which he believes, no matter how unpopular or controversial they may be in the short run. We would do well not to underestimate his determination and his competence. Least of all should we delude ourselves into believing that Olof Palme will preside over the liquidation of Swedish neutrality.

[18]"What's Happening," *Sweden Now,* April 1971, p. 5.

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FOREIGN AID AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS: THE ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA*

by Samuel J. Bernstein and Eugene J. Alpert

FROM 1961 to 1971 the General Assembly of the United Nations annually debated a resolution that would have given China's seat to representatives of the People's Republic of China. Each year the move was defeated, until October 1971 when Peking was finally admitted to the UN. These resolutions invariably generated public debate and private negotiations within the Assembly. It is the purpose of this article to provide a framework which models the negotiating and voting behavior of nations on the admission question. The approach adopted here is general in nature, permitting application to various voting issues in the General Assembly where international transfers may be said to have political ramifications, and to the voting behavior of individual nations as well as groups of nations whose votes seem to cluster on selected issues.

From almost the beginning of the United Nations, the political activities of member nations have been of interest to students of international politics. However, it was not before the late 1950's that studies on UN politics began to appear concurrently with the solidification of the East-West conflict.[1] Focusing on the "bloc" phenomena, these studies included attempts to (1) determine the cohesiveness of the various voting blocs;[2] (2) analyze the newly emerging and expanding Third World blocs, particularly the African bloc;[3] and (3) evaluate more precisely the political ac-

*An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970. The authors acknowledge with great appreciation the support of Harry Starr of the Littauer Foundation.

[1]Robert Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958); Norman Padelford, *Elections in the United Nations General Assembly: A Study of Political Behavior* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1959); and Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Expanding UN, I: Voting Patterns," *International Affairs,* April 1960, pp. 174-187.

[2]Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[3]Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Samaan Boutros Farajallah, *La Groupe Afro-Asiatique*

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tivities of groupings of nations through the introduction of quantitative techniques.[4]

Thomas Hovet's *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* made a seminal contribution by identifying General Assembly voting alignments that appeared consistently on selected crucial issues. Hayward Alker, Jr., and Bruce Russett refined the study of voting alignments in *World Politics in the United Nations;* by using the techniques of factor analysis they were able to (1) dimension the voting of nations in terms of the many issues considered by the General Assembly and (2) determine the saliency of these among the caucusing groups and individual nations.[5]

William Riker's *The Theory of Political Coalitions* advanced the study of voting blocs by providing quantitatively oriented studies like those cited with a more comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining the political behavior of nations.[6] His basic contribution was the introduction of the size principle and the corresponding sidepayments concept. The size principle states: "In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with sidepayments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger."[7] That is, participants in political negotiations seek to build alliances using sidepayments as an incentive for membership only up to the point where they are subjectively certain of winning. After that point, sidepayments are withdrawn as a membership incentive and the coalition members seek to maintain themselves at the size which is no larger than necessary to win.

We seek to explain voting behavior on the admission question by formulating a model incorporating the constructs of coalition

Dans Le Cadre Des Nations Unies (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1963); Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: Critiques and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review,* December 1963, pp. 902-917.

[4]Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett, *World Politics in the United Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) and Leroy Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the U.N. General Assembly," *International Organization,* Spring 1960, pp. 297-304.

[5]See Hayward Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review,* September 1964, pp. 642-675; Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*; Bruce Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *American Political Science Review,* June 1966, pp. 327-329; Alker, "Supranationalism in the United Nations," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 697-710.

[6]William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Another important work which applies game theory concepts to international behavior is Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[7]Riker, *op. cit.,* p. 32.

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theory. This involves a probabilistic application of the sidepayments principle, dimensioned as foreign aid transfers from the United States and the Soviet Union, to interpret General Assembly voting behavior from 1961 to 1968 on the admission of mainland China.

The Political Domain

The Charter of the United Nations mandates to the General Assembly the discussion of almost any question of international interest and the making of recommendations for resolving international problems. The Charter divides questions of interest into two types: general and important. Decisions on general questions require a simple majority, whereas "important questions," such as those involving the application of sanctions against member states, the admission of a new state, or the expulsion of a present member, require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting to carry.

Although the General Assembly is ostensibly a representative body in that each delegate is considered a legal proxy of his nation's government, empowered to express its views, its policies and its vote on issues, it is not a true legislative body as are domestic parliaments. The sovereignty of each nation is assured and the General Assembly lacks implementation powers. Nevertheless, the Assembly and domestic parliaments are similar with regard to the procedures for reaching major decisions. In both, major decisions are taken not on the floor of the legislative body, but in "behind the scenes" negotiations, where "informal interest factions make an effort to adjust conflicting interests on issues not of primary concern in order to obtain support on more vital concerns from other interest factions."[8]

To understand the negotiations between the super and smaller powers over the seating of mainland China, we must begin with a delineation of the major cleavages that divide the United Nations membership. The two basic ones are the North-South conflict in which the "have" and "have-not" nations are major adversaries,

[8]In the General Assembly, since there are no binding decisions, members agreeing to vote for a resolution of no primary concern in exchange for votes on an issue of primary concern can undertake such commitments with a realization that they have nothing more than a moral obligation to vote for and implement resolutions they have agreed to support. In other words, the nature of the Assembly not only makes voting alliances necessary but makes them easier to achieve than in other parliamentary bodies. (See Hovet, *Bloc Politics. . . , op. cit.*, p. 10.) For a more thorough treatise on political procedures in the United Nations, see Sir Pierson Dixon, "Diplomacy at the United Nations," *International Relations,* Volume 10, pp. 457-466.

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and the East-West conflict in which the Soviet Union and the United States are the main protagonists. The admission issue may be said to fall within the parameters of the East-West conflict, and three concerned subgroups may be noted: the Eastern bloc which supported admission; the Western bloc which opposed admission; and the "neutral" bloc which, theoretically at least, committed itself neither to the East nor to the West. This third group formed the target area for influence peddling by the superpowers to gain support for their respective positions on admission.

The superpowers exercised their influence by offering sidepayments as compensation for smaller powers' support. Sidepayments embrace threats of reprisals, payments of objective value, promises on policy, promises about subsequent decisions, or payments of emotional satisfaction.[9]

To improve their bargaining position for sidepayments from the superpowers, smaller nations have formed associations, based, for example, on geography or common interest, to "cluster" their voting. These associations aggregating the voting of individual nations on particular issues are classified as caucus groups. They have some degree of formal organization, hold fairly regular meetings, and express concern for one or more substantive issues and related procedural matters before the Assembly.[10] Of the caucus groups, only the Soviet one operates as a bloc unit; its members caucus regularly and are *bound* to vote in the General Assembly by the decision of the caucus. Table I shows the current pattern of caucusing groups.

From 1961 to 1970, whenever the resolution to seat the People's Republic of China was presented for a vote, the United States successfully proposed that admission be considered an important question requiring a two-thirds majority. With 126 UN members in 1968, this meant that the resolution needed 84 positive votes for passage, while merely 43 votes were sufficient to defeat it.

Each of the three groups on the admission question — the pro-admission, the anti-admission and the uncommitted group — may be considered a proto-coalition, i.e., a subset of United Nations members that does not have the necessary number of votes to win.[11] In order to win, members must be added to one of the three groups so that its status changes from a proto-coalition to a minimum winning coalition, i.e., one which ceases to be winning

[9]Riker, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-113.
[10]Hovet, *Bloc Politics. . . , op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.
[11]Riker, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

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TABLE I

CAUCUSING GROUPS IN THE UNITED NATIONS*

	Size
Africa	35
Latin America	19
Asia	16
Arab	14
Soviet Union	12
Commonwealth	11
Western Europe	5
Scandinavia	4
Countries That Do Not Caucus[a]	10
	126

[a]Austria, China, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Portugal, Spain, United States.

*The caucus groups are basically those specified by Hovet, *Bloc Politics . . . , op. cit.*, Chapter Four. Because the composition of the groups has changed since 1960, an effort has been made to include the new members of the Assembly since then and to represent the new alignments existing in 1968.

when one member is subtracted. The last member to join a coalition, and thus to change its status, is known as the pivotal member or the nation occupying the pivotal position.[12]

On the admission question, the pivotal positions of the respective voting blocs are illustrated by the continuum in Table II. The numbers in parenthesis represent the size of each bloc.

The bloc committed to support the resolution for Communist China's admission had 31 potential votes, while the bloc committed to oppose admission had 40 potential votes. The Western bloc, therefore, needed only three more votes to defeat the resolution in 1968. It seemed unlikely that the United States would have much trouble in forming a winning coalition, for the uncommitted bloc was composed of two large caucusing groups and four unaffiliated nations. Once it is obvious that a winning coalition can readily be formed, one would expect a bandwagon effect to occur: most nations would prefer not to antagonize the United States, the leader of the winning group and a potential donor of sidepayments. They would either vote with it or abstain and remain uncommitted.[13] Moreover, the United States could not pre-

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 125.

[13]The bandwagon effect occurs when an individual does not want to be the last one to support a winning candidate or position. Greater rewards are anticipated by joining the coalition just before the winning coalition is formed, or soon after. The bandwagon effect obtains on the municipal level and there seems to be no intuitive reason why it should not also appear on the international level. See Nelson Polsby

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vent a nation from joining its coalition, due to the parliamentary nature of the voting procedure. Yet a bandwagon effect did not develop on the admission question. Rather, there were indications that the trend was toward a minimum winning coalition and that the United States was limiting the size of the anti-admission coalition to conserve its resources.

TABLE II

BLOC VOTING ON THE ADMISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1968

Western Bloc Leaning or Committed NO	*Uncommitted*	*Eastern Bloc Committed YES*
40 votes	55 votes	31 votes
(11,5,19,1,1,1,1,1)[a]	(16,35,1,1,1,1,)[b]	(12,14,4,1)[c]

Needed to pass resolution: 84 YES votes
Needed to defeat resolution: 43 NO votes

The blocs and countries represented by their sizes are:
[a]Commonwealth, Western Europe, Latin America, Spain, Ireland, Greece, China and the United States.
[b]Asia, Africa, Austria, Portugal, Cyprus and Israel.
[c]Soviet bloc, Arab states, Scandinavian group and Finland.

For example, the votes for the U.S. position over seven voting years, 1961-1968,[14] averaged 55,[15] 16 more than the seven-year average of 39 votes[16] needed to defeat the resolution. The 16 extra votes that supported the U.S. position, however, cannot be assumed to be a significant deviation from the mean vote for two reasons: (1) it was only a small percentage (17 per cent) of the possible number of votes the United States could have received,[17] and (2) the coalition was not composed of the same members each year. Because voting support for the U.S. admission position was less than expected, the bandwagon effect may be said not to have obtained, in accordance with Riker's size principle. A model to

and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968; second edition).

[14]The seven voting years are 1961-1968, excluding 1964. No votes were taken in 1964 to avoid forcing the issue of whether France and the Soviet Union, in view of their refusal to pay for United Nations peacekeeping forces, were entitled to vote in the UN. Had a vote been taken, the United States was planning to insist that the Soviet Union and France not be allowed to vote.

[15]The figures for the respective years are: 48, 56, 57, 47, 57, 58, 58.

[16]The figures for the respective years are: 36, 37, 37, 39, 41, 41, 42.

[17]Since the voting data are not independent, the usual tests of statistical significance, such as the t test, could not theoretically be applied.

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explain voting on the admission question was thus formulated on this basis.

The Voting Model

Confronted with the admission question, and the probability of sidepayments from the United States and the Soviet Union, leaders of the uncommitted nations had to decide how to vote. The following set of definitions is used to represent this problem.

$i = (y,n,a)$ = an individual nation voting YES, NO, or ABSTAIN
$P(V_i)$ = probability of voting for a particular position i
S_u = sidepayments promised or received from the United States
NS_u = no sidepayments promised or received from the United States
S_r = sidepayments promised or received from the Soviet Union
NS_r = no sidepayments received or promised from the Soviet Union

The probability of voting NO to the admission resolution then equals the probability of voting NO with sidepayments and the probability of voting NO without sidepayments from the United States:

$$P(V_n) = P(V_n/S_u) \cdot P(S_u) + P(V_n/NS_u) \cdot P(NS_u)$$

In the ideal case, those that receive sidepayments from the United States should vote NO and those that do not receive sidepayments from the United States should vote YES:

$$P(V_n) = (1) \cdot (1) + (0) \cdot (0)$$
$$P(V_n) = 1$$

From observation, however, this is not the case, for some countries receiving U.S. sidepayments voted ABSTAIN or YES; that is $P(V_n/S_u) < 1$. Table III exemplifies this situation for the seven-year voting period of 1961-1968.

The probabilities indicate that U.S. sidepayments either were not decisive for nations voting NO or were smaller than the sidepayments received for voting YES or ABSTAIN. Assuming that counter-sidepayments originated from the Soviet Union, positioned at the opposite end of the voting scale, the voting decision rules on the admission question for potential recipient nations should then be expressed as follows:

If the value of voting NO, given sidepayments from the United States, is *greater* than the value of voting YES, given sidepayments from the Soviet Union, vote NO.

If the value of voting NO, given sidepayments from the United States, is *less* than the value of voting YES, given sidepayments from the Soviet Union, vote YES.

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If the value of voting NO, given sidepayments from the United States, is *equal* to the value of voting YES, given sidepayments from the Soviet Union, vote ABSTAIN.

Variant nations, such as France, Iceland and Saudi Arabia, clearly come within the rubrics of the expanded decision rule in which U.S. sidepayments are greater than those of the Soviet Union; nevertheless, they voted either YES with the Soviet bloc or ABSTAIN more than 50 per cent of the time, contrary to the NO vote that was expected. To narrow this discrepancy, sidepayments are specified as foreign aid within the set of decision rules. A matrix is then formulated to test the utility of the decision rules to predict nations' voting on the admission question.[18]

TABLE III

VARIANT VOTING PATTERNS OF NATIONS NOT VOTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED STATES SIDEPAYMENTS

France[a]

$P(S_u) = 1.0$
$P(V_y) = 4/7$
$P(V_n) = 3/7$
$P(V_a) = 0/7$

Iceland

$P(S_u) = 1.0$
$P(V_y) = 0/7$
$P(V_n) = 2/7$
$P(V_a) = 5/7$

Saudi Arabia[b]

$P(S_u) = 1.0$
$P(V_y) = 2/6$
$P(V_n) = 0/6$
$P(V_a) = 4/6$

[a]The probabilities were calculated by dividing the number of times a country voted NO, YES, and ABSTAIN by the total number of times it voted. Only the seven voting years from 1961 to 1968 (excepting 1964) were considered, because it was not until 1961 that a vote was actually taken on the resolution to seat Communist China. Previous votes only tabled the resolution.

[b]Six years were considered because Saudi Arabia was absent in 1967.

[18]Some recent works on the implications of foreign aid for international politics include: Lloyd Black, *The Strategy of Foreign Aid* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968); Herbert Feis, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Dell, 1966); Robert Goldwin, *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); J. M. Healy, *The Economics of Aid* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971); Jacob Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Masakatsu Kato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocations: An Application of a Rational Decision Making Scheme," in John Mueller, editor, *Approaches to Measurement in In-*

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The decision rules governing the matrix may be expanded as follows:

If both U.S. and Soviet aid is present, vote with the country that provides the greater amount of aid (Cell 1).
If only Soviet aid is received, vote YES (Cell 2).
If only U.S. aid is received, vote NO (Cell 3).
If neither Soviet nor U.S. aid is present, vote ABSTAIN (Cell 4.)

Table IV shows the derivative format of the decision matrix.[19]

Specifying the decision rules in terms of foreign aid and in matrix form permits (1) determining the extent to which foreign aid influences the voting behavior of nations on the admission question; (2) limiting the variant or inconsistent voting patterns of nations to grants from the United States and the Soviet Union; and (3) correlating apparently inconsistent voting with fluctuating foreign aid grants from these donor nations.

A three-pronged analysis of admission voting data is proposed to test the model, where (1) nations voting consistently, (2) nations voting inconsistently, and (3) the total membership of the

TABLE IV

THE DECISION MATRIX

Soviet Union	United States: *Aid*	United States: *No Aid*
Aid	(1)	(2) vote YES
No Aid	(3) vote NO	(4) vote ABSTAIN

ternational Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969); Edward Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Raymond Mikeskill, *The Economics of Foreign Aid* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968); John Montgomery, *Foreign Aid in International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review,* June 1962, pp. 301-309; Joan Nelson, *Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Michael O'Leary, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Atherton, 1967).

[19]The sources for these tables are based on the foreign aid information contained in the annual Operations Reports of the United States Agency for International Development; Marshall Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Baard Richard Stokke, *Soviet and East European Trade and Aid to Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1967), and Janos Horvath, "Economic Aid Flow from the USSR: A Recount of the First Fifteen Years," *Slavic Review,* December 1970, pp. 613-632.

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General Assembly voting, are catalogued in terms of foreign aid received from either one, both or neither of the superpowers for the years 1961-1968. The logic of the design is to typologize voting behavior patterns that correlate with specific foreign aid patterns from the United States and the Soviet Union. Nations voting consistently are analyzed first, because this is the larger of the two groups. A comparative analysis of the nations voting inconsistently follows. The voting pattern for the entire General Assembly on the admission question is then generalized as a final confirmation of the decision model.

The Decision Analysis

(1) *Foreign Aid and Consistent Voting Nations.* In Table V, the 86 nations voting consistently, either YES, NO or ABSTAIN on the admission question, are classified according to their foreign aid sources for the period 1961-1968.

Table V

VOTING DISTRIBUTIONS OF NATIONS RECEIVING FOREIGN AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

(1961-1968)

	Consistent Voters			*Inconsistent Voters*			*All Nations*		
Aid Source	*YES*	*NO*	*ABSTAIN*	*YES*	*NO*	*ABSTAIN*	*YES*	*NO*	*ABSTAIN*
U.S. and U.S.S.R	21	4	0	6	1	5	27	5	5
U.S.S.R. only	11	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0
U.S. only	0	28	3	1	17	5	1	45	8
No Aid	6	10	5	1	1	1	7	11	6

On the basis of the decision rules, the consistent voting nations may be distributed across a decision matrix, similar to Table IV, from which the probabilities for voting YES, NO or ABSTAIN are then calculated, as shown in Table VI.

Given these frequencies for nations voting consistently, their decision rules are shown by the corresponding probabilities, as follows:

Cell 1: When both Soviet and American aid is received, 84 per cent of these countries vote YES with the Soviet Union.
Decision Rule: Vote YES

Cell 2: When aid is received from the Soviet Union only, 90 per cent of these countries vote YES with the Soviet Union.
Decision Rule: Vote YES

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Cell 3: When aid is received from the United States only, 90 per cent of these countries vote NO with the United States.
Decision Rule: Vote NO

Cell 4: When no aid is received from either the United States or the Soviet Union, 46 per cent of these countries vote NO and 24 per cent vote ABSTAIN.
Decision Rule: Vote NO

The results of Cells Two and Three confirm the model. A major discrepancy between the model and the data, however, is shown in Cell Four where nations not receiving aid from both grantors were expected to ABSTAIN with a higher probability. The contrasting higher NO vote may be rationalized by two factors: (1) these nations were seeking to improve their bargaining positions for U.S. aid, or (2) U.S. sidepayments were larger than Soviet sidepayments but were not recorded, because they might have been in the form of food for peace, peace corp workers, and/or military aid.

Cell Four may be said to ascribe to the decision rule a conservative spirit, the impact of which is to preserve the political status quo, namely, keeping Communist China out of the United Nations. A NO vote, therefore, may be interchanged with AB-

TABLE VI

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF CONSISTENT VOTING NATIONS

Soviet Union \ United States	*Aid*	*No Aid*
Aid	(1) YES: 21/25 p*= .84 NO: 4/25 p = .16 ABSTAIN: 0/2 p = .00 Decision Rule: Vote YES	(2) YES: 10/11 p = .90 NO: 0/11 p = .00 ABSTAIN: 1/11 p = .10 Decision Rule: Vote YES
No Aid	(3) YES: 0/31 p = .00 NO: 28/31 p = .90 ABSTAIN: 3/31 p = .00 Decision Rule: Vote NO	(4) YES: 6/21 p = .30 NO: 10/21 p = .46 ABSTAIN: 5/21 p = .24 Decision Rule: Vote NO

*p = probability of voting

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STAIN because it has the same effect of denying the pro-admission bloc an additional vote it may need for passage of the resolution favoring the seating of Communist China. In addition, the NO vote provides potentially strengthened bargaining power for U.S. sidepayments similar to conditions reflected by Cell Three, but in reverse; that is, the NO vote is an attempt to precipitate a foreign aid grant.

In contrast, Cell One of the voting decision matrix, indicating a .84 probability for a YES vote with aid grants from both the United States and the Soviet Union, reflects the opposite, liberal position on the admission question. That is, in cases where a nation receives aid from both grantor nations, there is a tendency for it to vote YES rather than ABSTAIN.

Given the different foreign aid configurations, the model indicates the probabilities with which nations consistently vote YES, NO or ABSTAIN on the question of Communist China's admission. The findings, thus, may be said to establish a basis for measuring the political efficiency of foreign aid by correlating aid expenditures with voting support in the UN General Assembly.

We now turn to those nations whose votes deviate from a consistent pattern and consequently complicate an understanding of the political ramifications of foreign aid.

(2) *Foreign Aid and Inconsistent Voting Nations.* An inconsistent voting nation is one that has switched its vote on the resolution to seat mainland China. An inconsistent country may be classified as "inconsistent YES," "inconsistent NO," or "inconsistent ABSTAIN," according to the way it has voted more than 50 per cent of the time. For example, a country voting YES in four years and voting NO in three years is classified as "inconsistent YES." The frequency distribution of inconsistent voting nations, given the specified foreign aid sources, was shown in Table V. Table VII shows the probability distribution and the corresponding decision rules for countries that vote inconsistently.

Although the inconsistent voters embrace a relatively small number of nations (N=38) compared with the consistent voting nations (N=88), some inferences may, nevertheless, be drawn as to the probabilistic confirmation of the decision rules. Since no nations fall in the category of Cell Two and only three can be found in Cell Four, further discussion of these is not necessary. Cell Three confirms the decision rules found for the consistent voting nations; nations receiving aid only from the United States vote NO with a probability of .75.

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TABLE VII

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONS THAT VOTE INCONSISTENTLY

		United States: *Aid*	United States: *No Aid*
Soviet Union	*Aid*	(1) YES: 6/12 p = .50 NO: 1/12 p = .08 ABSTAIN: 5/12 p = .42 Decision Rule: Vote YES	(2) YES: 0/0 p = .00 NO: 0/0 p = .00 ABSTAIN: 0/0 p = .00
	No Aid	(3) YES: 1/23 p = .04 NO: 17/23 p = .75 ABSTAIN: 5/23 p = .21 Decision Rule: Vote NO	(4) YES: 1/3 p = .33 NO: 1/3 p = .33 ABSTAIN: 1/3 p = .33

For Cell One, however, the probabilistic result is of a somewhat different configuration. Whereas aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union precipitates a strong probability of .84 to vote YES among consistent nations, there is a significantly lower probability of .50 for inconsistent YES countries. The liberal trend does not appear here as prominently as it does among the consistent voting nations because the United States expends relatively larger amounts of aid on this group, which includes Chile, Iceland, Iran, Laos, Senegal and Tunisia.[20] Clearly, the added expenditures may be said to generate a cost effective political payoff in terms of containing Soviet influence, for the latter does not predominate in these Third World countries on the admission issue. Furthermore, from the perspective of the recipient nations — those voting inconsistently YES and NO — it may be said that variant voting improves their bargaining power with the United States for larger aid transfers.

Under these conditions, two policy questions should have arisen for the United States: Is there a diminishing political utility associated with the added cost of foreign aid transfers to this group of nations? Should not the aid transfer be reallocated to less

[20]The six nations voting in the inconsistent NO and inconsistent ABSTAIN categories are Chile, Iceland, Iran, Laos, Senegal and Tunisia. The six nations voting inconsistent YES are Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Mauritania, Morocco, Tanzania and Yemen.

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politically competitive situations which have equal, if not greater, political and humanitarian payoffs in light of a changing, more decentralized world order?

(3) *Foreign Aid and Total Membership Voting.* Table VIII illustrates the voting probabilities and the corresponding decision rules for the total Assembly grouping.

From this application the decision rules may be said to be reconfirmed if they are modified in accordance with the conservative and liberal voting principles explained earlier. To summarize for the entire membership:

Cell 1: If the United States and the Soviet Union grant aid, vote YES (liberal principle) p = 72 per cent
Cell 2: If the Soviet Union's aid is greater than aid from the United States, vote YES p = 90 per cent
Cell 3: If U.S. aid is greater than Soviet aid, vote NO p = 83 per cent
Cell 4: If neither the United States nor the Soviet Union grants aid, vote NO (conservative principle, including abstentions) p = 70 per cent

The following implications may be drawn from the model: (1) Overall, Soviet foreign aid is *not* significantly more effective than U.S. aid when measured by votes in favor of or against admission from 1961 through 1968. The popular impression that "our" foreign aid was ineffective as compared with "theirs" may thus be dispelled.

TABLE VIII

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Soviet Union	United States: *Aid*	United States: *No Aid*
Aid	(1) YES: 27/37 p = .72 NO: 5/37 p = .14 ABSTAIN: 5/37 p = .14 Decision Rule: Vote YES	(2) YES: 11/11 p = 1.00 NO: 0/11 p = .00 ABSTAIN: 0/11 p = .00 Decision Rule: Vote YES
No Aid	(3) YES: 1/54 p = .02 NO: 45/54 p = .83 ABSTAIN: 8/54 p = .15 Decision Rule: Vote NO	(4) YES: 7/24 p = .29 NO: 11/24 p = .56 ABSTAIN: 6/24 p = .25 Decision Rule: Vote NO

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(2) Showing foreign aid to be an effective correlate of voting on the admission issue confirms the proposition that aid is an instrument of U.S. policy seeking to advance political goals. These may be defined in terms of American national interest, which is best served by a stable international order where transitions take place in an orderly fashion.[21] Nevertheless, the humanitarian motive in foreign aid is also implied, because the probabilities correlating aid to votes on admission never reach unity.

(3) The growing awareness among UN members that all nations should be included in the international organization and the recent switch in U.S. China policy indicate a potentially diminishing political utility for extending aid in competitive situations with the Soviets for the purpose of containing their influence.

Conclusion

The General Assembly is a complex body which represents in microcosm the far more complicated international system. We have attempted to demonstrate the political relationship of foreign aid to the voting of nations in the Assembly, choosing as a test case the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. To do this, a probabilistic model was formulated in which nations' voting behavior on the admission issue from 1961 to 1968 was explained in terms of foreign aid from the United States and the Soviet Union. Advantages to this general approach are that (1) similar voting rules may be generalized for other less ideologically and emotionally charged conflicts in the United Nations, such as control of the sea bed; (2) multidimensional patterns of nations' voting may be identified so that votes on future important issues may be estimated; (3) estimates of the amount of aid necessary to change votes over select time periods and on specific voting issues may be obtained; and (4) evaluations of the political effectiveness of foreign aid may be derived.

On the theoretical plane, the approach simplifies and thereby enhances our understanding of some of the dynamic processes of international politics and diplomatic bargaining in the United Nations. On the policy level, it begins in a modest way to approach the problem of calculating the political effectiveness of foreign aid by using the vote in the General Assembly as a criterion for the measure of success.

[21]Samuel J. Bernstein and Hossain Ahmadi, "Political Stability and Foreign Aid: An Introductory Formalization," in Kenneth Boulding, Martin Pfaff and Janos Horvath, editors, *Readings in the International Grants Economy* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, forthcoming).

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Reviews

JAPAN: FUTURE SUPERSTATE?*

by Philip Van Slyck

Undoubtedly the most widely quoted American in Japan this year is Herman Kahn, and for good reasons. He has both flattered and disturbed the Japanese with his now obvious but nonetheless original observation that *if* current national growth trends of the great powers continue at about today's rates, Japan (even with a slight slowing of growth) will emerge sometime around the year 2000 as the world's richest nation in both per capita national product and aggregate economic power. Having hinted as long ago as 1962 at the possibility that "it would not be surprising" for Japan to become the pre-eminent world economy in the twenty-first century, the Hudson Institute futurologist has now evaluated the probabilities in *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response.*

Less widely noted in Japan or the United States, although in some respects a more informative book for Westerners, is *The Japanese Challenge: The Race to the Year 2000* by Robert Guillain, Tokyo correspondent for *Le Monde* and one of the most senior and most able Western reporters on Far Eastern, especially Chinese, affairs. Guillain draws the same conclusion as Kahn from the economic evidence and, like Kahn, devotes a substantial part of his book to analysis and anecdote concerning the unique qualities in the Japanese culture, socio-ethical structure and character which make the prediction plausible.

The two studies differ chiefly in sources and methodology. Kahn relies heavily for his appraisal of Japanese culture and character on intermediary and secondhand sources (especially the brilliant but also secondhand wartime cultural analysis, Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*), while Guillain relies on his long-time firsthand observations of Japanese people and society. Kahn's exposition follows the now familiar jotted-list, inspired-hunch, sideways-to-logic, brainstorming system through which Hudson Institute seminars work themselves into books, while Guillain's approach is essentially reportorial. Each technique has its advantages: the futurologist's is more provocative; the reporter's is considerably more readable.

The conclusions of the two studies are in the main compatible. Japan is rapidly heading toward either second or first rank among the world's national economies. It is doing so by merit of the indus-

**The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response.* By Herman Kahn. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 274 pp. $7.95.

The Japanese Challenge: The Race to the Year 2000. By Robert Guillain. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1970. 352 pp. $8.50.

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triousness, high educational level and skills of an achievement-oriented and cohesive people. The world role it has chosen—that of a nonmilitary economic superstate—is original and admirable, but may be subject to modification by force of internal or external events. As the most dynamic of all industrialized societies, Japan undoubtedly has much to teach the West, let alone the emerging societies.

Kahn suggests that one reason for Japan's success has been its good fortune in avoiding two epidemics currently bedeviling the West—loss of morale and erosion of work/achievement values (p. 94). Guillain puts the point in more positive terms, and may come closer to the most important lesson of the Japanese phenomenon. "It is a fact," he writes, "that in twenty or thirty years we shall be obliged to live in a world that has been radically changed by the scientific and technical revolutions of our time; and it is therefore urgently necessary for us to set about transforming our institutions . . . and to do so right away. This is something that the Japanese have understood better than we." (p. 27.)

II

To the Japanese, who take their own futurologists seriously, the prediction of world economic leadership is flattering. They have invested great energy, imagination and skill over the past century in a prodigious national effort to catch up with the West, and ultimately to surpass it in the areas that "count." What counts has of course differed between generations of Japanese, including one prolonged and ultimately disastrous adventure into conquest and empire building.

The constants have been technological prowess and economic strength, variables which are, according to Kahn, "most likely to make a nation powerful and influential." (p. 152.) These are also the necessary means—understood by the Meiji reformers as well as by contemporary Japanese captains of industry and state—to protect and enhance the distinctive Japanese quality of life with a minimum of alien dilution. For a century, Japan has been intent on modernizing, not Westernizing. In contemporary postmilitarist terms the goal is a successful *Japanese* Japan, enjoying full and acknowledged partnership, rights and responsibilities in the superpower club, but preferably without the nuclear (or even substantial conventional) military trappings of superpowerhood.

However flattering the prospect of a "Japanese century," most Japanese discuss the Kahn prediction with nervous skepticism. Their perspective takes account of variables that both Kahn and Guillain treat only in passing. Mindful that national economic power is precariously dependent on a healthy international economy, the Japanese also realize that economic power alone —unsupported by military expression of power—may not guarantee political status and influence, or even adequate voice in the management of the world economic and political structure. They are sensitive that their emphasis on economics as the basis of national

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policy is widely misunderstood and has already earned them the pejorative of an "economic animal."

Moreover, the prediction is a straight-line, "surprise-free" projection at the onset of a surprise-filled period of worldwide technological revolution, widespread intellectual and social unrest, and grave stresses in the postwar international trading and monetary systems. It is based on an imprecise measure—GNP—which will probably become even less meaningful as the United States, Japan and other technetronic societies shift their economic emphasis from production to service and from quantity to quality. Even now the Japanese government, while carrying out highly sophisticated ten-year projections for planning purposes, is pioneering the search for a more sensitive growth indicator that would measure "net national welfare"—NNW—in recognition that popular expectations of national economic performance are becoming increasingly discriminating.

Of more immediate pertinence, the Japanese are acutely conscious that, despite their rapid rise in the past decade and a half, they have not quite "caught up"—except in those salient (especially export) industries where they are already world leaders or nearly so, such as shipbuilding, steel, consumer electronics, photo-optics, compact automobiles and aircraft. In the round, Japan faces monumental social as well as economic adjustments in bringing agriculture, small-scale and cottage industries, and much of the service and distribution sectors into full participation in the benefits of the national economic boom. Third rank in gross output, Japan ranks only about fifteenth in per capita income; it is still a dual, not fully modernized economy. (So, for that matter, is the United States, but with less excuse in view of its far greater resources.)

The nature-loving but densely crowded Japanese have also become increasingly conscious that the quality of their collective life is in some respects deteriorating. This is because of insufficient investment in social infrastructure (housing, roads, sewage and other public utilities and services) and excessive or careless investment in pollution-producing and environment-scarring industrial expansion.

Their cautious view of the world-leadership forecast is therefore understandable—not that such success would be repugnant, but that discussion of it is premature, and perhaps dangerously so. The domestic challenges are formidable enough, politically as well as in terms of available economic, technological and human resources. Things could still go wrong, although government and corporate planning goals and forecasts, invariably high by Western standards, have been almost invariably low when compared with actual Japanese performance over the past decade and a half. There is a question how long the Japanese economy can outperform its planners in sheer quantitative growth and still serve the shifting priorities of the Japanese people.

III

The ultimate challenge to Japan's catching up with or surpass-

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ing the West is, in Japanese eyes, the turbulent and unpredictable international environment within which this insular and traditionally inward-looking society must operate. There is some fear that forecasts which are too glib may aggravate the problems of pursuit. If Japan's principal trading partners/competitors in the West become alarmist over the high angle of its trajectory, they may collectively place even greater obstacles in its catching-up course. President Nixon's unilateral action in August 1971, untying the dollar from gold and wiping out most of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts with a 10 per cent surcharge on imports, was received in Japan as an attack primarily on its export successes, its remaining import restraints, and yen valuation—a Pearl Harbor in reverse.

Japanese exports are already subject to more discriminatory restraints, especially in Western Europe, than the goods of any other noncommunist country. The United States has pressed Japan into "voluntary" export restraints on nearly 100 items, including steel, cotton textiles, man-made textiles and yarns, and sundries. Rising protectionist sentiment in Congress and in U.S. business leadership is seen in Japan not only as a threat to the healthy expansion of bilateral trade, but as an assault on the postwar liberalizing trend in the world trading system, under which it has prospered so far. The scenario for a Japanese nightmare might include a resurgence of American protectionism, reinforcing the protectionist mood in an expanding EEC, contributing to the further fragmentation of the world economy into regional trading blocs and preferential arrangements, leading to a slowdown in the growth of world trade, and leaving Japan once again isolated from the world trade mainstream.

Japanese leaders now realize that they have brought some of these hazards on themselves. Their slow pace through most of the 1960's in opening up their own market to foreign goods and investment provided ammunition for American protectionists and despair for the free traders. As a matter of enlightened self-interest they have rapidly accelerated the liberalization program. Today Japan is about as liberal in its import policies as West Germany, although its foreign capital induction controls, after four successive liberalizations, still leave something to be desired in Detroit and other centers hungry for a bigger equity share in the fast-growing Japanese market and for a Japanese manufacturing base in the enormous Asian market.

Simultaneously, Japan is attempting to slow its rate of export growth (by dismantling export subsidies), exploring techniques for "responsible marketing" (to counteract foreign resentment of over-concentration on soft markets), and diverting an increasing share of national resources both to foreign aid and investment and to domestic modernization. The fear that nags is that it is bringing itself into line with the rules of the free-world trading club at a moment when other members of the club are becoming careless about the rules and

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the club seems in danger of breaking up.

IV

The most elusive and in the long run most important question is, what is the Japanese strategy toward the year 2000? Neither Kahn nor Guillain probes this from the inside, nor have many Japanese spokesmen been helpfully articulate on this point. Yet there are hints that it is a highly sophisticated and even unself-conscious strategy, inherent in the Japanese cultural outlook. There is also some evidence that it is working, and that it is well suited to the requirements of a world economic system which is rapidly transforming itself.

For example, the Japanese are probably unique among the highly advanced industrial economies in seeing no discontinuity between their national and international objectives. To them there is no necessary contradiction between securing an appropriate place in the world system, promoting more rapid growth and stability in the developing parts of the system, and achieving the quality of domestic life—fully shared—which they are determined to achieve.

Japan is already a net importer of categories of textiles in which it quite recently led the world as an exporter, and Japanese capital is financing new industries in East and Southeast Asia whose products have tariff preference in the Japanese market. Japanese foreign investment, mostly in developing areas, is slated to reach $26 billion by the end of this decade.

The domestic adjustment costs for such a course are high; the government will spend $200 million to compensate textile firms damaged by the recently instituted restraints on textile exports to the United States. But the payoffs can also be high. Exporting manufacturing jobs, as numerous U.S. international corporations have demonstrated, produces an increasingly important contribution to a nation's payments balance, in the form of repatriated profits and goods purchased. It also contributes, as the Japanese seem to understand better than Americans, to rationalizing an already advanced economy in the direction of ever higher technologies and wider sharing of economic benefits through the upgrading of jobs and wages and the availability of low-cost imports.

The international implications are likewise significant, since the developing countries cannot hope to industrialize and integrate their economies into the world trading system unless they competitively enter those industries (especially the labor-intensive industries) that are becoming anachronistic in the highly advanced societies. The economies that will be most seriously affected by Washington's insistence on "voluntary" textile-export quotas will not be Japan but Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and others in the developing stage (whose access to the Japanese market, incidentally, is invited through preferential tariffs).

What is distinctive in the Japanese approach is the close linkage between national growth policy and foreign economic policy, a link ob-

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viously missing in our own country. American international corporations are coming under increasing fire from labor unions and regional political interests on the job-exporting issue, while Washington traditionally looks with disfavor on private investment outflow, takes for granted the profit inflow on these investments, and has no coherent or effective adjustment strategy for domestic industries affected by foreign competition.

As Kahn and Guillain, among others, observe, the coherence of Japanese national economic strategy—the normally great compatibility between the public and the private interest—is a cultural phenomenon. It reflects the way in which the Japanese build consensus and reach institutional or national decisions that inspire broad political support and sustained commitment. These peculiarly Japanese processes have proved congenial with democratic institutions, even with vigorous dissent, and they have enabled Japan to maintain a steady course with the highest sustained growth rates of any advanced society.

Whether such lessons can be exported to the West—whether indeed the extraordinary Japanese accomplishment becomes well understood and appreciated in the West—remains to be seen. It will take further analyses by competent Westerners such as Kahn and Guillain, and a much deeper probing, for which these two works have laid useful groundwork. Needed even more is a first-class Japanese interpretation of Japan, by a scholar who shares in his country's psyche and also understands the perceptions, misperceptions and limitations of his Western audience.

The Fifth Republic, 1958-1962: The View from the Top*

by Simon Serfaty

No criticism of de Gaulle's policies while he was President of France can ever detract from the "weight of feeling" toward France that the General displayed throughout his political career. The opposition to his policies often appeared overwhelming: the growing bitterness of a hostile press, the emotions of a frustrated army, the narrow claims of regional groupings, the stubborn opposition of almost all political parties, and, of course, strong pressure from abroad. Yet, for more than ten years de Gaulle usually managed to emerge victorious. However ambiguously, he reinstated France in the symbolic ranks of the great powers. With the support of the conservative right, he pursued in Algeria the very policy his opponents on the left had been incapable of implementing. With the reluctant backing of the liberal left, he introduced in France the authoritarian constitution his conservative opponents had been incapable of establishing.

His critics derided de Gaulle by describing him as an imaginary mixture of historical French figures. But this was precisely the national solidarity of which the General was so proud: de Gaulle argued that he, like France, com-

**Mémoires d'Espoir,* Volume I: *Le Renouveau, 1958-1962.* By Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon, 1970. 314 pp. n.p.

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prised all generations of Frenchmen, dead and living.[1] "One doesn't cry 'Vive de Gaulle' when one is against the nation."[2] He tells us, in the first volume of his memoirs on the Fifth Republic, *Mémoires d'Espoir: Le Renouveau, 1958-1962,* that he *was* France, "in charge altogether of her heritage of the past, her interests of the present, and her hopes of the future" (p. 7), and that he had returned to help her "resume the course of her history." (p. 157.) What the General believed, his critics came to believe too. They predicted that de Gaulle's departure would entail the collapse of France, and, for a long time, much of their criticism of him was based on the political vacuum he was assumed to be creating under him.[3]

This weight of feeling for France is most touchingly visible in de Gaulle's memoirs. In the opening lines he writes simply: "She lives." (p. 7.) Elsewhere, he had stated: "To our lady France we have only one thing to say, and that is that nothing is more important to us than serving her . . . so that the day death comes to seize us, she will gently shroud us in her fine and holy earth."[4] During the years of the Fourth Republic, this protracted love affair between de Gaulle and his Madonna had been enhanced by the latter's misfortune to be ruled by a majority which, however "arithmetically legal," was nevertheless deprived of any "national legitimacy." While the nation was surviving the ups and downs of the *régime des partis* and de Gaulle was surmounting the ins and outs of his own political life, the passion of one for the other grew warmer. France never looked more beautiful to de Gaulle than in the spring of 1958: ". . . this nation of still villages, ancient churches, hearty families, endless cycles of tilling, sowing and harvesting; this country of legends, ancestral songs and dances, provincial dialects, costumes and market places; this millennial France." (p. 164.)[5]

While France preserved her constancy, the international community deteriorated. One perceives the General's doubts not about his own qualifications but about the qualifications of his peers. Now that the "heroic period" of World War II had ended, the immediate stake of political conflicts was "no longer victory or annihilation but a more or less easy life. . . . Most of the giants, friends or foes, had disappeared. . . . There remained political chieftains." (p. 39.) During his decade in power few of

[1]Interview of December 13, 1965, in Jean Lacouture, editor, *Citations du Président de Gaulle* (Paris, 1968), pp. 26-27. (All translations from the French are mine.)

[2]Press Conference of May 19, 1958, *ibid.*, p. 178.

[3]As the solidity of the Pompidou regime increases one is reminded of Henry Kissinger's prophecy: "A structure which can be preserved only if there is a great man in each generation is inherently fragile." (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Policy toward Europe,* Hearings, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, p. 131.)

[4]Quoted in Lacouture, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[5]In Algiers, on June 4, 1958, de Gaulle stated: "Never more than here, and never better than tonight have I understood how beautiful, how great, how generous France is." Lacouture, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

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these political chieftains went up in de Gaulle's esteem and, beyond diplomatic artifacts, most portraits of them appear somewhat harsh. Yet, he discovered greatness in Konrad Adenauer (p. 184) and sensed it in President Kennedy (p. 271), while domestic tributes go particularly to Michel Debré as "his" Prime Minister to whom he gave audience at least once a week (p. 286), Couve de Murville as "his" Foreign Minister who brought into motion the impulse given by de Gaulle himself (p. 287), and André Malraux, *"cet ami génial,"* who kept the General away from triviality (p. 285).

He writes of the President and his government ("the solidarity of the government cannot be divided"), the President and his people (who "instinctively" called upon him for salvation), and the President and his nation ("I was France, I am France"). De Gaulle describes an idyllic picture darkened only by unruly "fealties" (the communists, the press and the political parties) that would be ultimately responsible for the "illusion of anarchy" in May 1968. (pp. 85, 140.)

II

Memoirs, enlightened as they are by the education of hindsight, narrate what remains when most has been forgotten. De Gaulle's last writing is no exception to the rule that every statesman seeks to idealize his policies and strengthen his place in history. Mistakes are rarely acknowledged; historical truth is secondary to historical justification. The Gaullist themes are by now well known, including the state and its legitimacy, the nation and its unity, political parties and ideologies, power, grandeur and independence. They are all reasserted here with renewed passion. The steadfastness of the General's ideas is also well known. His last reminiscences, therefore, confirm more than reveal, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs. Yet, when discussing, for example, his return to power, de Gaulle reveals much by what he chooses to ignore, while on the question of Algeria valuable insights into his tactics are occasionally introduced.

Clearly, de Gaulle's preoccupation with self-respect induces him to reject the image of a conspirator: the "sort of monarchy" he wanted to restore, the unity of France he wanted to rebuild, the national prestige he wanted to revive—these could not be accomplished by a man who had compromised himself by siding with one faction or the other and plotting the demise of the Fourth Republic.

De Gaulle denies participation of any kind in the coup which, from Algiers, speeded the collapse of the Fourth Republic in May 1958. In 1946, we are told, he had resigned in order to preserve for France *l'homme providentiel* who, in time of crisis, comes to the rescue of embattled institutions. "I would leave, but intact. Thus, when the time came, I would be once again the salvation, either personally or through the example that I had left." (p. 11.)

Such a return, however, would be in answer to the only source of power, the people, "whose voice

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is God's voice." (p. 87.) The military coup, his associates' role in it, everything occurred without de Gaulle's participation or even knowledge. (p. 27.) Not consulted at all, he lived "in complete retirement," receiving only his family or people from his village. (pp. 19, 21.) In May 1958 the decision to re-enter the political arena—to restore "the continuity and the stability of which the state has been deprived for one hundred and sixty years" (p. 23)—was taken under extreme military pressure: the High Command in Algiers had planned a military invasion of Paris for the night of May 27-28, the last step in the escalation of a situation which, admittedly, could only be solved by de Gaulle. (pp. 26, 28.)

This presentation leaves out much essential information. De Gaulle never expected his political exile to last as long as it did. From the moment he left, he began to plot the burial of the regime and prepare a rapid return. "Within a week," he predicted two days before his resignation of January 20, 1946, "I will be asked to return and, this time, I shall return on my terms."[6] He reasoned that under strong public pressure the political parties would give in and accept the type of constitution he later outlined in his Bayeux speech of June 1946 (which became, in essence, the constitution of the Fifth Republic).[7]

When this failed, the General attempted to rally the people around him through the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF). But the success of the RPF, like de Gaulle's return, was predicated on the inability of the regime to survive. "Everything depends upon events. If events keep the present system going we will not come to power."[8]

The Gaullist strategy thus consisted of infiltrating and weakening the institutions of the Fourth Republic. Despite the collapse of the RPF and the weakening of the Gaullist old guard, this strategy did not change. Chaos remained the only available means. "We must have some chaos first," de Gaulle told C. L. Sulzberger in December 1956. "This regime was made against me. Therefore it cannot call upon de Gaulle to save itself. De Gaulle is not prepared to save this regime."[9]

Indeed he was not. In April 1958 at a meeting with Leon Delbecque, one of the leaders of the movement that brought de Gaulle to power the next month, Delbecque asked the General, "If, following very grave circumstances, the army, the people, were to call on you, would your answer be affirmative?" De Gaulle replied: "I've always been accustomed to taking my responsibilities."[10] How conveniently ambiguous! The same technique made all these visiting conspirators agree with Jacques

[6]Georgette Elgey, *La République des Illusions: I, 1945-1951* (Paris, 1965), p. 87.

[7]Joseph Barsalou, *La Mal-Aimée. Histoire de la IVème République* (Paris, 1964), p. 31.

[8]Quoted in C. L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 28.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 31.

[10]Reported by Jean Raymond Tournoux, *Secrets d'Etat* (Paris, 1960), p. 231.

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Chaban-Delmas (then Defense Minister in the government of Félix Gaillard) that de Gaulle was "willing to take power if it were offered."[11] On the eve of General Salan's planned military invasion of France, de Gaulle, upon receiving Salan's representative, observed: "What Salan has done or will do is for the good of France."[12] This was the gleam of hope the General had been watching for while waiting in the shadows.[13]

III

In Algeria the objective was clear from the start: neither integration (this was "unfortunately" too late) nor status quo (endless continuation of the war), but self-determination. The public, however, was not yet prepared for it, particularly in view of the misinformation reported by the political, economic and journalistic "fealties." The General's tactics would therefore be dictated by the overriding need to avoid a rupture of national unity. "There will be some day an Algerian Republic," the General had thought since 1955,[14] but, for the time being, the objective needed to be disguised: "If, all of a sudden, I were to display my intentions, a wave of stupefaction and anger would have undoubtedly risen across the ocean of alarmed ignorance, outraged dismay and coalesced opposition, and the ship would have capsized. Without ever changing directions, I would navigate until the time when, decisively, good sense would have penetrated the fog." (p. 51.) To penetrate this fog of ignorance, carefully chosen words became the main compass: "I throw [to the crowd] words which appear to be spontaneous in their form but are in fact carefully calculated; words which, as I want it, create enthusiasm without carrying me further than I have decided to go." (p. 51.) Each pronouncement is made painfully ambiguous: the "peace of the braves" (but whose braves?), or the still memorable "I have understood you" (but who is you?). Every statement is open to various and contradictory interpretations. Yet, behind this ambiguity hides a constant progression toward the desired objective; a "forgotten" theme here, a new key word there, ever more subtle nuances irreversibly prepared every Frenchman for the "vital necessity" of Algeria's independence.

But military victory must precede France's political withdrawal

[11]Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Les 13 Complots du 13 Mai* (Paris, 1959), p. 25.

[12]Jean Ferniot, *De Gaulle et le 13 Mai* (Paris, 1965), p. 452.

[13]Completing his *Mémoires de Guerre* in midsummer 1958 after his return to power, de Gaulle spoke of his activities during the years in political exile in the following manner: "In the tumult of men and events, solitude was my temptation; now it is my friend. What other satisfaction can be sought once you have confronted history? . . . I steep myself in the insignificance of things." He had become, he added, "an old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope." Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs, III: Salvation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960).

[14]As early as 1955, de Gaulle writes, he knew that "integration" was an "astute but empty formula" (p. 49); as early as 1958, he knew that "French Algeria" was a "costly utopia" (p. 50).

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from Algeria, for what matters above everything else is for France to avoid being humiliated again. Led by de Gaulle, she will not surrender to force but will generously "grant liberty to her conquest," at a time which she will have chosen. (p. 102.) In several places de Gaulle insists that France "won" the Algerian war on the battlefield: "When the vote over self-determination clears the last remaining veils," he writes, "the war is practically over. Military success has been secured." (p. 101.)

Thus, it took four years to end a war which, on de Gaulle's own recognition, was politically lost from the moment he returned to power. Whether or not this exercise in political brinkmanship was indispensable remains questionable. That the nation was divided over the Algerian problem is obvious. What is less obvious was the depth of that division. There was, in those years, more indifference than passion in metropolitan France. Defeated in Indochina, the French army was attempting to pursue in Algeria the crusade it had discovered in Asia (namely, the preservation of the nation, of Europe, of the West, and of Christian civilization against international communism and internal decay). But to the more than one million conscripts who fought there between 1954 and 1962, such a mission was never quite credible. Many of the draftees or reservists recalled for service at first rebelled: demonstrations occurred in such major cities as Paris and Rouen, officers were mistreated in some instances, and numerous sit-ins were held in the hope of stopping trains carrying newly drafted troops.

As the war dragged on, however, most Frenchmen accepted it with growing detachment. Among the young, student efforts to organize opposition to the war never gained much momentum. Efforts to organize public support for *Algérie Française* remained unimpressive even after the formation of the ill-fated *Organization de l'Armée Secrete* (O.A.S.). In this mood of indifference conscripts from metropolitan France embarked for Algeria simply because they were ordered to do so. "The soldiers," wrote one of them, "don't have any feeling of being at home here and defending French territory as they would have done if the battle had taken place on metropolitan soil. . . . I have never heard a conscript from the metropole say 'Algeria is France.' For these men, Algeria is a foreign theater of operations."[15] In short, the war came to be ignored by a nation whose indifference was due in part to the relatively low level of casualties—9,000 soldiers killed in action.

The apathy of the conscripts and the French people was in sharp contrast to the attitude of the professional soldier. In Algeria the French centurion became a praetorian. In a novel that best recaptures the transformation of the French army during its colonial wars, Jean Larteguy described the reaction of one of these praetorians to the nation: "We've become adult without the help of our traditional

[15]Henry Azeau, *Revolte Militaire* (Paris, 1961), p. 185.

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leaders; we have fought wars in which they took no part and undertaken journeys on which they were unwilling to accompany us. . . . Our fellow countrymen have ignored us for ages. Here we are, turned into praetorians for having wished too strongly to be soldiers of the people."[16] De Gaulle did not alleviate such misgivings. On the contrary, by insisting on the importance of France's military prestige and by stressing the superiority of the French army in North Africa, he made its leaders all the more unreceptive to his objective of political withdrawal. Underestimating the professional army's desire to keep Algeria French and overestimating the public opposition to an early withdrawal, the General pursued delaying tactics that probably endangered, rather than strengthened, the national consensus and the unity of the army. For, while he was "preparing" the French people for a withdrawal which, de Gaulle assumed, the army would accept as a matter of course, the army was losing touch with the nation, which would emerge as the army's real enemy during the abortive coup of April 1961.

IV

As a manipulator of public opinion, de Gaulle was a first-class actor who wrote his own script and produced and directed his own show. The importance he ascribed to the performance and the correct choice of words is well known. His memoirs confirm that the late French President played to his compatriots' taste for abstract ideas and historical reminiscences and that he could be an artful comedian on the screen. He describes, for example, how thoroughly he used television: "In order to be faithful to my character I must address them [the French people] as if we were eye to eye, without notes and without glasses. . . . This seventy-year-old man, sitting alone behind a table and under merciless lights, must appear animated enough and spontaneous enough to seize and retain attention without compromising himself through excessive gestures and out-of-place grimaces." (p. 302.) Only through this "great effort" could the dialogue take place between "the people and me." (p. 284.) In the evening, de Gaulle adds, he watched the show, wondering how his performance would be received by "the immense and mysterious audience." (p. 302.) We sense the fears and the self-doubts, until the next day's reviews confirmed that "de Gaulle is as good as always."

De Gaulle wrote history at the same time he played it. Under his pen, forgotten words, e.g., *féal, volopuck* and *chienlit,* gained an untranslatable popularity, while others, such as *truc* and *machin,* assumed new forms of elegant disdain. From the past, too, de Gaulle drew vignettes that helped to explain the present. The reader is treated to a lecture on the relations between France and Germany: "Their complementary qualities," writes de Gaulle, "fecundated the presence of the Roman Empire on the Rhine, made the fortunes of

[16]Jean Larteguy, *The Praetorians* (London, 1963), p. 54.

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the Francs, brought glory to Charlemagne. . . , justified the relations of the King of France with the German Princes, set Germany on fire during the blazing French Revolution, inspired Goethe, Heine, Madame de Stael, Victor Hugo. . . . despite the furious struggles which opposed these two people, [they] never ceased to grope warily for a way in the dark." (p. 186.)

The press conference, held twice a year, provided an exclusive preview of French policy reserved to the journalists. A new script was tested ("I make sure that decisions are announced") and old ones were reintroduced ("at the same time as the conference reviews existing problems"). (p. 303.) Afterward the show, successful in the previews and on television, could go on the road where the principal actor must be seen live: "The French people must see me and hear me: I must see them and hear them." Hence, the repeated trips throughout France and Algeria during the first few years, trips which helped him demonstrate spectacularly the strength of the national unity he personified. De Gaulle went everywhere, and everywhere the program was the same. Everyone was "moved and strengthened" and de Gaulle himself was "filled with joy." (pp. 305-306.)

De Gaulle's last written testament shows to a striking extent how conscious he was of the effectiveness of modern techniques of persuasion. He consciously sought the man in the crowd and stressed the importance of each individual: "I ask for *your* support," he would say while using his hand to point to an imaginary Frenchman. Without *you,* everything is lost, without *your* support, everything will have been in vain. Every public relations technique was used: conditioned reflex through the repetition of key words (including prestige, grandeur, unity, salvation) and symbolic gestures (including the V for victory or the singing of the French anthem). All of these techniques reinforce the Gaullist motto that what appears to be will be, provided it is repeated with sufficient vigor. From it emerges the illusion of international power with the nuclear bomb or nuclear submarine, the illusion of urban growth with the model city, Grenoble, the illusion of authority by means of the timely television appearance of the father figure, and the illusion of irreplaceability through the neglect of the opposition or even the succession.[17]

The paternalism de Gaulle showed toward the French people is also displayed toward the former colonies and their leaders. If he saw himself as the salvation of France, de Gaulle wanted to be for French lands in Africa *l'homme de la décolonisation.* As in Algeria, his program was clear from the start: to put an end to French colonialism. But to create a community of states around France, he first needed to rally everyone around her—"a strong enough impulse could only come from me." (p. 68.) Accidentally, however, a different image is unveiled: a de Gaulle who continued to believe in France's millennial vocation of influence and

[17]Georges Pompidou's name appears only five times in the memoirs.

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expansion (p. 43), and who found in the granting of independence the continuation of colonial politics by other means. Cooperation replaced domination, but at Evian, for example, France still got "everything she wanted" (p. 132), particularly in the Sahara where "privileged rights for [her] research and exploitation of oil" were secured. In de Gaulle's words, association "modified the form without changing the substance of Franco-African solidarity." (p. 71.) *L'homme de la décolonisation* was also *l'homme de la néo-colonisation.*

V

In this new volume the General describes, with obvious self-satisfaction, how he reinstated France in the council of the great powers: by loosening her military and political subordination to one hegemony without becoming a prey of the other; by assuming a leading role in the search for a solution to the division of Germany and Europe; by emerging as a major pole of influence for the Third World; by devising her own means of defense; and, in a general vein, by gathering the will and the means to play an independent role in the areas of chronic confrontation between the two superpowers. Unfortunately, this volume covers only the phase of preparation (1958-1962), not the period of realization (1962-1968).

It was during this preparatory period that tensions between the two superpowers began to diminish. The Berlin crisis and other crises of the time are passed over hastily. De Gaulle mentions hardly any of Khrushchev's rocket-rattling. Instead, a rather favorable image of Khrushchev-the-peacemaker is presented: he was "impressive in the strength . . . of his personality and willing to believe that, despite everything, world peace has a chance and Europe a future." (p. 246.) Unimpressed by Khrushchev's nuclear brinkmanship, de Gaulle was far more favorably impressed by President Kennedy's display of American strength and determination at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis: Kennedy confirmed American military superiority. The gravity of these confrontations between the two giants soon forced them to seek areas of accommodation. The ensuing relaxation of tensions lessened security requirements in Europe and permitted the subsequent trend toward polycentrism.

De Gaulle did not create this situation; he merely took advantage of it. Disregarding passing ideologies and worn-out parties, de Gaulle found his realities only in existing circumstances. In 1944-1945, when he saw in Germany the main threat to French security, he had gone to the USSR, the traditional land ally in the East. But when the German threat subsided and communist Russia became the danger to Europe, de Gaulle went to the Anglo-Saxon countries, asking that "the enlightened generosity" of the United States be extended from the economic sphere to the realm of defense.[18] By 1962-1963 he had concluded that the superpowers were severely crippled by the variety of their worldwide

[18]Statement made in early 1948; quoted in Barsalou, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

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involvement. The Cuban crisis indicated how both states were inhibited by the devastating nature of the power in their possession. He, therefore, attempted to use this stalemate to restore France as a mediator, a link between Washington and Moscow whose rapprochement might be hastened by the growth of China—"an empire that is indestructible, ambitious and deprived of everything."[19]

It was during the 1958-1962 period that de Gaulle shifted away from a policy in Europe based on a Paris-London axis toward one based on a Paris-Bonn axis. His September 1958 request for a tripartite directorate for the Atlantic Alliance is explained in detail in *Le Renouveau*. Its rejection was proof of Anglo-Saxon malevolence and confirmed his personal prejudices. "As I expected," de Gaulle writes, "both recipients of the memorandum answered evasively." (p. 215.) While attempting to redefine the bonds between France and her Anglo-Saxon partners, de Gaulle found in a receptive Adenauer the opportunity to devise a European security system on the basis of a reconciliation between France and Germany. A Paris-Bonn-London triangle had actually been outlined by Prime Minister Macmillan during an earlier visit to Rambouillet. "Let us reunite Europe," Macmillan suggested to the French President. "We are three men who can do it together: you, me and Adenauer." (p. 231.)

For a short while it appeared to the skeptical French President that Great Britain was willing to enter Europe on French terms. De Gaulle believed that Macmillan had come to Rambouillet in December 1962 to tell him that he was right in building nuclear forces. Worried by the problems encountered by Great Britain in developing her own nuclear force after the failure of the Skybolt project, Macmillan was reported by de Gaulle as confiding: "We also have ours . . . . and we ought to be able to unite the two within a context of independence from the U.S."[20] But, following Rambouillet, Macmillan went to the Bahamas where he and Kennedy reached the so-called Nassau agreements. "There," de Gaulle asserts, "Great Britain gave the U.S. whatever poor atomic forces she had. She could have given them to Europe. She had thus made her choice."[21] The French "retaliation" was officially inflicted on January 14, 1963, during the famous news conference in which de Gaulle denounced the Nassau agreements and vetoed Great Britain's application for admission into the Common Market.

There was in all of de Gaulle's policies a view of power that mixed the old and the new in a rather exotic formula. Much of his career had been built on the assumption that national aspirations need not always be limited by existing resources. Abroad during World War II and at home during his political

[19]Press Conference of July 29, 1963. Quoted in Simon Serfaty, *France, de Gaulle and Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 164.

[20]Statement of February 6, 1963, in André Passeron, editor, *De Gaulle Parle, 1962-1966* (Paris, 1966), p. 199.

[21]Statement of January 24, 1963, *ibid.*, p. 207.

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exile, he sought to *acquire* power by acting as though he *had* power. The emergence of a nuclear stalemate between the two superstates strengthened this conviction. Since both Moscow and Washington were acting as if power were an end in itself, it was up to other states to define and pursue intermediate ends, the fulfillment of which would not affect the existing stalemate. To this extent, France could seek glory without power; strength without allied unity; equality without size. The irrelevance of power resolved the contradictions of his policies: "At the scale of megatons," he told Eisenhower in Paris, "only a few bombs would be sufficient to demolish any country. To make our deterrent effective it is sufficient to be able to kill the adversary once, even if he has the means to kill us ten times." (p. 227.)

But at the same time, de Gaulle preserved a more traditional understanding of politics. Viewing international relations as a struggle for power, he saw in the possession of power an indispensable prerequisite to all national accomplishments. In foreign affairs, he frequently asserted, "logic and sentiment do not weigh heavily in comparison with the realities of power."[22] The failure of the Fourth Republic stemmed precisely from its inability to gather enough resources to impose its policies abroad as well as at home. Thus, power conscious and realistic, de Gaulle was willing to discard glory when power was needed but lacking, to seek strength through alliances, and forget about equality in time of crisis. His immediate and unquestioned endorsement of Kennedy's actions during the Cuban missile crisis is one case among many.

His handling of nuclear weapons also reflected this dual reaction to power. To be sure, these weapons were indicative of France's national strength, particularly vis-à-vis a denuclearized state such as West Germany, "which has no nuclear weapons and should have none." (p. 183.) In theory, as previously indicated, they might symbolize the equalization of power. But in practice, nuclear weapons presented de Gaulle with a situation in which his old motto—"too poor to be able to bow"—no longer seemed to apply. Like most Europeans who regarded deterrence as the best form of defense, de Gaulle might well have regarded appeasement as the best form of defense once deterrence had failed.

It is unfortunate that fate has deprived us of de Gaulle's own account of the period of "realization," for in this area his failings were flagrant.[23] At the Atlantic level, Gaullist demands could have brought about a useful revision of NATO; instead, the French government behaved as if there could be no middle ground between alliance integration and disintegration. American offers of nuclear weapons (but under Washington's control) were unequivocally rejected by a French President deter-

[22]De Gaulle, *War Memoirs, II: Unity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959).

[23]For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Serfaty, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-160.

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mined to own such weapons "entirely and without restrictions." (pp. 221, 225.) The French *force de frappe* could not alone deter or oppose another nuclear power; nor could a nuclear-armed France credibly challenge a nonnuclear nation without prior consent from one or both of the superpowers. Ultimately, economics forced de Gaulle to reduce his relatively modest nuclear program.

At the European level, de Gaulle attempted to promote a European nationalism (*l'Europe européenne*) while strengthening French nationalism. He dreamed of a Europe strong enough to stand up to either hegemony, yet he needed a Europe weak enough to depend for its security on an ambiguous French protection. Such a Europe would be built around a Paris-Bonn axis, yet Paris was bound to be distrustful of the future policies and demands of a Germany always susceptible to *mauvais démons:* "How to forget," writes de Gaulle, "her ambition which, yesterday, suddenly released military forces capable of breaking at once the armies of France and her allies . . . [Germany's] tyranny which ruled by means of oppression, extortion and crimes . . . ?" (pp. 182-183.)

In the realm of foreign affairs, de Gaulle never opened the Pandora's Box he built. Where was the focus of his policies? Was it a traditional *politique de sécurité* directed against Germany and seeking the collaboration of traditional Eastern allies in addition to the support of Western allies? Or was it an anti-British, anti-American policy based on the search for an all-European alliance, including Russia? Or again, did that policy remain, in an age of uncertain détente, an anti-Russian policy based on an alliance with Anglo-Saxon states, now embellished with the illusion of cooperation?

VI

Much has been written about de Gaulle's style: the rhythmic music of Rousseau, the respectful eloquence of Bossuet, the loving passion of Racine. *Le Renouveau* confirms all this and enhances his stature as a writer of rare quality.

Traditionally, France has treated her writers with greater respect than her generals or politicians. De Gaulle did not escape the Frenchmen's habit of first revering and then beheading their kings. But in his case—perhaps in deference to him as a writer—it was done with unusual timidity and shame. One columnist described Paris after de Gaulle's exit in this way: "Most people refused to speak about the event. There was a glimmer of guilt in their voices and they could not mention his name. In the papers there was talk of patricide. . . . [It] was . . . like a family tragedy not to be discussed with strangers."[24]

De Gaulle thought that life could not be explained until death. In the end, however, most of his policies remained unexplained.[25]

[24]Friedel Ungeheur, "France: A Struggle Against the Second-Rate," *Harpers Magazine,* December 1969, pp. 122-128.

[25]For example, we do not learn much about the "French people" de Gaulle found in Quebec, "a country" he thought should be granted self-determination. (pp. 251, 254.)

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In his memoirs he wrote about an ideal policy, one that did not take into account the vicissitudes, variations and failures. Reading about Indochina, for example, an observer might think that no war would have been fought there if de Gaulle had stayed in power in 1946 (pp. 16-17, 127) and if President Kennedy had listened to him in 1961 (pp. 268-269). But this ignores too much of what was said and done by the Gaullists throughout the 1950's. To paraphrase Charles Peguy's poem, "It's a nuisance, God said. When de Gaulle is gone no one will be left to understand the things we did." This volume of his memoirs does not add much of substance to what was already known, nor does it shed much illumination on what was previously unknown. Yet it is the quintessential de Gaulle and, assuming an English translation that will capture the eloquence of his style, it deserves to be read carefully.

Morality and Power Politics in the Middle East*

by Allan C. Brownfeld

In the post-World War II years the Middle East has been an enigma for students of international affairs. But even more enigmatic has been an American foreign policy that has presided over the serious decline of U.S. power and influence in the Arab world in conjunction with the rise in influence and presence of the Soviet Union.

Harry Ellis, currently the *Christian Science Monitor's* correspondent in Bonn and previously its Middle East correspondent in Beirut, points out in his important new book, *The Dilemma of Israel: United States Interests in the Middle East,* that "the Palestine problem has been intimately involved in domestic American politics." He notes that early evidence of the political content of government policy on this issue was disclosed by Colonel William A. Eddy, United States Minister to Saudi Arabia from 1944 to 1946. Writing after his retirement, Eddy told of the recall to Washington in 1946 of four American diplomats stationed in the Middle East—the ministers to Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (a joint post) and Saudi Arabia and the consul general to mandated Palestine. President Truman asked the diplomats' views on the effects of an American policy in support of a Jewish Palestine. The substance of their reply was that American relations with the Arabs would be gravely jeopardized by one-sided partiality to the Zionists. "Mr. Truman," wrote Colonel Eddy, "summed up his position with the utmost candor: 'I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.' "

Saying unpopular things which may need to be said as the Middle East moves dangerously toward another war that could draw the

**The Dilemma of Israel: United States Interests in the Middle East.* By Harry B. Ellis. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1970. 107 pp. $3.00.

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United States and the Soviet Union into confrontation, Ellis declares that "Mr. Truman's decision to work for the creation of Israel ran directly counter to the advice of American diplomats in the area. The latter felt it was not a question of being 'pro-Arab' or 'anti-Jewish.' The fact was that support of Israel would cause damage to wider American interests in the Middle East." One American diplomat is quoted as having said privately that "If our government in Washington decides it wants to side with Israel it is not our business as Ambassadors to Middle Eastern countries to object. But it is our job to point out very clearly what will be the costs involved."

Not least among these costs was that the Arabs, feeling betrayed by Washington, would open their doors to Moscow and that domination of the Middle East by the Soviet Union would jeopardize Western access to Arab oil. For the Soviets, control would be the prize. Oil exporters themselves, they do not need petroleum from the Middle East, though forecasts indicate that in time they may become net petroleum importers. As Ellis observes, "the ability to deny Arab oil to the West would shift the world's strategic balance in favor of the Communists. Soviet control of the Middle East also would cut American and Western defense links with South Asia and the Far East. These factors, in the view of State Department experts, dictated a policy of American friendship with the Arabs." President Truman, however, decided otherwise, "with the result that almost overnight the United States—the power almost universally admired by the Arabs in the days of Woodrow Wilson—became Arab enemy number one."

Today Israel exists as a sovereign state, more than one million Arab refugees are homeless, increasingly militant commando groups are operating along frontier areas, Egypt leads the Arab nations in talking war, and Soviet influence is growing. What can American policy do to preserve American interests despite the errors of the past? At the heart of the matter, what is the moral and ethical position for the Christian West to take now, in 1971, on the Arab-Israeli conflict? Ellis devotes much of his book to seeking answers to these basic and perplexing questions.

In connection with the first question, he discusses in some detail the options Israel has in the situation devolving from its 1967 victory. It can remain an occupation power, or it can give citizenship to one million additional Arabs and lose its identity as a "Jewish" state. A third alternative —backed by the United Nations and the United States, and one the Israeli government thus far refuses to contemplate short of an overall peace agreement—is a partial or complete withdrawal from Arab lands won in 1967. "Israel's dilemma," writes Ellis, "becomes that of the United States, chief supplier of military equipment and capital assistance to the Jewish state. Can the United States maintain its protective attitude toward Israel and still preserve essential American interests in the Arab world?" The implicit answer is No.

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On the moral issue Ellis, whose book is as fair as any on this controversial subject and who continuously asks the kind of questions most commentators ignore, reflects: "To many persons, who have regarded the establishment of Israel primarily as an act of justice to a long-persecuted people, a deeper question may be raised. It was, indeed, a humanitarian motive which impelled much support for the Zionist cause. But since the Zionist goal—establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine—displaced more than a million Arabs, and now leaves nearly a million more under military occupation, was not humanity toward the Jews accompanied by inhumanity toward the Arabs?"

He points out that Zionism never has represented the thinking of all Jews, many of whom continue to reject the notion that Israel is in any sense their "homeland." They are, they continue to insist, Americans, Frenchmen, Englishmen or other nationals of the Jewish faith. Judaism, in their view, remains a religion and not a nationality, despite Zionist efforts to impose Israeli nationality upon them. He also refers to the little quoted and little remembered portion of the Balfour Declaration which states that the rights of the indigenous Arab population were in no way to be affected by the creation of a Jewish state.

Facing a moral dilemma arising from guilt feelings about the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany, many Christians sought expiation by supporting the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. But, the Arabs reply, we too deplore the Nazi persecution of the Jews. If you seek to make restitution, why not give the Jews a piece of Germany, why give them our land? Arabs also point to the long period of Moslem-Jewish friendship and amity, contrasting it with the virulent anti-Semitism which for so long has infected the Christian world.

But the West did not take heed of the Arab position, and the presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is, in large measure, the result of the West's answer to that moral dilemma of World War II.

Ellis has brought to this subject an intimate knowledge of the Middle East, and a genuine feeling of affection and concern for both of the peoples involved. How does one solve a moral and political dilemma in which both parties have been wronged, and in which a step in either direction may lead to disaster? At least, Harry Ellis would say, one discusses the options openly. In a time of crisis we cannot afford the luxury of doing any less.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS).

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis. By Robert S. Walters. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. 299 pp. $9.95. This comprehensive analysis of American and Soviet economic aid to developing countries provides useful insights into the superpower rivalry in the Third World. The author compares the expectations of the donors, the magnitude and practices of their respective aid programs, and their successes and failures. He observes that the pre-eminence of the United States in world trade gives it an edge in establishing more diversified relations with developing countries, while the Soviet system of centralization facilitates administrative efficiency and policy coordination.

Columbia Essays in International Affairs, Volume V: The Dean's Papers, 1969. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 328 pp. $10.00. A selection of the best papers written during the academic year 1968-1969 by graduate students of The Faculty of International Affairs of Columbia University. Topics include French and British diplomacy in the Fashoda Crisis, warfare among the Eskimos, democratization in European communist countries, the succession crisis in Yugoslavia, political participation in Soviet local government, the United States and the Yemen crisis of 1962, and the law, practice and financing of Soviet foreign trade.

Do You Sincerely Want to be Rich? By Charles Raw, Bruce Page and Godfrey Hodgson. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 400 pp. $8.95. Three London *Sunday Times* editors describe the swift rise in the 1960's of Bernie Cornfeld and his mutual-fund operation, Investors Overseas Services (IOS), and the even more swiftly moving events of 1970 when his empire crumbled.

Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement. By Margaret P. Doxey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 162 pp. $4.50. In a detailed survey of the institutional framework for international enforcement both in the League of Nations and the United Nations, the author examines major cases in which sanctions have been imposed and evaluates their effectiveness.

The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: Volume I, Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance. Edited by Michael Elliott-Bateman. New York: Praeger, 1970. 181 pp. $6.50. A collection of nine papers on the conduct of war in the arena of politics where cultural, social and economic factors are more crucial than the weight of military forces. The editor defines fourth-dimensional warfare as "the systematic supply, training, and deployment of irregular forces, using in a methodical and deliberate way all kinds of modern techniques for the disruption of enemy forces, morale, and communications by means of subversion, intelligence, and resistance." One paper deals with the Zealots and the ancient Jewish resistance to Rome and their relevance to Israel and Viet Nam today.

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Another describes the gathering and evaluation of intelligence and the role it played in World War II. Several papers recount efforts to coordinate sabotage and subversive activities in occupied territories and neutral nations during the war, and two treat of the nature of people's warfare.

Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. By James Cable. New York: Praeger, 1971. 251 pp. $11.00. After establishing the principles and precedents for the application of limited naval force, the author assesses its effectiveness in achieving the results intended by initiating governments and explores its potential uses in the international environment of the future.

Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-five Years. By George Quester. New York: Dunellen, 1971. 327 pp. $10.00. In a study that is more analytical than policy-oriented, Professor Quester of Cornell University surveys most major events of the postwar period related to American-Soviet nuclear diplomacy.

The Politics of Ecosuicide. Edited by Leslie R. Ross, Jr. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 404 pp. n.p. (paper). Increasing awareness of environmental issues and their interplay with the decision and policymaking processes of government has produced this interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of ecological problems. The general outline of the problem, the institutions concerned and the role of public opinion are explored from several perspectives. The result is a useful survey both for political science students and for those engaged in programs to improve the environment.

Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations: A Twenty-five Year Perspective. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs. New York: New York University Press, 1971. 211 pp. $8.95. This volume deals with the main issues that have faced the United Nations throughout its twenty-five-year history—disarmament and arms control, decolonization, economic development, peacekeeping, the role of law in promoting international peace and security and settling disputes, diplomatic behavior, and strategic rivalry. The essays compare and contrast the behavior of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the extent to which each has influenced, and in turn been influenced by, the UN as an institution and as an arena of superpower rivalry.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1971/1972. Edited by John Paxton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. 1569 pp. $13.50. This encyclopedia of nations provides information and statistics on the history, population, climate, constitution, governmental structure and leaders, religion, education, justice, health, finance, products and resources, commerce, communications and travel, banking and currency, and defense of every country on the globe. The first fifty pages describe the functions of the United Nations and seventeen other international organizations.

II. United States

Fragments of My Fleece. By Dean Acheson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 224 pp. $6.95. A charming collection of shorter pieces, speeches, articles and papers that displays Dean Acheson apart from matters of state.

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. By Raymond Vernon. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 326 pp. $8.50. This is the first of a five-volume series resulting from Harvard's Multinational Enterprise Project, which has been in existence since 1965. Drawing on an extensive body of data emanating from the project, the author considers whether the power of multinational giants is "excessive," whether they undermine the ability of national

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governments to pursue independent policies for the welfare of their people, and whether they are in fact truly multinational or are merely being used by the parent country—the United States—as a means of controlling the economies of other nations.

U.S. Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs, and Choices. By John Newhouse with Melvin Croan, Edward R. Fried and Timothy W. Stanley. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971. 177 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). In light of current Congressional efforts to have the number of American military forces in Europe cut back, made notable by the Mansfield Resolution, this is a timely assessment of the complex economic, military and political factors which require consideration before such a step might be taken. The authors attempt to answer such crucial questions as: Does improvement of the East-West political environment mean that the Soviet threat to Western Europe is diminishing? Is there a stable military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe, and how important to that balance are U.S. forces? What do American forces actually cost, and how could the burden be reduced?

The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and World War I, 1914-1917. By John Milton Cooper, Jr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970. 271 pp. $11.50. Dr. Cooper, Assistant Professor of History at Wellesley College, defining isolationism as "an attitude, policy, doctrine, or position opposed to the commitment of American force outside the Western Hemisphere, except in the rarest and briefest instances," reviews the historical antecedents of isolationism in America and examines the intellectual development of national ideas and purpose, diplomatic policies, ethnic, partisan and ideological influences, and popular interests and emotions that fused together to form a basic American isolationist position in the 1914-1917 period.

The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. By Lyndon Baines Johnson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 636 pp. $15.00. In this personal account of his years in the Presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson reports on "how I saw it from my vantage point." Inevitably, much of his attention is given to foreign affairs—especially Viet Nam—but he devotes a great deal of space to his achievements on the domestic scene in such fields as civil rights, education, federal health insurance, traffic safety, highway beautification, housing, urban mass transit, anti-pollution, and the war on poverty. Separate chapters treat such international issues as crises in the Caribbean, strengthening the Atlantic Community, space exploration, the Six-Day War, the growth of regionalism around the globe, and thawing the Cold War.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

Cooperation in Europe. Edited by Johan Galtung, with Sverre Lodgaard. New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 371 pp. $15.50. An examination of the theoretical conditions for international cooperation with special reference to the problems of European security. The volume contains essays on the international organizations for European cooperation, a proposal for European security commissions, perspectives on the German problem, relations between West European states and Eastern Europe, and East European views on problems of East-West détente.

Europe and America: The Next Ten Years. By W. Randolph Burgess and James Robert Huntley. New York: Walker, 1970. 232 pp. $8.50. An examination of the urgent social, economic, political, diplomatic and strategic issues facing the Atlantic Community in the 1970's: revolt of the youth, environmental

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deterioration, scientific-technological-industrial gaps and challenges, trade and monetary relationships, restiveness of the Third World, East-West accommodation, defense and unification of Western Europe, and cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.

German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933. By Harald von Riekhoff. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 421 pp. $15.00. Utilizing recently available primary source material from public and private archival collections, the author presents a scholarly study of the diplomatic, economic and military relations which evolved between Weimar Germany and the restored Polish Republic during the 1918-1933 period. Competing revisionist and reconciliatory trends in these relations are assessed in the context of the interwar diplomacy of the European powers.

The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II. By Robert McGeehan. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971. 280 pp. $10.00. Drawing extensively on diplomatic sources and memoirs, the author explores the postwar European security environment as it affected the U.S. decision to seek a rearmed Germany within NATO. Included is a detailed examination of diplomacy between Paris, Bonn, London and Washington in the period before the failure of plans for a European Defense Community and the creation of the Western European Union.

The Modern Netherlands. By Frank E. Huggett. New York: Praeger, 1971. 272 pp. $9.00. In this informative work the accent is on crucial recent events—the emergence of the Provo movement, the growth of new political parties, the riots in Amsterdam, and the changes in the Catholic Church—that have profoundly altered the structure of society in the Netherlands.

Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present. By William Martin, with others. New York: Praeger, 1971. 335 pp. $10.00. This standard history of Switzerland, first published in 1929, has gone through six editions in the original French and in this version has been updated to 1970 by three Swiss scholars. The book shows the growth of Swiss unity from its roots in medieval parochialism, through Switzerland's era as a "great power" (1400-1516), the religious hatreds of the Reformation and the collapse of national unity, the conflicts between dominant merchant towns and fiercely resistant peasant cantons, the period of French domination, and the return to independence and emergence as a modern nation-state in the form of a federal union pursuing a neutral international course.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953. By Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 341 pp. $8.50. A personal account of Stalin's strategy of 'silent strangulation"—a series of offensive moves designed to subjugate Yugoslavia to Moscow—and Tito's struggle for control of his country's destiny. Dedijer, Director of Information and close associate of Marshal Tito in 1948, and author of *Tito: A Biography,* was motivated by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to write this story.

The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Chicago: Aldine, 1971. 478 pp. $12.50. This new volume of readings on Soviet foreign policy is divided into sections on domestic determinants of policy, the role of ideology, the origins of the Cold War, Western diplomacy and competitive coexistence, and USSR relations with the Third World. Contributors include Alexander Dallin, John A. Armstrong, Sidney I. Ploss, R.N. Carew Hunt, Richard Lowenthal, Adam B. Ulam, Norman A.

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Graebner, William Appleman Williams, Christopher Lasch, Robert C. Tucker, Herbert J. Spiro, Arnold Horelick and Marshall D. Shulman.

Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. New York: Praeger, 1971. 330 pp. $17.50. The communist system, according to the author, has been incorrectly labeled "totalitarian" and should be termed an "absolute monopoly" which implies that the ruling group has *exclusive*, rather than *total*, control over all aspects of society. "Any movement from below not directed by it may challenge the leadership's unique position as transmitter [of ideology], and must be either prevented from coming into being or liquidated when it arises." Dr. Jancar uses Czechoslovakia as a case study and contends that "what occurred there during the 1960's was the progressive erosion of the absolute monopoly," leading to the "Prague Spring" of 1968 and Soviet intervention in August.

Icon & Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control. By Harvey Fireside. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 242 pp. $8.00. During the four years of Nazi occupation of Soviet territories in World War II, the Orthodox Church staged a remarkable religious revival. In this book, Dr. Fireside, Associate Professor of Political Science at Ithaca College, traces the travails of the Church under the Soviet regime to 1941; discusses Nazi policies and practices toward religion in the Third Reich; examines German policy toward the Orthodox Church and the popular reactions to Nazi religious policies; shows how the Nazis were first welcomed as liberators and then depicts the chilling effect of German controls on the Russian people; relates how the Russian religious groups played Nazi occupation administrators off against each other and managed to steer a neutral course between collaboration and resistance; and finally examines Stalin's September 1943 religious truce with the Church and concludes that the strong patriotism shared by Church and State and the Church's support for Soviet foreign policy ensure the survival of religious life in the USSR.

Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: With Special Reference to Nationality Groups. By Jaan Pennar, Ivan I. Bakalo and George Z. F. Bereday. New York: Praeger, 1971. 395 pp. $20.00. This ambitious and ably researched study suggests that the high priority assigned by Soviet leaders to education may help to explain the USSR's impressive economic development. Furthermore, "An examination of education in the different national republics seems to suggest that diversity, rather than uniformity, has resulted, that the Soviet Union has achieved a school system built on parallel, rather than central lines." Apart from brief historical sketches of educational development under the Czars and the Soviets, the work features case studies of the situation in several of the Soviet republics: the Russian SFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic States, the Caucasian SSR's, and certain Central Asian ones as well.

Soviet Nationality Problems. Edited by Edward Allworth. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 296 pp. $9.95. The ten papers published in this book, originally presented to the research Seminar on Soviet Nationality Problems at Columbia University, examine several aspects of this critical Soviet domestic issue: Tsarist imperial policies; three historical stages of Soviet communism and nationalism; political implications and statutory recognition of nationality differences; Islamic and local consciousness and ethnic identity among Soviet nationalities; and the mixing of Russian and Soviet nationalities and its demographic impact. The contributors are the late Hans Kohn, Zbigniew Brzezinski, John N. Hazard, Alexandre Bennigsen, Marc Raeff, Vaclav Lamser, Robert A. Lewis, Paula G. Rubel and the editor.

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V. Middle East and Africa

The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals—1958-1970. By Malcolm H. Kerr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 166 pp. $1.95 (paper). The third, and according to Dr. Kerr the last, edition of a work whose brevity belies its substance. Concentrating on the aspects of the Arab Cold War seen from the perspective of the Middle East—rather than from the pinnacles of the superpowers—this edition updates the analysis of events from the war of June 1967 through the death of Nasir on September 28, 1970.

Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. By Ferenc A. Vali. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 410 pp. $12.50. Dr. Vali, Professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts, describes in detail the historical, geopolitical and ideological background that has shaped Turkey's contemporary foreign policy and analyzes Ankara's policy toward the United States and NATO; the USSR, the Straits and the Balkans; Greece and Cyprus; and the Middle East. Other chapters are devoted to the impact on foreign policy-making of political parties and public opinion; development as a foreign policy goal; and the outlook for Turkey's role in world politics.

The Cameroon Federal Republic. By Victor T. LeVine. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971. 205 pp. $8.50. The most recent addition to the Africa in the Modern World series, under the general editorship of Gwendolen M. Carter, surveys the politics of Africa's most successful federation. The author describes the former trusteeship territories of the British and French Cameroons in historical perspective, examines the process of integration into a federal republic, and analyzes the new nation's history since independence and its contemporary aspects. He places primary focus on the emergent political process and on how this process deals with the issues of national unity, development and foreign relations.

Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm. By Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 249 pp. $8.95. Liberia, conceived by white theorists, established and governed by black people, is the oldest black republic and Africa's first independent state. It is here described from its founding to the present, with emphasis on the unique role it plays in the community of nations.

The Middle East: A Handbook. Edited by Michael Adams. New York: Praeger, 1971. 633 pp. $25.00. In addition to a country-by-country description, this valuable compendium of factual data on the nations of the Middle East presents material on the general background of the area, political and economic affairs, social patterns, and the arts and mass media. Essays by noted analysts in each of the above sections are invariably well-researched and soberly developed.

Middle East Record: 1967. Edited by Daniel Dishon. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1971. 637 pp. $25.00. This is the third volume in a series, the first two having chronicled the events of 1960 and 1961. Future volumes are contemplated on an annual basis. The current work is rich in information despite the difficulties presented by the turbulence experienced in the Middle East during 1967. It is divided into four parts: The Middle East in World Affairs; Relations Between the Countries of the Middle East; The Arab-Israeli Conflict; and The Countries of the Middle East.

The Middle East Today. (Second edition.) By Don Peretz. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 496 pp. n.p. Intended by its author as an introductory text on the Middle East, this volume examines several issues as they affect the region, discusses Islam, Zionism and Arab nationalism, and provides surveys of the various countries. The Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Iraq, Syria,

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Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran and Israel are all treated in this comprehensive survey.

Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy. By James E. Mayfield. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971. 288 pp. $8.50. Unlike most contemporary treatments of Egyptian politics, this pioneering study concentrates on the workings of the Egyptian village as a political community and on the role of the *fellahia* as it is reflected upward from the grass roots level. Central to Dr. Mayfield's analysis are examinations of local branches of the Arab Socialist Union, the village councils and the influence of administrative officials appointed by the central government.

Secrets of the Great Pyramids. By Peter Tompkins. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 416 pp. $12.50. A beautifully produced and well documented chronicle of the architectural secrets and the treasures enclosed in the Great Pyramids.

Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa. By Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970. 251 pp. $6.50. Following a chapter on political realities in tropical Africa, Dr. Lefever treats of the military, police and politics in three countries—Ghana, the Congo and Ethiopia—and then compares the effects of the military and police on political development in these three states. In the final chapter, he considers the military and public safety assistance provided by the United States and develops several hypotheses and conclusions on the influence of American aid and the political impact of local armies and police forces.

Understanding the Middle East. By Joe E. Pierce. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1971. 232 pp. $5.50. Dr. Pierce, an anthropologist, views the Middle East as a broad culture area distinguished by widely shared beliefs and values. In introducing the reader to the values of the region's inhabitants, he discusses the broader implications of some of their basic beliefs, among them those pertaining to virginity, honor, the supernatural, ceremonies, hospitality, and the material aspects of culture.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939. By John Patrick Haithcox. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 392 pp. $12.50. A detailed tracing of the development of communism and nationalism in India from the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 to the defeat of the left wing of the India National Congress in 1939. The author focuses on the career and contributions of M. N. Roy, the founder of India's Communist Party, and his working relationships with, among others, Lenin, Stalin, Nehru and Gandhi.

The Cultural Revolution in China. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 509 pp. $13.50. Five members and consultants of the Social Science Department of The RAND Corporation discuss various aspects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: power, policy and ideology; Marxist theories of policymaking and organization; Chou En-lai's activities and position; the Foreign Ministry and foreign affairs; and events in the agricultural and rural sphere.

Gandhi: His Relevance for Our Times. Edited by G. Ramachandran and T. K. Mahadevan. Berkeley, Calif.: World Without War Council, 1971. 303 pp. $2.95. This collection of essays first published in 1967 and now reprinted by arrangement with the Gandhi Peace Foundation of New Delhi explores various aspects of Gandhi's philosophy and practice of nonviolence, noting his successes and failures and the relevance of his thought for the present.

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The Great Moghuls. By Bamber Gascoigne. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 264 pp. $15.00. A study of the prodigious achievements of the six Great Moghuls, father to son for six generations, who ruled India from 1526 to 1707—Babur, Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. Emphasis is given to their feats of empire-building and their patronage of all forms of art, learning and science.

Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism. By James Chieh Hsiung. New York: Praeger, 1970. 359 pp. $11.00. Professor Hsiung examines the traditional Chinese soil into which the roots of communism were planted and the growth of Mao's hybrid therein. He concludes that, while major tenets have been adopted from Europe and the Soviet Union, the imprint of the Chinese intellectual heritage is indelible. In appraising the development of ideology and practice in Communist China since 1949, he devotes particular attention to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs. By Francine R. Frankel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 236 pp. $7.50. India hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains by 1973 under a program of agricultural effort to which the slogan "green revolution" has been attached. Dr. Frankel assesses the successes and failures of the green revolution in five key areas of India: Ludhiana, Punjab; West Godavary, Andhra Pradesh; Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu; Palghat, Kerala; and Burdevan, West Bengal. Although the principal focus is on agriculture, various timely conclusions are drawn regarding social upheavals, economic gains and losses, and the political shifts that have resulted. Attention is paid to how the overall effects of the program influenced the elections of March 1971.

Indonesia is A Happening. By Christopher Lucas. New York: Walker/Weatherhill, 1970. 134 pp. $5.95. A valuable travel guide to Java, Bali and Sumatra in the form of an entertaining personal account of extensive trips across these beautiful islands.

Indonesia: The Possible Dream. By Howard Palfrey Jones. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971. 473 pp. $12.95. An important study of Indonesian affairs with emphasis on the critical years 1958 to 1965, the era of "Guided Democracy," by the man who was U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia during this period. Jones provides a brief survey of the island archipelago's history and culture; a reliable account of the struggle between various forces, especially the communists and the army; a valuable portrait of President Sukarno, the man and leader, and an appraisal of his ambitions and abilities; and an evaluation of the new order under military guidance.

In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. Edited by David Joel Steinberg. New York: Praeger, 1971. 522 pp. $12.95. In this history of Southeast Asia since the 18th century, six young historians examine the many dimensions of the region's modern transformation. They explore such factors as climate and ecology; the thrust of science and technology; the evolution of institutions and the process of change; the influence of the multiplicity of religions, cultures and languages; the development of agriculture, crafts and basic industry; the impact of colonialism and nationalism; and the transformation of political structures.

Nepal: Strategy for Survival. By Lea E. Rose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 310 pp. $10.00. The success of the mountain kingdom of Nepal in retaining its independence is the theme of this well-documented political study. In the context of the changing international environment, Dr. Rose

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reviews the internal upheavals during the 18th and 19th centuries, the Tibetan, Chinese and English incursions, Nepal's relations with Britain during the 1846-1945 period, and its postwar adjustment to an independent India and a unified China.

Readings in Modern Chinese History. Edited by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 701 pp. n.p. (paper). A book of readings designed as the companion to the author's text, *The Rise of Modern China.* Following, in the main, the organizational scheme of the text, Professor Hsu provides a cross-section of leading scholarship on modern China. In addition to a wealth of signed articles, he includes relevant portions of significant documents bearing on China, such as the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement.

Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S.-China Relations. By Jerome Alan Cohen, Edward Friedman, Harold C. Hinton and Allen S. Whiting. New York: Praeger, 1971. 191 pp. $7.50 ($2.50, paper). The proceedings of a conference co-sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, this volume examines the nature of American and Chinese national interests in Taiwan, the importance of Taiwan as a factor in U.S. foreign policy, and the major options available to the United States in its future relations with Taiwan and mainland China as a result of the new trends in Washington-Peking diplomacy.

Towards an Integrated Society: Reflections on Planning, Social Policy and Rural Institutions in India. By Tarlok Singh. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970. 554 pp. $13.50. Mr. Singh, associated for 17 years with the Indian Planning Commission and currently concerned with planning for UNICEF, discusses India's plans and policies for economic development, analyzes their successes and failures, points out the obstacles in the way of true social integration, political democratization and economic stability, and suggests ways to promote the economic growth and social change that are essential to the achievement of an integrated society—a society without caste and class privilege—and the elimination of mass poverty.

Understanding China: An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources. By John M. H. Lindbeck. New York: Praeger, 1971. 159 pp. n.p. (paper). This report to the Ford Foundation evaluates the field of Chinese studies, primarily in the United States, and urges correction of the relative lack of attention being paid to an increasingly important area of the world. It is more than a call for remedial action however; its wealth of information should be of use to students contemplating a China specialty or recently embarked on such a course.

VII. Latin America

Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence. Analyses for Nine Countries. Edited by Weston H. Agor. New York: Praeger, 1971. 523 pp. $22.50. Research conducted by scholars focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela provides a corporative assessment of the role of legislatures in decision-making, the relationship between the legislature and other political institutions and processes, the nature of interest aggregation and articulation, behavioral characteristics within the legislative assembly, interparty conflict, and attitudinal profiles among legislators.

The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. By Alfred Stepan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 309 pp. $10.00. An examination of the nature of the military in Brazil, its ideologies and institutional and social organization; its relations with civilian governments before the coup of 1964, especially

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its role as "moderator" and the impact of the 1961-1964 political and economic crises on this role; its use of power since 1964; and the weaknesses of the post-1964 governments, which have prevented them from meeting the requirements of social development. The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and a consultant to The RAND Corporation.

The Political Elite in Argentina. By Julio A. Fernández. New York: New York University Press, 1970. 133 pp. $7.95. A political profile of Argentine leadership from the inauguration of the first constitutionally elected president in 1958 after the overthrow of Juan Perón to the coup which brought General Onganía to power in 1966. Dr. Fernández, who teaches political science at the University of Colorado, examines the party function in political recruitment attitudes of the power elites, and the forces—military, church, business, labor—that influence the political environment.

The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970. By Ronald N. Schneider. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 431 pp. $13.50. Since the early 1960's Brazil, "an adolescent giant in severe trouble," has been ruled by a military dictatorship. The origins of the military takeover, the character and behavior of the military rulers, and the prospects for Brazilian development are treated here in scholarly fashion. Dr. Schneider supplements descriptive chapters with an attempt to formulate an authoritarian model from the Brazilian experience.

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Monographs and Reports Received

African Probings: Reflections on Political Theory in the Context of French African Development. By W. Hardy Wickwar. Columbia: The University of South Carolina, The Institute of International Studies, Essay Series No. 2, April 1971. 40 pp. n.p.

Agricultural Politics in the European Community. By Nina Heathcote. Canberra: Australian National University, Department of Political Science, Occasional Paper No. 7, 1971. 49 pp. n.p.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy. Text by Science and Technology Division, Library of Congress. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, for the Office of Technology Utilization, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1970. 534 pp. $2.25.

Berlin in the East-West Struggle, 1958-1961. Edited by Glen D. Camp, Jr. New York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1971. 252 pp. $4.45.

Biafra. Edited by Peter Schwab. New York: Facts on File, Inc., September 1971. 142 pp. $3.45.

Britain and the Common Market: The Effect of Entry on the Pattern of Manufacturing Production. By S. S. Han and H. H. Liesner. New York: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper No. 27, August 1971. 116 pp. $3.95.

Chinese Communist Economic Infiltration Abroad. By Chang Wei-ya. Taipei, Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, June 1971. 92 pp. $1.00.

The Chinese Communists Can No Longer Fight the People's War. Taipei, Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, May 1971. 72 pp. 80 cents.

Communist China: A Bibliographic Survey. Prepared by Research Analysts of the U.S. Army Library. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, for the Department of the Army, Pam 550-9, February 1971. 253 pp. n.p.

The Communist International, the Palestine Communist Party, and the Political Unrest in Palestine in 1929. By Jacob Hen-Tov. Worcester, Mass.: Worcester State College, April 1970. 34 pp. n.p.

Cuba and the U.S.: The Tangled Relationship. By Robert D. Crassweller. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 207, October 1971. 63 pp. $1.00.

Issues Before the 26th General Assembly. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 584, September 1971. 222 pp. $2.00.

New Dimensions of U.S. Marine Policy. By Norman J. Padelford and Jerry E. Cook. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, National Sea Grant Program, Report No. MITSG 71-5, April 1971. 250 pp. n.p.

The 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Bibliography, 1968-1970. By Michael Parrish. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1971. 41 pp. $6.00.

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MONOGRAPHS AND REPORTS RECEIVED

Prices and Earnings Around the Globe: A Comparison of Purchasing Power in 31 Cities. Zurich: The Union Bank of Switzerland, June 1971. 37 pp. n.p.

Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Hiroshi Kitamura. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers on International Affairs No. 28, August 1971. 42 pp. $1.75.

Soviet Military Power. By John Erickson. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1971. 112 pp. $3.20.

Stemming World Inflation. By Gardner Ackley. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers, No. 2, 1971. 96 pp. $1.40.

The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis. By Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj. Canberra: Australian National University, Department of Political Science, Occasional Paper No. 6, 1970. 154 pp. $1.80.

Wars and Revolutions: A Comprehensive List of Conflicts, Including Fatalities: Part One, 1820 to 1900. Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, July 1971. 161 pp. n.p.

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